...........

N.B. Effective December 1, 2017, only registered individuals may access the text of the more then 4,800 case summaries running from Abandonment of Position to Zero Drug Tolerance Policy posted on New York Public Personnel Law.

Below are 115 of summaries of court and administrative decisions currently posted on this searchable database. Full access to the database, however, requires a one-time payment of $100 [U.S.] to become a registered NYPPL user.


Click the button below to pay your registration fee with your credit card via PayPal:



Your license key will be e-mailed to you the work-day following PayPals' approval of your payment. Any new or supplemental material that, from time to time, may be posted will be automatically made available to registered individuals without cost.
................
................



To search this database type in a word or phrase in the box in the upper left and any material containing the word or phrase will be displayed for your review.

Wednesday, July 26, 2017

The collective bargaining representative's duty of fair representation


The collective bargaining representative's duty of fair representation
Henvill v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01785, Appellate Division, First Department

One of the issues in Winston Henvill's Article 75 petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award that terminated his employment with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority [MTA] was his allegation that his collective bargaining representative, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Benevolent Association [PBA], breached its duty of fair representation.

The Appellate Division, however, said that none of the allegations in Henvill's complaint supported his claim that that PBA's conduct in representing him at the disciplinary arbitration hearing that resulted in his termination was arbitrary, discriminatory or done in bad faith.

At most, said the court, Henvill alleged that PBA "was irresponsible or negligent" and that was not sufficient to show unfair representation. As the Appellate Division observed in Badman v CSEA, Inc., 91 AD2d 858, "To sustain a cause of action for breach of the duty of fair representation there must be substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct, or evidence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives." Further, as the court held in Trainosky v Civil Service Empls. Assn, 130 AD2d 827, "the fact that the union was guilty of mistake, negligence or lack of competence does suffice" to prevail in an action for alleged unfair representation.

The Appellate Division then ruled that because Henvill failed to state an unfair representation claim against PBA, his claim against his employer, MTA, for its alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement must also fail.

As to Henvill's challenge of the arbitration procedure itself, the court said that he failed to show the existence of any of the statutory grounds for vacating the arbitrator's award such as fraud, bias or the failure to follow proper procedure.

Finally, the Appellate Division rejected Henvill's argument that the arbitrator's fact-finding was irrational and required vacatur in light of "the well-settled principle that courts in considering a petition to vacate a voluntary arbitration may not review the arbitrator's findings of fact."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


Tuesday, July 25, 2017

Determining if a demand for arbitration of alleged violations of provisions set out in a collective bargaining agreement is viable


Determining if a demand for arbitration of alleged violations of provisions set out in a collective bargaining agreement is viable
City of Watertown (Watertown Professional Firefighters' Assn. Local 191), 2017 NY Slip Op 05553, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The City of Watertown [City] filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking a court order permanently staying the arbitration of a grievance filed by the Watertown Professional Firefighters' Association Local 191 [Local 191].

Local 191 alleged that the City had violated, among other things, provisions in the parties' collective bargaining agreement [CBA] by failing to maintain required staffing levels of captains within the City's Fire Department and by requiring certain members of the Fire Department to perform out-of-title work as a result of Watertown's failure to maintain the required staffing levels.

Supreme Court denied the City's petition with respect to Local 191's grievance alleging a failure to maintain minimum staffing levels but granted the City petition with respect to dismissing that part of Local 191's grievance alleging the assigning its members to perform out-of-title work constituted a violation of the CBA.

Both the City and Local 191, respectively, appealed these ruling by Supreme Court. The Appellate Division unanimously modified the Supreme Court's decision "on the law" by denying the City's petition in its entirety.

The court then addressed arbitrability of each of the issues set out in Local 191's demand for arbitration.*

1. Failure to maintain minimum staffing levels.

The Appellate Division rejected the City's contention that arbitration of minimum staffing levels "is prohibited by law." In City of New York v Uniformed Fire Officers Assn., Local 854, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 95 NY2d 273, the Court of Appeals held that "the subject matter of the dispute controls the analysis" and "a pending administrative proceeding concerning [a] respondent's alleged improper practices does not preclude arbitration inasmuch as there is no indication that the 'particular subject matter of the dispute' is not authorized,' i.e., not "lawfully fit for arbitration."

2. Agreement to arbitrate.

The Appellate Division also rejected the City's argument that the parties did not agree to arbitrate  Local 191's grievance, indicating that a court's review of that question "is limited to the language of the grievance and the demand for arbitration, as well as to the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Here, said the court, the CBA contains a broad arbitration clause. Thus its determination of the arbitrability of the matter is limited to whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA.

Finding that such a reasonable relationship existed, the Appellate Division said it was "the role of the arbitrator, and not the court, to make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them."

3. Staffing levels.

Local 191 contended that the City demoted eight fire captains and thus violated the CBA by failing to maintain the requisite staffing levels, and by concomitantly forcing other members of the Fire Department to perform out-of-title work, i.e., fire captain's work, without the appropriate compensation. As the CBA included provisions governing both minimum staffing levels and compensation for out-of-title work, the Appellate Division concluded that the dispute is reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA.

That said, the court reject the City's argument to the contrary, holding that issue presented by Local 191 involves an interpretation of that provision and the merits of Local 191's grievance and thus is a question to be resolved by the arbitrator, "who is tasked with making 'a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them.'"

4. Grievance procedural matters.

The Appellate Division ruled strict compliance with the step-by-step grievance procedure set forth in the CBA, which procedures the City's maintained Local 191 failed to honor, was a question for the arbitrator to resolve.

