SUNY Research Webinar highlighting the women who shaped New York State’s past and continue to inspire its future

Join the SUNY Research Foundation Webinar on Wednesday, March 25, 2026 highlighting the women who shaped New York State’s past and continue to inspire its future. Hear from the Radley Fellows as they share their groundbreaking research.

This event honors the vision of Dr. Virginia Radley, whose fellowship uplifts SUNY scholars exploring women’s leadership, the humanities, and inclusive civic impact.

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New York State Comptroller releases local government audits

On March 19, 2026 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli issued the local government audits described below.

Click on the text highlighted in color to access the text of the audits.

Village of Asharoken – Claims Audit and Treasurer’s Duties (Suffolk County)  Auditors found the board did not always conduct a thorough audit of individual claims for non-payroll disbursements because supporting documentation was not consistently included with claims submitted for review. Of the 232 disbursements totaling $877,625 reviewed, 51 disbursements totaling $69,707 were not properly audited due to missing invoices, unsigned vouchers, late fees and claims that showed no evidence of board review. Auditors also found that some payments were withdrawn directly from the village’s bank account without being audited by the board.

Town of Gorham – Distribution of Foreign Fire Insurance Tax Proceeds (Ontario County)  Town officials did not properly distribute the 2023 and 2024 Foreign Fire Insurance tax proceeds in accordance with state law and relevant case law. The bookkeeper incorrectly calculated the allocation by using an inaccurate formula that included the fire district and based the distribution on contract payments and budgeted appropriations rather than the number of active members in the fire companies. Auditors determined that the fire district should not have been included in the calculation and that the proceeds should have been distributed based on a pro-rata formula using active membership totals. As a result, one fire department received $681 more than its share, another received $4,076 less than its share and the fire district improperly received $3,395. In addition, town officials did not review the allocation calculations to ensure the funds were accurately distributed.

Fairview Fire District – Procurement and Claims Audit (Dutchess County)  The board and district officials did not always procure goods and services in a cost-effective manner or ensure claims were properly audited for accuracy and completeness. As a result, officials could not support the district procuring a $1.2 million ladder truck in the most cost-effective manner and did not pursue competition or document the competitive process for 11 purchases totaling $178,347 out of 18 purchases totaling $414,458. In addition, officials did not effectively audit 50 claims totaling $124,600, made 15 purchases totaling $5,784 that were not appropriate because they were gifts and did not approve reimbursement payments to 27 employees totaling $19,419.

Preston Fire District – Board Oversight (Chenango County)  The board did not provide proper oversight of the district’s financial activities. The board did not adopt an investment policy, correctly monitor investments, establish a procurement policy, effectively audit claims, annually audit the treasurer’s records or ensure the district’s annual financial reports were filed in a timely manner. Although the district’s investments were legal, safe and liquid, officials maintained the capital reserve fund in a savings account earning 0.02% interest and realized only $125 in earnings during the three completed fiscal years of the audit period. If officials invested in an alternative permissible investment, such as treasury bills with an average interest rate of 3.89%, the district could have realized approximately $26,000 in additional earnings during the same period.

Town of Ridgeway – Health Insurance Benefits (Orleans County)  Auditors found the board did not properly authorize or monitor health insurance benefits provided to current and former officials. Because internal controls and oversight were not established, the supervisor did not ensure officials were eligible to receive post-employment health insurance benefits or that required premium contributions were paid to the town. As a result, the town incurred $236,885 more for health insurance premiums than it should have during the audit period, representing approximately 34% of the town’s total health insurance premiums over the seven-year period. In addition, the supervisor did not ensure certain former officials were eligible for benefits, resulting in $179,325 in unauthorized payments, and did not collect $52,659 in required premium contributions owed to the town.

Middlesex Fire District – Procurement (Yates County)  District officials did not ensure that goods and services were procured in an economical manner. These deficiencies occurred because officials did not follow the procurement policy adopted by the board of fire commissioners or demonstrate that the emergency exception to competitive bidding applied when purchasing a new tanker truck. As a result, officials did not competitively bid and awarded a contract valued at $564,065 to purchase the tanker truck. In addition, officials did not seek competition by obtaining verbal or written quotes for 14 purchases totaling $82,727, which reduced assurance that purchases were made in the most prudent and economical manner and in the district’s best interest.

Middlesex Fire District – Fiscal Transparency (Yates County)  The treasurer prepared and provided monthly and annual financial reports to the board. However, the treasurer did not prepare and file the district’s annual financial reports with the Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) in a timely manner for fiscal years 2018 through 2024. The treasurer indicated that the former treasurer’s records were disorganized and incomplete and that she did not initially have access to the OSC’s online portal to file the reports.

