New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following local government audits were issued on May 20, 2025

Click on text highlighted in color to access the full audit.

City of Middletown – Payroll and Leave Benefits (Orange County)

City officials did not accurately pay employees’ salaries, wages and benefits or properly accrue leave benefits. Auditors reviewed payments and benefits totaling $1.9 million and found exceptions totaling $292,205, including $191,253 in potential overpayments. As a result, the city paid employees for time they did not work or accrue. Two sewer treatment plant employees received $91,492 for time they may not have worked because they were working at another municipality. City officials made $99,761 in vacation buyout payments that were not in accordance with city collective bargaining agreements.

Town of Philipstown – Financial Management (Putnam County)

The board did not properly manage the town’s financial operations and used the town’s general fund to pay for the Garrison Landing Water District’s (GLWD’s) operation and maintenance costs. During the audit period, the town’s residents paid $2.4 million of the GLWD’s costs that only benefited taxpayers within the water district and resulted in the decline of the general fund balance from $1 million to $53,137. Specifically, the board did not appropriately budget for GLWD operations. Although the town had a GLWD water fund and budgeted approximately $20,000 for debt service in it, the board did not budget for GLWD appropriations in the general fund each year, where annual GLWD expenditures were funded and increased from $85,436 to $975,475 over the six-year audit period. The board did not adopt a transparent budget that clearly communicates the costs associated with GLWD operations or the associated funding sources to taxpayers. The board also did not adopt a comprehensive written multi-year financial plan to help guide the budget development process or establish funds to help finance future expenditures.

Town of Pleasant Valley – Financial Management (Dutchess County)

The board did not develop realistic budgets or properly manage reserves. As a result, the town had significant recurring operating surpluses and may have levied more taxes than necessary. From fiscal years 2019 through 2023, revenues were underestimated and expenditures were overestimated in the general and highway funds, generating operating surpluses totaling $5.1 million and $1.2 million, respectively. The board appropriated fund balance to offset annual deficits that was not needed to fund operations, including $439,870 in the general fund for the audit period and $603,395 in four of the five years reviewed for the highway fund. The board also accumulated surpluses resulting in unrestricted fund balances totaling $4.5 million and $2.4 million in the general and highway funds, respectively, as of Dec. 31, 2023. Because the board did not adopt a fund balance policy and lacked a plan on how the funds will be used, there was no rationale for accumulating significant fund balances.

Village of Leicester – Financial Management (Livingston County)

The board did not effectively manage the village’s fund balance or adopt realistic budgets.

Officials maintained unrestricted fund balance in the general and water funds totaling $729,709 and $152,143, respectively, at the end of the 2023-24 fiscal year, which was sufficient to fund the upcoming fiscal year’s budget appropriations for the general fund by nearly four times and for the water fund by more than half. The board also did not adopt a written fund balance policy or develop and adopt comprehensive written multi-year financial or capital plans that would have assisted the board and officials in developing and adopting realistic budgets and planning for the village’s financial future.

Caledonia Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. – Board Oversight (Livingston County)

The board did not provide adequate oversight of financial operations. In addition, the previous audit report, released March 2014, had similar findings and recommendations concerning the board’s lack of oversight. Because the board did not implement adequate corrective action to address these findings, the same deficiencies exist. The board did not ensure that the financial review committee conducted an annual review of the treasurer’s financial records or that all 325 claims paid between Jan. 1, 2023 and May 31, 2024, totaling $174,302, were reviewed, approved and properly supported. The board also did not ensure the treasurer maintained accurate and complete financial records or provided the board with adequate financial reports, bank statements, canceled check images and bank reconciliations to monitor operations. The board also did not ensure that officials safeguarded and properly supported hall rental and fundraising revenues. From Jan. 1, 2023 through May 31, 2024, deposits, including those for hall rentals and fundraising, totaled $211,917.

Employer failed to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint by failing to show it lacked constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition

Plaintiff, a teacher, alleged that she fell when she leaned on a defective desk as she was grading papers in a classroom. 

Supreme Court granted the Employer's motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's cause of action. The Appellate Division, however, unanimously reversed the Supreme Court's ruling "on the law", and reinstated Plaintiff's complaint. 

