New York Public Personnel Law
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
Nov 6, 2025
New school audits issued by the New York State Comptroller
On November 5, 2025, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli today announced the school audits listed below were issued.
Click on the text highlighted in color to access the audit.
School officials did not ensure that disbursements were adequately supported, for appropriate purposes, and reviewed and approved before payment.
The audit also determined that 112 disbursements and credit charges totaling $504,506 did not have an itemized invoice and a documented school purpose. Officials said they purchased 300 gift cards each worth $100 (totaling $30,975) for students for achieving certain grades on state exams but the cards were given to 19 teachers and support staff based on student grades.
In addition, the operations manager’s responsibilities were not adequately segregated, and she was able to make purchases, prepare checks, sign checks with a board member’s stamp and modify or delete data in the financial software.
Finally, the school’s former operations manager was arrested in December 2024 for the alleged theft of $1,100 in gift cards. On July 2, 2025, she pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and repaid the school.
Greenburgh Central School District – Procurement (Westchester County)
District officials generally procured time and materials contracts in a cost-efficient manner using competitive bids or the required exception to the competitive bidding process. However, district officials did not confirm that the goods and services billed by the vendor and paid by the district were accurate and complied with the applicable bid specifications or, in some circumstances, the terms of the contract. Because of this, officials overpaid three vendors a total of $55,015.
In addition, officials did not ensure all vendor invoices were properly supported and audited before payment. As a result, there is an increased risk that paid claims may not be for legitimate expenditures.
Elmira City School District – Capital Projects (Chemung County)
Although district officials complied with competitive bidding requirements and certain aspects of the district’s procurement policies, they did not seek competition for two professional service contracts related to the 2020 Capital and Energy Performance Improvements Project.
Auditors reviewed a total of 60 contracts and 12 change orders associated with the contracts that either exceeded the competitive bidding requirements set forth in state law or were subject to the district’s procurement policies and procedures. The total cost of these contracts and change orders was approximately $62.9 million. Of these costs, $7.3 million was paid to two vendors through contracts for professional services that were not let in accordance with the district’s procurement policy that requires the district to use a request for proposals process.
Jasper-Troupsburg Central School District – Emergency Drills (Steuben County)
During the regular school year, district officials must conduct a minimum of 12 evacuation and lockdown drills for each building and three bus drills for each bus to provide staff and students with the training necessary to respond appropriately in an emergency.
District officials did not conduct all required drills or conduct all drills within the required time frames and officials could not support that they met all drill requirements. Officials also did not file the required state Education Department annual certification for bus drills or properly notify parents of drills.
Without adequate emergency instruction and training, district officials cannot ensure that staff and students are prepared for emergencies.
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Nov 5, 2025
Controverting a claim that the employee contracted COVID19 while working at the worksite
The New York State Workers' Compensation Board [Board] had reversed a Workers' Compensation Administrative Law Judge's finding that the Claimant was not eligible for workers' compensation benefits related to contracting COID-19. In so doing the Board reasoned that Claimant's public-facing job exposed him to an elevated risk of contracting the disease.
The School District and its workers' compensation carrier [jointly referred to as "Carrier"] had controverted the Claimant's application for benefits, contending, among other things, that the alleged injury did not occur in the course of Claimant's employment and that there was no causal relationship between the alleged injury and Claimant's employment, appealed the Board's ruling.
Acknowledging that "the contraction of COVID-19 in the workplace is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Law", the Appellate Division explained:
a. The issue of whether a compensable accident has occurred is a question of fact for the Board to resolve; and
b. The Board's findings in this regard, if supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed.
Opining that case law makes clear that where, as here, the injured Claimant alleges that he or she contracted COVID-19 at work, the Appellate Division said that the claimant for workers' compensation benefits "bears the burden of demonstrating either a specific exposure to COVID-19 or that COVID-19 was so prevalent in the work environment as to present an elevated risk of exposure constituting an extraordinary event". As an example, the Appellate Division identified such individuals as "workers with significant contact with the public in communities with high rates of infection or workers in a workplace experiencing high rates of infection".
