Exhaustion of administrative remedies a condition precedent to seeking judicial relief

Exhaustion of administrative remedies a condition precedent to seeking judicial relief
Dobrin v NYC PBA, Inc., Supreme Court, New York County, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

It is clear that courts, as a general rule, will not consider lawsuits filed by public employees protesting some administrative determination unless the individual has exhausted his or her administrative remedies.*

The major exception to this rule: any attempt to exhaust the available administrative remedy would constitute an exercise in futility. Typically, the courts apply this exception when it is decided that the administrative decision is a foregone conclusion.

As the Dobrin case demonstrates, the same general rule applies in lawsuits filed by an individual against his or her union.

Dobrin, a New York City police officer, apparently had sexual intercourse with a woman in the backseat of his car. The woman later filed a complaint alleging that Dobrin had raped her.

A Grand Jury declined to indict Dobrin. Dobrin, however, was also served with administrative disciplinary charges by the New York City Police Department, found guilty and dismissed from his position.*

Dobrin was a member of the New York City Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association [PBA] at the time the disciplinary hearing was held.

Dobrin complained that although the PBA was supposed to provide legal counsel to its members in such situation, it failed to do so in his case. This, he argued, constituted a breach of contract because PBA failed to supply an attorney to represent him in defending him in the disciplinary action.

Although Dobrin alleged that the PBA wrongfully, negligently, and improperly denied him counsel, State Supreme Court Justice Ira Gammerman pointed out that before Dobrin could bring such a claim, he was required to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.

As Dobrin had not made any attempt to utilize the appeal procedures available to him under the Constitution and By-Laws of the PBA and the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, Judge Gammerman dismissed his petition.

In the words of the court, [a]lthough, [Dobrin] was allegedly denied representation, he elected not to utilize the available [PBA] appeal procedures. Instead, he brought this action. His failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him mandates dismissal of his complaint.

Judge Gammerman commented that the PBA’s By-Laws set out a procedure for a member to appeal a decision by the PBA denying or curtailing a request for legal assistance. In addition, said the court, the City’s Collective Bargaining Law established a Board of Collective Bargaining and gives the Board exclusive jurisdiction to prevent and remedy improper public employer and public employee organization practices.

* The courts will reject a law suit if the party filing the action failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies and such an effort would not constitute "an exercise in futility" such as its finding that the administrative decision would be "a foregone conclusion."

** See Dobrin v. Safir, 272 A.D.2d 134, in which the Appellate Division sustained Dobrin’s termination.

Compensation paid to a member of public retirement system by a private entity not credited in determining the member's Final Average Salary

Compensation paid to a member of public retirement system by a private entity not credited in determining the member's Final Average Salary
Matter of Andrews v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 2011 NY Slip Op 00132, Appellate Division, Third Department

Donald Andrews joined the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System [NYSTRS] in 1967. He retired in 2005 while serving as Superintendent of Schools for the Wallkill Central School District.

Andrews had also “separately served on a part-time basis” from 1986 until 2005 as the chairperson of the Mid Hudson Athletic League (MHAL). MHAL is voluntary athletic association of public and private schools and is not a participating employer in NYSTRS although it operates under a Cooperative Services Agreement of the Ulster Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES). The BOCES is a participating employer in NYSTRS.

When he filed his retirement application, Andrews sought to include the compensation he earned while working for MHAL included in determining his "final average salary" for the purposes of determining his retirement allowance. NYSTRS, however, determined that the compensation Andrews had earned as MHAL's chairperson could not be included in determining his final average salary.

Andrews then filed an Article 78 petition challenged NYSTRS’ decision. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, sustaining NYSTRS’ decision and Andrews appealed.

Essentially Andrews contended that his status and services as a MHAL's chairperson should have been deemed to have been performed as a BOCES employee.

The Appellate Division said that “rather than merely looking to the titles used during an employment relationship,” it must look to the actual conduct of the parties to determine if an employer-employee relationship existed.

The court found that there was a rational basis NYSTRS determining that Andrews was not a part-time employee of BOCES during the relevant period for the following reasons:

1. MHAL's association with BOCES was as a separate entity with its own constitution, bylaws and regulations.

2. BOCES did not certify that Andrews was a BOCES employee to NYSTRS during the period he served as MHAL's chairperson, although though it was required to so certify all its NYSTRS member- employees pursuant to Education Law §520(4).

3. Andrews was employed as a school superintendent while he served as MHAL's chairperson and BOCES's rules for Cooperative Services Agreements provide that "[a] person may not be employed by both a BOCES and a school district for the same contract period."

4. Andrews’ employment contracts with Wallkill Central School District provided that while it would pay him for his work as chairperson of MHAL, MHAL would ultimately bear the responsibility of reimbursing the school district for those wages.

