Supplements to an official’s salary
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, 98-16
A county Industrial Development Agency is authorized to issue bonds and grant tax exemptions as a means of providing financial assistance to business projects approved by the Agency. The employment contract between the Niagara County Industrial Development Agency [NCIDA] and its executive director provided that the director was to be paid an annual salary of $69,000 and, in addition, “would receive 1.5% of the agency fees” collected by NCIDA for “bond projects.”
There may have been some question concerning paying the director additional compensation based on a percentage of the fees received by NCIDA as the contract also provided that “in the event the additional payment was held unenforceable or in conflict with State Legislation, a minimum additional payment of $3,000 per year would be paid ... in place of the percentage payment.”
When asked if either of these provisions violated State Law, the Attorney General advised the Niagara County Attorney’s office that in his view, both provisions constituted violations of Section 858-a(1) of the General Municipal Law. The Attorney General first noted that the granting of the percentage of the agency fee collected by the Agency was “contingent upon the granting of financial assistance,” and thus violated the statute. He then observed that the alternative formula for supplementing the director’s salary -- the additional payment of $3,000 per year -- was unlawful for the same reason. The Attorney General viewed the supplement as being contingent on NCIDA’s collecting fees for its financial assistance, commenting that “[p]resumably, if [such payment] was unrelated to financial assistance to clients of [NCIDA], it would be a fixed amount that is part of the base salary of the executive director.”
The County Attorney’s office also wanted to know what NCIDA should consider doing if the Attorney General decided that its arrangement with its executive director violated the General Municipal Law. The Attorney General said that “contract provisions that are contrary to statutory requirements intended to protect the public and prevent fraud are void and unenforceable [and] [t]herefore the unlawful payments may be recoverable.”
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
July 09, 2010
Workers’ compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 71
Workers’ compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 71
Bryant v City of New York, App. Div., 3rd Dept, 252 A.D.2d 777, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 813
Section 71 of the Civil Service Law, commonly referred to as “workers’ compensation leave,” requires a public employer to give an employee who is injured on the job and as a result is unable to perform his or her duties a leave of absence for at least one year unless he or she is permanently disabled. The standard applied: the employee’s disability must result from an occupational injury or disease as defined in the Workers’ Compensation Law [WCL].
Many Taylor Law agreements provided for workers’ compensation leave, incorporating by reference the provisions of Section 71 of the Civil Service Law. However, not every injury or disease suffered at work that prevents an individual from performing the duties of the position is an “occupational injury or disease” within the meaning of WCL. As the Court of Appeals held in Mack v Rockland County, 71 NY2d 1008, for the purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits, “an occupational disease derives from the very nature of the employment, not a specific condition peculiar to the employee’s place of work.”
The Bryant case illustrates the fact that not every disease or injury arising in the work place is an occupational injury or disease for the purposes of receiving workers’ compensation benefits and thus such a claim does not automatically trigger eligibility for workers’ compensation leave.
Meridie Bryant, a word processor employed by the City of New York, applied for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that neck, shoulder and back ailments she suffered were caused by the physical layout of her work site and the chair in which she sat while at work. The Workers’ Compensation Board rejected her application on the grounds that she had not suffered an occupational injury or disease within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
Byrant’s appeal from the Board’s ruling was rejected by the Appellate Division.
The court, citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mack, said that in order to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, the applicant “was required to demonstrate a recognizable link between the disease from which [he or] she allegedly suffers and some distinctive feature of [his or] her employment.”
The Appellate Division decided that Byrant’s condition related to her particular work area and not the “very nature of her employment.” Accordingly, the court upheld the Board’s determination rejecting Byrant’s workers’ compensation claim and dismissed her appeal.
The practical effect of this for the purposes of Section 71, however, is not as drastic as it might appear. Section 71 leave is provided as a leave without pay, although the employee may be continued on the payroll using his or her leave credits in order to continue to be paid.
If the individual viewed as being on workers’ compensation leave by the employer is later found not to have suffered an occupational injury or disease as was the situation in Bryant’s case, all that need be done is to amend the employee’s personnel record to show that he or she is on Section 72, rather than Section 71 leave.
Section 72 leave is available to an employee who is unable to perform his or her duties because of a disability other than a disability resulting from an occupational injury or disease as defined in WCL. Again employees are entitled to such a leave of absence without pay as a matter of law. As is the case in a Section 71 situation, “an employee on such leave of absence shall be entitled to draw all accumulated, unused sick leave, vacation, overtime and other time allowances standing to his [or her] credit” while on such leave.
There is, however, one significant difference between Section 71 leave and Section 72 leave. The one-year leave period allowed under Section 71 is determined on the basis of the individual’s cumulative absence while the minimum leave period under Section 72 is based on the employee’s consecutive absence for one year.
In other words, under Section 72, the employee may be terminated pursuant to Section 73 of the Civil Service Law if he or she has been absent from work for an uninterrupted period of at least one year. On the other hand, an employee absent on Section 71 leave may be terminate after he or she has been absent for a cumulative total of at least one year, even if such absences are intermittent whereby the employee returns to work and then goes on Section 71 leave again because of the same injury or disease.
