Continuing Legal Education program offered by New York City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings

The Trials Division of New York City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH] will offer a Continuing Education program focusing on Rules and Ethical issued in administrative proceeding before OATH.

The program will be presented by Administrative Law Judges Kevin Casey, Julia Davis, Faye Lewis, and Christine Stecura.

The program’s first half will provide an overview of the rules and best practices for appearing at OATH’s Trials Division. The program’s second half will review relevant sections of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and related ethics opinions and their impact on practitioners who appear before OATH’s Trials Division.

This free program will give participants 1.0 CLE credit in Areas of Professional Practice and 1.0 CLE credit in Ethics and Professionalism (transitional/non-transitional).

Pre-registration is required. Click here to register.

 

A Petitioner seeking to vacate an arbitration award must meet a high burden in order to have a court grant a motion to vacate the award

Supreme Court granted Petitioner law firm's motion to confirm an arbitration award granting it $297,150.91 in unpaid legal fees, and denied the Respondents' motion to vacate the arbitration award. 

Citing CPLR 7511[b][1] and Matter of D.P.I. Imports, Inc v Q4 Designs, LLC, 232 AD3d 512, leave to appeal denied, 43 NY3d 903, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's ruling, explaining that the Respondents failed to meet the "high burden" placed on it in order to have a court grant its motion to vacate the arbitration award at issue.

The decision notes that the record "does not show that the arbitrator engaged in fraud, corruption or misconduct by refusing to hear pertinent and material evidence, or that he manifestly disregarded the law in finding that [Respondents] breached the retainer agreement and were otherwise liable for the unpaid legal fees based on the equitable theories of recovery."

In the words of the Appellate Division, "A court will not set aside an arbitrator's award for errors of law or fact unless the award is so irrational as to require vacatur, which is not the case here."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected items posted on blogs during the week ending October 25, 2025

8 Cybersecurity Best Practices From CivicPlus® Cyber threats target governments—deploy best practices to secure systems, protect resident data, and sustain trust. Learn More 

How AI-Powered Agents Streamline State and Local Service Delivery Explore how AI agents can help state and local governments handle routine tasks, streamline operations, and give staff more time for complex issues. DOWNLOAD 

Transparency in Motion: Real-Time Data for Safer Streets and Stronger Communities Public safety agencies are under pressure to do more with less -- respond faster, operate more efficiently, and remain accountable to both leadership and the communities they serve. This paper explores how telematics and in-vehicle data are helping agencies meet those expectations and deliver measurable results. DOWNLOAD

Modernizing Outdated Identity Tools in Government Outdated identity tools increase the risk of cyberattacks, user fatigue, and regulatory noncompliance for state and local agencies. Learn why legacy IAM systems—and methods like passwords, manual provisioning, and siloed identity data—can no longer meet today’s security and compliance needs. DOWNLOAD 

How to Drive Value with AI Now Government agencies are under pressure to adopt AI—but without the risk, complexity, or backlash that often follows rushed implementations. This paper lays out the practical steps state and local governments can take to start using AI right now — without losing control of costs, data or decision-making. DOWNLOAD

Inside the Priorities Shaping Public Budgeting in 2025 Discover what’s top-of-mind for local and state government budget leaders. This year’s survey of public finance professionals reveals how agencies are balancing uncertainty with action, and where opportunity still exists to make budgeting smarter and more community focused. DOWNLOAD

Employer's denial of a police officer application for General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits deemed to be a travesty under the circumstances

In October 2021, a police officer [Petitioner] employed by a New York State village police department responded to an emergency welfare call that culminated in a confrontation during which Petitioner fatally shot an individual. 

Placed on administrative leave pending an investigation, Petitioner returned to work after being cleared of any wrongdoing. In April 2022, Petitioner left work on sick leave after disclosing concerns regarding his mental health to the Village's Chief of Police. 

Petitioner began meeting with a clinical social worker and, on June 29, 2022, he was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder [PTSD] stemming from the October 2021 incident. Petitioner then spoke with the Chief of Police about applying for General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits. In accordance with the Police Chief's instructions, Petitioner promptly submitted various supporting documents and also submitted his completed application for General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits to the Mayor of the Village.

