A union’s duty of fair representation

A union’s duty of fair representation

County of Tompkins and Tompkins County Sheriff and Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, Inc., 44 PERB ¶3024, U-28437, U-28483

The Board affirmed the dismissal of a charge by the Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, Inc. (Association), which alleged that the joint employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting to interest arbitration a proposal to exclude all unit employees not on the payroll at the time of contract ratification and/or the date of an interest arbitration award from receiving retroactive payments of wages and benefits. 

Although a demand for retroactivity of wages and benefits is generally a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act and arbitrable under §204.9(g) of the Act, the Association asserted that the joint employer’s proposal was prohibited based upon the rationale in the Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Baker v Board of Education, Hoosick Falls Central School District, 3 AD3d 678, 37 PERB ¶7502 (3d Dept 2004).

In that decision, the appellate court concluded that the particular facts alleged in a plenary action were sufficient to state a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation based upon the employee organization’s alleged failure to provide any representation to the plaintiffs, who had been excluded from receiving retroactive salary increases under a negotiated agreement.

The Board noted that in reaching its decision, the Appellate Division was obligated to grant all reasonable inferences to the factual allegations of bad faith and arbitrariness made in the complaint. Accordingly, the Board found that the Hoosick Falls decision does not stand for the substantive proposition that parties are prohibited from proposing the exclusion of one group of employee from a negotiated retroactive salary increase or other benefits.

In its decision, the Board also resolved exceptions and cross-exceptions to the ALJ’s conclusions with respect to the arbitrability of various Association proposals under §209.4(g) of the Act. The Board concluded that the Association’s mandatory on-call and General Municipal Law §207-c proposals were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because they were unitary demands that included inseparable nonarbitrable components under §209.4(g) of the Act.

The Board emphasized that the application of the unitary demand principle to disputes under §209.4(g) of the Act is necessitated by the Legislature’s public policy choice of dividing the subject matter of proposals for deputy sheriffs into two classes with distinct impasse procedures.

The Association’s health insurance buy-out, rate of pay and overtime proposals were found to be arbitrable because they are directly related to compensation. However, the Board found that the Association’s proposals concerning union leave, road patrol schedules, and clothing were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act.

Providing employees with legal representation and reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defense of a civil action arising out work related activities

Providing employees with legal representation and reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defense of a civil action arising out work related activities

Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2012 NY Slip Op 04280, Appellate Division, First Department [See, also, Sagal-Cotler v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2012 NY Slip Op 04281, Appellate Division, First Department]

The genesis of the Thomas action: An individual employed as a paraprofessional by the New York City Department of Education (DOE), sought to obtain legal representation pursuant to Education Law §2560(1) when she was named as the defendant in a civil action.*

To obtain legal representation pursuant to the statute in such a situation, however, the individual must meet three requirements: 

1. He or she must have acted within the scope of her employment;

2. He or she must have acted in the discharge of her duties; and

3. His or her action must not have been in violation any rule or regulation of the DOE at the time of the incident.

The Corporation Counsel rejected the individual request for representation and indemnification if held liable.

Noting that the Corporation Counsel is empowered by General Municipal Law §50-k(2) to make factual determinations in the first instance as to whether the individual violated any agency rule or regulation, which "determination may be set aside only if it lacks a factual basis and in that sense, is arbitrary and capricious," the Appellate Division sustained the Corporation Counsel’s decision.

Although the individual denied the charges that had been filed against her, the court said that the allegations against her were "substantiated" at the conclusion of an investigation. Significantly, said the Appellate Division, the individual did not challenge the disciplinary findings against her.

Accordingly, the Corporation Counsel’s determination denying the individual with legal representation and indemnification in a civil action arising out of this incident had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.

In so ruling the Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court’s holding that Education Law §2560, which incorporates by reference General Municipal Law §50-k, and Education Law §3028, are not in conflict and should be read together and "applied harmoniously and consistently," citing Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199.

The Appellate Division explained that "It is the duty of the courts to so construe two statutes that they will be in harmony, if that can be done without violating the established canons of statutory interpretation," (see McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 1, Statutes §398).

In this instance the Appellate Division said that individual was acting within the scope of her employment since the incident occurred in a classroom but the alleged action, hitting a child on the head during a lesson, violated DOE Chancellor's Regulation A-420 as well as a Statewide rule prohibiting corporal punishment (see 8 NYCRR 19.5[a][2]).

Accordingly, said the court, the alleged act was not undertaken in the discharge or furtherance of the individual’s duties as a school employee, regardless of the purpose of the alleged act.