Although the Employer sustained its burden of establishing that it neither created nor had actual notice of the alleged defective desk, the Appellate Division held that Employer failed to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiff's complaint.

The Appellate Division explained that Employer did not show that the alleged defective condition did not exist when the area was last inspected prior to Plaintiff's fall. 

The Appellate Division's decision is set out below.

Mamah v New York City Dept. of Educ.

2025 NY Slip Op 02877

Decided on May 13, 2025

Appellate Division, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered: May 13, 2025
Before: Moulton, J.P., Kapnick, Scarpulla, Rodriguez, Higgitt, JJ.

Index No. 28148/19|Appeal No. 4355|Case No. 2024-02688|

[*1]Ramah Mamah, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

The New York City Department of Education et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Godosky & Gentile, P.C., New York (Robert E. Godosky of counsel), for appellant.

Muriel Goode-Trufant, Corporation Counsel, New York (Karin Wolfe of counsel), for respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Mitchell J. Danziger, J.), entered April 9, 2024, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied, and the complaint reinstated.

Plaintiff, a teacher at a school in the Bronx, alleges that she fell when she leaned on a defective desk as she was grading papers in the back of a classroom. Defendants sustained their burden of establishing that they neither created nor had actual notice of the alleged defect by submitting the testimony of the school's custodian engineer stating that there had been no prior complaints or injuries related to the desk, and that there was no repair record of any desk because the school discarded broken desks and chairs. Plaintiff also testified that she was not aware of the defective desk leg until after her accident, and that none of the students who used the desk ever reported any defect to her (see Velocci v Stop & Shop, 188 AD3d 436, 439 [1st Dept 2020]).

Nevertheless, defendants failed to establish prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint, as they did not sustain their burden of demonstrating that they lacked constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition. Although defendants relied on a daily logbook recording the custodian engineer's daily routine for the building, the logbook was not sufficient to show that defendants inspected the classrooms to ensure that they were free from defects (see Dan v City of New York, 227 AD3d 495, 496 [1st Dept 2024]). Furthermore, the custodian engineer testified at his deposition that although he inspected the classrooms every morning, he did so only to make sure that the heat was on. This testimony is insufficient to demonstrate defendants' lack of constructive notice, as it fails to show that the alleged condition did not exist when the area was last inspected before plaintiff fell (see Bonilla v 191 Realty Assoc., L.P., 125 AD3d 470, 470 [1st Dept 2015]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: May 13, 2025

A Government Artificial Intelligence [AI] Webinar Roundup

Catch up on recent AI-focused webinars for Government.

Manage Fewer Resources and Higher Demands with AI PCs Government teams are stretched thin, but AI PCs offer a smarter way to keep up. Watch this on-demand webinar on how these AI-powered devices can help state and local agencies work faster -- without sacrificing security. WATCH NOW   AI at the Edge: What Public Sector CISOs Need to Know Now As artificial intelligence capabilities become embedded in everything from public services to campus operations, leaders in the public sector face a pivotal challenge: How to support innovation without compromising security, compliance or control. WATCH NOW   AI, Automation, and Mitigating Risk in Government IT Watch this on-demand webinar for a discussion on how AI and automation are reshaping government IT operations. WATCH NOW   Quantum-Safe Printing and AI-Driven Protection Cybersecurity isn't just about firewalls and phishing filters anymore. As quantum computing edges closer to reality and AI changes how agencies operate, one often-overlooked part of the tech stack is getting smarter — and safer. WATCH NOW   AI in Action: Real-World Workflows Watch this on-demand webinar webinar where we'll walk through real workflows where AI workstations are already making a difference. You’ll leave with a sharper understanding of what’s possible today, what’s worth piloting next, and what to put on the roadmap for tomorrow. WATCH NOW   Navigating the Federal Transition: AI Use Cases, Security Risks, and What You Need to Know As state and local governments adapt to new federal administration policies and priorities, IT leaders must continue to modernize. This webinar explores what it takes to build AI-ready infrastructure, ensure security and compliance, and learn from real-world use cases in the public sector. WATCH NOW   AI-Powered Automation that Servesfor Efficient Government Gain insights on how to deploy secure, scalable AI solutions that work seamlessly with your current infrastructure—ensuring compliance and minimizing risk. WATCH NOW

To view upcoming and on-demand webinars, visit: webinars.govtech.com   📜 All attendees will have the opportunity to download a certificate of attendance at the completion of a webinar.  For questions or assistance with registration, contact:  resources@govtech.com

From Hype to Habits - Comparing data on generative Artificial Intelligence in law firms

Rochester New York attorney Nicole Black has posted another item, this one addressing Generative Artificial Intelligence as a law firm tool.

