Complying with all statutory tests critical to sustaining an administrative decision

Complying with all statutory tests critical to sustaining an administrative decision
Gallo v Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 37 AD3d 984

Albert P. Gallo’s application for employment as a bus driver with the Schenectady County Chapter NYSARC, Inc. (ARC) was rejected by OMRDD after it found that Gallo had been convicted of assault in the second degree in 1988.

OMRDD said that his employment as an ARC driver involved an unreasonable risk to the safety or welfare of consumers served by ARC in view of this conviction. Gallo sued, asking the court to overturn OMRDD’s determination.

Supreme Court found the record “insufficiently developed” and annulled OMRDD’s determination. The court also directed OMRDD to approve ARC's employment of Gallo but denied Gallo counsel fees. The parties cross-appealed, OMRDD from that part of the judgment annulling its determination and directing it to approve Gallo’s employment by ARC and Gallo from the denial of counsel fees.

The Appellate Division said that OMRDD is required by statute to undertake criminal history background checks of employees of voluntary corporations such as Schenectady ARC. It noted that when Gallo’s background check revealed the 1988 assault in the second-degree conviction, OMRDD notified Gallo of its finding. It also advised him “to submit any answering documentation.”

After receiving Gallo’s letter of explanation and letters of reference, OMRDD rejected Gallo’s application, indicating that its decision was “on the grounds that [Gallo was] convicted of a crime or crimes” and that this determination was consistent with the provisions of Correction Law Article 23-A.

The court noted that Correction Law Section 753, which is part of Article 23-A, sets out eight elements that a public agency is to consider in making a determination pursuant to Correction Law Section 752 concerning licensure or employment of any individual with a criminal conviction. In the words of the Appellate Division:

When all eight factors are considered and the positive factors are balanced against the negative factors, the resulting decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious nor does it constitute an abuse of discretion and reviewing courts may not reweigh the factors and substitute their judgment for that of the agency.

In this instance, however, the Appellate Division found that a number of the statutory elements required to be considered were not set out in the “checklist” that OMRDD claimed mirrored the statutory factors and was used in making OMRDD’s determination regarding Gallo’s eligibility for employment by ARC.

Because these factors were apparently not considered, the Appellate Division ruled that OMRDD’s determination was arbitrary. It remitted the matter back to OMRDD for its consideration of “the public policy issue and for a determination of whether a certificate of relief from disabilities or good conduct or the equivalent evidence would benefit this applicant.”

Addressing the issue of the attorney fees claimed by Gallo, the court said it that denial of counsel fees was not premature and OMRDD’s position herein “may ultimately prove to be correct” and, in any event, “it was substantially justified.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/02/complying-with-all-statutory-tests.html
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While a public employer may abolish a position for reasons of economy or efficiency, it may not do so to avoid a civil servant’s statutory rights

While a public employer may abolish a position for reasons of economy or efficiency, it may not do so to avoid a civil servant’s statutory rights
Matter of Gallagher v Board of Educ. for Buffalo City School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 01163, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

James F. Gallagher, in his capacity as president of the responsible employee organization, challenged the Buffalo City School District’s abolishing the positions of Director of Emergency Planning for the Buffalo City School District and Stenographic Secretary to the Superintendent and in replacing them with nearly identical civil-service exempt confidential positions.

Contending that the School District had acted in bad faith in abolishing these positions, Gallagher asked Supreme Court to annul the District’s decision abolishing the items.

Supreme Court granted the petition Gallagher’s petition and the Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division rejected the School District’s contention that they were entitled to abolish the position of Director of Emergency Planning because “they are entitled to abolish a position at any time” as being without merit.

While, the court explained, "A public employer may in good faith abolish a civil service position for reasons of economy or efficiency, but a position may not be abolished as a subterfuge to avoid the statutory protection afforded to civil servants," citing Hartman v Erie 1 BOCES Bd. of Educ., 204 AD2d 1037.

The Appellate Division said that in this instance the record showed that the position of Director of Emergency Planning was abolished in favor of a re-created civil-service exempt position entitled Homeland Security Coordinator. Yet, said the court, the School District “presented no evidence justifying the need for that position to be re-created for reasons of economy or efficiency, nor did they justify the need for that position to be classified as civil-service exempt.”

