Arbitrators relinquish all powers over the parties to the arbitration upon issuance of a final award and are precluded from modifying or reconsidering that award

On August 26, 2026, the Appellate Division, Second Department, issued a decision addressing efforts by the relevant parties to confirm an arbitration award and a related proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 75, inter alia, to vacate an arbitration award involving the same parties.

The Appellate Division's decision is set out below:

In the Matter of Tawannah Jordan, appellant,

v

New York City Transit, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 26, 2026

2024-01413, (Index Nos. 510230/23, 516876/23)

Lara J. Genovesi, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Barry E. Warhit

Lourdes M. Ventura, JJ.

Law Office of Edward Pichardo PLLC, New York, NY, for appellant.

David I. Farber, Brooklyn, NY (Byron Z. Zinonos of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to confirm an arbitration award dated January 10, 2023, and a related proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to vacate an arbitration award dated May 18, 2023, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Patria Frias-Colón, J.), entered January 11, 2024. The order denied the petition, inter alia, to vacate the arbitration award dated May 18, 2023, in effect, confirmed that arbitration award, denied, as academic, the petition to confirm the arbitration award dated January 10, 2023, and, in effect, dismissed the proceedings.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

New York City Transit (hereinafter the Transit Authority) suspended the petitioner's employment without pay. In an arbitration award dated January 10, 2023 (hereinafter the January 2023 award), the arbitrator determined that the appropriate discipline for the petitioner was a time-served suspension and completion of an anger management program. In a second arbitration award, dated May 18, 2023 (hereinafter the May 2023 award), the arbitrator determined that the January 2023 award made the petitioner's completion of the anger management program a condition precedent to her reinstatement. In connection with these awards, the petitioner commenced two related proceedings against the Transit Authority pursuant to CPLR article 75: the first to confirm the January 2023 award and the second, inter alia, to vacate the May 2023 award. In an order entered January 11, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the petition, among other things, to vacate the May 2023 award, in effect, confirmed the May 2023 award, denied, as academic, the petition to confirm the January 2023 award, and, in effect, dismissed the proceedings. The petitioner appeals.

"'It is well settled that judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited. An arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator offer[s] even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached'" (Matter of Adams v Veolia Transp. Servs., 242 AD3d 1196, 1197, quoting Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 NY3d 471, 479). "A party seeking to overturn an arbitration award bears a heavy burden and must establish a ground for vacatur by clear and convincing evidence" (Matter of Board of Educ. of the Yonkers City Sch. Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 185 AD3d 811, 812; see Matter of NRT N.Y., LLC v St. Arromand, 216 AD3d 641, 642). "'[A]n arbitrator's award should not be vacated for errors of law and fact committed by the arbitrator and the courts should not assume the role of overseers to mold the award to conform to their sense of justice'" (Matter of Tauber v Gross, 216 AD3d 1066, 1068, quoting Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 NY3d at 479-480). "'Where, as here, an arbitration award was rendered after a consensual arbitration process pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the award may not be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his or her power unless it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power'" (Matter of Henry v New York State Workers' Compensation Bd., 230 AD3d 1241, 1242, quoting Matter of Lewis v New York City Tr. Auth., 183 AD3d 738, 738; see CPLR 7511[b][1][iii]). "An award 'is irrational only where there is no proof whatever to justify the award'" (Matter of Rivera v New York City Tr. Auth., 216 AD3d 644, 645, quoting Matter of Reddy v Schaffer, 123 AD3d 935, 937).

Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the May 2023 award violated this standard (see Matter of Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326, 333; Matter of Professional Firefighters Assn. of Nassau County, Local 1588, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v Village of Garden City, 119 AD3d 803, 803). Moreover, the May 2023 award was not indefinite or nonfinal for purposes of CPLR 7511, as it did not leave the parties unable to determine their rights and obligations, it resolved the controversy before the arbitrator, and it did not create a new controversy (see id. § 7511[b][1][iii]; Matter of County of Nassau v Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc., 213 AD3d 661, 663; Matter of Rokeach v Salamon, 193 AD3d 937, 939).