In the words of the court, "Questions concerning compliance with a contractual step-by-step grievance process have been recognized as matters of procedural arbitrability to be resolved by the arbitrators, particularly in the absence of a very narrow arbitration clause or a provision expressly making compliance with the time limitations a condition precedent to arbitration."

5. Out of title work.

The Appellate Division said that with respect to Local 191's cross-appeal with concerning alleged out-of-title work, Supreme Court was incorrect in dismissing it and modified the lower court's order accordingly.

Rejecting the City's contention that arbitration should be stayed with respect to the issue of out-of-title work because compensation for such work falls within the meaning of "salary," which is expressly excluded from the CBA's definition of "grievance," the Appellate Division ruled that as "there is a reasonable relationship between the dispute over out-of-title work and the subject matter of the CBA ... it is for the arbitrator to determine whether the [compensation for out-of-title work] falls within the scope of the arbitration provisions of the [CBA]."

The Appellate Division ruled "that the [Supreme Court's] order so appealed from is unanimously modified on the law by denying the [City's] petition in its entirety, and as modified the order is affirmed without costs."

* The Appellate Division noted the so-called "two-part test" used by New York courts to determine if a grievance is subject to arbitration, stating "Proceeding with a two-part test, we first ask whether the parties may arbitrate the dispute by inquiring if there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance." If there is a prohibition, our inquiry ends and an arbitrator cannot act. "If no prohibition exists, ' the courts then ask "whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their [CBA]."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


Friday, July 21, 2017

Judicial review of a determination arrived at following a quasi-judicial hearing is typically limited to determining if the decision is supported by substantial evidence


Judicial review of a determination arrived at following a quasi-judicial hearing is typically limited to determining if the decision is supported by substantial evidence
2017 NY Slip Op 05608, Appellate Division, Second Department

In this decision the Appellate Division sets out the basic rules followed by the courts when reviewing an administrative determination arrived at following a quasi-judicial hearing by an appointing authority or its designee. In this instance the appointing authority adopted the report and recommendation of a hearing officer, made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 finding the charged party [Petitioner] guilty of certain disciplinary charges, and terminated the Petitioner's employment.

Confirming the appointing authority's determination is confirmed, the Appellate Division explained:

1. The standard of review of an administrative determination made after a quasi-judicial hearing required by law is limited to considering whether the determination was based on substantial evidence.

2. It is the function of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, and determine which testimony to accept and which to reject.

3. Where evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists, a reviewing court may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by the administrative agency.

Here, said the court, substantial evidence supported the appointing authority's determination that Petitioner was guilty of committing certain acts of misconduct or insubordination.

As to the penalty imposed, dismissal from the position, the Appellate Division, citing Kreisler v New York City Tr. Auth., 2 NY3d 775, concluded that "the penalty of termination of [Petitioner's] employment was not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

________________
A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition, and as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html
 ________________


Thursday, July 20, 2017

Considering breaks in service in determining seniority for the purposes of layoff and reinstatement


Considering breaks in service in determining seniority for the purposes of layoff and reinstatement
2017 NY Slip Op 05657, Appellate Division, Third Department

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court Ulster County granting petitioner's [Petitioner] application in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking to annul a determination of the Board of Education denying Petitioner's request for certain seniority rights.

The Petitioner in action was elementary teacher and had attained tenure with the school district [the District]. In 2004 Petitioner took an unpaid leave of absence and in December 2005 resigned from her position when her eligibility for continuation on unpaid leave expired rather than return to work. In 2007 the District appointed Petitioner to a teaching position and she was subsequently granted tenure by the District upon her satisfactory completion of her probationary period associated with this new appointment in 2009.

In 2010 the District eliminated positions in the elementary tenure area and Petitioner seniority for the purposes Education Law §2510 was based on her service with the District running from 2007. §2510 provides, in pertinent part, "Whenever a board of education abolishes a position under this chapter, the services of the teacher having the least seniority in the system within the tenure of the position abolished shall be discontinued."

A temporary kindergarten teaching position then became available for the 2011-2012 school year. However, another former teacher was recalled to fill the vacancy because of her greater seniority. Petitioner, contending that the District had improperly calculated her seniority by ignoring her earlier service with the District and it should have reinstated her to the vacancy. Petitioner initiated the Article 78 action seeking a court order annulling the District's decision and ultimately Supreme Court directed the District to recalculate Petitioner's "seniority rights and all salary due to her."

The District appealed the Supreme Court's decision, contending that Petitioner's resignation from her position in 2005 served to sever her ties with the District and thus she forfeited any claim with respect to her earlier service with the District for the purposes of determining her  seniority rights.

The Appellate Division, citing Kwasnik v King, 123 AD3d 1264, explained that "Although an employee may waive his or her seniority rights by resigning or retiring, such a relinquishment must be knowing and voluntary" and be an effective waiver of such rights, the waiver "must be free from any indicia of duress or coercion."

In Petitioner's case the Appellate Division concluded that she resign from her position in 2005 rather than return from her leave when the District informed her that such extension was not possible as she had "exhausted her unpaid leave time." In other words, it was Petitioner decision to resign rather than return to work.

Thus, said the court, there was nothing in the record that could be construed as duress or coercion on the part of the District to obtain her resignation and the record indicated that Petitioner voluntarily resigned for her tenured position "in response to being accurately informed that she had exhausted her [rights to additional unpaid] leave.”

The Appellate Division also noted that Petitioner had been subsequently appointed by the District as a probationary employee after a year and half break in service, thus "belying any claim that she maintained a continuing employment relationship with it."