Click HERE to access Ms. Black's post on the Internet.

Ms. Black's earlier Daily Record articles can be accessed here.

New York State Comptroller DiNapoli reports his Office of Unclaimed Funds has returned $266,069,545 being held as unclaimed funds to its owners, entities and individuals since January 1, 2025

New York State’s Abandoned Property Law requires certain entities to transfer abandoned money or securities to the New York State Comptroller’s Office of Unclaimed Funds. Entities required to report and remit unclaimed funds include, for example, banks, insurance companies, corporations and government agencies.

These funds are transferred to the Comptroller’s Office of Unclaimed Funds from inactive bank accounts, uncollected insurance policies or refunds, amounts due for undelivered goods or services, abandoned stocks, uncashed checks and more. The Comptroller’s Office of Unclaimed Funds serves as the custodian of such property until it is claimed by the rightful owner.

For example, State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli presented the Long Island Hispanic Bar Association an unclaimed funds check in the amount of $2,988.27 at a recent SOMOS New York Conference. SOMOS is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, "501(c)3 organization" that unites the Latino community.

To access the Comptroller's Internet site to search for "unclaimed funds" belonging to an entity, public or private, or to an individual or to a family, being held by the Comptroller’s Office of Unclaimed Funds, and for instructions for filing an application to retrieve such property from the Comptroller’s Office of Unclaimed Funds, click HERE.

Son admits stealing almost $80,000 of pension benefits deposited into his late father's bank account by the New York State Employees' Retirement System

On May 12, 2025, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Nassau County District Attorney Anne T. Donnelly announced the son of a Long Island state pensioner pleaded guilty to identity theft in connection with his theft of nearly $80,000 in pension payments deposited into his late father's bank account. The defendant, Richard Gaines Jr., 55, of Daytona Beach, Florida was arrested in November 2024 following an investigation by DiNapoli’s office.

“Mr. Gaines Jr. tried to profit off of his deceased father’s nearly 30 years of public service,” DiNapoli said. “My office prioritizes protecting our pension system and members from fraud and abuse. My thanks to District Attorney Donnelly for her partnership in ensuring those who steal public funds are held accountable.”

“Richard Gaines Sr. was a dedicated public servant who rightfully earned his pension for nearly 30 years of service to the State of New York. After his death, this defendant dishonestly stole his father’s identity and tens of thousands of dollars of his father’s pension benefits that he had no claim to,” said District Attorney Donnelly. “Public employees work hard knowing that the benefits they earn will ease their retirement. This defendant, motivated by his own greed, tried to take advantage of this system, and with our partners at the New York State Comptroller’s Office, we held him accountable for his crimes.”

The defendant’s father worked for the Nassau County Bridge Authority for 29 years before retiring in 1996. He received state pension payments monthly via direct deposit into his checking account. He died on Nov. 9, 2019, and all pension payments were to end, but DiNapoli’s investigators found Gaines Jr. used his father’s debit card to steal benefits deposited into the account from 2019 to 2022. Gaines Jr. was not an account holder on his father’s checking account and did not report his father’s death to the New York State Local Retirement System until June 2022, at which time payments were stopped.

Gaines Jr. used about $2,484 of the money he stole to make personal purchases at Nassau County businesses. He also made ATM withdrawals in New Jersey, Georgia and Florida.

Gaines Jr. pleaded guilty to identity theft in the first degree in Nassau County Court before Judge Colin O’Donnell. He is due back in court on July 17.

                                            ####

Since taking office in 2007, DiNapoli has committed to fighting public corruption and encourages the public to help fight fraud and abuse. New Yorkers can report allegations of fraud involving taxpayer money by calling the toll-free Fraud Hotline at 1-888-672-4555, by mailing a complaint to: Office of the State Comptroller, Division of Investigations, 8th Floor, 110 State St., Albany, NY 12236, or by emailing a complaint to investigations@osc.ny.gov.

