Compelling disclosure of records pursuant the New York State's Freedom of Information Law

 

Matter of Puig v New York State Police

2023 NY Slip Op 00258

Decided on January 19, 2023

Appellate Division, Third Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered:January 19, 2023

534648

[*1]In the Matter of Kenneth Puig, Appellant,

v

New York State Police et al., Respondents.

Calendar Date:December 15, 2022
Before:Garry, P.J., Lynch, Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Ceresia, JJ.

Law Offices of Cory H. Morris, Melville (Cory H. Morris of counsel), for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Laura Etlinger of counsel), for respondents.

 

Ceresia, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Catherine E. Leahy Scott, J.), entered November 17, 2021 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent New York State Police denying petitioner's Freedom of Information Law request.

Following the repeal of Civil Rights Law § 50-a (see L 2020, ch 96, § 1) — which formerly shielded law enforcement personnel records from inspection or review without a court order— petitioner, an attorney, made a Freedom of Information Law (hereinafter FOIL) request for, among other things, copies of all disciplinary records of any state trooper who had been disciplined. Respondent New York State Police (hereinafter respondent) denied the request on the ground that it failed to reasonably describe the records sought and was exceedingly broad. Specifically, respondent stated that it had employed thousands of individuals throughout its history and noted that disciplinary records are maintained by individual employee, such that a search of every employee's file would constitute a monumental task. Petitioner sent respondent a letter administratively appealing this determination and, within that letter, modified his request, indicating that he was only seeking disciplinary records of active troopers assigned to the Counties of Orange, Dutchess and Ulster. In response to the administrative appeal, respondent affirmed the denial of the broader request but remitted the narrower, modified request to its Records Access Office for a determination. Upon remittal, that office denied petitioner's modified request on the basis that it still failed to reasonably describe the records sought, because respondent's employee files, in which disciplinary records are kept, cannot be searched by county of assignment. Petitioner administratively appealed, and respondent failed to rule on the appeal.

Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to compel disclosure of the records sought in his modified request. Petitioner also sought an order directing respondent to undergo training regarding its legal obligations under FOIL, as well as an award of counsel fees and litigation costs. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding that respondent had established a valid basis to deny the modified request — namely, that it was unable to search for and locate the records sought when described by county. The court also denied the additional requested relief. Petitioner appeals.^[FN1]

It is well settled that, "[u]nder FOIL, agency records are presumptively available for public inspection" (Matter of Empire Ch. of Associated Bldrs. and Contractors, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Transportation, ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2022 NY Slip Op 06852, *1 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). While Public Officers Law § 89 (3) (a) requires that the records sought be "reasonably described," an agency denying a FOIL request for lack of a reasonable description "bears the burden to establish that the descriptions were insufficient for purposes of locating and identifying the documents sought" (Matter of Jewish Press, Inc. v New York State Police, 207 AD3d 971, 974 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Konigsberg v Coughlin, 68 NY2d 245, 249 [1986]). With particular respect to records that are maintained electronically, the agency must show "that the descriptions provided are insufficient for purposes of extracting or retrieving the requested document[s] from the virtual files through an electronic word search . . . [by] name or other reasonable technological effort" (Matter of Pflaum v Grattan, 116 AD3d 1103, 1104 [3d Dept 2014]; see Matter of Reclaim the Records v New York State Dept. of Health, 185 AD3d 1268, 1269 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 910 [2021]).

As noted above, in denying petitioner's modified request, respondent indicated that it was not able to conduct a search of its disciplinary records based upon a trooper's county of assignment. Thus, respondent reasoned, it would be necessary to search "every employee's individual file[], a herculean task that is not required under FOIL." Respondent elaborated upon this reasoning in its answer to the petition by submitting the sworn affidavit of an attorney assigned to assist respondent with FOIL requests, who claimed that, although respondent has the ability to "track discipline electronically [going] back to 1999," respondent "does not file, maintain or index employee records by what county they work out of. To the extent that [respondent] is an agency that services the entire State of New York, there may be instances where [m]embers of [respondent] work across county lines or in multiple counties on the same day."

Notwithstanding this position, the parties acknowledge that the three counties at issue in petitioner's modified request are served by only two of respondent's 11 troops — Troop F and Troop K. Respondent concedes that troopers are generally assigned to work in a specific troop. Thus, given that the records sought by petitioner are confined to two identifiable troops, we find that the description in petitioner's modified request was reasonable and sufficiently detailed to enable respondent to locate and identify the requested records.

However, the question of whether a request contains a reasonable description is separate from consideration as to whether the request is unduly burdensome (see Matter of Jewish Press, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 183 AD3d 731, 733 [2d Dept 2020]; Matter of New York Comm. for Occupational Safety & Health v Bloomberg, 72 AD3d 153, 162 [1st Dept 2010]). While an agency may not "evade the broad disclosure provisions of FOIL by merely asserting that compliance could potentially require the review of [a large volume] of records" (Matter of Ruberti, Girvin & Ferlazzo v New York State Div. of State Police, 218 AD2d 494, 499 [3d Dept 1996]), we note that the record concerning this issue is not sufficiently developed, in that it does not demonstrate how many troopers' files would need to be searched or the particular manner in which such a search would be conducted. Accordingly, we remit the matter to Supreme Court for a determination as to whether it would be unduly burdensome for respondent to comply with petitioner's modified request (see Matter of Jewish Press, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Educ., 183 AD3d at 733; Matter of New York Comm. for Occupational Safety & Health v Bloomberg, 72 AD3d at 162). Upon remittal, the court shall also reconsider whether petitioner is entitled to counsel fees and costs (see Public Officers Law § 89 [4] [c] [ii]).