 

The decision notes that it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a court, "in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" and the plain meaning of the statutory language is "the clearest indicator of legislative intent.”

Both Education Law §§3028 and 2560 provide for the legal representation and indemnification of Board of Education employees. However, they each set forth different circumstances under which such representation and indemnification are to be provided.

When read together, said the court, it is clear that, pursuant to Education Law §3028, a board of education must provide legal representation and pay attorney's fees and expenses incurred in the defense of an employee in any action arising out of a disciplinary action taken against a student by an employee while acting in the scope of his or her employment and in the discharge of his or her duties, unless, pursuant to Education Law §2560(1), the employee is a member of a board of education in a city having a population of one million or more, and, pursuant to General Municipal Law §50-k, he or she violated any rule or regulation of the agency.

* §§17 and 18 of the Public Officers Law respectively address providing State officers and employees and officers and employees of political subdivisions of the State with legal representation and reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defense of a civil action arising out an act or omission involving the performance of official duties. §19 of the Public Officers Law provides for the state to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred by or on behalf of a State officer or employee in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding in a state or federal court arising out of any act which occurred while such officer or employee was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties upon his or her acquittal or upon the dismissal of the criminal charges against him or her or reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection.

The Thomas decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04280.htm

The Sagal-Cotler decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04281.htm

Individual dismissed after being found guilty of stealing from a fellow employee

Individual dismissed after being found guilty of stealing from a fellow employee

Clinkscales v Kelly, 2012 NY Slip Op 04287, Appellate Division, First Department

New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly dismissed a police officer found guilty of disciplinary charges that alleged that the officer had stolen a money order from a fellow officer and deposited it in her bank account.

Holding that there was substantial evidence to support finding the officer guilty of the charges filed against her, the Appellate Division then addressed the issue of the officer’s request for an adjournment of the hearing pending the disposition of the complaining officers' related disciplinary charges.

The court ruled that the officer was not deprived of due process as her counsel agreed to the scheduled hearing date, knowing that the minutes, but not the decision, in the related matter were available. Indeed, the decision reports that the officer had a copy of the complaining officers' testimony in the related hearing.

Further, said the court, the decision in the related matter was not probative of any issue in the officer’s disciplinary proceeding.

As to the penalty imposed, dismissal, the Appellate Division said that it did not shock its sense of fairness, citing Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04287.htm

Negotiating under the Taylor Law in joint employment relationship

Negotiating under the Taylor Law in joint employment relationship

Negotiating under the Taylor Law in joint employment relationship

Matter of the County of Erie, 44 PERB ¶3027, U-28856

The Board affirmed, as modified, a decision of a PERB Administrative Law Judge finding that the County of Erie violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act when it refused to execute memoranda of agreement negotiated and signed by CSEA and the Erie County Medical Center Corporation.

The Board reiterated that Public Authorities Law §§3629 and 3630 demonstrate a clear legislative intent to create a statutory joint employment relationship between the County and ECMCC, but with unique characteristics distinct from those of other joint employers designated under the Act.

The Board held that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by failing to sign the agreements because the County had previously acquiesced in ECMCC conducting separate direct negotiations with CSEA resulting in memoranda of agreement that the County signed and the County failed to inform ECMCC and CSEA that it would not execute future agreements resulting from the direct ECMCCCSEA negotiations. 

Failure to cooperate defeats allegations the union violated Civil Service Law §209-a [The Taylor Law] when it withdrew from representing the individual in a disciplinary proceeding

Failure to cooperate defeats allegations the union violated Civil Service Law §209-a [The Taylor Law] when it withdrew from representing the individual in a disciplinary proceeding

Ronald Grassel and United Federation Of Teachers, Local 2, PERB Case U-29040

PERB Administrative Law Judge Blassman dismissed the charge which alleged that the United Federation of Teachers [UFT] violated §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act when it withdrew as Grassel’s representative in his Education Law §3020-a disciplinary proceeding.

The ALJ found that the UFT did not act arbitrarily, discriminatory or in bad faith when it withdrew as Grassel’s representative, the standard required for such violations.

The record showed that NYSUT, which was representing Grassel on behalf of the UFT, withdrew as Grassel’s representative because Grassel sent a letter to the arbitrator in which he made various motions and requests to the arbitrator and refused to rescind that letter upon NYSUT’s request. The ALJ found that, by making motions and requests normally reserved for the assigned attorney, Grassel had failed to cooperate with NYSUT in his representation and had impinged upon the negotiating representative’s rights under the Act to make litigation and trial decisions.