Accordingly, said the court, the District had properly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to count the period of time she had been employed by it prior to her 2005 resignation "for the purpose of [§2510] seniority" and, reversing the Supreme Court's decision, reinstated the District's initial determination regarding Petitioner seniority for the purposes of her reinstatement from the preferred list.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

_______________

The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual -This e-book reviews the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5216.html
_______________

Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Petitioning the Commissioner of Education to remove a member of a school board from his or her office


Petitioning the Commissioner of Education to remove a member of a school board from his or her office 
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #17,055

A number of district residents, taxpayers and current or former members of the Board of Education [Petitioners] sought to have a sitting member of the Board of Education [Respondent] removed from his office by action of the Commissioner of Education pursuant to §306 Education Law. Petitioners alleged that the Respondent was guilty of "willful violation of the Education Law, General Municipal Law §805-a(1)(b) and Public Officers Law §105, and engaging in acts of willful misconduct in violation of the [school] district's code of ethics and policies concerning the confidential nature of the board's executive sessions."

Finding that there were a number of procedural defects in their appeal, the Commissioner dismissed Petitioners' complaint without reaching its merits.

First, said the Commissioner, Petitioners' application must be denied as moot as only matters in actual controversy will be considered and no decision will be rendered "on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest." In arriving at this ruling the Commissioner took "administrative notice that the official website" of the school district indicated that the Respondent "no longer serves on the board of education." Thus the issue of his removal from office was a  matter that had been "laid to rest."

The Commissioner then said that even if the Petitioners' application had not been dismissed as moot, it would have been denied because of the following procedural error or omissions:

1. Lack of proper service" as Petitioners did not personally serve their complaint "upon each named respondent;" and

2. The notice of petition was defective as it did not specifically advise a school officer that an application was being made for his or her removal from office by using the notice prescribed under 8 NCYRR §275.11(a) for appeals brought pursuant to Education Law §310.  

The Commissioner explained that "A notice of petition which fails to contain the language required by the Commissioner’s regulation is fatally defective and does not secure jurisdiction over the intended respondent" as it is the notice of petition that alerts a party to the fact that he or she is the subject of removal proceedings. Thus the Petitioners' "failure to comply with 8 NYCRR §277.1(b) necessarily results in a jurisdictional failure and requires dismissal."

That said, the Commissioner noted that although the Petitioners' application must be dismissed on procedural grounds, there was yet "one administrative matter" to be consider.

The Respondent in this action had requested that the Commissioner issue a "certificate of good faith" pursuant to Education Law §3811(1) thereby authorizing the Board to indemnify him for "legal fees and expenses incurred in defending a proceeding arising out of the exercise of his powers or performance of duties as a board member."

The Commissioner explained that it was appropriate to issue such certification "unless it is established on the record that the requesting board member acted in bad faith."

As the Petitioners' application in this action was denied on procedural grounds and there had been no finding that Respondent acted in bad faith, the Commissioner certified, "solely for the purpose of Education Law §3811(1)" that the Respondent is entitled to a certificate of good faith.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 


Tuesday, July 18, 2017

An employer may be vicariously liable for an allegedly slanderous statement made by its employee


An employer may be vicariously liable for an allegedly slanderous statement made by its employee
2017 NY Slip Op 05353, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Plaintiff in this action against a village and an employee of the village [Defendants] alleged that an employee of the village made defamatory remarks* concerning the Plaintiff in the course of her employment as an administrative assistant of the village.

Addressing appeals concerning the disposition of motions for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's petition filed by the Defendants, the Appellate Division said:

1. It is well established that, although "[s]lander as a rule is not actionable unless the plaintiff suffers special damage," where, as here, a statement charges plaintiff with a serious crime, the statement constitutes "slander per se" and special damage is not required.

2. In situations involving "slander per se," the defendants may claim a qualified privilege contending that there was a good faith, bona fide communication upon a subject in which the individual has an interest, or a legal, moral or societal interest to speak, and the communication is made to a person with a corresponding interest.

3. In the event the defendants in such an action meet their initial burden of establishing that any of the alleged disparaging statements are protected by a qualified privilege inasmuch as they were made between members of the organization in connection with the plaintiff's application for employment, membership or a similar relationship, "the burden shifted to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact whether the statements were motivated solely by malice."

4. In the event the plaintiff raises an issue where a jury could reasonably conclude that malice was the one and only cause for the publication of the statements claimed by the plaintiff to constitute slander, the plaintiff has raised an issue of fact whether statements were motivated solely by malice and thus are not protected by a qualified privilege.

5. Citing Seymour v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 215 AD2d 971, the Appellate Division noted that an employer may be held vicariously liable for an allegedly slanderous statement made by an employee only if the employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment at the time that the statement was made.

In this action the Appellate Division concluded that the village failed to establish its  entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on the theory that the administrative assistant was not acting within the scope of her employment when she allegedly made disparaging statements concerning Plaintiff to other officials or employees of the village.

* A false statement that tends to expose a person to public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion or disgrace constitutes defamation. An oral utterance that inaccurately accuses a person of a serious crime can be slander per se as can oral statements alleging an individual's being infected with some disease that would result in his or her being ostracized from society, or being unfit to perform of his or her duties as an officer or employee. Defamatory words that could prejudice the individual in his or her profession or trade or the chastity of the individual have been held to constitute slander per se.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

Monday, July 17, 2017

Exploring claimed procedural obstacles to demands for certain records pursuant to New York's Freedom of Information Law


Exploring claimed procedural obstacles to demands for certain records pursuant to New York's Freedom of Information Law
Kirsch v Board of Educ. of Williamsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 05547, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Kim A. Kirsch filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order directing the Williamsville Central School District's Board of Education [Board] to comply with her Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] request. Kirsch's FOIL request sought certain email records.

