Providing assistance to an employee in the negotiating unit served with disciplinary charges

Providing assistance to an employee in the negotiating unit served with disciplinary charges

Source: Inquiry from a NYPPL reader

A reader asks “what kinds of assistance may a union provide a member served with disciplinary charges?”

Most Taylor Law agreements include a multi-step disciplinary grievance procedure in lieu of, or as an alternative to, a statutory disciplinary procedure. Included in the employee organization’s duty of fair representation is the duty to assist an individual in the collective bargaining unit in the event the individual is served with disciplinary charges by the appointing authority.

If, after evaluating the disciplinary action initiated by the appointing authority against the employee, the employee organization determines that it has a duty to assist the employee in the defense of the disciplinary charges filed against the individual, its representative or an attorney designated by the employee organization can assist the employee by representing him or her in the disciplinary grievance procedure and represent the individual in an administrative disciplinary hearing as well as advising the individual in the following areas:*

1. Evaluate the charges and possible defenses available to the employee. The union representative or attorney typically has the experience and training to advise the individual of the potential for successfully defending the disciplinary action, in whole or in part, and the disciplinary penalties that may be imposed if the individual is found guilty of one or more of the charges filed against him or her.

2. Negotiate with the employer's representative or attorney. A union’s representative or attorney can discuss possible settlement or withdrawal of the charges with employer or its representative to negotiate the best settlement possible to attain a mutually satisfactory resolution of the disciplinary charges. 

3. Evaluate settlement offers. If an offer to settle the disciplinary action is made by the employer, the union’s representative or attorney can advise the individual about things that might be prove significant such as the impact of a resignation from the position in lieu of the employer going forward with prosecuting the charges. Likewise the union’s representative or attorney may initiate settlement discussions with the employer's representative or the employer's attorney.

4.Consider the economic impact of the settlement under consideration.  The settlement offer could have an adverse impact on the individual’s career, other job opportunities, retirement benefits and other elements involving his or her financial future that the union’s representative or attorney could explain.

5.Anticipate legal issues the individual may not have considered. The union’s repetitive or attorney can explain the plethora of legal issues that could arise as a result of finding that the individual guilty of one or more of the charges filed against the employee in a disciplinary action or, in the alternative, the potential difficulties that might arise in the event the matter is settled or the employee’s submits his or her resignation or an application for retirement in an effort to avoid a disciplinary hearing.

*These same general observations would apply in the event the disciplinary charges are filed against a member of the negotiating unit pursuant to Civil Service Law §75, Education Law §3020-a or a similar statutory disciplinary procedure.

 __________________

The Discipline Book, - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State set out in a 2100+ page e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5215.html

 __________________

Violating the employer’s prohibition against its employees associating with an individual associated with criminal activity

Violating the employer’s prohibition against its employees associating with an individual associated with criminal activity

Dillin v Waterfront Commn. of N.Y. Harbor, 2014 NY Slip Op 05036, Appellate  Division, First Department

Supreme Court granted a longshoreman’s [Petitioner] motion seeking to annul the determination of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor (Commission) revoking Petitioner's longshoreman's certificate and remanded the matter for a new hearing before a different hearing officer. The Appellate Division reinstated the Commission’s determination.

The Appellate Division explained that the Commission’s finding that Petitioner “violated a prohibition against association with an identified member of an organized crime family is supported by substantial evidence,” noting that the prohibition was imposed by a federal court* pursuant to a provision* of the Waterfront and Airport Commission Act.** “prohibiting such association under circumstances rendering a person's continued participation in any activities requiring registration pursuant to the WCA to be ‘inimical to the policies of’ the WCA (Uncons Laws § 9913[6]).” The policies of the WCA, said the court, include countering organized crime and corruption which have been found to be endemic in waterfront labor practices.

In this case there was testimony that Petitioner attended two parties that were also attended by an associate of an organized crime group. The Appellate Division said that there was “sufficient evidence to refute Petitioner's claim that her attendance at the same parties as the person in question was accidental or inadvertent.” Petitioner, said the court, also admitted to making remarks to coworkers about being "best friends" with this person and "hanging out" with him, and insofar as petitioner suggested that she was not serious about such remarks, the ALJ was not required to credit her testimony.