"[A]rbitrators relinquish all powers over the parties to the arbitration upon issuance of a final award and, therefore, are precluded from modifying or reconsidering that award" (American Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v Allied Capital Corp., 35 NY3d 64, 71; see Matter of County of Nassau v Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc., 213 AD3d at 663). Here, the May 2023 award did not improperly modify the January 2023 award, which was indefinite and nonfinal insofar as it left the parties unable to determine their rights and obligations regarding the duration of the petitioner's suspension (see Matter of Rosenberg v Schwartz, 176 AD3d 1069, 1071; Matter of Board of Educ. of Amityville Union Free School Dist. v Amityville Teacher's Assn., 62 AD3d 992, 994).

The petitioner's remaining contention is without merit.

GENOVESI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and VENTURA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

Click HERE to access Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet. 

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Appellate Division reverses Supreme Court's granting the Employer's petition to vacate an arbitration award

The petitioner [Employer] issued a notice of personnel action seeking the termination of the services of Employee, who had been employed for several years, for alleged  misconduct and, or, incompetence. Employee's union, the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 1000, A.F.L.-C.I.O., by its Local 830 [CSEA], commenced an arbitration proceeding challenging Employee's termination. 

The arbitrator found, among other things, that Employee "committed misconduct and/or incompetency" but reduced the penalty imposed from termination of employment to suspension without pay, with loss of time served, which equated to an unpaid suspension of approximately 15 months, and directed the Employee's return to his employment.  Employer then commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 75 to modify or vacate the arbitration award.

Supreme Court determined that Employee's termination was warranted and proper and that Employer was not obligated to return Employee to his employment. CSEA and Employee appealed the Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division, observing that "Collective bargaining agreements commonly provide for binding arbitration to settle contractual disputes between employees and management," opined that when the parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator courts generally play a limited role". 

In the words of the Appellate Division, [numerous court citations omitted]:

1. "An application to vacate an arbitration award may be granted only in narrow circumstances, including where "an arbitrator . . . exceeded his [or her] power" (CPLR 7511[b][1][iii])";

2. "Such an excess of power occurs only where the arbitrator's award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power";

3. "The scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power to resolve disputes is extremely narrow, existing only where a court concludes that there are strong and well-defined policy considerations embodied in constitutional, statutory, or common law that the final result creates an explicit conflict";

4. "The burden is on the movant to establish grounds for vacatur by clear and convincing evidence";

5. "Courts are bound by an arbitrator's factual findings, interpretation of the contract and judgment concerning remedies";

6. "A court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one. Indeed, even in circumstances where an arbitrator makes errors of law or fact, courts will not assume the role of overseers to conform the award to their sense of justice"; and

7. "An arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator offers even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached".

The Appellate Division opined that Employer failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitration award should have been vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his power noting that "Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the arbitrator properly declined to consider evidence of misconduct that occurred, before certain dates, explaining that the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] governing this dispute provided that "[f]or any incompetence or misconduct alleged to have occurred on or after January 1, 1995, . . . no discipline may be imposed more than one (1) calendar year after such occurrence unless said incompetence or misconduct would, if proved in a court of competent jurisdiction, constitute a crime."

None of Employee's misconduct or incompetence was alleged to have been criminal or to have prevented the Employer from timely bringing charges. Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that arbitrator properly adhered to the CBA by disregarding evidence of misconduct that occurred outside the limitation period. 

The Appellate Division then noted that Employer failed to identify any public policy, statute, or regulation that required the termination of [Employee's] employment rather than a lengthy suspension.

Finding the Supreme Court should have denied the Employer's petition, the Appellate Division reinstated the arbitration award and remit the matter to the Supreme Court for the entry of an appropriate judgment (citing CPLR 7511[e]; 7514[a]).

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.