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli posts audits of New York State local governments on the Internet

On May 14, 2025, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced the following local government audits were issued.

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the full audit issued.

Town of Sherburne – Budgeting (Chenango County)

The budgets adopted by the board underestimated revenues and overestimated expenditures. In addition, officials appropriated fund balance to balance the budgets because purported revenues were not sufficient to fund operations. However, operating surpluses occurred which resulted in an unplanned increase in fund balance. Furthermore, the board did not have written multiyear capital or financial plans or a written fund balance or reserve policy in place to guide the board’s decisions regarding appropriate fund balance and reserve fund levels. As a result, more taxes may have been levied than were needed to fund the town’s operations.

Yates County – Court and Trust Funds  

The treasurer delayed turning over $44,940 of abandoned property to the State Comptroller for three years. In addition, the county clerk’s register did not include one court and trust action totaling $38,253 identified in the treasurer’s records. Lastly, the surrogate’s court register did not include an action ordering the deposit of $6,867 with the treasurer during 2017.

Town of West Seneca – Audit Follow-Up (Erie County)

The purpose of this review was to assess the town’s progress, as of December 2024, in implementing recommendations in a March 2020 audit. The audit determined that the board did not properly plan and manage a certain capital project and was not fully transparent on the anticipated project costs. As a result, original estimates of $9.8 million were increased by more than $3.6 million after competitive bids were received. In addition, town officials did not ensure an itemized project budget outlining revenues and expenditures was maintained in the accounting records. The audit included four recommendations to help officials monitor and improve the town’s capital project management, none of which were implemented.

Town of Perth – Conflict of Interest (Fulton County)

A board member was the sole proprietor of an automotive company that did business with the town. Therefore, the board member had a prohibited conflict of interest, which means they did not follow state law and the town’s code of ethics. The prohibited interest occurred when the board member’s business repaired a town dump-truck and was paid $13,183 for the repair. The board member with the prohibited conflict of interest, the town supervisor, and another board member approved the $13,183 payment. According to the board member with the conflict of interest, he approved the claim because two board members refused to approve the claim due to their concerns with his prohibited conflict of interest. The town supervisor stated he approved the claim because the repair work was completed so the town had an obligation to pay. Although the town supervisor, who is a member of the town’s board of ethics, had concerns with the payment, he was unable to provide a reasonable explanation for why he did not bring this matter to the board of ethics. The remaining board member approved the claim because the town supervisor had approved it.

Town of Perth – Supervisor’s Records and Reports (Fulton County)

The supervisor did not maintain complete, accurate and timely accounting records or provide adequate financial reports to the board. For example, as of March 31, 2024 the general fund was overstated by $584,018 and the highway fund was understated by $123,066. As a result, the board lacked reliable records and reports to manage the town’s financial operations. The supervisor also did not prepare any monthly bank reconciliations during our audit period and the adjusted bank balances did not agree with the cash balance from the accounting records. The general fund and the highway fund cash balances as of March 31, 2024 were overstated by a combined total of $460,952. The issues identified may have been detected had the board annually audited the supervisor’s records as required by state law.

Montauk Fire District – Payroll – Advanced Life Support (ALS) Employees (Suffolk County)

The board overpaid its 13 ALS employees a total of $9,386. A lack of oversight and inadequate controls led to the overpayments occurring. The district’s inconsistent time records and the secretary-treasurer not reconciling time records before processing payroll enabled three ALS employees to overlap their shifts at the district and the neighboring Amagansett Fire District. Had the chairman of the board, who was responsible for reviewing the payroll, checked the calculations or verified that ALS employee hourly rates were correct before certifying the payroll each pay period, the payroll calculation errors may have been identified and corrected.

Town of Wawayanda – Financial Operations (Orange County)

The board and town officials did not properly manage financial operations, and the board did not provide adequate oversight. The board adopted unrealistic budgets. For example, the board continuously adopted budgets that underestimated revenues by approximately $5.2 million and appropriated $2.2 million of fund balance that was not needed to fund operations during the audit scope period. The board did not effectively manage the town’s fund balance over the last five fiscal years, resulting in operating surpluses that increased unrestricted fund balance from $4.3 million for all funds to $7.7 million as of the end of 2023 or 118% of the 2024 appropriations. The board also did not adopt a fund balance policy. Therefore, no rationale was established for maintaining this level of unrestricted fund balance. As a result, real property tax obligations for town residents were likely higher than necessary.

