Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
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The Workers' Compensation Board ruled, among other things, that a New York State Trooper [Plaintiff] assigned to a vehicle checkpoint was not a participant in the World Trade Center [WTC] rescue, recovery and cleanup operations and denied Plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits based on his alleged exposure to toxins at the WTC site as untimely.
The Appellate Division said it agreed with the Board's finding that Plaintiff did not sustain an occupational disease, explaining:
1. "An occupational disease derives from the very nature of the employment, not a specific condition peculiar to an employee's place of work, nor from an environmental condition specific to the place of work;" and
2. "To establish an occupational disease, the claimant must demonstrate a recognizable link between his or her condition and a distinctive feature of his or her employment".
The Appellate Division, conceding that toxic substances were present in Plaintiff's work environment at WTC, the indicated the Plaintiff's "alleged disability arose from a specific condition peculiar to his place of work and not from a distinctive feature of his employment as a state trooper."
Turning to Plaintiff's argument that his claim was within the ambit of Workers' Compensation Law Article 8-A, the Board then treated the claim as one for accidental injury and disallowed the claim, finding it untimely.
The Appellate Division said that Article 8-A was enacted "to remove statutory obstacles to timely claims filing and notice for latent conditions resulting from hazardous exposure for those who worked in rescue, recovery or cleanup operations following the [WTC] September 11th, 2001 attack." Accordingly, the court held that "this legislation was intended to be liberally construed to provide a potential avenue of relief for workers and volunteers suffering from ill health as a result of their efforts in the aftermath of the terrorists attacks."
Noting that Plaintiff had testified that his duties at the checkpoint included stopping traffic and clearing routes for emergency and construction vehicles traveling to and from ground zero, the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff's "activities had a tangible connection to the rescue, recovery and cleanup operations at the WTC site."
The court then opined that "in light of the liberal construction afforded this remedial statute, "the Board's determination that Workers' Compensation Law Article 8-A does not apply because [Plaintiff] did not participate in the rescue, recovery and cleanup operations at ground zero is not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, the claim should not have been disallowed as untimely under Workers' Compensation Law §28".
The Appellate Division then remitted the matter to the Workers' Compensation Board "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision."
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's opinion.
An employee [Plaintiff] employed by a state agency [Department] suffered a work-related injury and was placed on workers' compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §71. Plaintiff regularly submitted medical documentation supporting her assertion that she was unfit to return to her employment. Department then notified Plaintiff that as she had been absent for one cumulative year, she would be terminated from her position. Department also advise Plaintiff that she could apply for restoration to duty if she was medically fit and directed her "to submit medical documentation clearing her to return to work before an examination was scheduled."
Plaintiff, however, ignored this directive and scheduled the medical examination on her own.* Upon learning of this, the Department, apparently relying on 4 NYCRR 5.4(d)(1),** cancelled the appointment and subsequently terminated Plaintiff 's employment after she declined to submit the requested medical documentation to the Department for review.
Plaintiff then commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding alleging that:
[1] the Department violated the Civil Service Law and its regulations;
[2] her termination was arbitrary and capricious; and
[3] her due process rights were violated.
Ultimately Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's petition finding that it was not unreasonable, irrational or arbitrary for the Department to request certain medical information prior to making its preliminary determination as to petitioner's medical fitness to perform the duties of her position and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Department's request for medical documentation was an error of law.
Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's judgment, contending that 4 NYCRR 5.9 places no duty upon her to submit medical documentation in order to return to work.
The Appellate Division disagreed, opining that 4 NYCRR 5.9(c)(2) provides that an employee on §71 leave has a "right to apply to the appointing authority pursuant to subdivision (d) of this section for reinstatement to duty if medically fit" (emphasis added by the court).
The Appellate Division explained that the requirement that employee then on §71 leave to initially produce medical documentation showing the employee is medically fit to return to work "prior to scheduling a medical examination promotes an efficient procedure, in a fiscally sound manner, that is rationally related to the Department's interest in returning only medically fit employees to their duties."