Garry, P.J., Lynch, Aarons and Reynolds Fitzgerald, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as denied petitioner's modified requests for records, counsel fees and costs; matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnote 1: To the extent that petitioner now challenges the denial of his original request for all trooper disciplinary records statewide, that claim is unpreserved as it was not raised in the petition (see Matter of Urena v Mulligan, 201 AD3d 1215, 1218 [3d Dept 2022]; Marshall v City of Albany, 184 AD3d 1043, 1044 [3d Dept 2020]).

Concerning confirming or vacating an arbitration award

Noting that judicial review of arbitration awards is limited, the Appellate Division indicated an arbitration award would be vacated:

1. When the arbitrator's award is "so imperfectly executed ... that a final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made"; or

2. When the arbitration award is indefinite or nonfinal for purposes of CPLR §7511 because:

            a. it does not dispose of a particular issue raised by the parties; or

            b. it leaves the parties unable to determine their rights and obligations; or

            c. it does not resolve the controversy submitted; or

            d. it creates a new controversy;

Citing Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v Peters, 123 AD3d 1198; Matter of Rochester City School Dist. [Rochester Teachers Assn. NYSUT/AFT-AFL/CIO], 38 AD3d 1152, and Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v County of Nassau, 305 AD2d 498, the Appellate Division explained that in this instance the arbitrator denied the contract grievance in full, resolving the stipulated issue of whether the County violated the collective bargaining agreement, and held "the Supreme Court properly confirmed the original arbitration award as it was not indefinite or nonfinal, and it completely disposed of the issue before the arbitrator."

Further, opined the Appellate Division, arbitrators are without power to render a new award or to modify an original award, except as provided in CPLR 7509" although an arbitrator may modify an award, inter alia,* where "the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted."

*Among other things.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Follow-up on reports concerning school districts facing "fiscal stress"

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli reports school districts designated in fiscal stress dropped to record lows largely due to aid increase.

The Comptroller's office has been tracking local government and school district fiscal stress for nearly a decade through its Fiscal Stress Monitoring System and now reports that its finds that for fiscal year 2021-22 indicates only 14 school districts were designated in fiscal stress. This is the lowest number of districts in stress since the System’s inception.

Major increases in aid over the last two years from both the federal government (temporary) and the State (ongoing) have helped – particularly for many high-need districts that have struggled to avoid fiscal stress in recent years.

For more, see the Comptroller's: 

Report on Fiscal Year 2021-22 Results; and the

Lists of School Districts in Stress and all School District FSMS Scores.

Reports and fiscal stress scores for all counties, cities, towns and villages are available. For more information and for the Comptroller's most recent data, visit the Fiscal Stress Monitoring System main page.  

Characteristics of a hostile work environment for the purposes of litigating claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983

To prevail in a “hostile work environment” action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983  the Plaintiff must set out claims alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment and demonstrate that his “workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment.”  

The Circuit Court Appeals, Second Circuit held that Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim was based on the same conduct underpinning his racial discrimination and retaliation claims: his being given work orders to change light bulbs and, from time to time, receiving work orders for items not in need of repair. 

The Circuit Court explained that such "identified conduct falls far short of the conduct required to sustain a hostile work environment claim." The Circuit Court then affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint.

The District Court had dismissed Plaintiff's claims, in part, because Plaintiff failed to identify any adverse employment action. The Circuit Court, agreeing with the District Court that the Plaintiff failed to identify an adverse employment action, affirmed the lower court's ruling and opined that it "need not address any of the other grounds identified by the District Court as supporting summary judgment". 

Click HERE to access the Circuit Court's decision posted on the Internet.

Applying the Doctrine of Res Judicata

Federal district court dismissed Plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. 

The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the lower court's ruling explaining “res judicata bars re-litigation of a claim if :

    (1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; [and]

    (2) the previous action involved the same parties or those in privity with them; [and] 

    (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.”

In this instance the Plaintiff and the Defendants were parties in both this case and the prior litigation and the prior action was decided on the merits through a motion to dismiss. 

The Circuit Court also noted that Plaintiff's current claims against Defendants could have been brought in the earlier action if they were not and, accordingly, the District Court properly determined that the claims against Defendants were barred by res judicata. 

As to another claim advanced by Plaintiff, the Circuit Court observed that "defamation claims against the attorneys relating to their work in the prior lawsuit are precluded by the common law litigation privilege," citing Martirano v. Frost, 25 N.Y.2d 505. The court opined that "a courtroom statement is absolutely privileged unless it is 'so outrageously out of context as to permit one to conclude, from the mere fact that the statement was uttered, that it was motivated by no other desire than to defame'”. 

Click HERE to access the Circuit Court's decision.