It should be remembered that under both Section 71 and Section 72, separating an employee from service after the employee has been absent for the minimum period mandated for such leave is discretionary and the appointing authority is not required to terminate the employee.
Bryant v City of New York, App. Div., 3rd Dept, 252 A.D.2d 777, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 813
Section 71 of the Civil Service Law, commonly referred to as “workers’ compensation leave,” requires a public employer to give an employee who is injured on the job and as a result is unable to perform his or her duties a leave of absence for at least one year unless he or she is permanently disabled. The standard applied: the employee’s disability must result from an occupational injury or disease as defined in the Workers’ Compensation Law [WCL].
Many Taylor Law agreements provided for workers’ compensation leave, incorporating by reference the provisions of Section 71 of the Civil Service Law. However, not every injury or disease suffered at work that prevents an individual from performing the duties of the position is an “occupational injury or disease” within the meaning of WCL. As the Court of Appeals held in Mack v Rockland County, 71 NY2d 1008, for the purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits, “an occupational disease derives from the very nature of the employment, not a specific condition peculiar to the employee’s place of work.”
The Bryant case illustrates the fact that not every disease or injury arising in the work place is an occupational injury or disease for the purposes of receiving workers’ compensation benefits and thus such a claim does not automatically trigger eligibility for workers’ compensation leave.
Meridie Bryant, a word processor employed by the City of New York, applied for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that neck, shoulder and back ailments she suffered were caused by the physical layout of her work site and the chair in which she sat while at work. The Workers’ Compensation Board rejected her application on the grounds that she had not suffered an occupational injury or disease within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
Byrant’s appeal from the Board’s ruling was rejected by the Appellate Division.
The court, citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mack, said that in order to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, the applicant “was required to demonstrate a recognizable link between the disease from which [he or] she allegedly suffers and some distinctive feature of [his or] her employment.”
The Appellate Division decided that Byrant’s condition related to her particular work area and not the “very nature of her employment.” Accordingly, the court upheld the Board’s determination rejecting Byrant’s workers’ compensation claim and dismissed her appeal.
The practical effect of this for the purposes of Section 71, however, is not as drastic as it might appear. Section 71 leave is provided as a leave without pay, although the employee may be continued on the payroll using his or her leave credits in order to continue to be paid.
If the individual viewed as being on workers’ compensation leave by the employer is later found not to have suffered an occupational injury or disease as was the situation in Bryant’s case, all that need be done is to amend the employee’s personnel record to show that he or she is on Section 72, rather than Section 71 leave.
Section 72 leave is available to an employee who is unable to perform his or her duties because of a disability other than a disability resulting from an occupational injury or disease as defined in WCL. Again employees are entitled to such a leave of absence without pay as a matter of law. As is the case in a Section 71 situation, “an employee on such leave of absence shall be entitled to draw all accumulated, unused sick leave, vacation, overtime and other time allowances standing to his [or her] credit” while on such leave.
There is, however, one significant difference between Section 71 leave and Section 72 leave. The one-year leave period allowed under Section 71 is determined on the basis of the individual’s cumulative absence while the minimum leave period under Section 72 is based on the employee’s consecutive absence for one year.
In other words, under Section 72, the employee may be terminated pursuant to Section 73 of the Civil Service Law if he or she has been absent from work for an uninterrupted period of at least one year. On the other hand, an employee absent on Section 71 leave may be terminate after he or she has been absent for a cumulative total of at least one year, even if such absences are intermittent whereby the employee returns to work and then goes on Section 71 leave again because of the same injury or disease.
It should be remembered that under both Section 71 and Section 72, separating an employee from service after the employee has been absent for the minimum period mandated for such leave is discretionary and the appointing authority is not required to terminate the employee.
July 08, 2010
In an administrative disciplinary hearing, conflicting testimony merely "raised issues of credibility" for the hearing officer to resolve
In an administrative disciplinary hearing, conflicting testimony merely "raised issues of credibility" for the hearing officer to resolve
Matter of Weymer v New York State Div. of State Police, 2010 NY Slip Op 05779, Appellate Division, Second Department
Harry J. Corbitt, the Superintendent of the New York State Division of State Police, adopting the findings of a hearing board made that Craig J. Weymer “improperly impounded a motor vehicle and failed to act in a courteous, dignified, and businesslike manner in violation of New York State Police Rules and Regulations.”
The Superintendent also adopted the hearing boards finding that Weymer “acted in a manner tending to bring discredit upon the New York State Division of State Police in violation of the New York State Police Rules and Regulations.”
The penalty imposed: Weymer was formally censured and suspended for one day without pay.
The Appellate Division rejected Weymer’s appeal, holding that the determination was supported by substantial evidence.” Further, said the court, although there were a few instances of conflicting testimony, this merely "raised issues of credibility for the Hearing [Board] to resolve," citing Leong v Safir, 259 AD2d 751.