In its review of a Supreme Court's ruling directing the Board to provide the records demanded by Kirsch the Appellate Division addressed the following objections raised by the Board:

1. Standing to submit a FOIL request.

The Board contended that Kirsch's attorney, Michael A. Starvaggi, Esq., the individual submitting the FOIL request, "lacked standing" to maintain the Article 78 action. The Appellate Division rejected this claim, explaining FOIL provides that "Any person denied access to a record may appeal and seek judicial review of any adverse appeal determination," and "any person on whose behalf a FOIL request was made has standing to maintain a proceeding to review the denial of disclosure of the records requested."

The court noted that the administrative appeal letter expressly stated that Starvaggi was making the request on behalf of Kirsch and concluded that Kirsch had "standing to maintain this proceeding."

2. Statute of Limitations.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Board's claim that the action was untimely was not "preserved for [the Appellate Division's] review," the court elected to consider the merits of its argument that the proceeding is barred by the statute of limitations. In so doing, the Appellate Division opined that the Board "failed to meet [its] burden of establishing that petitioners received notice of the final decision denying the administrative appeal more than four months before the proceeding was commenced.

3. Adding another party to the action.

The Board objected to Supreme Court's granting Starvaggi's oral motion to amend Kirsch's Article 78 petition "to add Starvaggi as a petitioner." The Appellate Division sustained the lower court's granting his oral motion "under the circumstances" in this action. Significantly, the court said that the relation back doctrine* permited the addition of Starvaggi after the expiration of the statute of limitations as the claims brought by Starvaggi and Kirsch are identical in substance - i.e., that Board improperly denied the FOIL request made by Starvaggi on behalf of Kirsch, and Starvaggi and Kirsch are united in interest in seeking compliance with that request.

4. Exemptions from disclosure.

The Board contended that the emails may contain "exempt material." The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court directing the Board to provide Kirsch and Starvaggi  with the requested emails, "with any claimed exemptions from disclosure documented in a privilege log that may be reviewed by the court."

Addressing the Board's "broad allegation here that the [emails may] contain exempt material," the Appellate Division said that such a representation "is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the records are open for inspection . . . and categorically to deny petitioner[s] all access to the requested material."

Further, said the court, should the Board establish that a requested email contains exempt material, "the appropriate remedy is an in camera** review and disclosure of all nonexempt, appropriately redacted material."

5. Identification of the records demanded.

Noting that Kirsch and Starvaggi had "reasonably described" the requested emails thus enabling the Board to identify and produce the records, the Appellate Division, citing Konigsberg v Coughlin, 68 NY2d 245, held that the Board "cannot evade the broad disclosure provisions of [the] statute . . . upon the naked allegation that the request will require review of thousands of records."

It should be remembered that the basic concept underlying FOIL is that all government documents and records, other than those having access specifically limited by statute, are available to the public. The release of certain public records, such as those identified in Civil Rights Law §50-a, Education Law §1127 - Confidentiality of records and §33.13 Mental Hygiene Law - Clinical records, are examples of records to which access has been limited by statute. 

Otherwise, an individual is not required to submit a FOIL request as a condition precedent to obtaining public records where access is not barred by statute. Submitting a "formal" FOIL request becomes necessary only in the event the custodian of the public record[s] sought declines to “voluntarily” provide the information or record requested. In such cases the individual or organization is required to file a formal FOIL request to obtain the information.

It should also be noted that there is no bar to providing information pursuant to a FOIL request, or otherwise, that falls within one or more of the exceptions that the custodian of the record could rely upon in denying a FOIL request, in whole or in part, for the information or records sought.

* Apply the Doctrine of Relation Back permits "something done today" to be treated as though it "were done earlier" notwithstanding the fact that the otherwise controlling statute of limitations had already expired.

** A hearing held conducted by the court or hearing officer in private or when the public is excluded from the proceeding to consider a particular issue is referred to as being held in camera.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

Friday, July 14, 2017

Attempting to vacate an adverse arbitration award rendered after a consensual arbitration process


Attempting to vacate an adverse arbitration award rendered after a consensual arbitration process
Transit Workers Union, Local 100 v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 05446, Appellate Division, Second Department

The New York City Transit Authority [CTA] terminated the employment of a member of the Transit Workers Union, Local 100 [Local 100], a bus CTA driver, who had been involved in an incident with a pedestrian. Local 100 filed an Article 75 action seeking a court order vacating an arbitration award that held that CTA had just cause to terminate Local 100's member's employment because of the incident.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and Local 100 appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court's decision, explaining that "Where, as here, an arbitration award was rendered after a consensual arbitration process pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the award may not be vacated unless it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power."

Contrary to Local 100's contention that the arbitrator's award was irrational, the Appellate Division ruled that "the arbitrator's award was supported by evidence in the record and is, therefore, rational."

Local 100 also argued that the penalty imposed, termination from employment, was irrational. The Appellate Division said it disagreed and sustained the dismissal of the bus driver from employment by CTA, concluding that the penalty did not violate any strong public policy or clearly exceed an enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition, and as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html
________________ 

Thursday, July 13, 2017

Suspension of a tenured teacher requires the timely filing of written charges and specifications with the clerk or secretary of the board of education


Suspension of a tenured teacher requires the timely filing of written charges and specifications with the clerk or secretary of the board of education
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 17,054

After disposing of a number of procedural issues, the Commissioner of Education addressed Petitioner's allegations that she was unlawfully placed on administrative leave with pay without any disciplinary charges having been preferred against her pursuant to Education Law §3020-a in violation of her rights to administrative due process. Holding that this aspect of the appeal submitted by Educator was timely, the Commissioner explained that the "Suspension of a tenured teacher requires a board of education to file written charges with the clerk or secretary of the board (see Education Law §3020-a). Suspension of a tenured teacher without the filing of such charges within a reasonable time is ultra vires and constitutes a continuing wrong.