Consequently, said the Appellate Division, NYSTRS’ determination that Andrews was employed by MHAL was not irrational, despite the evidence to the contrary that he presented.

In Jensen-Dooling v New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 68 AD3d 1264, and in Blais v New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 68 AD3d 1266, the Appellate Division ruled that individuals must be employed by a public employer to claim member service credit in a New York State public retirement system.

Both of these actions involved the same basic issue: the denial of member service credit in the New York State Teachers’ Retirement System claimed by Jensen-Dooling and by Blais based on their employment by an entity named “Project Lead The Way”, a private, not-for-profit corporation performing services for school districts pursuant to contracts.*

In a similar type of situation, the Appellate Division held that an individual employed by a private entity and paid with funds provided by the City of New York is not “paid by the City” for the purpose of membership in the New York City Employees Retirement System [Matter of Ivan v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 63 AD3d 572].

The court explained that Richard Ivan worked for a private corporation under contract with New York City Department. of Health & Mental Hygiene. Although Ivan was paid with funds provided by the City, he was not "paid for by the city" as that term is defined in the Administrative Code of City of NY §13-101[3][a].**

* The Jensen-Dooling and Blais decisions are summarized by NYPPL at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2009/12/individual-must-be-employed-by-public.html

** The Ivan decision is summarized by NYPPL at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/03/individual-employed-by-private-entity.html

The text of the Andrews decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_00132.htm

Statute of limitations not stayed when pursuing another remedy

Statute of limitations not stayed when pursuing another remedy
Levine v Board of Education, 272 AD2d 328

Sometimes an individual will file a grievance in accordance with the grievance procedure set out in a collective bargaining agreement rather than immediately initiate a lawsuit on the assumption that he or she can file the lawsuit later.

The Levine case is another example of the difficulties an individual may encounter if he or she does not take the steps necessary to protect his or her right to litigate the issue.

The New York City Board of Education terminated Martin Levine from his position as laboratory specialist. When he later attempted to challenge his dismissal by filing a petition pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, he found that he was time barred.

Levine’s problem: he had filed a contract grievance disputing his termination under the assumption that filing a grievance would stop the running of the Statute of Limitations for the purposes of his filing an Article 78 petition until the conclusion of the grievance procedure and the arbitrator issued a final determination.

Levine’s assumption proved to be incorrect, as the Appellate Division quickly pointed out.

Affirming the dismissal of his petition by State Supreme Court William J. Garry as untimely, the Appellate Division set out the following factors as basic to individual litigating an issue initially submitted for adjudication under a grievance procedure:

1. An Article 78 must be commenced within four months after the determination to be reviewed becomes final and binding.

2. Where, as in Levin’s case, a review of an administrative decision is sought, the determination, for the purposes of bringing a timely Article 78, becomes final and binding on the date that the termination of individual’s employment becomes effective.

3. The invocation of an administrative grievance procedure in accordance with a Taylor Law agreement does not stop the running of the Statute of Limitations.

Levine could probably have avoided this problem by filing an Article 78 petition within the four-month Statute of Limitations period even though a final determination on his grievance had not yet been made.

Standing to appeal an arbitrator's determination

Standing to appeal an arbitrator's determination
Delgado v NYC Board of Education, 272 AD2d 207, Leave to appeal denied, 95 NY2d 768

The basic issue in the Delgado case concerns the right of an individual to bring a lawsuit involving the same issue[s] considered by an arbitrator in resolving a grievance filed in accordance with procedures negotiated under the Taylor Law.

John Delgado, an employee of the Board of Education Office of School Food and Nutritional Services, was terminated from his position. His grievance protesting his dismissal was denied by an arbitrator.

In an effort to vacate or modify an arbitration decision rejecting his grievance challenging his termination of his employment Delgado filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking to vacate the arbitrator’s award.

The Board of Education opposed Delgado’s motion. The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court ruling summarily dismissing Delgado’s petition.

The court’s rationale: Delgado lacks standing to bring the instant petition since he was represented by the union at the arbitration.

Significantly, the Appellate Division said that although the issue of standing was first raised by the Board of Education in its appeal, it presented a question of law -- did the court have jurisdiction to adjudicate Delgado’s petition -- that could not have been avoided had it been raised before the lower court. Accordingly, it was proper to raise, and the court to consider, the question of jurisdiction at the appellate level.

In other words, if Delgado did not have standing to bring the Article 75 action, the courts may not consider his petition in the first instance and that issue -- jurisdiction -- may be raised by a party at any stage of the proceeding.

Clearly, had the union filed an Article 75 petition challenging the arbitrator’s determination, it would have found to have standing.