The court said that the primary duty of both the abolished Director position and the "re-created" Director position was the responsibility for emergency preparedness, including the implementation of safety plans and the organization of training programs and the knowledge, skill and ability for both positions appeared identical.

The Appellate Division said that with respect to the Stenographic Secretary position, the record supports a finding that it was abolished in bad faith.

Again, said the court, the School District did not present any evidence justifying the need to replace the Stenographic Secretary position with the newly created Confidential Secretary position for reasons of economy or efficiency, nor did they justify the need for that position to be classified as civil-service exempt.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01163.htm

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Employer’s filing appropriate Workers’ Compensation claims forms defeats “statute of limitation” objection to payment employee’s claim

Employer’s filing appropriate Workers’ Compensation claims forms defeats “statute of limitation” objection to payment employee’s claim
Matter of Kwadzogah v New York City Health & Hosp. Corp, 2011 NY Slip Op 01389, Appellate Division, Third Department

An employer waives the limitations defense by making payments of compensation to a claimant in the form of wages, medical treatment or other compensable expenses that carry a "recognition or acknowledgment of liability under the Workers' Compensation Law"

In this case the Appellate Division found that Innocencia Kwadzogah had sustained a work-related injury on July 29, 2006, but did not lose any time from work at that time and therefore did not file a claim for workers' compensation benefits.

In June 2008, however, Kwadzogah lost time from work as a result of the injury and filed a claim for benefits on July 30, 2008 — one day after the expiration of the limitations period of Workers' Compensation Law §28.

When her employer, the New York City Health and Hospital Corporation opposed the claim, alleging that it was time-barred, a Workers' Compensation Law Judge determined that the employer had waived the limitations defense by making payments of compensation to claimant with an acknowledgment of liability.

Intimately the Workers' Compensation Board affirmed and HHC appealed.

The Appellate Division found that substantial evidence existed in the record* to support the Board's determination that HHC made payments to Kwadzogah “with a recognition of liability and, thus, waived the statute of limitations defense.”

Further, said the court, HHC did not file a notice of controversy, however, which it was required to do within 25 days of the Board's mailing of the notice of indexing if it intended to contest the claim (see Workers' Compensation Law §25[2][b]).

Cited as substantial evidence to support the Board's determination that HHC had waived the statute of limitations defense by:

1. Making payments of compensation to Kwadzogah with an acknowledgment of liability:

2. Filing a C-2 form reporting the injury as a work-related injury, offeredKwadzogah medical treatment; and

3. Filed a C-669 form (notice of carrier's action on a claim for benefits) with the Board in which HHC reported that the "claim [was] not disputed."

In addition, said the Appellate Division, HHC filed a C-11 form (Employer's report of injured employee's change in employment status resulting from injury) reporting to the Workers' Compensation Board that Kwadzogah had lost time beginning in June 2008 and indicating that, for part of that time, it had made payments to Kwadzogah.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01389.htm
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Federal charges characterized as involving “the failings of New York State government” and highlighting the need for comprehensive reform legislation

Federal charges characterized as involving “the failings of New York State government” and highlighting the need for comprehensive reform legislation
Source: Office of the Governor

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara has filed a 53-page complaint in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v Carl Kruger, Richard Lipsky, Aaron Malinski, Solomon Kalish, Robert Aquino, David Rosen, William Boyland, Jr. and Michael Turano, alleging violations of 18 USC §§1341, 1343, 1346, 1349, and 1956(a)(1)(B) and (h).

In a press release issued March 10, 2011, concerning the complaint, Governor Cuomo said:

"Today's arrests again spotlight the failings of New York State government and highlight the urgent need for the legislature to pass comprehensive ethics reform - now. During the campaign, I made a commitment that we would either pass real ethics reform with real disclosure and real enforcement or I would form a Moreland Commission on public integrity. New Yorkers deserve a clean and transparent government comprised of officials who work for the people, not for the special interests and certainly not for their own corrupt self-interests. Today, I reaffirm my commitment to clean up Albany and state clearly that either ethics legislation will be passed or I will form a Moreland Commission by the end of this legislative session."