Although Claimant did not allege, and the Board did not conclude, nor did the record did not support a finding that Claimant had a specific exposure to COVID-19, the Appellate Division decided that "the issue distills to whether substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that '[Claimant's] job as a high school custodian was a public-facing job that significantly elevated his risk of exposure to COVID-19 via contact with students'".
Noting that the record was silent as to the rate of infection in either the school where Claimant worked or the surrounding community, the Court, considering the record as a whole, concluded that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Division found:
1. The record was devoid of proof that there was a high rate of infection present in Claimant's work environment at the relevant point in time;
2. Claimant's brief encounters with a passing group of students in a corridor falls short of the degree of regular, consistent and close interaction with the public at large necessary to sustain a finding of prevalence; and
3. The record indicated that either Claimant or members of his household engaged in other in-person pursuits during the relevant time period.
In the words of the Appellate Division, "Under these circumstances, the Board's finding that [Claimant's] employment exposed him to an elevated risk of exposure to COVID-19 cannot stand". Reversing the Board's decision, the Court remanded the matter "to the Workers' Compensation Board for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision".
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.
When an administrative determination is made without a hearing, a court's review is limited
A police officer [Petitioner] grieved disciplinary charges served on him pursuant to the applicable collective bargaining agreement and requested a hearing before an arbitrator.
In lieu of the hearing, the parties agreed to resolve the matter through a consent award that provided that Petitioner would serve a 120-day suspension without pay and then be "reinstated full time and in good standing, subject to the [Police] Chief's discretion to direct an alternate assignment." As a condition of the consent award, Petitioner waived his right to a hearing on the charges.
After Petitioner completed his suspension period, the Police Chief placed Petitioner on an alternative assignment. Petitioner later resigned from his position, indicating that he had "decided to explore other opportunities in law enforcement in lieu of continuing the current alternative assignment." In accordance with statutory obligations, the Police Chief then notified the Division of Criminal Justice Services [DCJS] that Petitioner's employment with the police department "had ended by a standard resignation".
The Police Chief subsequently advised DCJS that he had improperly characterized Petitioner's separation from employment as a standard resignation and requested that Petitioner's record be amended to reflect that Petitioner's removal had been "for cause", citing 9 NYCRR 6056.2 (h).
DCJS amended Petitioner's record to reflect that he was removed "for cause" and notified Petitioner that his basic training certification had been permanently invalidated. Petitioner then sought administrative review of DCJS determination, contending that the "for cause" designation was based upon inaccurate information since his resignation from his former employer occurred after the disciplinary matter had been fully resolved and after he had been reinstated on a full-time basis in good standing. Petitioner submitted a copy of the consent award, along with other documentation, in support of such assertion.
DCJS reviewed the matter pursuant to 9 NYCRR 6056.7, which applies when it receives information indicating "a material inaccuracy in an employer's reporting of the reason an officer ceased to serve." During that process, the Police Chief sent a letter which claimed that, during the negotiation of the consent award, "it was determined that [Petitioner] would resign as a [department[officer] ... rather than return to duty under an alternate assignment," representing that Petitioner never returned to work upon the completion of his suspension and instead used accrued leave credits until he submitted his resignation.
The Police Chief further explained that he began investigating the decertification process after he received information that Petitioner had applied for employment with another law enforcement agency, claiming that Petitioner had agreed during the negotiation of the consent award that he would not seek employment with that particular law enforcement agency, among others, as a police officer.
Petitioner provided DCJS with copies of his attendance report and pay stubs, which demonstrated that he worked remotely on 10 days, using accrued leave for the remaining days and other relevant records indicating that he had "completed his disciplinary suspension" and was "now on full pay and benefits." Indeed, pay stubs submitted to DCJS during the administrative review process confirm that petitioner was paid by the Police Department during this period. Petitioner also provided DCJS with various exhibits from the administrative record, as well as an affidavit in which he alleged that in the course of the negotiations in furtherance of the consent award, he was advised that his certification would remain intact if he proceeded with a consent award rather than a hearing on the charges and then subsequently resigned.