Turning to the merits of Petitioner's appeal, the Commissioner found that although Petitioner was advised that she was being placed on “paid administrative leave,” there was nothing in the record indicating the reason for her placement on such leave beyond the initial two days. In any event, the Commissioner found that Petitioner had been suspended for more than a year without any charges being preferred against her and that during that time she has been prohibited from coming onto school property. 

The only reason provided by the district for the continuation of Petitioner on such leave was her failure to submit a HIPAA-compliant release and submit to an independent medical examination as requested more than three months after she was placed on such "administrative leave."  However, said the Commissioner, there is nothing in the record to show that the district preferred charges alleging insubordination against Petitioner based on her alleged failure to comply with the district’s directive "to submit to a medical examination, as it is clearly empowered to do."

The Commissioner agreed that a board of education has the right to place an employee on administrative leave pending an investigation and, or pending disciplinary charges being filed against the employee and has the right to require a teacher to submit to a medical examination. However, on this record, the Commissioner ruled that the district’s actions constitute an unlawful suspension in the absence of its timely filing of disciplinary charges against Petitioner. Further, said the Commissioner, the board of education did not introduce any evidence that it was conducting an active investigation during the period of such administrative leave and had not established that it took action to file charges within a reasonable time in compliance with Education Law §2566(6). Further, the Commissioner noted that there was no "viable explanation" for the board's delay in bringing disciplinary charges against Petitioner.

The Commissioner concluded that as Petitioner's suspension was not acted upon in a timely manner, it must be deemed null and void and directed that all references to the suspension challenged by Petitioner be expunged from her record.

Finally, the Commissioner ordered that Petitioner be deemed to be on involuntary sick leave pursuant to Education Law §913 until she submits to a medical examination, indicating "that nothing in this decision precludes [the] board from filing [disciplinary] charges [against Petitioner] in accordance with Education Law §3020-a within the period of limitation prescribed in Education Law §3020-a(1).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

_______________

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5215.html
_______________

Wednesday, July 12, 2017

Imposing a lesser disciplinary penalty than the one recommended by the disciplinary hearing officer


Imposing a lesser disciplinary penalty than the one recommended by the disciplinary hearing officer
2017 NY Slip Op 01628, Appellate Division, First Department

The penalty of termination of employment was imposed by a disciplinary hearing officer upon the petitioner in the Article 78 action [Petitioner], a special education home instruction teacher. The hearing officer found that Petitioner had submitted time sheets falsely stating that she had provided instruction to a disabled student and inaccurately indicated that she had reported to certain New York City Department of Education [DOE] schools and libraries over the two-month period in the aftermath of the impact of Hurricane Sandy on New York City and its surrounding area.

There was no question that the hearing officers findings were correct; Petitioner was guilty of all charges and specifications. Petitioner, however, appealed, seeking a court order not to setting aside the findings of misconduct but only an order modifying the penalty imposed on her. Further, Petitioner had acknowledged her error in judgment and pledged to change her practices and never to repeat the error.

Notwithstanding Petitioner's guilt of the charges misconduct filed against her, the Appellate Division ruled that under the circumstances the penalty of termination shocked its sense of fairness and applied the so-called Pell Doctrine [see Matter of Pell v Board of Educ., 34 NY2d 222, 233.

The Appellate Division explained that here there were extraordinary conditions to consider, as well as certain attempts at mitigation undertaken by Petitioner, including the following:

1. Petitioner and her student had been displaced from their homes as a result of Hurricane Sandy and Petitioner, although she had contacted her student's mother, did not provide any educational services to her student.

2. The Department of Education had not provided teachers such as Petitioner with any guidance or information as to the instruction of students displaced by Hurricane Sandy, other than that displaced students would not be penalized.

3. Petitioner had filled out the time sheets in question in advance of the dates to which those time sheets pertained and although she had  no provided instruction to the disabled student on the days indicated in those time sheets, she had instructed other students on each of the dates in question and she would have received the same salary regardless of how many students she had instructed or how many hours she had spent with them, and thus derived no extraordinary benefit from her actions.

4. Prior to Hurricane Sandy Petitioner had an unblemished record over a 17-year period as a special education home instruction teacher and the disabled student's mother had  testified at the disciplinary hearing that Petitioner was a good teacher who worked well with her son and had served his needs more successfully than had other teachers.

The Appellate Division characterized Petitioner's misconduct as "more a matter of lax bookkeeping than implementation of any venal scheme" and no intent to defraud or harm to the public. and any harm to DOE was mitigated. It then explained that "a [disciplinary] result is shocking to one's sense of fairness if the sanction imposed is so grave in its impact on the individual subjected to it that it is disproportionate to the misconduct, incompetence, failure or turpitude of the individual, or to the harm or risk of harm to the agency or institution, or to the public generally visited or threatened by the derelictions of the individuals."

Additional factors to be considered, said the court, "would be the prospect of deterrence of the individual or of others in like situations, and therefore a reasonable prospect of recurrence of derelictions by the individual or persons similarly employed."

Noting that at the hearing Petitioner admitted guilt and acknowledges that her misconduct warrants punishment since the disabled student was deprived of the services of a teacher for two months, the Appellate Division,  . Petitioner does not seek to set aside the findings of misconduct contained in the hearing officer's opinion, but only to modify the penalty imposed on her. She has acknowledged her error in judgment and has pledged to change her practices and never to repeat the error.

