A claimant for unemployment insurance benefits must be totally unemployed to be eligible to receive such benefits

A full-time school district teaching assistant [Claimant] was also employed as a part time home instruction teacher. When furloughed from her part-time position, Claimant filed an application for unemployment insurance benefits. Based upon Claimant's weekly certifications that she had worked zero days during the week for which she was certifying for benefits, Claimant received unemployment insurance benefits for that period as well as federal pandemic unemployment compensation [FPUC] pursuant to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act of 2020 [The CARES Act].

The Department of Labor [Labor], however, determined that Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed as she continued to work at and receive her full salary from the school district during the relevant time period. Accordingly, Labor charged her with recoverable overpayment of the state benefits and FPUC received and imposed a monetary penalty and forfeiture of future benefit days based upon a finding that Claimant made willful false statements to obtain those benefits.

An Administrative Law Judge sustained Labor's initial determinations, which decision was affirmed by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board [Board]. Claimant appealed the Board's decision.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board ruling, noting that the record and Claimant's testimony indicated that Claimant "continued to work remotely in her full-time position at the school district and to receive her regular salary during the period at issue." The court found that the Board's decision that Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits because she was not totally unemployed was supported by substantial evidence. Acknowledging the Board's finding that Claimant was not totally unemployed, the Appellate Division concluded that as Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits under state law, Claimant was also ineligible to receive federal pandemic assistance under the CARES Act.

As to the Board's recovery of the overpayment of benefits, the court noted that where a claimant willfully makes a false statement or representation, or willfully conceals a pertinent fact in connection with his or her claim for unemployment insurance benefits, even if the misrepresentation was unintentional, the benefits paid to the claimant are recoverable.

Considering that Claimant did not disclose her continued full-time employment by the school district when certifying for and obtaining unemployment benefits, the Appellate Division opined that "there is no basis to disturb the Board's finding that the benefits paid to [Claimant] were recoverable."

In addition, as Claimant failed to disclose a pertinent fact and therefore made willful false statements, the Appellate Division held that the imposition of a monetary penalty and forfeiture of future benefit days was warranted. Finally, said the court, the FPUC received by Claimant was also recoverable.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

The writ of mandamus and other ancient common law "writs"

In order to compel a public officer or body to perform a particular act or correct an omission, a party may seek a court order in the nature of a Writ of Mandamus, one of the ancient writs in common law. This writ is an extraordinary remedy and if granted by the court, would compel "an officer or body to perform a specified ministerial act that is required by law to be performed".

In contrast, mandamus "does not lie to enforce a task or duty that is discretionary" as demonstrated by the decisions in Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v New York City Police Dept., 152 AD3d 113, affd 32 NY3d 1091, cert denied, 139 S Ct 2651; and  Matter of Meyer v Zucker, 185 AD3d 1265, lv denied 36 NY3d 904).

As the Appellate Division explained in Alliance, supra, "A ministerial act is best described as one that is mandated by some rule, law or other standard and typically involves a compulsory result". Further, mandamus is not available to compel an officer or body to reach a particular outcome with respect to a decision that turns on the exercise of discretion or judgment. In other words, as the Court of Appeals opined in Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525, mandamus will lie to compel a body to perform a mandated duty, not how that duty is to be performed.

As the Appellate Division noted in Matter of Willows Condominium Assn. v Town of Greenburgh, 153 AD3d 535, quoting Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, "A discretionary act 'involves the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically produce different acceptable results[,] whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherence to a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result' ".

Other ancient common law writs include the writ of prohibition issued by a higher tribunal to a lower tribunal to "prohibit" the adjudication of a matter then pending before the lower tribunal on the grounds that the lower tribunal "lacked jurisdiction"; the writ of injunction - a judicial order preventing a public official from performing an act; the writ of "certiorari," compelling a lower court to send its record of a case to the higher tribunal for review by the higher tribunal; and the writ of “quo warranto” [by what authority].

 The University of Southern California [USC] Gould School of Law has created an "English Medieval Legal Documents Database, A Compilation of Published Sources from 600 to 1535" which it has posted on the Internet. Click HERE to access this resource posted by USC.

New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR], sets out the modern equivalents of the surviving ancient writs available in New York jurisprudence as noted in Matter of Brusco v Braun, 84 NY2d 674.

 

 

Vicarious liability of agencies for the alleged negligence of operators of the agency's fire and other emergency vehicles

In recognition of the unique responsibilities placed on fire truck and other emergency vehicle operators to respond quickly to calls for aid, Vehicle and Traffic Law §1104 grants such drivers the "privilege" to proceed past red lights when involved in emergency operations, as long as specified safety precautions are observed and they do not act recklessly.*

With respect to volunteer fire companies, General Municipal Law §205-b makes fire districts vicariously liable "for the negligence of volunteer firefighters" when they operate fire district vehicles in the discharge of their duties.

The issue before the Court of Appeals in this action was whether the relevant statutes authorize a claim against a fire district for the alleged "negligence" of a volunteer firefighter when the firefighter's actions are otherwise privileged and subject to a heightened recklessness standard under Vehicle and Traffic Law §1104.

The Court of Appeals concluded that that imposition of vicarious liability for a driver's negligence within the context of the instant appeal would be contrary to legislative intent, the precedents of the Court of Appeals and general principles of negligence law and vicarious liability.

* See Vehicle and Traffic Law §1104 [a]-[c], [e]).

Click HERE to access the full text of the Court of Appeals' decision posted on the Internet.