The compliant filed by the U.S. Attorney is available on the Internet at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/50454766/Kruger-Carl-et-al-Complaint
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Failure to file prehearing statements required by the reviewing agency’s rules held to constitute a “waiver of defenses”

Failure to file prehearing statements required by the reviewing agency’s rules held to constitute a “waiver of defenses”
Matter of Smith v Albany County Sheriff's Dept., 2011 NY Slip Op 01559, Appellate Division, Third Department

Raymond C. Smith, a correction officer with the Albany County Sheriff’s Department, filed for workers' compensation benefits alleging that he suffered depression and anxiety due to harassment at his work place.

Although the Sheriff Department workers' compensation carrier controverted the claim, it failed to file a prehearing conference statement as required by the Rules of the Workers’ Compensation Board [12 NYCRR 300.38 (f) (1)]. As a result, the Workers' Compensation Law Judge held that the employer waived its defenses and, upon review of the medical records submitted by Smith, established the claim for a mental injury caused by work-related stress.*

The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the Law Judge’s ruling and the insurance carrier appealed.

The Appellate Division, finding that Smith had submitted records sufficient to sustain the conclusion that the stress that caused the injury was greater than that experienced by others working in similar capacities and dismissed the carrier’s appeal.

The court explained that the prehearing conference statement requiring the employer to include, among other things, an offer of proof for each defense raised is designed to "facilitate the just, speedy and efficient disposition of the claimant's right to workers' compensation benefits, including settlement." The Appellate Division decided that providing by rule for a “waiver of defenses” for failing to file the statement is not an unreasonable expansion of the statute.**

* In contrast, Section 2(7) of the Workers’ Compensation Law specifically excludes from compensation "an injury which is solely mental and is based on work related stress if such mental injury is a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision involving a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in good faith by the employer."

** Similarly, the Aures decision demonstrates the problem that could result if a party fails to appear at an administrative hearing as scheduled -- the hearing officer may hold the hearing "in absentia" and the determination will be binding on the parties [Aures v Buffalo Board of Education 272 AD2d 664].

The Smith decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01559.htm
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Courts may not revive an expired eligible list

Courts may not revive an expired eligible list
Matter of Leone v City of New York, 2011 NY Slip Op 01701, Appellate Division, First Department

Vincent Leone filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking to reinstate an expired promotion list for the position of Sergeant in the New York City Police Department. He also asked he court to direct his retroactive promotion to the rank of Sergeant from the “reestablished eligible list.”

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of Leone’s petition, holding that Leone acknowledged that he may not be promoted from an expired list and the courts do not have the power to extend the life of a civil service list.

Leone had argued that “he was the victim of the Department's "illegal quota" system.” The court, however, said that his claimed “lacks evidentiary support.”

Further, said the Appellate Division, “given, among other things, [Leone’s] extensive disciplinary history,” the appointing authority “had a rational basis for declining to promote him.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01701.htm
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Employee terminated for falsifying attendance records and other misconduct

Employee terminated for falsifying attendance records and other misconduct
Dinnocenzo v Lackawanna, 270 AD2d 840

In Dinnocenzo the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, sustained the termination of an employee found guilty of falsifying his time records and other offenses.

James Dinnocenzo was charged, and found guilty, of disciplinary charges alleging misconduct and insubordination. Among the specifications:

1. Unauthorized absence from work;

2. Failure to obey his superior’s orders to report his absences; and

3. Submitting time sheets falsely indicating the hours that he was present at work.

Finding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of guilt, the court said that in light of all the circumstances, the penalty of dismissal was not so disproportionate to the misconduct as to be `shocking to one’s sense of fairness’ -- the Pell doctrine [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222].

As to Dinnocenzo’s testimony concerning the reason for his absences and minimizing the length of those absences, this, said the court, raised an issue of credibility for the Hearing Officer to resolve. The Hearing Officer apparently was not persuaded by Dinnocenzo’s efforts to explain his actions.
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Rebutting a statutory presumption

Rebutting a statutory presumption
Hutnik v Kelly, 37 AD3d 346

New York City police officer John Hutnik applied for accident disability retirement benefits pursuant to Section 207-k of the General Municipal Law. Section 207-k creates a rebuttable presumption that Hutnik’s “heart-related disability” underlying his application for accidental disability retirement benefits was service-related.