Town of Marathon – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Cortland County)  The board did not conduct or provide for an annual audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024 in accordance with state law. In addition, the supervisor did not prepare and file the 2023 and 2024 annual financial reports with OSC and did not provide the board with complete monthly financial reports. The supervisor also did not properly maintain accounting records, record the dates cash receipts were collected or properly reconcile bank accounts and cash records.

Town of Coventry – Transparency of Fiscal Activities (Chenango County)  The board did not conduct or provide for an annual audit of the supervisor’s financial records and reports for fiscal year 2024 in accordance with state law. In addition, the supervisor did not prepare and file the town’s annual financial reports for fiscal years 2022 through 2024 with OSC and did not provide the board with sufficient financial information to monitor the town’s fiscal activities. Auditors also found that the supervisor did not ensure debit card purchases were approved by the board, review payroll reports or provide the board with monthly budget status reports.

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An appeal to the Commissioner of Education pursuant to Education Law §310 is appellate in nature and is not ripe for review by the Commissioner until the decision is final

Petitioner filed an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 with New York State's Commissioner of Education concerning an action of the Board of Education of a school district [Respondent] involving its filling an administrative position [Coordinator Position] for which the Petitioner had earlier applied and had been interviewed.

In the instant appeal Petitioner alleged Respondent "declined to hire him for the vacant Coordinator Position in retaliation for, among other things, multiple lawsuits he commenced against a member of Respondent’s hiring committee. In addition, Petitioner alleged that Respondent had violated certain provisions of New York State's Constitution, certain provisions of New York State's Civil Service Law, and board policy.

Respondent had posted a job announcement for the Coordinator Position and subsequently reposted the job announcement in which it stated that "previous applicants need not reapply" but was otherwise identical to the previous posting.

Citing Appeal of Frey, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,308, and other decisions of the Commissioner of Education, the Commissioner said Petitioner's appeal "must be dismissed as premature as the Commissioner will not render an advisory opinion on an issue before it becomes justiciable". 

The Commissioner explained the Commissioner’s jurisdiction under color of Education Law §310 is appellate in nature and an action is not ripe for review by the Commissioner until it is final and results in an actual, concrete injury.

Noting that Respondent’s Policy 9240 requires that an interview committee recommend three or more candidates for second round interviews for administrative positions such as the Coordinator Position and Respondent had reposted the Coordinator Position:

1. In an effort to obtain the requisite number of candidates;

2. At the time Petitioner's  appeal was filled Respondent indicated that “none of the candidates … interviewed at the first-level were rejected; and

3. Petitioner had not submitted a reply or otherwise contested these assertions by the Respondent;

the Commissioner found that Petitioner's appeal must be dismissed as premature.

The Commissioner also observed that to the extent Petitioner suggests that Respondent was required to conduct "a competitive examination of merit and fitness" to fill the Coordinator Position, such examinations are not required for positions such as the Coordinator Position as the duties of the positions involve “the function of administration of teaching” and dismissed Petitioner's appeal.

Click HERE to access the Commissioner of Education's decision posted on the Internet.

Challenging a New York State statute alleged to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad

Executive Law §70-b established the Office of Special Investigation [OSI] within Office of the Attorney General [Respondent] to "investigate and, if warranted, prosecute" any alleged offense by a peace officer or police officer, "whether or not formally on duty", concerning any incident in which the death of a person, "whether in custody or not, is caused by an act or omission of such police officer or peace officer or in which the attorney general determines there is a question as to whether the death was in fact caused by an act or omission of such police officer or peace officer".

An off-duty state trooper was driving his private vehicle when another vehicle crossed over the center line of a highway and struck the trooper's vehicle head on. The trooper and a passenger were seriously injured and the driver of the other vehicle died. This triggered an investigation by OSI* pursuant to Executive Law §70-b.

The Police Benevolent Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. [PBA], contending that Executive Law "§70-b was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad", brought an action challenging the statute.

Supreme Court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss PBA's complaint "for lack of standing" and PBA appealed the Supreme Court's ruling. In the course of the appeal Respondent conceded that PBA had standing to bring the action and asked the Appellate Division to address the merits of PBA's allegations. The Appellate Division declined Respondent's request and remitted the case to Supreme Court to allow Respondent to serve an answer to PBA's complaint. 

Following remittal and service of Respondent's answer, Supreme Court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and granted, among other things, a declaratory judgment in Respondent's favor, holding that Executive Law §70-b is not void for vagueness and overbreadth. PBA appealed the Supreme Court's decision.