Auburn Industrial Development Authority (AIDA) – Project Approval and Monitoring (Cayuga County)

The board and AIDA officials did not properly approve and monitor projects. The board and AIDA officials did not review all supplemental documentation for project approval or properly monitor the 16 active projects. AIDA officials did not require project owners to submit supporting documentation for capital investment and job data with applications and ensure project owners submitted the required annual reporting form and supporting documentation needed to monitor project goals, including job retention and creation. In addition, AIDA officials did not conduct policy-required site visits in 2023 and 2024. As a result, the board and AIDA officials did not adequately monitor job creation and retention and did not determine the reasons for all of the variances between 2023 year-end jobs and project goals or document their assessments.

Village of Hudson Falls – Information Technology (IT) (Washington County)

The village board and officials did not establish adequate controls to safeguard IT systems or develop adequate IT policies or procedures. In addition, the board did not develop and adopt an IT contingency plan to help minimize the risk of data loss or suffering a serious interruption of services, periodically test backups or provide IT security awareness training. As a result, village officials cannot be assured that village IT systems are secured and protected against unauthorized use, access and loss, and there is an increased risk that officials could lose important data and suffer a serious interruption in operations.

###

Appeal alleging a violation of the New York State's Dignity for All Students Act supported only by hearsay evidence and subjective interpretations dismissed

The Dignity for All Students Act* [Dignity Act] seeks to provide the State’s public elementary and secondary school students with a safe and supportive environment free from discrimination, intimidation, taunting, harassment, and bullying on school property, a school bus and/or at a school function. 

In this appeal to the Commissioner of Education the Petitioner alleged that the teacher acted unprofessionally toward a student when she accused a certain student and others of cheating, and “intentionally ignored” the student thereafter.  For relief, Petitioner asked that the Commissioner find the teacher had violated the Dignity Act as well as her “removal” from employment with the school district.

Addressing the merits of the Petitioner's appeal, the Commissioner noted hat a district’s Dignity Act determination [1] will only be reversed upon a showing that it was arbitrary or capricious and [2] the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief.

Finding that the record indicated the School District's Dignity Act coordinator "promptly investigated by interviewing the student and reviewing the complaint and supporting materials" and ultimately determined that the complaint “was not based on harassment, bullying, or discrimination as defined in [the Dignity Act]", the Commissioner found that Petitioner's conflict was with "the teacher’s general teaching/advising style” and the Petitioner’s evidence concerning the matter consisted of "hearsay statements and his subjective interpretation of the  correspondence [received] from the teacher".  

Weighing the probative value of the parties’ respective submissions, the Commissioner found that Petitioner "failed to prove that school district’s Dignity Act determination was arbitrary or capricious" nor had the Petitioner identified any relief that could have been awarded were he to have prevailed as the teacher had earlier resigned from her position with the school district.

* The Dignity Act amended the New York State Education Law by creating a new Article 2 – Dignity for All Students and, in addition, amended Section 801-a of such law addressing instruction in civility, citizenship, and character education and amended Section 2801 of said law by requiring Boards of Education to include language addressing The Dignity Act in their respective codes of conduct.

The text of the Commissioner's decision, Decision of the Commissioner of Education No. 18,551, is set out below and is posted on the Internet.

Decision No. 18,551

Appeal of E.G., on behalf of his child, from action of the Board of Education of the Whitehall Central School District regarding student bullying and application for the removal of a teacher.

Decision No. 18,551

(February 14, 2025)

Girvin & Ferlazzo, P.C., attorneys for respondent, Ryan P. Mullahy and Victoria A. Mosley, Esqs., of counsel

ROSA., Commissioner.--Petitioner appeals a determination of the Board of Education of the Whitehall Central School District (“respondent”) regarding bullying and harassment.  He also seeks the removal of a teacher in connection therewith.  The appeal must be dismissed and the application denied.

