A three-part test is applied by the court to determine if a party to a collective bargaining agreement's demand for arbitration is viable

A three-part test is applied by the court to determine if a party to a collective bargaining agreement's demand for arbitration is viable

City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 2018 NY Slip Op 08294, Appellate Division, Second Department

The collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between Local 328 and the City of Yonkers provides a three-step grievance procedure to resolve a dispute involving the interpretation or application of any provision of the CBA. In the event the grievance is not administratively resolved at any of the three step of the grievance procedure, the City or Local 328, as the case may be, may elect to submit the dispute to arbitration.

When the City issued a General Order, General Order No. 4-15, changing certain dispatch response protocols for Emergency Medical Service [EMS] personnel to include new or additional incidents, Local 628 filed a grievance asserting, among other things, that the new protocols had not negotiated with it. After exhausting its internal grievance remedies, Local 628 filed a timely demanded for arbitration of the dispute.

In response to Local 628's demand for arbitration, the City had initiated this Article 75 proceeding in Supreme Court seeking an order permanently staying arbitration, contending that the dispute was not arbitrable. Supreme Court agreed with the City argument and, in effect, granted the City's petition to permanently stay arbitration.

Local 628 appealed the Supreme Court's ruling and the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's determination "on the law."

The Appellate Division, citing Matter of City of Long Beach v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Long Beach Unit, 8 NY3d 465, explained that "[p]ublic policy in New York favors arbitral resolution of public sector labor disputes." A dispute between a public sector employer and an employee, however, is only arbitrable if it satisfies a two-prong test.

Initially the court must determine that there is no statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance. If the demand for arbitration survives this judicial test, the court must then "examine the parties' collective bargaining agreement and determine if they in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute." Further, when deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable the court may not consider the merits of the dispute as the arbitrator is charged with weighing the merits of the claim.

Noting that it was undisputed that there is no statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition to arbitration of Local 628's grievance, the Appellate Division said that the only issue to be resolved is whether the parties, in fact, agreed to arbitrate the dispute.

Citing Matter of Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF, AFL-CIO v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, the Appellate Division explained that "Where, as here, the relevant arbitration provision of the CBA is broad, if the matter in dispute bears a reasonable relationship to some general subject matter of the CBA, it will be for the arbitrator and not the courts to decide whether the disputed matter falls within the CBA."

Local 628's grievance alleged that the City violated Article 33.1 of the CBA, which mandated that the EMS program be kept at the highest level of professional standards based upon the standards in place at the time of the agreement. Local 628 contended that General Order 4-15 increased the call protocols and subjected its members to calls for which they are not trained and lack necessary equipment. Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, the grievance is reasonably related to at least one provision in the CBA, and the Supreme Court should have denied the petition to permanently stay arbitration.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_08294.htm

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An administrative determination made after a hearing will be sustained by the court if the decision is supported by substantial evidence

An administrative determination made after a hearing will be sustained by the court if the decision is supported by substantial evidence

DeStefano v Incorporated Vil. of Mineola, 2018 NY Slip Op 08481, Appellate Division, Second Department

Michael A. DeStefano, a member of the Volunteer Fire Department of the Incorporated Village of Mineola, was served with disciplinary charges alleging that he had violated certain provisions of the Fire Department's constitution and by-laws. Found guilty of the charges by the Fire Department's Fire Council [Fire Council], DeStefano membership in Fire Department was terminated.

DeStefano asked the Board of Trustees of the Incorporated Village of Mineola [Board] to review the Fire Council's determination. The Board of Trustees appointed a hearing officer, who conducted a hearing. Following the hearing, the hearing officer recommended that the Fire Council's findings of misconduct and the penalty of termination of DeStefano's membership in the Fire Department be sustained. The Board adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer.

DeStefano appealed the Board's decision by commencing a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 contending that the Board's determination "was made in violation of lawful procedure and was not supported by substantial evidence."* Supreme Court denied DeStefano's petition and dismissed the proceeding. DeStefano appealed the Supreme Court's ruling to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division, noting that as a matter of procedure Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division but as the complete record "is now before this Court," held that it would treat the matter as one that has been transferred here and will review the determination de novo."