Addressing PBA's contention that Executive Law §70-b is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the Appellate Division, citing White v Cuomo, 38 NY3d 209, said "It is well settled that legislative enactments are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality, and courts strike them down only as a last unavoidable result after every reasonable mode of reconciliation of the statute with the Constitution has been resorted to, and reconciliation has been found impossible". The Court then noted that "To rebut that presumption, the party attempting to strike down a statute as facially unconstitutional bears the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is in conflict with the Constitution", explaining that "A statute, or a regulation, is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, and it is written in a manner that permits or encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement".

Concluding that PBA "has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that the statute is unconstitutionally void on its face", the Appellate Division opined that PBA's conclusory assertion that Executive Law §70-b is constitutionally overbroad lacks merit as it does not infringe on any constitutionally protected conduct.

* In a footnote to its decision in the instant matter the Appellate Division observed that after an initial investigation OSI found that the underlying incident involving the death of the driver was not under the jurisdiction of Respondent's office because the death of the driver of the other vehicle was not caused by a police officer.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Appellate Division rejects claim that adding age to New York State's Equal Rights Amendment nullified the constitutional mandatory retirement age of 70 for New York State judges and justices

In November 2024, New York State voters in the general election approved the Equal Rights Amendment [ERA], which, among other things, added the category of "age" to the Civil Rights Clause set out in Article I, §11(a) of the State Constitution. 

Petitioners in this action are three current or former New York State court justices who turned 70 or 76 years of age in 2025 and are therefore subject to mandatory retirement or to the "certification process" in order to continue to serve as New York State court justices. 

The Petitioners contended that the amendment to New York State's ERA nullified the constitutional mandatory retirement age of 70 for New York State court judges and justices when it added "age" to the list of protected categories set forth in Article I, §11(a) of the State Constitution. 

The Appellate Division disagreed, opining that "The plain language of the ERA does not support [Petitioners'] contention that article VI, §25(b), the mandatory judicial retirement provision, has been implicitly repealed, as the ERA contains no reference to Article VI, the eligibility of persons to serve as judges or justices, or the judicial retirement age". 

Rejecting the Petitioners' reliance on the "well-established exception . . . that a subsequent general statute will repeal a prior special law relating to the same subject where inconsistency exists and the Legislature's intent to effect such a repeal is manifest" [emphasis in the decision], the Appellate Division set out two reasons for rejecting Petitioners' arguments:

1. "... in contrast to the examples cited by petitioners, the ERA addresses a different subject matter from the provision petitioners seek to have declared nullified; and

2. "[Petitioners] cannot show that the legislature or the voters intended for the ERA to repeal article VI, §25(b)".

The Appellate Division noted that almost immediately after the ERA's changes became effective on January 1, 2025, new legislation proposing amendments that would raise the Article VI, §25(b) judicial retirement age was introduced in January 2025 and April 2025 in New York State's Assembly and Senate respectively, "suggesting that the drafters of the ERA did not, in fact, contemplate raising the judicial retirement age, but rather intended to address that issue separately."

In addition, citing Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, the Appellate Division pointed out "[r]epeal by implication is distinctly not favored in the law",  observing that implicit repeal requires that the repugnancy between two laws "be so palpable that upon reading the two acts together it is obvious, without the aid of elaborate argument, that both could not have been intended to remain in force at the same time".

The text of the Appellate Division's ruling is set out below:

Matter of Miller v State of New York

2026 NY Slip Op 01409

Decided on March 12, 2026

Appellate Division, First Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided and Entered: March 12, 2026
Before: Kennedy, J.P., Mendez, Pitt-Burke, Rosado, JJ.

Index No. 163102/25|Appeal No. 6084|Case No. 2025-07659|

[*1]In the Matter of Robert J. Miller et al., Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v

The State of New York et al., Respondents/Defendants-Respondents, New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation. Amicus Curiae.

Morrison Cohen LLP, New York (Y. David Scharf of counsel), for appellants.

David Nocenti, Office of Court Administration, New York (Pedro Morales of counsel), for New York Office of Court Administration, respondent.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York (Ester Murdukhayeva of counsel), for State of New York, respondent.

New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York (Jessica Perry of counsel), amicus curiae.

Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Lyle E. Frank, J.), entered December 1, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted the cross-motion of respondent The State of New York to dismiss the petition-complaint seeking a judgment declaring that the 2024 amendment to article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution rendered null and void the mandatory retirement age for judges and justices of the New York State Courts set forth in article VI, § 25(b) of the State Constitution and that the application of Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115 violates article I, § 11 of the State Constitution, and seeking an injunction barring respondents from requiring petitioners to retire or be denied certification for service, and dismissed this hybrid proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR articles 30, 63, and 78, unanimously modified, on the law, to grant judgment to respondents to the extent of declaring that article VI, § 25(b) of the State Constitution has not been repealed and that Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115 are not unconstitutional, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

In November 2024, New York State voters in the general election approved the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which, among other things, added the category of "age" to the Civil Rights Clause set forth in article I, § 11(a) of the State Constitution. Petitioners are three current or former state court justices who turned 70 or 76 years old in 2025 and are therefore subject to mandatory retirement or the certification process. They commenced the instant proceeding contending that the ERA nullified the constitutional mandatory retirement age of 70 for judges and justices when it added "age" to the list of protected categories set forth in article I, § 11(a). We disagree.