Petitioner’s child (the “student”) attended respondent’s high school at all times relevant to this appeal.  On May 8, 2024, petitioner filed a Dignity for All Students Act (“Dignity Act”) complaint alleging that the student’s English teacher engaged in bullying and harassment during the 2023-2024 school year.  The district’s Dignity Act coordinator proceeded to investigate.  By letter dated May 31, 2024, the coordinator determined that there was insufficient evidence of a Dignity Act violation.  An appeal to respondent was denied by letter dated June 20, 2024; this appeal ensued.

Petitioner alleges that the teacher acted unprofessionally toward the student when she accused her (and others) of cheating, tossed a packet of materials on to the student’s desk, and “intentionally ignored” the student thereafter.  For relief, petitioner requests a determination that the teacher violated the Dignity Act as well as her “removal” from employment with the district.

Respondent contends that the appeal should be dismissed on myriad procedural grounds.  Alternatively, respondent contends that petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof.  Respondent additionally argues that the application for removal is moot insofar as the teacher resigned her position within respondent’s district at the end of the 2023-2024 school year.

Initially, petitioner’s application for removal must be denied for lack of the required notice.  Section 277.1 (b) of the Commissioner’s regulations dictates the specific notice required for removal applications pursuant to Education Law § 306, which is distinct from the notice required under section 275.11 (a) for appeals pursuant to Education Law § 310.  The notice of petition secures jurisdiction over the intended respondent and alerts the respondent that he or she must appear in the removal proceeding and answer the allegations contained in the application (Application of Johnson, et al., 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,055; Appeal of Hertel, 49 id. 267, Decision No. 16,021; Application of Barton, 48 id. 189, Decision No. 15,832).  Thus, a removal application that does not include the specific notice required by 8 NYCRR 277.1 (b) is fatally defective and must be denied (Application of Johnson, et al., 56 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,055; Appeal of White and Carmand, 56 id., Decision No. 16,994; Appeal of Kelly, 45 id. 38, Decision No. 15,253).  Petitioner’s application lacks the required notice and, thus, must be denied (Appeal of Melton, 63 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,359; Appeal of M.B., 56 id., Decision No. 17,044).[1]

Turning to the merits, the Dignity Act prohibits harassment and bullying in public schools.  It defines “harassment” and “bullying,” in relevant part, as: “the creation of a hostile environment by conduct or by threats, intimidation or abuse, including cyberbullying ....” (Education Law § 11 [7]; 8 NYCRR 100.2 [kk] [1] [ix]).  Such a hostile environment may be created where bullying or harassment:

(a) has or would have the effect of unreasonably and substantially interfering with a student's educational performance, opportunities or benefits, or mental, emotional or physical well-being; or

(b) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause a student to fear for his or her physical safety; or

(c) reasonably causes or would reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or emotional harm to a student ....[2]

A district’s Dignity Act determination will only be reversed upon a showing that it was arbitrary or capricious (Appeal of a Student with a Disability, 59 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,859; Appeal of L.D., 55 id., Decision No. 16,864).

In an appeal to the New York State Commissioner of Education, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884).

The record demonstrates that respondent appropriately responded to petitioner’s Dignity Act complaint.  Upon receipt thereof, respondent’s Dignity Act coordinator promptly investigated by interviewing the student and reviewing the complaint and supporting materials.  After doing so, the coordinator determined that the complaint “was not based on harassment, bullying, or discrimination as defined in [the Dignity Act], but rather [petitioner]’s conflict with [the teacher’s] general teaching/advising style.”  Petitioner’s evidence, by contrast, consists of hearsay statements and his subjective interpretation of correspondence from the teacher.  Weighing the probative value of the parties’ submissions, I find that petitioner has failed to prove that respondent’s Dignity Act determination was arbitrary or capricious (see Appeal of G.M., 62 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,257; Appeal of M.E., 62 id., Decision No. 18,248; Appeal of John and Jane Doe, 61 id., Decision No. 18,088).  Moreover, petitioners have not identified any relief that can be awarded at this juncture as the teacher has resigned.

To the extent they are not addressed herein, petitioner’s remaining arguments are without merit.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

THE APPLICATION IS DENIED.

END OF FILE

 

---

[1] Additionally, Education Law § 306 only applies to “school officers,” not school employees such as the teacher (Application of Passer, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,274). 

