ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

February 22, 2012

Filing a complaint about a school teacher with the school district may not be protected by an “absolute privilege”

Filing a complaint about a school teacher with the school district may not be protected by an “absolute privilege”
Posner v Lewis, 2012 NY Slip Op 01323, Court of Appeals

In this tort action, the Court of Appeal said that it must decide whether defendants' course of conduct in instigating complaints to school authorities against Posner, a nontenured teacher, is entitled to an absolute privilege under Brandt v Winchell (3 NY2d 628]) that would warrant dismissal of Posner's causes of action for prima facie tort and tortious interference with prospective contractual rights.

The Court’s conclusion: Assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint, as we must at this early stage of the litigation, we conclude that defendants' conduct is not immunized by Brandt.

In Brandt the court recognized an "immunity from civil suit" for truthful communications resulting in "the exposure of those guilty of offenses against the public" (3 NY2d at 635).

The Posner decision is posted on the Internet at:

February 21, 2012

A probationer has the burden of establishing that he or she was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statute or decisional law

A probationer has the burden of establishing that he or she was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statute or decisional law
Appeal of Lindsey Stephenson, Decisions of the Commissioner Education, Decision No. 16,329

Lindsey Stephenson, a probationary educator, was notified that her position was being abolished, effective June 30, 2010, and that she would be placed on a preferred eligible list. 

Subsequently, and as the result of an investigation following a report concerning an alleged incident involving students, the principal submitted a letter to the superintendent recommending that Stephenson be terminated. 

On the basis of the principal’s recommendation, superintendent notified Lindsey that he would recommend that the board terminate her from her position. 

Lindsey requested, and received a written statement of the reasons for the superintendent’s recommendation to terminate her services as a probationary teacher pursuant to Education Law §3031. Ultimately the school board voted to terminate Lindsey’s employment and to remove her from the preferred eligible list. 

Although the Commissioner dismissed Lindsey’s appeal for a number of other technical reasons, his decision notes that “it is well settled that a school employee who elects to submit an issue for resolution through a contractual grievance procedure may not bring an appeal to the Commissioner of Education for review of the same matter.”

Here the record indicated that Lindsey brought a grievance in which she alleged that the district violated the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and as relief “sought rescission of her termination and placement on the preferred eligibility list.” Her grievance was denied. Lindsey than filed a second grievance, alleging that the district violated certain provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. This grievance was also denied.

The Commissioner then said the “Even if the petition was not dismissed on procedural grounds, it would be dismissed on the merits.  Generally, a board of education has the unfettered right to terminate a probationary teacher or administrator’s employment for any reason unless the employee establishes that he or she was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statute or decisional law.”

Noting that Lindsey disagreed with School Board’s decision to terminate her services, the Commissioner found that she had not establish that Board had terminated her employment for a constitutionally impermissible reason or in violation of a statutory proscription or decisional law.  Nor, said the Commissioner, the record did not support Lindsey’s assertions that Board had acted in bad faith

Finding that “On the record before me, there is no basis for overturning [the Board’s] decision to terminate [Lindsey’s] probationary appointment,” the Commissioner dismissed Lindsey’s appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

February 18, 2012

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli
[Issued during the week of February 13 - 19, 2012]

For details, click on the text highlighted in color below.

DiNapoli Makes Property Tax Cap Information Available

Local governments and school districts are required to report the information used in calculating their tax cap for the coming fiscal year prior to adopting a budget. An estimated 4,000 local governments and school districts may be required to report this information annually. Over 2,000 local governments have already submitted their tax cap reports and that information is now available on Open Book New York, which will be updated nightly. Please note, the tax cap information found on Open Book New York reflects the data as submitted by local governments; it has not been edited or certified by the Comptroller’s Office.


DiNapoli: Village Officials Used LDC to Avoid State Procurement Laws

The village of Cornwall–on–Hudson skirted state procurement laws by using the Cornwall–on–Hudson Local Development Corporation to construct a new public works garage that was built on unsuitable land, failed to meet building codes and cost $929,000, according to an audit released Wednesday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.


DiNapoli: Pension Fund Gains in Third Quarter of FY 2011

The New York State Common Retirement Fund (Fund) was valued at $140.3 billion after Fund investments posted an estimated 4.83 percent rate of return for the third quarter ending December 31, 2011, according to New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.


DiNapoli’s Office Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller” office completed the following audits in the last two weeks:

The Town of Warren; and;
The Westport Fire District.

February 17, 2012

The failure of the appointing authority to designate the §75 hearing officer in writing is a fatal jurisdictional defect

The failure of the appointing authority to designate the §75 hearing officer in writing is a fatal jurisdictional defect
Gardner v Coxsackie-Athens Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2012 NY Slip Op 01156

A Civil Service Law §75 hearing officer found in A. Dennis Gardner guilty charges alleging that he had engaged in “inappropriate behavior” and he was terminated from his head custodian position by the Coxsackie-Athens Board of Education.