Citing Bolt v New York City Dept. of Education, 145 AD3d 450, the Appellate Division said that "There is no evidence that '[Petitioner] could not remedy her behavior'" and that it believed that the penalty of termination, "is disproportionate to the level of [Petitioner's] misconduct and exceeds the standards that society requires to be applied to this offense."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_01628.htm


 _______________

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition, and as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html
_______________

 

Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Guidelines applicable when police officer being sued in a civil action seeks to have his or her employer provide for his or her defense and indemnification in the civil action


Guidelines applicable when police officer being sued in a civil action seeks to have his or her employer provide for his or her defense and indemnification in the civil action
2017 NY Slip Op 01549,  Appellate Division, Second Department

A federal civil rights action was commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against, among others, a Nassau County police officer [Petitioner]. The claims in the federal action against Petitioner arose from an off-duty altercation caused by a traffic dispute, during which the Petitioner allegedly fired a gun at the plaintiff in the federal action. Petitioner sought to have his employer, Nassau County, defend and indemnify him in the federal action.

The Nassau County Police Officer Indemnification Board* concluded that Petitioner was not entitled to defense or indemnification by Nassau County because the alleged acts underlying the federal action were not committed "while [Petitioner was engaged] in the proper discharge of his duties and were not within the scope of his employment."

Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's challenge of the Board's determination and he appealed its ruling.

Citing General Municipal Law §50-l, the Appellate Division said that question of whether a police officer's acts which formed the basis of the civil action were committed in the proper discharge of his or her duties and within the scope of his or her employment is to be determined in the first instance by the Board.

The Board's determination that Petitioner was not acting in the proper discharge of his duties and within the scope of his employment may be set aside by a court only if it was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Division, sustaining Supreme Court's ruling, concluded that the record supported the Board's determination that Petitioner "was not acting while in the proper discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment, since there is a factual basis for the conclusion that the alleged misconduct arose from an altercation that was personal in nature" and was not undertaken in the exercise of his "public responsibility as a police officer."

* General Municipal Law §50-l, in pertinent part, provides for "the defense of any civil action or proceeding brought against a duly appointed police officer of the Nassau county police arising out of a negligent act or other tort of such police officer committed while in the proper discharge of his duties and within the scope of his employment. Such proper discharge and scope shall be determined by a majority vote of a panel ...."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


Monday, July 10, 2017

A contingent permanent appointment made pursuant to §64.4 of the Civil Service Law must be specifically so identified by the appointing authority


A contingent permanent appointment made pursuant to §64.4 of the Civil Service Law must be specifically so identified by the appointing authority
2017 NY Slip Op 04740, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The employee [Petitioner] in this CPLR Article 78 proceeding sought a court order vacating the appointing authority's decision to reinstate her to her lower grade position, contending that she had been appointed to the higher grade position as a permanent or contingent permanent employee and thus was entitled to the procedural protections of Civil Service Law §75 as a condition precedent to her being returned to her lower grade position.

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court had properly dismissed her petition as the record indicated that Petitioner had been given a "temporary appointment ... [to fill] a position that was encumbered by an employee on leave of absence."

Accordingly, there was nothing to support Petitioner's claim that she had been appointed to the higher grade position on a contingent permanent basis in the record.

As the Court of Appeals indicated in Snyder v Civil Service Commission, 72 NY2d 981, an employee, even if otherwise eligible for appointment as a contingent permanent employee pursuant to §64.4 of the Civil Service Law, must be specifically designated as being appointed as a contingent permanent employee by the appointing authority, which status is granted solely at the discretion of the appointing authority.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

Friday, July 07, 2017

Unlawful discrimination complaint sustained notwithstanding respondent's failing to appear at the administrative hearing conducted by the NYS Division of Human Rights


Unlawful discrimination complaint sustained notwithstanding respondent's failing to appear at the administrative hearing conducted by the NYS Division of Human Rights
New York State Div. of Human Rights v Milan Maintenance, Inc., 2017 NY Slip Op 05508, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division unanimously sustained the New York State Division of Human Rights' (DHR) determination holding that  Milan Maintenance, Inc., [Milan] had unlawfully discriminated against an individual that it rejected for employment and DHR's awarding the complainant $10,000 for mental anguish and humiliation.

Noting that Milan defaulted at the administrative hearing held by DHR,* thus failing to rebut a prima facie showing that it had unlawfully discriminated against the complainant, the court said that DHR's findings were supported by substantial evidence and DHR's "award of compensatory damages for mental anguish" was proper.

Mari v Safir, 291 AD2d 298, sets out the tests typically applied by New York courts in resolving litigation challenging the decision of an administrative agency arrived at as the result of having conducted an administrative hearing in absentia

* In Hall v Environmental Conservation, 235 AD2d 757, the Appellate Division upheld an arbitrator's award in favor of the employee after Environmental Conservation boycotted the arbitration because if believed that the employee was not entitled to arbitrate the dispute.

The Milan decision is posted on the Internet at:

Hearsay may constitute "substantial evidence" supporting the tribunal's findings in an administrative hearing



Hearsay may constitute "substantial evidence" supporting the tribunal's findings in an administrative hearing
2017 NY Slip Op 05147, Appellate Division, Third Department

An employee [Employee] at a residential facility operated by the Office of People with Developmental Disabilities [OPWDD] was alleged to have physically abused a resident.

An investigator conducted interviews of several witnesses and found the report of physical abuse to be substantiated. After a hearing, Employee's request that report be amended to unsubstantiated and that the report be sealed was rejected and a final determination sustaining the report of physical abuse was made.

Employee then commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination which was made following an administrative hearing as unsupported by substantial evidence. Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division found that the final determination was supported by substantial evidence. Addressing Employee's contention that the hearsay statements in the record cannot constitute substantial evidence, the Appellate Division said that "it is well established that, in an administrative hearing, hearsay is admissible and may support a finding of substantial evidence."