In this instance the Appellate Division found that this statutory presumption was “rebutted by credible evidence” that Hutnik did not suffer from a heart-related disability, notwithstanding his personal physician’s opinion to the contrary. As there was no other evidence or claim presented by Hutnik as to any other possible cause for the medical condition underlying his claim, the Appellate Division sustained the rejection of his application for accidental disability retirement benefits.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/02/rebuttable-presumption.html

Failure to exhaust the available administrative remedy to challenge a determination held a fatal defect in seeking judicial relief

Failure to exhaust the available administrative remedy to challenge a determination held a fatal defect in seeking judicial relief
Matter of Connor v Town of Niskayuna, 2011 NY Slip Op 01556, Appellate Division, Third Department

A number of police officers submitted applications for membership in the New York State and Local Retirement System. Although advised of the availability of two optional retirement plans available to them pursuant to §§384 and 384-d of the Retirement and Social Security Law, and that an election to become a member of either optional retirement plan must be filed within one year of becoming a police officer or member of the Retirement System, none of the police officers in this action filed an election to become a member of either of the two optional plans when they submitted their applications. Accordingly, they were automatically enrolled in the retirement plan provided by Retirement and Social Security Law §375-c.

The police officers subsequently filed an application for enrollment in the §384-d retirement plan. The Comptroller, however, issued a written determination declining to process their respective applications because the statutory one-year election period had expired.

The police officers involved then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking to compel the Comptroller to accept their applications and to make all contributions required in connection with their membership in the §384-d plan. Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that the police officers failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, pointing out “It is hornbook law that one who objects to the act of an administrative agency must exhaust available administrative remedies before being permitted to litigate in a court of law," citing Watergate II Apts. v Buffalo Sewer Auth., 46 NY2d 52.

Here, said the court, the Retirement and Social Security Law sets out the procedure for challenging a retirement benefit determination made by the Comptroller whereby the disappointed individual is to request a hearing and redetermination and then, upon final determination of the Comptroller, he or she commence a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.

In this instance, despite their dissatisfaction with the Comptroller's decision to reject their applications as untimely, the police officers failed to avail themselves of the proceedures set out in Retirement and Social Security Law §374(d).* The Appellate Division said that that the Comptroller's written refusal to process their applications constituted a "determination" within the meaning of Retirement and Social Security Law §374(c).

As the police officers could have challenged the rejections of their respective applications by requesting a hearing and redetermination, they failed to do so. Accordingly, Supreme Court correctly dismissed their Article 78 petition for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them by statute.

*§374.d provides, in pertinent part, that: “At any time within four months … the applicant or his [or her] counsel may serve a written demand upon the comptroller for a hearing and redetermination of such application. … The comptroller shall have the same power upon such hearing as upon the original application. After such hearing the comptroller shall make his final determination. A copy thereof shall be mailed to the applicant and his [or her] counsel, if any. Such final determination shall be subject to review only as provided in article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_01556.htm
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FMLA does not cover faith healing trip

FMLA does not cover faith healing trip
Source: Adjunct Law Prof Blog; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2011, Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Johns Law School and New York Law School, All rights reserved.

Tayag v. Lahey Clinic, ____F.3d____(1st Cir. Jan. 22, 2011), is both an interesting and important case. The First Circuit held that a company that fired a woman for taking unapproved time off to accompany her husband on a “faith healing” trip did not violate the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. The circuit agreed with a lower court's finding that the trip, a seven-week “healing pilgrimage” was not protected under the statute “because it was effectively a vacation.” Such travel is not “medical care” as defined by the FMLA, 29 U.S.C. §2601.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

NYPPL Comments: In Sanni v NYS Office of Mental Health [USDC, EDNY, decided February 15, 2000], “faith healing” was one of the issues in a disciplinary action.

Thomas Sanni, then employed in a grade 27 project director position at Kings Park Psychiatric Center, was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law.

Ultimately a hearing officer found Sanni guilty of 11 of the 14 charges filed against him. Among the charges for which Sanni was found guilty: “Improperly participating in and supporting the decision to employ the minister of [Sanni’s] church to exorcise a patient 'possessed by spirits.'”
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