As to Weymer’s challenge to the penalty imposed, the Appellate Division concluded that the penalty imposed was not "so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Accordingly, it did not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05779.htm
Matter of Weymer v New York State Div. of State Police, 2010 NY Slip Op 05779, Appellate Division, Second Department
Harry J. Corbitt, the Superintendent of the New York State Division of State Police, adopting the findings of a hearing board made that Craig J. Weymer “improperly impounded a motor vehicle and failed to act in a courteous, dignified, and businesslike manner in violation of New York State Police Rules and Regulations.”
The Superintendent also adopted the hearing boards finding that Weymer “acted in a manner tending to bring discredit upon the New York State Division of State Police in violation of the New York State Police Rules and Regulations.”
The penalty imposed: Weymer was formally censured and suspended for one day without pay.
The Appellate Division rejected Weymer’s appeal, holding that the determination was supported by substantial evidence.” Further, said the court, although there were a few instances of conflicting testimony, this merely "raised issues of credibility for the Hearing [Board] to resolve," citing Leong v Safir, 259 AD2d 751.
As to Weymer’s challenge to the penalty imposed, the Appellate Division concluded that the penalty imposed was not "so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Accordingly, it did not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05779.htm
A “conclusory affidavit” by the custodian of the records that are the target of a FOIL request insufficient to trigger a FOIL “statutory exception”
A “conclusory affidavit” by the custodian of the records that are the target of a FOIL request insufficient to trigger a FOIL “statutory exception”
Matter of Capital Newspapers Div. of the Hearst Corp. v City of Albany, 2010 NY Slip Op 05704, Decided on July 1, 2010, Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the City of Albany failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the records sought by Capital Newspapers pursuant to a FOIL request were "personnel records "or police officers within the meaning of Civil Rights Law §50-a.
The court found that the police chief’s “conclusory affidavit” did not establish that the documents were "used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion," as required by that statute.
Accordingly, said the court, the unredacted gun tags do not fall squarely within a statutory exemption and are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (see Public Officers Law § 87 [2]).
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05704.htm
Matter of Capital Newspapers Div. of the Hearst Corp. v City of Albany, 2010 NY Slip Op 05704, Decided on July 1, 2010, Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the City of Albany failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the records sought by Capital Newspapers pursuant to a FOIL request were "personnel records "or police officers within the meaning of Civil Rights Law §50-a.
The court found that the police chief’s “conclusory affidavit” did not establish that the documents were "used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion," as required by that statute.
Accordingly, said the court, the unredacted gun tags do not fall squarely within a statutory exemption and are subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) (see Public Officers Law § 87 [2]).
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05704.htm
Nonmembers of an employee organization required to pay agency shop fees are entitled to a refund of such fees used for union organizing activities
Nonmembers of an employee organization required to pay agency shop fees are entitled to a refund of such fees used for union organizing activities
David H. Scheffer, et al, v The Civil Service Employees Association, Local 828; Civil Service Employees Association; AFSCME, Local 1000, USCA, 2nd Circuit, Docket No. 07-3683-cv, Decided: June 28, 2010
In considering an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissing claims brought by public-sector employees who, as nonmembers of CSEA,* the union that represents them for collective-bargaining purposes, challenging the organizing fees assessed by the union, the Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “although the union’s fee disclosure procedures met the relevant constitutional standards, charging these nonmembers “their proportionate share of the costs associated with some of the union’s organizing activities,” violates their First Amendment rights.
The Circuit Court of Appeals also noted that Civil Service Law §208(3)(a) provides that the union must “refund to any employee demanding the return any part of an agency shop fee deduction which represents the employee’s pro rata share of expenditures by the organization in aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of employment.”
* The decision notes that approximately nine percent of the employees represented by CSEA [approximately 18,700 employees statewide] are not members of the union but who nonetheless are obligated to pay agency shop fees to CSEA.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/542c6566-bb30-452f-9aec-d6b9856a5341/11/doc/07-3683-cv_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/542c6566-bb30-452f-9aec-d6b9856a5341/11/hilite/
David H. Scheffer, et al, v The Civil Service Employees Association, Local 828; Civil Service Employees Association; AFSCME, Local 1000, USCA, 2nd Circuit, Docket No. 07-3683-cv, Decided: June 28, 2010
In considering an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissing claims brought by public-sector employees who, as nonmembers of CSEA,* the union that represents them for collective-bargaining purposes, challenging the organizing fees assessed by the union, the Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “although the union’s fee disclosure procedures met the relevant constitutional standards, charging these nonmembers “their proportionate share of the costs associated with some of the union’s organizing activities,” violates their First Amendment rights.
The Circuit Court of Appeals also noted that Civil Service Law §208(3)(a) provides that the union must “refund to any employee demanding the return any part of an agency shop fee deduction which represents the employee’s pro rata share of expenditures by the organization in aid of activities or causes of a political or ideological nature only incidentally related to terms and conditions of employment.”
* The decision notes that approximately nine percent of the employees represented by CSEA [approximately 18,700 employees statewide] are not members of the union but who nonetheless are obligated to pay agency shop fees to CSEA.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/542c6566-bb30-452f-9aec-d6b9856a5341/11/doc/07-3683-cv_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/542c6566-bb30-452f-9aec-d6b9856a5341/11/hilite/
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
CAUTION
Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL.
For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf.
Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law.
Email: publications@nycap.rr.com