It is generally held that unless the Taylor Law agreement includes an uncommon provision -- allowing an employee himself or herself to demand arbitration of his or her grievance independent of the union -- the right to demand that a grievance be submitted to arbitration is vested exclusively in the employee organization.*

Accordingly, as a general rule, only the union has to right to challenge an adverse determination by the arbitrator by filing an Article 75 petition seeking to vacate or modify the award.

* Such a limitation is tempered, however, and the individual is typically permitted go forward with the arbitration in the event he or she can demonstrate that the union failed in “its duty of fair representation.”

The timeliness of the filing of an appointee’s Oath of Office critical to his or her continuation in the position

The timeliness of the filing of an appointee’s Oath of Office critical to his or her continuation in the position
Matter of Scro v Board of Educ. of the Jordan-Elbridge Cent. School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 30182(U), Sup Court, Onondaga County, Judge Donald A. Greenwood [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

Anthony Scro filed an Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul the decision of Jordan-Elbridge Central School District Board of Education terminating his employment as “Treasurer” of the School District as a result of his alleged failure to file his Oath of Office in timely fashion.*

The Board moved to dismiss Scro’s petition, contending that its action was consistent with law in that Scro had failed to file his Oath of Office within the time period permitted by Public Officers Law §30.1.h and thus he had been removed from his position “ by operation of law.”

Public Officers Law §30.1.h, in pertinent part, provides that a public office “shall be vacant upon” … the appointee’s “refusal or neglect to file his official oath or undertaking, if one is required … within thirty days after notice of his appointment, or within thirty days after the commencement of such term; or to file a renewal undertaking within the time required by law, or if no time be so specified, within thirty days after notice to him in pursuance of law, that such renewal undertaking is required.”

According to the decision, Scro was initially appointed to the statutory office of School District Treasurer, effective October 31, 2007. He was thereafter reappointed at the beginning of the following three fiscal years at the School Board’s annual reorganization meetings in July, each such reappointment being to a new twelve month term as Treasurer.

Scro was last appointed to that position by the Board to serve a one-year term effective July 1, 2010 and had signed his Oath of Office on August 9, 2010.

The Board alleged that Scro’s term began on July 1, 2010 and the Board had reappointed him on July 7, 2010. Accordingly, said the Board, the latest possible date for Scro to file his Oath of Office within the time period permitted by §30.1.h was Friday, August 6, 2010.

Observing that “The requirement for the taking and filing of an Oath of Office is not an obscure requirement, but instead is fundamental and of significant import …” Judge Greewood said that the requirement is not waivable and is strictly construed and that had Scro failed to file his Oath of Office within the requisite thirty days as required by §30.1.h, the appointment would be vitiated and the office would be deemed vacant.

In this instance, said the court, the timeliness of Scro’s execution of his Oath of Office is critical. Was it filed “within thirty days after notice of his appointment, or within thirty days after the commencement of such term...”, as required by statute?

Judge Greenwood said that “There is no question that [Scro’s] term commenced on July 1, 2010 and the appointment did not take place until the School Board’s reorganizational meeting of July 7, 2010” nor was there any question that Scro had not executed his Oath of Office within thirty days of either of those dates.

However, observed Judge Greenwood, §2121(5) of the Education Law provides that it is the duty of the school district clerk to “give notice immediately to every person elected or appointed to the office of his election or appointment; and also to report to the town clerk of the town in which the school house of his district is situated, the names and post-office addresses of such officers, under a penalty of five dollars for neglect in each instance.”

As the Legislature specifically required notice to an officer and not simply action of the Board.
Judge Greenwood said that Jeanette Brock, the School District Clerk, was obligated to discharge her statutory duty under the Education Law "by providing notice to each officer of his [or her] appointment and this constituted a condition precedent to the officers’ execution of the Oath."

Finding that Brock had advised all officers required to sign the Oath of Office form “within three to four business days of the reorganization meeting”, and viewed in the light most favorable to the Board, Brock provided the Scro with notice on either July 12 or July 13, and that Scro had signed his Oath of Office on August 9, Judge Greenwood ruled that Scro had timely executed his Oath of Office and thus he may not be removed during the term of his employment except through petition to the Commissioner of Education.

Holding that the Board’s action in terminating Scro’s employment violated his statutory rights, Judge Greenwood declared the Board’s action “null and void and ultra vires”** and ordered Scro’s immediately reinstatement to his office as District Treasurer “with all back pay and associated benefits he would have been entitled to had the improper termination not occurred.”

* N.B. The failure to file a timely oath cannot be cured by subsequently filing the required oath [Opinion of the Attorney General, 86-41, Informal].

** Ultra vires -- beyond the power of the body so acting.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2011/2011_30182.pdf