The Appellate Division then said that it did not find that the penalty of revocation of Petitioner's registration shocking to one's sense of fairness in that by associating with individuals with connections to organized crime and boasting about such associations to other longshoremen, Petitioner “engaged in conduct which potentially undermines the Commission's continuing efforts to ensure public safety by reducing corruption on the waterfront.”

Noting that Petitioner “does not have a perfect record” in that she was suspended by the Commission for 15 days for filing a false application for longshoreman registration and  was also previously found guilty of theft by deception for continuing to receive food stamps after she had become ineligible, the court said that “In light of Petitioner's behavior in connection with the instant misconduct and on previous occasions, revocation of petitioner's registration does not shock our sense of fairness.”

An employer, particularly one engaged in law enforcement, may prohibit its employees from associating with certain individuals.

For example, the Suffolk County Police Department's rules prohibit members of the Department from "associating or fraternizing" with any person known (by the employee) to have been convicted of any misdemeanor or felony under (any) state or federal law”. A police officer, after being advised that "a close friend" was a convicted felon, decided his continued association with him would not violate Department rules because the individual's "conviction was nearly 20 years old" and he had a "certificate of relief from civil disabilities." Eventually the officer was charged pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law with violating Department Rules, found guilty, and had to forfeit 10 days of vacation credit as a penalty. The Court of Appeals rejected the officer's argument that the rule was unconstitutionally overbroad,*** noting that the State could regulate the off-duty conduct of its police officers even though it involved a constitutionally protected right (1st Amendment, Right of Association), the regulation was held to serve a valid governmental concern the public's perception of a police department as perceived through the conduct of the individual officers.

Indeed, in Fludd v Sielaff, 184 A.D.2d 362 (1992), the Appellate Division sustained the termination of a New York City correction officer who, when police officers seeking to execute a warrant for the arrest of her estranged husband, asked her if she knew his whereabouts, denied having seen him for three or four weeks, knowing that he was hiding in another room in her apartment. A few moments later police discovered her estranged husband and arrested him. Fludd  was charged with official misconduct for "harboring a fugitive," and for lying about her knowledge of his presence in her apartment when confronted by police seeking to arrest him. The court explained that "the commissioner was free to find that the choice [Fludd] made was utterly incompatible with her position as correction officer."

Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to review an appeal of a California State Court decision, Bailey v National City, Calif., 277 Cal Rptr 427, which had sustained the termination of a police officer who was found to have violated department rules concerning outside work, used his position as a police officer for personal gain and refused to discontinue a personal association with a known felon.

* See United States v ILA Local 1588, 2003 WL 221851, 2003 US Dist LEXIS 1229 [SD NY, Jan. 30, 2003], affd 77 Fed Appx 542 [2d Cir 2003].

** Unconsolidated Laws of New York, §9801, et seq.

*** Morrisette v. Dilworth, 59 N.Y.2d 449 (1983).

Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a person dismissed from a position in the Classified Service

Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a person dismissed from a position in the Classified Service

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,620

An Education Analyst [EA] filed an appeal with the Commissioner of Education challenging the New York City Department of Education’s terminating her employment and sought an order by the Commissioner directing the Department to reinstate her to her "former job status and title with full benefits."

The Department claimed that EA “was a probationary employee appointed to a civil service position [i.e., a position in the classified service] who failed to meet its expectations, that she was terminated from her position during her probationary period, and that its actions were legal, proper and reasonable.”*

The Commissioner said that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction explaining that Civil Service Law §17 vests jurisdiction to administer the provisions of the Civil Service Law with respect to the offices and employments in the classified service in the applicable civil service commission, personnel officer or other form of civil service administration.

In case of the City of New York, the City is empowered to administer the Civil Service Law through whatever form of administration it chooses to prescribe in its City Charter. Further, said the Commissioner, Civil Service Law §102(3) vests jurisdiction to address alleged violations of the Civil Service Law in State Supreme Courts.

In contrast, the Commissioner noted that under of the Civil Service Law §35(g), the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over positions certified as positions involving teaching and the supervisory staff of school districts and BOCES,  i.e., positions in the Unclassified Service.

The position of Education Analyst, however, is not among the positions that have been certified by the Commissioner of Education pursuant to §35 (g) of the Civil Service Law as a position involving teaching or being a member of the supervisory staff of a school district or a BOCES. To be considered a pedagogical position for which certification by the Commissioner is required the position must involve teaching or “the function of administration of teaching, i.e., supervision and direction of supervisors, principals and all other members of the teaching and supervisory staffs.”

