Extending a probationary period

Extending a probationary period

76 AD2d 973

An individual was permanently appointed to a position with the State subject to his satisfactorily completing a 52-week probationary period.

As a result of his being absent from work 24 days due to job-related injury, he was told that his probationary period was extended “24 days”. The employee was subsequently dismissed from his position “for failure to satisfactorily complete the probationary period.”

The individual sued, seeking a court order directing his reinstatement to the position. The Appellate Division, however, rejected his argument that he became permanent at the end of 52 weeks, holding that the Rules for the Classified Service* for employees of the State as the employer, provided that the “Maximum period of probationary term of any employee shall be extended by the number of work days of his absence which ... are not counted as time served in the probationary term."

The court explained that the "rationale of the regulation is to add to the expiration date of the probationary period the same period of time that the (employee) had missed during his probationary period, so that his performance of duty could be fully observed and evaluated for an entire 52 week period."

* See 4 NYCRR 4.5(g). A number of municipal civil service commissions and personnel officers have adopted similar rules.
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State voters may amend a state's constitution to prohibit consideration of racial preferences with respect admission to colleges and universities if it does not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose

State voters may amend a state's constitution to prohibit consideration of racial preferences with respect admission to colleges and universities if it does not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose

Schuette v. Coal. Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigration Rights, USSC, Docket 12-682

The summary of the decision set out below was prepared by Justia. The text of the decision, the several concurring opinions and the dissent are posted on the Internet at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-682

After the Supreme Court decided that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions plan’s use of race-based preferences violated the Equal Protection Clause, but that its law school admission plan’s limited use did not, Michigan voters adopted a new section of the state constitution (Proposal 2), prohibiting use of race-based preferences in the admissions process for state universities.

The district court upheld Proposal 2, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that it violated Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, reasoned that the principle that consideration of race in admissions is permissible when certain conditions are met was not challenged; the issue was whether, and how, state voters may choose to prohibit consideration of such racial preferences. The decision by Michigan voters reflects an ongoing national dialogue; there was no infliction of a specific injury of the type at issue in cases cited by the Sixth Circuit. Individual liberty has constitutional protection, but the Constitution also embraces the right of citizens to act through a lawful electoral process, as Michigan voters did. Justices Scalia and Thomas stated that the question here, as in every case in which neutral state action is said to deny equal protection on account of race, is whether the challenged action reflects a racially discriminatory purpose. Stating that it did not, the Justices stated that the proposition that a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a disparate racial impact “has been squarely and soundly rejected.”

Justice Breyer agreed that the amendment is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, but reasoned that the amendment only applies to, and forbids, race-conscious admissions programs that consider race solely in order to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student body; the Constitution permits, but does not require, the use of that kind of race-conscious program. The ballot box, not the courts, is the instrument for resolving debates about such programs. This case does not involve a diminution of the minority’s ability to participate in the political process.

A press release advising of the publication of Professor John D. Skrentny’s latest book, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS, [Princeton University Press, 2013] notes that this year marks the 50^th anniversary of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, but talking about race at work remains as difficult as ever.

Professor Skrentny brings together the latest social science studies and evidence to provide a comprehensive picture of how employers manage racial difference in the 21^st century—and sets out his views as to why the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is no longer in sync with that picture.

For additional information about this book, click on:

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10095.html
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Loss of a required license or permit to perform the duties of the position

Loss of a required license or permit to perform the duties of the position

2014 NY Slip Op 50585(U),  Supreme Court, Dutchess County, Judge James D. Pagones (Not selected for publication in the Official Reports.)

In this Article 78 action a former employee of a State agency [Petitioner] challenged his summary dismissal from his position on the grounds that he did not possess a valid driver’s license to operate a motor vehicle in New York State. Petitioner asked Supreme Court to (1) annulling the Employer’s terminating him from his position, (2) directing his reinstatement to his position with back pay, benefits, service time, seniority and other fringe benefits; and (3) award him the costs and disbursements of this proceeding, together with reasonable attorney's fees.

Petitioner’s employer had notified Petitioner that his employment would be terminated because he did not meet the "minimum qualifications" of his position as he had not secured and/or maintained a valid New York State driver's license.” Alleging that the Employer’s determination was arbitrary, capricious and made in bad faith, Petitioner argued that:

(1) he should have been afforded the protections mandated by Civil Service Law Section 75, and as outlined in Article 33 of the Collective Agreements between the State of New York and the New York State Civil Service Employees Association;

(2) while minimum qualifications of employment may not rise to acts of misconduct that would invoke disciplinary procedures mandated by the Civil Service Law, a driver's license was not a minimum qualification at the time of his appointment; and

(3) the class specification for his position does not clearly identify a valid driver's license as a minimum qualification.

Judge Pagones said that it is well settled that the failure to maintain a minimum qualification for employment is not an act of misconduct nor one related to job performance that would invoke the disciplinary procedures mandated by Civil Service Law §75, citing Matter of NYS Office of Children and Family Services v Lanterman, 14 NY3d 275. 

Courts have viewed employees who lack licenses as being “unqualified,” in contrast to being “incompetent,” to perform the duties of the position. Common examples include the revocation of a truck driver’s permit to operate a motor vehicle on public roads, loss of an attorney’s license to practice law and the expiration of a temporary permit to teach. All that appears to be necessary in such cases is for the appointing authority to make some reasonable inquiry to determine if the employee may lawfully perform the duties of the position.*

Thus, explained the court, "an employee charged with failing to possess a minimum qualification of his or her position is only entitled to notice of the charge and the opportunity to contest it" and dismissed Petitioner’s action.

* See, for example: Fowler v City of Saratoga Springs, 215 A.D.2d 819 (City Engineer lawfully dismissed for failure to obtain Professional Engineer’s license by a specified date); Meliti v Nyquist, 53 AD2d 951, affirmed 41 NY2d 183 (immediate suspension of teachers was lawful because their teaching licenses had expired); and O’Keefe v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp, 714 FSupp 622, (traveling company demonstrator was not discriminated against when a private employer terminated him after his driver’s license was suspended)

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_50585.htm
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Probationary employee improperly terminated entitled to back salary

Probationary employee improperly terminated entitled to back salary

92 AD2d 259

A probationary teacher was found to have been “improperly terminated” by her school principal. One year later the Chancellor of the Board of Education, City of New York, reinstated the educator to her former position. 

As the Court of Appeals noted in Frasier v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763, where there has been an unlawful removal from service, back pay is authorized upon reinstatement.
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Goggle Statistics – March 2014

Goggle Statistics – March 2014

Goggle Statisticsreports the following have been the most frequently accessed NYPPL items as of March 31, 2014.

Essentials of the “Pickering Balancing Test”             2721 “hits”

The legal distinction between domicile and residence            1655 “hits”

Any administrative action in the nature of discipline taken against a tenured teacher must be taken pursuant to Education Law §3020-a exclusively            1234 “hits”

Employee's inability to provide the necessary urine sample for a drug test because of a medical condition trumps allegations of misconduct                   1070 “hits”

Two different complaints; two different forums            970 “hits”
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