The court explained that with respect to judicial review of a determination rendered by an administrative body following a hearing, the Appellate Division's function "is limited to consideration of whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence." In this instance, said the Appellate Division, the Board's determination that DeStefano violated certain provisions of the Fire Department's constitution and its by-laws was supported by substantial evidence. Further, said the court, "... contrary to [DeStefano's] contention, certain members of the Fire Council were not required to disqualify themselves from acting on the disciplinary charges filed against him."

With respect to the penalty imposed, termination from the Fire Department, the Appellate Division noted that a court may set aside an administrative penalty only if it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law." 

The Appellate Division said that it found that the penalty of dismissal imposed on DeStefano was "not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness," citing Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222.

The court then confirmed the Board's decision and dismissed DeStefano's appeal "on the merits."

* Substantial evidence it is less than a preponderance of the evidence, overwhelming evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and "means such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact [300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_08481.htm

A public retirement system's denial of an application for retroactive membership in the System must be supported by substantial evidence

A public retirement system's denial of an application for retroactive membership in the System must be supported by substantial evidence

Sears v DiNapoli, 2018 NY Slip Op 08610, Appellate Division, Third Department

§803.a of the Retirement and Social Security Law [RSSL] addresses processing applications for retroactive membership in a public retirement system of New York State and provides, in pertinent part, that "A public retirement system shall have the authority to grant relief from a failure to file an application for membership in that system in connection with service rendered prior to April first, nineteen hundred ninety-three in accordance with the provisions of this [§803]."

Patricia Sears, a permanent employee of the Department of Taxation and Finance [T&F] from November 1977 until her retirement in July 2015 was enrolled in ERS as a Tier 3 member.  Prior thereto her permanent appointment in 1977, Sears had been employed by T&F as a seasonal employment on two occasions, initially from March 4, 1976 to June 30, 1976 and then again from January 6, 1977 until September 16, 1977. Prior to the commencement of her second temporary period of employment with T&F Sears signed a waiver dated December 28, 1976 acknowledging her right to join the Retirement System and elected not to do so.*

After RSSL §803 was enacted in 1993, Sears sought, but was denied, retroactive Tier 2 membership in ERS. Shortly before Sears retired in July 2015, she again sought to have her ERS membership in Tier 3 changed to a Tier 2 membership. Although ERS again denied Sears' request for Tier 2 membership, Sears challenged the decision via an administrative hearing and the Hearing Officer recommended Sears' application for retroactive Tier 2 membership be granted. The Comptroller rejected the Hearing Officer's recommendation and Sears filed an Article 78 petition challenging the Comptroller's determination.

The Appellate Division said the ERS conceded, and its review of the record confirms, that the underlying determination denying Sears' application to Tier 2 membership in ERS was not supported by substantial evidence. In words of the court, "As the Hearing Officer aptly observed, the waiver signed by [Sears] in December 1976 cannot be applied retroactively to encompass [Sears'] initial period of seasonal employment from March 1976 to June 1976, and Sears testified without contradiction that she was neither offered an opportunity to join nor declined membership in the Retirement System at that time."

The court explained that there was no information in Sears' personnel file regarding her membership options or opportunities when she was first hired in 1976, nor were there any current employees who could attest to the membership notification procedures that were in place when Sears was initially employed by T&F. Further, said the court, the documentary proof offered at the hearing was insufficient to establish, among other things, that Sears participated in a procedure that a reasonable person would recognize as an opportunity to join or decline membership in the Retirement System.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division annulled the Comptroller's determination, granted Sears application for retroactive Tier 2 status in ERS and remitted the matter to ERS "further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision."

In contrast, see Schuyler v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement System at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_00874.htm where the Appellate Division ruled that a "lack of documentation, coupled with information suggesting that petitioner's services were performed as an independent contractor rather than a state employee, supports the Comptroller's denial of petitioner's request for additional service credit."

* Frequently employees, other than employees in the Labor Class, eligible for membership in ERS but not required to become a member, declined becoming a member in order to avoid being required to make employee contributions to ERS and participating in Social Security. Employees in the Labor Class were required to participate in Social Security regardless of their membership in ERS.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_08610.htm