Citing Matter of Today's Lounge of Oneonta, Inc. v New York State Liq. Auth., 103 AD3d 1082, the court commented that hearsay evidence may, "under appropriate circumstances, form the sole basis of an agency's determination, unless the hearsay evidence is seriously controverted."

In this instance, said the court, the corroborated description of the incident by the eyewitness was only controverted by Employee's denial.  Consequently, the corroborated description by the eyewitness could be viewed as not seriously controverted and "sufficiently reliable" so as to constitute substantial evidence.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

Thursday, July 06, 2017

Disqualifying an employee for employment in the public service and revoking his or her appointment based on a finding of fraud of a substantial nature in his or her application for employment


Disqualifying an employee for employment in the public service and revoking his or her appointment based on a finding of fraud of a substantial nature in his or her application for employment  
2017 NY Slip Op 05151, Appellate Division, Third Department

In 2009 the petitioner [Petitioner] in this Article 78 action had completed an application for employment with a public employer [Employer A] that included the question, "Have you ever resigned from employment rather than face discharge?" Petitioner answered "no" and signed an affirmation that the statements in the application "[were] true under the penalties of perjury and that a material misstatement or fraud may disqualify [her] from appointment." Petitioner was subsequently appointed by Employer A.

In 2015, Employer A issued a notice of charges alleging several acts of misconduct and notifying Petitioner that it would seek her dismissal if she was found guilty after a hearing. After obtaining additional information, the notice of discipline was revised to add a charge that Petitioner had made a false statement in her application for employment.

A disciplinary hearing was conducted and the hearing officer found, among other things, that Petitioner had withheld relevant information regarding her previous employment with another public employer, Employer B. As a result of this additional information, Petitioner was sent a notice of revocation of eligible certification, appointment and termination of employment pursuant to Civil Service Law §50(4). Petitioner requested, and was provided with a due process hearing. Ultimately Petitioner's "eligible certification and appointment" was revoked and Petitioner was terminated from her position.

Petitioner then commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a court order annulling Employer A's determination and reinstate to her former position. Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's action and she appealed the court's determination.

The Appellate Division noted that evidence and hearing testimony resulting Employer A terminating Petitioner revealed that Employer B, her former employer, had issued six disciplinary charges against her in 2008, which carried a maximum penalty of dismissal. After being served with these disciplinary charges, Petitioner had filed various claims against Employer B and her union, including charges with the Public Employment Relations Board. In September 2008, the parties entered into a separation agreement, by which Petitioner agreed to resign from her employment and withdraw her claims and Employer B, among other things, agreed to withdraw the disciplinary charges* against her, to issue a letter of reference using agreed-upon language, and to pay Petitioner $100,000 in settlement of her claims. In addition, the parties agreed not to discuss "the terms of [the agreement] or any fact concerning its negotiation, execution or implementation with anyone," unless "required to do so by law or legal process."

Acknowledging that she had resigned her position with Employer B while the charges were still pending, and that the maximum penalty sought by Employer B was dismissal, Petitioner gave several reasons for her "no" answer to the application question, stating that:

1. She acted upon the advice of counsel;**

2. She believed that she could not discuss the agreement because of its confidentiality provisions, and;

3. She expected to prevail on the disciplinary charges and therefore believed that she was not facing discharge.

Pursuant to the Civil Service Law §50[4], the State Civil Service Commission, with respect employee of the State as the employer and a county civil service department with respect to employers within its jurisdiction, may investigate the background and qualifications of an eligible individual after he or she has been appointed, and may revoke a certificate of appointment and direct the termination of employment, as pertinent here, "upon finding facts which if known prior to appointment, would have warranted his [or her] disqualification, or upon a finding of . . . fraud of a substantial nature in his [or her] application, examination or appointment."

Here, said the Appellate Division, Employer A's Personnel Officer found that Petitioner had resigned her position with Employer B rather than face discharge, that this resignation would have warranted Petitioner's disqualification from eligibility and, in the alternative, that Petitioner's failure to disclose the circumstances of her resignation constituted, as relevant here, a fraud of a substantial nature in her application. The Personnel Officer further found that Petitioner's failure to disclose her resignation had prevented Employer A from inquiring into the circumstances and discovering information material to her qualifications and background, and that her failure to disclose her resignation amounted to fraud.

The court noted that Employer A appointed Petitioner almost six years before it brought charges against her. Thus, said the Appellate Division, "Supreme Court correctly determined that [Employer A] is time-barred by the three-year statutory limitations period from enforcing Civil Service Law §50 on grounds other than fraud, and the sole issue to be resolved here 'is whether fraud of a substantial nature existed in connection with petitioner's application.'"

In the words of the Appellate Division, [Employer A] has "[w]ide discretion" to determine the fitness of candidates for civil service eligibility and employment and, in the absence of clear abuse, this Court will sustain such a determination."

Further, said the court, "Our review is limited to whether [Employer A's] determination was an abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious." Considering the affirmation that the statements in Petitioner's application were true in light of her acknowledgment that she resigned while charges that could have resulted in her dismissal were pending against her, the Appellate Division did not find Employer A's inference that Petitioner acted intentionally to be arbitrary and capricious. As Petitioner's resignation was an express requirement of the agreement by which Employer B agreed to withdraw the charges, "it was not arbitrary and capricious for [Employer B] to discredit Petitioner's assertion that she resigned, not for the purpose of avoiding dismissal, but instead to obtain payment for settling her claims against [Employer B].