Finding that there was no evidence in the record that EA’s job duties involved teaching or the supervision of pedagogical staff, the Commissioner said that “It is well settled that the termination of a classified [service] employee is not the proper subject of an appeal brought pursuant to §310 of the Education Law" and dismissed EA’s appeal.

*The Civil Service of the State of New York consists of positions jurisdictionally classified as being in the Unclassified Service and positions jurisdictionally classified as being in the Classified Service. In addition, there are a number of positions in the Military Service of the State.

.

Dismissal of a teacher rated satisfactory for 18 consecutive years until assigned to a special education class overturned as “shocking to the court’s sense of fairness”

Dismissal of a teacher rated satisfactory for 18 consecutive years until assigned to a special education class overturned as “shocking to the court’s sense of fairness”

2014 NY Slip Op 05032, Appellate Division, First Department

A licensed common branches and special education teacher [Teacher] had been employed by the New York City Department of Education for more than 21 years when he was terminated in 2011. He had received satisfactory ratings for 18, Teacher was then assigned to a self-contained special education class comprised of 12 students who were chronologically fourth, fifth, sixth, graders, but who were functioning at two and three years below grade level. The principal of the school rated Teacher unsatisfactory. Teacher's request to be assigned to another class or, in the alternative, be assigned an aide or assistant, was denied.

Teacher was again assigned the same class with the same group of students for three consecutive years, until the older students completed the eighth grade. He was rated as unsatisfactory all three years he taught this class based in part on his inability to control the classroom and his inability to plan and effectively execute certain lessons. His requests to be assigned to a different class were repeatedly denied, although various teachers and administrators were purported to advise him as to how to improve his performance. Teacher was also criticized for “failing to follow the Teacher's College Workshop Model lessons, even though the Workshop Model made no provisions for students with learning disabilities.”

Served with disciplinary charges, the Hearing Officer determined that Teacher was guilty of seven out of nine of the specified charges spanning a three-year period. Although the Hearing Officer acknowledged that Teacher had attempted to improve his performance by working with a mentor and participating in the Peer Intervention Plus Program (PIP Plus), the Hearing Officer deemed his performance to be unsatisfactory.

Teacher contended that the remediation efforts were inadequate as he never received organized or consistent lessons from his peers and that they usually consisted of rushed, disorganized, and informal hallway meetings. He also contended that the assistance he received from the assistant principals was uncoordinated and often contradictory. As an example, Teacher said that he had sought help designing a lesson from one assistant principal but when a different assistant principal observed the lesson that the first assistant principal had prepared with him, the second one rated it as unsatisfactory “because the lesson failed to follow a specific structure established by written guidelines.”

Although the Appellate Division said that it did not dispute the specific findings of the Hearing Officer concerning Teacher's deficiencies in the management of this one special education class, it found that under the circumstances presented here the penalty of termination shocked its sense of fairness.

The court said that it was troubled “to see [the Department of Educations] apparent determination to terminate [Teacher], a 21-year veteran with 18 years of satisfactory ratings, because of his difficulty with one class in which he was kept for three years.

Finding that the Hearing Officer's decision to dismiss Teacher to be manifestly disproportionate to his conduct, the Appellate Division remand the matter “for the imposition of a lesser penalty.”

_______________

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - a 442-page volume focusing on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition, and as an e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html

_______________

 .

Filing age discrimination complaints in federal courts

Filing age discrimination complaints in federal courts

Hildebrand v Allegheny [Pennsylvania] County, USCA, 3^rdCircuit, Docket 13-1231

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a state or local government employee may not maintain an age discrimination in employment action pursuant to the Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C 1983, but may only proceed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [ADEA], 29 U.S.C. §§621-634.

The court agreed with Allegheny County’s argument that the ADEA “is the exclusive remedy for claims of age discrimination in employment” and thus its employee was precluded from bring a  §1983 cause of action alleging age discrimination, explaining that §1983 is a statutory remedy* and Congress retains the authority to repeal it or replace it with an alternative remedy, in this instance the ADEA.

The Circuit Court also held that the plaintiff in this action was not obligated to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies with particularity but may, instead, allege in general terms that the required administrative process had been completed.

* The Circuit Court also noted that The Supreme Court has held that §1983 suits are precluded by statute in a case where a plaintiff sought vindication of a constitutional – rather than a statutory – right, citing Smith v Robinson, 468 U.S. 992.