[2] The fourth and final definition, subsection (d), concerns the circumstances under which off-campus conduct may constitute bullying or harassment (Education Law § 11 [7] [d]). 

The Law and the Emoji - Part 2

N.B.: The trial court's decision was appealed. Below is Professor Goldman's analysis of the appellate court's decision, which included a dissenting opinion.

Thumbs-Up Emoji Formed Binding Sales Contract in Canada–Achter v. South West Terminal

December 20, 2024 · by Eric Goldman · in Emojis, Licensing/Contracts

This is the instant-classic lawsuit involving a Saskatchewan farmer who text-messaged a “thumbs-up” emoji in response to an offer to buy his flax. The lower court found that the seller’s thumbs-up emoji constituted assent to the buyer’s offer and awarded the buyer $82k (Canadian) in damages. Prior blog post. On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on a 2-1 vote.

Note: as usual for Canadian opinions, this is a long read–220 paragraphs, approximately 28k words.

The Majority Opinion

For the most part, the majority opinion endorses the lower court decision, repeatedly saying (in essence) that the lower court judge got it right (or least didn’t make any obvious errors). The lower court judge should feel good about his work. That judge was surely dealing with an emoji interpretation case for his first time, and operates in a community not known for being at the cutting edge of technology law. Nevertheless, the lower court judge wrote a strong and thoughtful opinion that held up on appeal. At the same time, the majority opinion also reflects the standards for appellate review in Canada, which provide some deference to the lower court ruling.

I especially liked the majority’s framing that emoji interpretation isn’t really a new skill for common law courts:

human communication is often subtle. Words, phrases, gestures and symbols may carry more than one meaning. All of this gives rise to the potential for ambiguity and uncertainty and, indeed, litigation. The law has long accommodated for this, and courts are often called upon to determine the legal import of a multitude of communication types between individuals. The fact that, in this case, one part of the communication comprised an emoji simply provides a modern twist to this otherwise rather unremarkable observation

In other words, we need to be careful about overassuming emoji exceptionalism. When I do emoji law trainings for judges, I remind them that emojis are just another form of non-textual communication, and all of the techniques the judges routinely use to interpret human communication are likely to work with emojis as well.

(The most significant emoji exceptionism is the cross-platform depiction diversity issue I discuss in my paper, but that hasn’t generated much activity in court).

The seller argued that he had used the thumbs-up emoji to acknowledge receipt of the buyer’s text, not to assent to it. The majority says that is theoretically possible:

The judge would have committed error had he approached his decision by suggesting that a thumbs up emoji invariably means “I agree” or always bears something akin to that meaning. But he did not do that…

It is irrelevant that a thumbs up emoji may be used in other contexts to communicate other messages or ideas. What matters is the use to which it was put by Mr. Achter in the eyes of an objective observer

Nevertheless, the majority says that the seller chose this particular emoji in this particular context:

ALC submits that, if Mr. Achter had simply intended to acknowledge receipt of a draft contract from Mr. Mickleborough, “it is hard to imagine what other emoji would have been more apt”. However, the premise of this submission is that Mr. Achter was limited to communicating by way of emojis. It was Mr. Achter who chose to use the thumbs up emoji, when in the past he had used words like “looks good”, “ok” and “yup” in a similar situation to form binding contracts.

As a result, the emoji functioned as a signature:

The thumbs up emoji expressed Mr. Achter’s agreement to the contract and the act of sending the emoji with the metadata identified, or authenticated, Mr. Achter as the person expressing that agreement with that intention…

There may be some validity to the proposition that, taken together, the thumbs up emoji with the metadata that accompanied Mr. Achter’s text message could not result in a signature if his text message had not been sent in response to one from Mr. Mickleborough or if there had not been a history of authenticated communications between the parties. However, I do not need to decide if these hypothetical changes to the fact pattern would affect the result of this case.

While Canadian law resembles US law about electronic signatures, the emoji-as-signature issue may have been an easier call in the US courts. I think that the E-Sign and UETA laws in the US make it entirely clear that the emoji usage in this context would satisfy their requirements as a signature.