DCJS notified Petitioner that it had completed its review and had concluded that the Police Chief accurately reported Petitioner's separation from employment as a removal for cause.
Petitioner then commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding against the Police Chief and others, [collectively referred to as Respondents] and DCJS, challenging DCJS's administrative determination as arbitrary and capricious. Upon considering the record, Supreme Court dismissed the petition against the Respondents holding that they were improper parties.
Supreme Court, finding that DCJS' determination was not arbitrary and capricious insofar as the record demonstrated that Petitioner resigned due to being placed on an alternative assignment, which, the court emphasized, was a disciplinary consequence of the misconduct allegations, otherwise dismissed Plaintiff's petition on the merits.
The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition against Petitioner's former employer as "The primary relief requested by [Petitioner] is annulment of DCJS' determination and reinstatement of his basic training certification.
Noting that DCJS is the entity with the authority "to amend [an] inaccuracy" in a police officer's record and is the agency that issued the final and binding determination (see Executive Law § 845 [3] [b]; General Municipal Law § 209-q [1] [b-1]), the Appellate Division said it was "unpersuaded by [Petitioner's] argument" that the Respondents are necessary parties because they "played a substantial role in the injury to [Petitioner] or ... were primarily responsible for" DCJS' determination.
Noting that it recognized that the Police Chief's "for cause" notification to DCJS "immediately" invalidated Petitioner's basic training certification as of that date, DCJS subsequently conducted a merits review of that determination under 9 NYCRR 6056.7, concluding that the Police Chief's "for cause" reporting was correct.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that it was DCJS, not the Respondents, who made the ultimate administrative determination that caused Petitioner's injury.
That said, the Appellate Division ruled that "under the particular circumstances of this case", it agreed with Petitioner that DCJS' determination was arbitrary and capricious, explaining that "Where, as here, an administrative determination is made without a hearing, our review is limited to whether the determination was arbitrary and capricious, lacked a rational basis or was affected by an error of law", noting that "An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts".
The Appellate Division opined that DCJS' position that Petitioner was separated "for cause" from employment within the meaning of 9 NYCRR 6056.2 (h), if accepted, lacks a sound basis in reason, as it would permit a police department to claim that an officer resigned "for cause" any time a resignation was part and parcel to a disciplinary consequence — even if charges had been fully resolved years prior and even if the officer worked for several more years before retiring.
Further, the Appellate Decision noted, DCLS' view was accepted, it would also render the consent award effectively meaningless — a troubling prospect given that [Petitioner] waived his right to a hearing on the misconduct charges in exchange for resolving the matter in a manner that would allow him to be reinstated in good standing, without any provision in the consent award notifying him that his basic training certification could be revoked if he resigned.
The Court remitted the matter to DCJS for further consideration "not inconsistent with this Court's decision."
N.B. In a footnote in its decision, Footnote 4, the Appellate Division pointed out that prior to October 16, 2021, a removal for cause meant, in pertinent part, a "removal for incompetence or misconduct" by virtue of an employee's resignation "while a disciplinary process has commenced ... which may result in removal". In Matter of Kitto v City of Albany, N.Y. Dept. of Police (213 AD3d at 1170), that Court impliedly concluded that, for a resignation to constitute a removal for cause under the prior definition, it must have occurred while misconduct charges were still pending. The Appellate Division said it recognized that the amended definition uses broader language, but concluded that DCJS' determination, on these facts, "is not rational."*
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.
* A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - NYPPL's 442-page e-book focusing on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html.
Nov 4, 2025
Pandemic unemployment fraud conspiracy
On October 22, 2025, New York State Inspector General Lucy Lang announced the sentencing of Jodi Drygula, of Amsterdam, NY, and Anthony Camou, of Las Vegas, NV, for their roles in a conspiracy to fraudulently obtain more than $250,000 in unemployment insurance benefits intended to support New Yorkers during the COVID-19 pandemic.