The Appellate Division also rejected Petitioner's assertions related to the provisions of the agreement that prohibited her from disclosing its terms and related facts, explaining that the language in the agreement did not preclude her from disclosing the fact that she had resigned pursuant to an agreement. As Supreme Court had noted, said the court, Petitioner could have completed the employment application truthfully while complying with the agreement's confidentiality requirements by answering the question about previous resignations "yes" and indicating in the application's explanatory section that she had resigned from her employment with [Employer B] pursuant to an agreement, but could not disclose its details.

Such an acknowledgment would have allowed Employer A an opportunity to inquire further into circumstances surrounding her resignation, "as it did promptly when it later learned of her resignation." The Appellate Division said it found nothing arbitrary and capricious and no abuse of discretion in Employer A's determination that Petitioner committed fraud of a substantial nature.

* 4 NYCRR 5.3(b), which applies to employees of the State as the employer, in pertinent part, provides that, Resignation, provides: that “… when charges of incompetency or misconduct have been or are about to be filed against an employee, the appointing authority may elect to disregard a resignation filed by such employee and to prosecute such charges and, in the event that such employee is found guilty of such charges and dismissed from the service, his termination shall be recorded as a dismissal rather than as a resignation." Many local civil service commissions have adopted a similar rule.

** Petitioner, said the Appellate Division, clarified that she did not consult with counsel while completing the application, and that her understanding of the issue was based upon a conversation that she had previously had with her counsel when she entered into the separation agreement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_05151.htm
______________________

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition, and as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html
______________________ 
  


Wednesday, July 05, 2017

The actions of an employee prior to his or her promotion may properly form the basis for terminating the individual prior to the completion of his or her probationary period


The actions of an employee prior to his or her promotion may properly form the basis for terminating the individual prior to the completion of his or her probationary period
2017 NY Slip Op 05145, Appellate Division, Third Department

An individual [Probationer]  serving with the  New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision was promoted to a higher grade position subject to his satisfactory completion of a 52-week probationary period. Shortly after Probationer had completed the minimum period of probation he was terminated from his probationary appointment and reinstated to his former, lower grade, position.

Probationer contending that the termination of his probationary period was made in bad faith as the appointing authority "waited to demote him to his former position until just after he completed the eighth week of his probationary period — the minimum probationary service period — to avoid having to establish under Civil Service Law §75 that the demotion was based on incompetence or misconduct," filed an Article 78 petition in Supreme Court seeking reinstatement to the higher grade position with back salary.

Supreme Court dismissed Probationer's petition and he appealed the court's ruling.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's determination, explaining that "An employee's probationary appointment may be terminated without a hearing for any reason or no reason at all, so long as the termination was not "in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason."*

To warrant a hearing after completing his or her minimum period of probation, the employee bears the burden of raising a material issue of fact as to whether the termination was made in bad faith or for an impermissible reason; allegations of a conclusory or speculative nature are insufficient to meet this burden.

Here, said the Appellate Division, Probationer's submissions were insufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether his discharge from the higher grade position was made in bad faith or based on an improper or impermissible motive.

The court noted that in answering Probationer's petition, the appointing authority submitted, among other things, the affidavit of the Personnel Director "which established that the decision to terminate [Probationer's] probationary promotion was made in good faith." The affidavit of the Personnel Director cited an investigative report in which it was concluded that the most credible version of certain events that occurred prior to Probationer's promotion "pointed to [Probationer] having observed and/or participated in threatening [a] particular inmate and then denying such observation or participation."

In addition, "as found by Supreme Court," the Appellate Division said that Probationer's allegations of bad faith "were too conclusory and speculative to warrant a hearing on the matter" as there was no evidentiary support that the Director waited to demote him to his former position until just after he completed the minimum probationary period.

* "Probationary employees" typically hold permanent appointment in the position and may enjoy limited tenure rights. For example, courts have ruled that probationers are entitled to notice and hearing if the appointing authority seeks to dismiss the individual during his or her minimum period of probation. In contrast, a probationer may be dismissed without notice and hearing after completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to the expiration of his or her maximum period of probation.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


______________

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5215.html
 ______________

Monday, July 03, 2017

Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a disciplinary determination made after a hearing in determining if an individual is disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits



Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a disciplinary determination made after a hearing in determining if an individual is disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits
Matter of Telemaque (Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 02109, Appellate Division, Third Department

Veronica Telemaque appealed the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Telemaque had been found guilty and dismissed from her position after a hearing on disciplinary charges filed against her pursuant to Education Law §3020-a for allegedly engaging in misconduct, conduct unbecoming and/or prejudicial, insubordination and violating the employer's rules.

The Appellate Division said that Telemaque's primary challenge concerns the disciplinary Hearing Officer's factual and credibility determinations and alleged evidentiary errors were made at the disciplinary hearing. The Board noted that it did not appear that Telemaque appealed that disciplinary determination and "her challenges to the merits of that determination may not be raised in this unemployment insurance proceeding."

As Telemaque had "a full and fair opportunity to litigate the charges of misconduct at [her §3020-a disciplinary] hearing, the Appellate Division said that the Board had "properly gave collateral estoppel effect to the Hearing Officer's factual determinations" in that proceeding and sustained the Board's determination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_02109.htm 

Caution:

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the decisions summarized here. Accordingly, these summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.

THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.

Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material in this blog is presented with the understanding that the publisher is not providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader should seek such advice from a competent professional.

Items published in NYPPL may not be used for commercial purposes without prior written permission to copy and distribute such material. Send your request via e-mail to publications@nycap.rr.com

Copyright© 1987 - 2017 by the Public Employment Law Press.



___________________



N.B. From time to time a political ad or endorsement may appear in the sidebar of this Blog. NYPPL does not have any control over such posting.

_____________________

.