Noting that the record indicated that Plaintiff never asserted that she was medically fit to perform her duties prior to her termination and that the only medical documentation presented to the Department for over one year consisted of statements from Plaintiff's own physician attesting that she was unable to return to work, the Appellate Division concluded that the Department's determination was not arbitrary and capricious or irrational.
Addressing Plaintiff's claim that the Department's failure to provide her with a medical examination violated her due process rights, the Appellate Division said that the record indicates that Plaintiff "received a pretermination notice that set forth the reasons she was being terminated, explained that she could apply for reinstatement if medically fit, requested her to produce medical documentation showing that she was fit and informed her that she was entitled to a pretermination meeting."
Thus, said the court, Plaintiff's due process rights were satisfied as she was provided [1] with an explanation of the grounds for discharge; [2] given an opportunity to respond prior to her actual termination; and [3] did in fact participate in a pretermination meeting.
* §71 of the Civil Service Law further provides that an individual terminated from the position pursuant to §71 may, within one year after the termination of the disability, make application to the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction for a medical examination.
** 4 NYCRR 5.4(d)(1), Restoration to duty from workers' compensation leave, provides "(1) Upon request by the employee, the appointing authority, if satisfied that the employee is medically fit to perform the duties of the position, shall restore the employee to duty. If not satisfied that the employee is medically fit to perform the duties of the position, the appointing authority shall require the employee to undergo a medical examination, by a physician designated by the appointing authority, before the employee may be restored to duty. Prior to the medical examination, the appointing authority shall provide the designated physician and the employee with a statement of the regularly assigned duties of the position from which the employee is on leave."
Click HERE to access the text of the Appellate Division's decision.
Juneteenth, the federal holiday commemorating the end of slavery in the United States, is observed on June 19. President Joe Biden "signed the new holiday into law" on Thursday, June 17, 2021.
As it falls on a Saturday in 2021, Juneteenth is being observed by Federal employees on a workday, Friday June 18, 2021.
On June 14, 2020, New York State Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed into law legislation designating Juneteenth as an official public holiday in New York State. The Governor earlier issued an Executive Order recognizing Juneteenth as a holiday for New York State employees.
Other jurisdictions have designated Juneteenth as holiday by proclamation.
For example, then Massachusetts Gov. Deval Patrick signed a proclamation recognizing Juneteenth as a holiday in Massachusetts in 2007 while Maryland Governor Larry Hogan has announced that Maryland State government agencies and offices will be closed on Friday, June 18, 2021, in observance of Juneteenth National Independence Day and West Virginia's Governor Jim Justice issued a proclamation on June 18, 2021, officially declaring Juneteenth a State holiday in West Virginia.
Supreme Court had agreed with the Plaintiffs and held the City's Local Law No. 2 violated the Taylor Law, Civil Service Law §75, and Unconsolidated Laws §891. The court also, sua sponte, "referred [Local Law No. 2] back to the Rochester City Council "to be reconciled and made compliant with New York State law and the Rochester City Charter."* The City Council appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.
The Appellate Division, noting that "the Rochester City Charter has been amended to grant virtually all authority for disciplining police officers to a new entity called the 'Police Accountability Board' [PAB]," opined that although "the politics swirling around this provision are weighty and fraught ... its legality is not" and held that Supreme Court "properly invalidated Local Law No. 2 insofar as it imbues PAB with disciplinary authority over Rochesterpolice officers without regard to collective bargaining."
The Appellate Division's decision explores the events leading to the establishment of the PAB, relevant law and court decisions, including two procedural issues, and the merits of the Plaintiffs' challenges to Local Law No. 2.
* The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court "erred by referring Local Law No. 2 "back to the Rochester City Council to be reconciled and made compliant with New York State law and the Rochester City Charter."
The text of the Appellate Division's decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_03787.htm.