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October 22, 2019

Requesting authorization to treat the chronic pain that a Workers' Compensation benefits recipient was experiencing from his work-related injuries with medical marihuana


The Workers' Compensation Board among other things, sustained the employer's workers' compensation carrier's denial of a claimant's treating physician's "MG-2 Form" requesting a variance to permit treating his work-related injuries with medical marihuana.

A Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] subsequently approved the variance request for causally-related medical marihuana treatment following a hearing and submission of additional medical evidence from claimant's treating medical provider which included a medical report in which the medical provider summarized claimant's pain management regimen and reviewed the various "beneficial effects of the medical mari[h]uana" that claimant had received.

The provider reported, among other things, that Claimant's sleep has improved and pain was reduced "since using medical marihuana," that medical marihuana "allowed him to participate more with his wife and children" and that he "[e]motionally feels much improved" as a result of using medical marihuana. The treating medical provider also noted that claimant was experiencing a "[f]inancial burden with continuing an optimal dose of the medical THC."*

The Workers' Compensation Board's reverse and vacated the WCLJ's decision, finding that "it could not approve a variance for treatment already rendered. Claimant appealed the Board's decision.

The Appellate Division, citing 12 NYCRR 324.3 [a], explained that a variance is a treating medical provider's request for authorization of medical care that varies from the Medical Treatment Guidelines, and, generally, the burden of proof to establish that a variance "is appropriate for the claimant and medically necessary shall rest on the [t]reating [m]edical [p]rovider requesting the variance," noting that 12 NYCRR 324.3 [a] [1] provides that "[a] variance must be requested and granted by the carrier, [the] Special Fund, the Board or order of the [Board] Chair before medical care that varies from the Medical Treatment Guidelines is provided to the claimant and a request for a variance will not be considered if the medical care has already been provided."

However, said the Appellate Division, in its view, although the Board properly denied the variance request for medical care, that applied only to the extent such care had already been provided. In contrast, the court opined that in "an instance such as here, however, where the claimant has a chronic pain condition necessitating ongoing treatment, the Board should have addressed the merits of claimant's variance request for prospective medical marihuana treatment."

The Appellate Division then remitted the matter to the Board "for consideration in the first instance of claimant's variance request for prospective treatment."

* Tetrahydrocannabinol [THC] binds with the cannabinoid 1 [CB1] receptors in the brain and produces a high or sense of euphoria. In contrast, Cannabidiol [CBD] binds very weakly, if at all, to CB1 receptors is reported to be able to interfere with the binding of THC and dampen its psychoactive effects.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

October 21, 2019

Confusing permanent appointment with attaining tenure in the position


In Matter of Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME AFL-CIO v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 174 AD3d 1206 [CSEA] and, similarly, in Ayers v City of Mount Vernon, Appellate Division, Second Department, 2019 NY Slip Op 07230 [Ayers], it appears that there some misunderstanding or misapplication of the words of art "permanent appointment" and "tenure" in determining the employment  status of a public employee while he or she is serving a probationary period.

In CSEA, the court states: "Respondent determined that, at the time of the termination, Sansky had 25 days remaining in his probationary period and that, because he had not yet been permanently appointed to the position of Cadet Leader 1, he was not entitled to a pretermination hearing under Civil Service Law §75 or the applicable collective bargaining agreement" [emphasis supplied].

In Ayers, the "Notice of Appointment" reported in the decision indicated that the plaintiff, Andrea L. Ayers, would serve a six-month probationary period, after which she would be appointed to her position permanently [emphasis supplied].

However, in both situations as described in these decisions the "appointment status" of the individual was that of a "permanent employee" but the individual had not attained a "tenured" appointment status in the position. This is significant with respect to the appointee's right to "notice and hearing" as a condition precedent to termination for cause and for other purposes set out in law.

As a general rule, an individual appointed to a position on a permanent basis attains such status on the effective date of such "appointment" but [1] does not attain tenure in the position until he or she satisfactorily completes his or her maximum period of probation or [2] attains tenure by estoppel, acquisition, default, or otherwise by operation of law or [3] attains tenure as the result of the appointing authority's lawfully truncating the individual's maximum period of probation. In addition, tenure may be acquired in consideration of certain military service performed during a probationary period or by other lawful process.

York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, sets out the basic rule concerning the dismissal of probationary employees as follows: “After completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation, a probationary employee can be dismissed without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, as long as there is no proof that the dismissal was done for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law, or the decision was made in bad faith.”

This limitation on summarily dismissing a probationary employee during the minimum probationary period is to provide the individual a minimum period of time to demonstrate his or her ability to satisfactorily perform the duties of the position. In contrast, should the appointing authority elect to terminate a probationary employee before he or she has completed the required minimum period of probation, the individual is entitled to administrative due process, i.e., "notice and hearing," otherwise to be accorded a "tenured employee."

Further, the distinction between a date of "permanent appointment" in contrast to the date on which an appointee "attains tenure" is illustrated in other provisions of the Civil Service Law such as §80.1 [layoff] where, in pertinent part, it provides that ... incumbents holding the same or similar positions shall be made in the inverse order of original appointment on a permanent basis in the classified service in the service of the governmental jurisdiction in which such abolition or reduction of positions occurs.

The CSEA decision is posted on the Internet at:

The Ayers decision is posted on the Internet at:

October 18, 2019

Excessive PCBs in the Hudson River: Attributable to Incompleteness of Dredging, or to Seven Years of Dredging? - Source: Environmental Claims Journal


Below is the abstract of an article by Dr. Robert Michaels [corresponding author, bam@ramtrac.com] and Uriel M. Oko recently published in the Environmental Claims Journal.   The full text of the article can be downloaded from ResearchGate.net at no charge, via the following URL:  

Abstract1

GE recently completed a seven-year US EPA-mandated clamshell dredging project to remediate PCB contamination of the Hudson River. Post-project PCB levels in water and fish, however, are higher than anticipated, suggesting to some the need to extend the project to remove more PCB-bearing sediments. Our investigation of the effectiveness of the dredging project revealed that a previously unconsidered physical process must mobilize sediments as a result of dredge bucket closure. We also used computerized dredging data (‘bucket files’) to estimate the fraction of dredged sediments returned to the river instead of being deposited into waiting barges. We conclude that excessive post-project PCBs in the Hudson River predominantly are attributable to sediment mobilization by clamshell dredges. We predict that proposed extension of the dredging project would prolong mobilization processes, allowing PCBs to spread widely and enter ecosystems that include people, endangered fish such as sturgeon, and endangered birds such as bald eagles.

==================================
1 Michaels, Robert A; and Uriel M. Oko.  Excessive PCBs in the Hudson River:  attributable to incompleteness of dredging, or to seven years of dredging?  Environmental Claims Journal, 29(2):115-40, 2017; online:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10406026.2017.1307007, 25 April 2017.



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