 

Hearsay evidence is admissible in an administrative hearing

The Plaintiff [Petitioner] in this CPLR Article 78 action was accused of leaving a 22-month-old child alone and unsupervised, outside on a playground while acting in her capacity as a day care worker at a community family development day care center. The Dutchess County Department of Community and Family Services investigated the report and thereafter determined that the report of "maltreatment" was appropriate.

Petitioner made an application to the New York State Office of Children and Family Services [OCFS] to amend the indicated report of the State Central Register from "indicated" to "unfounded" and to seal the report. OCFS denied Petitioner's application. Petitioner then commenced  an Article 78 CPLR proceeding seeking judicial review OCFS' determination.

Citing Matter of Brown v Velez, 153 AD3d 517, the Appellate Division observed that at an administrative expungement hearing to determine whether a report of child abuse or maltreatment is substantiated, the allegations in the report must be established "by a preponderance of the evidence"*.

Further, opined the court, "Judicial review of a determination that a report of child maltreatment has been substantiated is limited to whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record" noting that where substantial evidence exists, "the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even if the court would have decided the matter differently."

Concluding that the Petitioner was one of the individuals responsible for the child at the time of the incident is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Appellate Division opined contrary to Petitioner's contention, "the fact that the [OCFS]  determination was based, in large part, on hearsay evidence, does not require a different conclusion. Hearsay is admissible in an administrative hearing and, in this case, was sufficiently relevant and probative to support the determination".

* The preponderance of the evidence test requires that each element of the proof advanced by the charging party's "is more likely true than not."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Supreme Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint alleging age discrimination

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court correctly dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint alleging the New York State Insurance Fund [NYSIF] discriminated against him because of his age within meaning of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law §296[1][a]). 

The Appellate Division opined the defendant NYSIF "proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its refusal to hire the Plaintiff for its claims services representative or underwriter trainee positions" and Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons advanced by NYSIF in its defense were pretextual.

 

Ruderman v New York State Ins. Fund

2023 NY Slip Op 01974

Decided on April 18, 2023

Appellate Division, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered: April 18, 2023
Before: Webber, J.P., Friedman, Singh, Scarpulla, Rodriguez, JJ.

Index No. 650940/11 Appeal No. 51 Case No. 2022-03934

Irving Ruderman, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v

New York State Insurance Fund, Defendant-Respondents, John/Jane Does I-XX, Defendants.

Pardalis & Nohavicka, LLP, New York (Israel Klein of counsel), for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (Kristin Cooper Holladay of counsel), for respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Latin, J.), entered March 17, 2022, which granted defendant New York State Insurance Fund's (NYSIF) motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.^[FN1]

The court correctly dismissed the complaint alleging age discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296[1][a]). NYSIF proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its refusal to hire plaintiff for its claims services representative or underwriter trainee positions, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons were pretextual (see Sedhom v SUNY Downstate Med. Ctr., 201 AD3d 536 [1st Dept 2022]). It is undisputed that plaintiff was late for his interview, that his application was incomplete, and that his resume lacked details as to his past employment. Further, NYSIF was unable to verify plaintiff's employment with the employers that plaintiff provided. Plaintiff failed to show that any of the nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by NYSIF were "false or unworthy of belief" and that age discrimination was the real reason for its refusal to hire him (DeFreitas v Bronx Lebonon Hosp. Ctr., 168 AD3d 541, 541 [1st Dept 2019]; see also Kwong v City of New York, 204 AD3d 442, 444 [1st Dept 2022], lv dismissed 38 NY3d 1174 [2022]).

Although plaintiff's score on the New York State Professional Careers Test was higher than those of the selected candidates, state employers are not required to select the highest scoring individual, and factors outside of performance on the test may be taken into consideration in making civil service appointments (see Matter of Cassidy v Municipal Civ. Serv. Commn. of City of New Rochelle, 37 NY2d 526, 529 [1975]). Plaintiff's contention that his undergraduate degree and years of experience automatically make him more qualified than the selected candidates is unavailing, particularly in light of NYSIF's showing that other candidates were better suited for the roles based on the many factors considered.

Finally, most of NYSIF's interviewers were in plaintiff's protected class, and NYSIF ultimately selected candidates from a broad age range, including at least one candidate who was the same age as plaintiff (see Miller v News Am., 162 AD3d 422, 422 [1st Dept 2018]). These factors weigh against any inference of discrimination (see id.; see also Sedhom, 201 AD3d at 537), and undermine plaintiff's claim that the interviewers expressly told him that he would not be hired due to his age.

Plaintiff's challenges to the dismissal of his claims under the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY §8-107[1][a]) are not properly before this Court, as he had withdrawn those claims pursuant to a stipulation and filed an amended complaint asserting only causes of action under the New York State Human Rights Law (see Weinstein v City of New York, 103 AD3d 517, 517 [1st Dept 2013]). In any event, as an "instrumentality of the State," NYSIF is not subject to the provisions of the New York City Human Rights Law (Jattan v Queens Coll. Of City Univ. of N.Y., 64 AD3d 540, 542 [2d Dept 2009]; see also Ajoku v New York State Off. of Temporary & Disability Assistance, 198 AD3d 437, 437-438 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 908 [2022]).

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: April 18, 2023

Footnotes

Footnote 1: Defendants John/Jane Does I-XX have not appeared in this action or sought representation from the Attorney General. In any event, the complaint is devoid of facts attributing any discrimination to any anonymous or unnamed person. Thus, the complaint is dismissed as to John/Jane Does I-XX as well as NYSIF.