It appears the seller argued that a signature needs to be a newly created artifact, like how a wet-signature (ink on paper) creates something that didn’t previously exist. The majority does not agree:

I can agree with ALC that Mr. Achter did not create the thumbs up emoji for the purposes of signing contracts. However, the same can be said about the letters that together make up a person’s name. In either case, what is controlling is the use to which the thumbs up emoji or those letters are put.

The majority summarizes its conclusion:

Mr. Achter’s use of the thumbs up emoji communicated his agreement to the terms of the contract proposed by Mr. Mickleborough with the expectation that ALC would be held to it. Because Mr. Achter sent that emoji in a text message from his personal cellphone, there was electronic data that he knew would identify him as the maker of the mark and communicate his agreement to the contract. His text message therefore signed the contract as surely as if he had printed the photograph that Mr. Mickleborough had sent to him and then written his name on that print copy and returned it to Mr. Mickleborough.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissent’s opinion wasn’t easy to read. The judge used a lot of Latin and seemingly hid his takeaway point. He says he “would take judicial notice of the fact that a thumbs-up emoji can signify approval or agreement.” However, he doesn’t think the signature requirement was satisfied because, I believe, the emoji would have needed to be affixed to the contract draft, not communicated in a message separated from the contract text.

This makes me wonder how the dissenting judge would interpret a multi-email negotiation where there is no single email defining the parties’ terms. Would the judge take the position that a contract never formed because there was no “signature” to the contract when the emails collectively would have to constitute the “contract”?

The dissent seems especially odd in light of the parties’ course of dealing. This buyer and seller had previously come to contract terms when the buyer sent a form contract and the seller replied with a brief text (e.g., “OK”) functioning as the signature to that contract. If the parties decide that’s how they would like to communicate with each other, the court should respect that.

Implications

I think this opinion reinforces some lessons we took away from the lower court ruling:

• Emoji law sits on top of longstanding legal principles, many of which the courts can apply without any exceptionalism.
• Using emojis as a communicative tool can have major legal significance. People often misperceive emojis as some second-tier form of communication with no legal implications of their usage. This case showed that a single emoji has substantial consequences–in this case, $82k (CAN). As usual, we are responsible for the words–and emojis–we choose.
• Emojis need to be interpreted in context. Emojis derive meaning from the content preceding them in a conversation, as do all other forms of human communication. Further, in this case, the parties’ course of dealing informed the emoji’s meaning. If the seller and buyer had never dealt with each other, the court might not have been as confident that the thumbs-up was assent and not just acknowledgment. But in the context of a pattern of similar dealings, it was more obvious that the emoji was assent.
• The fact that emojis have multiple meanings isn’t unusual. Many aspects of human communication develop multiple meanings, including slang. And that fact alone doesn’t mean that emojis are fatally ambiguous. Courts are very good at interpreting potentially ambiguous communications, whether that’s words, emojis, or anything else.

Case Citation: Achter Land & Cattle Ltd. v South West Terminal Ltd., 2024 SKCA 115.

The Law and the Emoji

A single 👍 emoji contained in an email that the sender alleged was simply intended to indicate “got it” resulted in a legal battle involving the payment of about $62,000 for certain goods and raised the question "Can an emoji seal a contract?".  

Source: The following was posted on the Internet at:

 https://99percentinvisible.org/?p=45069) (50) 😅⚖️ - YouTube

"In 2021, a Canadian farmer named Chris Achter responded to a buyer’s grain contract with a simple 👍 emoji. What followed wasn’t just a misunderstanding—it was a legal showdown that captured global attention.

"Achter, based in Saskatchewan, had a long-standing business relationship with the buyer. They often finalized grain deals over text. That year, when the buyer sent over a standard flax contract, Achter responded with a thumbs up. Months later, as drought conditions drove up flax prices, the buyer expected a delivery. None came.

"The buyer sued.

"The central question? Does a thumbs up emoji constitute a digital signature?

"A judge ruled that, yes, it did.

"According to Eric Goldman, a law professor at Santa Clara University, Achter later claimed the emoji was merely an acknowledgment—not acceptance. But the court disagreed, calling the emoji a “nontraditional but valid” form of agreement. The court awarded the buyer over $60,000 in damages.

"Goldman put it bluntly: “That single thumbs up emoji was worth tens of thousands of dollars.” 👍

"Goldman believes this approach should be the norm. “It’s exactly what we would hope the courts would do,” he said."