The guiding principle in the interpretation of a written constitution is to give effect to the plain language of the document (Matter of King v Cuomo, 81 NY2d 247, 253 [1993]). It has long been settled that "an amended constitution must be read as a whole, and as if every part had been adopted at the same time and as one law, and effect must be given to every part of it, each clause explained and qualified by every other part" (People ex rel. Killeen v Angle, 109 NY 564, 575 [1888] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Thus, courts are obliged to reconcile "seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution without doing violence to either" (McMahon v Michaelian, 38 AD2d 60, 62 [1st Dept 1971], affd 30 NY2d 507 [1972]; see Matter of Burger King v State Tax Commn., 51 NY2d 614, 620-621 [1980]).

The plain language of the ERA does not support petitioners' contention that article VI, § 25(b), the mandatory judicial retirement provision, has been implicitly repealed, as the ERA contains no reference to article VI, the eligibility of persons to serve as judges or justices, or the judicial retirement age (see NY Const art I, § 11[a]; see also Matter of King, 81 NY2d at 253). For two reasons, we reject petitioners' reliance on the "well-established exception . . . that a subsequent general statute will repeal a prior special law relating to the same subject where inconsistency exists and the Legislature's intent to effect such a repeal is manifest" (Gerry v Volger, 252 AD 217, 219 [4th Dept 1937] [emphasis added]).

First, in contrast to the examples cited by petitioners, the ERA addresses a different subject matter from the provision petitioners seek to have declared nullified (see Gerry, 252 AD at 218 [statutory change to statewide jury duty qualification implicitly amended statute regarding jury duty in specific counties]; see also US Const 14th amend, § 2 [changing calculation for apportioning representatives from prior method found in article I, former § 2, clause 3]; US Const 17th amend [changing method of selecting United States Senators found in article I, former § 3, clause 1]; Moore v United States, 602 US 572, 582-583 [2024], quoting US Const 16th amend [noting repeal of limitation that taxation of income from real property be evenly apportioned among the states by article I, former § 2, clause 3 and article I, § 8]).

Second, petitioners cannot show that the legislature or the voters intended for the ERA to repeal article VI, § 25(b). On the contrary, almost immediately after the ERA's changes became effective on January 1, 2025, new legislation seeking to propose amendments that would raise the article VI, § 25(b) judicial retirement age was introduced in January 2025 and April 2025 in the Assembly and Senate, respectively, suggesting that the drafters of the ERA did not, in fact, contemplate raising the judicial retirement age, but rather intended to address that issue separately (see Assembly Bills A 3756, A 3757 [2025]; Senate Bill S 7455 [2025]). Similarly, a proposed amendment with this same provision failed in the 2013 general election. The sponsors of the ERA bill focused instead on enshrining comprehensive protections from discrimination given the changing national legal landscape endangering abortion rights, rights for the disabled and pregnant, and rights based on sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression.

In addition, "[r]epeal by implication is distinctly not favored in the law" (Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199, 204 [1987]). Implicit repeal requires that the repugnancy between two laws "be so palpable that upon reading the two acts together it is obvious, without the aid of elaborate argument, that both could not have been intended to remain in force at the same time" (Pines v State of New York, 115 AD3d 80, 98 [2d Dept 2014], appeal dismissed 23 NY3d 982 [2014], quoting Matter of Tiffany, 179 NY 455, 457 [1904]). Because there is no support for petitioners' position within the ERA's legislative history, their cause of action asserting an implicit repeal necessarily fails. It follows that petitioners cannot demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Judiciary Law §§ 23 and 115, which implement article VI, § 25(b) faithfully, are unconstitutional (Matter of McGee v Korman, 70 NY2d 225, 231 [1987]; see Stefanik v Hochul, 43 NY3d 49, 57 [2024]).

We decline to reach the issues of whether the ERA made the Civil Rights Clause of article I, § 11 self-executing, or whether strict scrutiny applies to age-based statutory classifications, as these issues are academic in light of our determination.

Finally, Supreme Court erred in dismissing petitioners' first three causes of action seeking declaratory relief upon a finding that they were not entitled to the declaration sought. Instead, the proper course was to issue a declaration in respondents' favor (Gourin v 72A Realty Assoc., L.P., 226 AD3d 475, 477 [1st Dept 2024]).

We have considered petitioners' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: March 12, 2026