Gardner appealed claiming that the decision and the penalty imposed had to be annulled as the hearing officer had not been designated to serve as the hearing officer in writing as mandated by §75.2 of the Civil Service Law. The Appellate Division agreed and annulled the school board’s determination.

Noting that Civil Service Law §75(2) mandates that an employee disciplinary proceeding "shall be held by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such charges are preferred, or by a . . . person designated by such officer or body in writing,” the Appellate Division said that “in the absence of a written designation” the removing body or hearing officer has no jurisdiction to discipline an employee and “any disposition flowing from such a proceeding will be void.”

Although in cases as Perryman v Village of Saranac Lake, 64 AD3d 830 where there was evidence that the designation of hearing officer was reflected in minutes of board meeting and Stafford v Mohonasen CSD, 61 AD3 1259, (Leave to Appeal denied, 13 NY3d 704) where the “designation of hearing officer memorialized in letter referencing appointment of hearing officer at board meeting,” in this instance the Appellate Division said that Coxsackie-Athens “provided no evidence that it ever designated the Hearing Officer in writing as required by Civil Service Law §75(2).”

The court rejected Coxsackie-Athens argument that Gardner “had notice of the Hearing Officer's identity because its attorney copied [Gardner] on an e-mail to the Hearing Officer establishing the time and date of the hearing.”

The e-mail, said the court, “did not reference any official designation of the Hearing Officer” by Coxsackie-Athens and, citing Perez v New York State Dept. of Labor, 244 AD2d 844, ruled that the school district’s reliance on such a writing was insufficient to meet the specific requirement of Civil Service Law §75(2).

In addition, the Appellate Division pointed out that this “jurisdictional defect” could not be waived by Gardner’s failure to object to the defect.

The Appellate Division said that the Hearing Officer's determination and school district’s adoption thereof must be annulled and that Gardner was to be restored to his former position, with back pay and benefits.

Addressing the school district’s claim that Gardner’s Article 78 petition was untimely, the Appellate Division said that Supreme Court’s holding that the four-month statute of limitations to commence an CPLR Article 78 proceeding was extended for 30 days upon filing a notice of claim under Education Law §3813(1) was correct and, therefore, Gardner’s Article 78 petition was timely.

New York courts have distinguished between proceedings “which on the one hand seek only enforcement of private rights and duties and those on the other in which it is sought to vindicate a public interest; the provisions of subdivision 1 of section 3813 are applicable as to the former but not as to the latter” (see Union Free School Dist. No. 6 of Towns of Islip & Smithtown v New York State Div. of Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 NY2d 371, 380, rearg denied 36 NY2d 807).
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The 2012 edition of the Discipline Book is now available
To learn more about this concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
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The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_01156.htm

Tenure by estoppel

Tenure by estoppel

Andrews v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op 00845, Appellate Division, First Department

Education Law §§2573(1)(a) and 3012(2) requires that a probationary employee whose employment will not be continued be given the 60-day written notice that he or she was not recommended for tenure.

Although Dana Andrews was not given the required written notice and claimed to have taught for one day after the expiration of her probationary term, the Appellate Division ruled that Andrews had not acquired tenure by estoppel.

The court said that the record shows that the New York City Department of Education [DOE] “did not, ‘with full knowledge and consent,’ permit her to continue to teach after her probationary term expired.” According to the decision, it was undisputed that Andrews was informed in May 2009 that her employment would be discontinued, “and when she reported for duty on September 8, 2009, she was told immediately that she had been terminated, and was given no further assignments.”

Explaining that Andrews was not paid for working on September 8, 2009 and the DOE’s actions "speak loudly against any supposition that [DOE] meant to perpetuate [Andrews's] employment" the Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s denial of her petition seeking a court order declaring that she had attained tenure by estoppel.

Tenure by estoppel "results when a school board fails to take the action required by law to grant or deny tenure and, with full knowledge and consent, permits a teacher to continue to teach beyond the expiration of the probationary term," [Lindsey v Board of Education of Mt. Morris Central School District, 72 AD2d 18].

However, in Tucker v Board of Education, 189 AD2d 704, the Appellate Division held that Tucker was entitled to pay corresponding to the number of days for which she was not provided the statutory 60 days of notice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s determination [see 82 N.Y.2d 274]. The court noted that while the law does not specially provide for a remedy in the event the notice requirement is not met, the courts and the Commissioner of Education have consistently held that in cases involving intentional delay or as a result of oversight, teachers are to be awarded one day of pay for each day that the notice was late.

The Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of the statute's 60-day notice requirement is to afford probationary teachers a reasonable period of time, before the end of their probationary period, to make plans for the upcoming school year and is a rule founded on reasons of practicality and fairness to probationary teachers. It said that there was nothing in the statute or its legislative history indicating that there should be an exception to law's broader purpose of providing probationary teachers with minimal notice of tenure denials to enable them to seek other employment.

The Andrews decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_00845.htm

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
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NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com