The Mayor acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's application but Petitioner's application for General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits was denied as untimely under the applicable collective bargaining agreement [CBA] which required that such an application had to be made within 10 business days of when the individual "reasonably should have known of the illness or injury giving rise to his claim".

Petitioner challenged the denial of his application as provided by the relevant CBA grievance process and an arbitration hearing was conducted.

The arbitrator issued a written recommendation that the Village [Respondent] exercise discretion available to it under the CBA to overlook any untimeliness in Petitioner's application and grant him General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits. The Respondents rejected the arbitrator's recommendation and denied Petitioner's application for General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits. 

Petitioner initiated the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Respondent's determination. Respondents moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Article 78 petition for failure to state a cause of action. 

Supreme Court, reaching the merits of the Respondent's determination: 

1. Held that the Respondents' determination was not improper;

2. Held the Respondents' determination was supported by substantial evidence; and 

3. Dismissed Plaintiff's Article 78 Petition.

Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's rulings.

The Appellate Division found that the Respondents' determination that Petitioner had failed to demonstrate good cause for the minor delay in the submission of his application for accidental disability retirement "is unsupported by substantial evidence" and opined that it "wholeheartedly agree with the arbitrator that denying [Petitioner's] application for General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits would be a travesty".

The Appellate Division annulled the Supreme Court's judgement and remitted the matter to the Respondents "for further proceedings not inconsistent with [its] decision".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Access to educational facilities

Plaintiffs allege that the New York City public education system, through its admissions and screening policies, curriculum content, and lack of diversity among the teacher workforce, discriminates against and disproportionately affects Black and Latino students, leading to unequal educational opportunities and negative outcomes for those students. 

Plaintiffs further allege that these practices and policies deprive Black and Latino students of a sound basic education in contravention of the Education Article of the State Constitution (NY Const., Article XI, §1), denies them equal protection of the laws (NY Const., Article I, §11), and denies them access to educational facilities in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law §296. 

Although Plaintiffs identify troubling aspects of New York City's public education system, the claims as presented in the complaint fail as a matter of law. 

Click HERE to access the Court of Appeals' decision posted on the Internet.

A School Board, as the "body corporate" of a School District, not to be deemed to be the School District in the instant litigation

The Hempstead Classroom Teachers Association [Plaintiff] had entered into two settlement agreements with the Hempstead Union Free School District [School District], resolving certain grievances that had been filed by the Plaintiff against the School District. The settlement agreements set out a schedule for the School District's payment of sums due pursuant to arbitration awards entered in favor of the Plaintiff and its members.

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract, Plaintiff appealed a Supreme Court order which dismiss its complaint and denied the Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint to adding the Board of Education of the Hempstead Union Free School District and the Superintendent of Schools of the School District as Defendants [hereinafter "Defendants"]. Defendants had moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were not parties to the settlement agreements between the Plaintiff and the School District.

The Plaintiff appeal the Supreme Court's decision. The Appellate Division, noting that generally "[o]ne cannot be held liable under a contract to which he or she is not a party", ruled that the Supreme Court "properly granted dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)" as the Defendants were not parties to the settlement agreements between the Plaintiff and the School District. 

Citing Roseblum v Board of Educ. Great Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 231 AD3d 881, the Appellate Division pointed out that "although the settlement agreements were subject to approval by the Board, the settlement agreements did not obligate the Board to perform on behalf of the School District". The Appellate Division explained that the School Board, as the "body corporate" of the School District, is not interchangeable with the School District.

Finding that the Supreme Court had providently exercised its discretion in denying Plaintiff's request for leave to amend the complaint, the Appellate Division pointed out that "the Plaintiff's request was made in opposition to the Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's efforts to amend the complaint by adding Defendants to the Plaintiff's complaint and not by motion or cross-motion on notice. Further, the Appellate Division observed that the Plaintiff had failed to annex a copy of the proposed amended complaint as required by CPLR 3025(b).

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

For the purposes of the Freedom of Information Law, the ability of an agency to retrieve a document is distinguishable from whether the description in the request was sufficient to allow the agency to locate it

In an action to obtain certain documents pursuant to New York State's Freedom of Information Law [FOIL], the Court of Appeals, citing Public Officers Law §89[3][a], said to trigger a government agency's obligation to produce records under FOIL the entity seeking the records "must submit to the agency a written request in which the records sought are 'reasonably described'". An agency, upon receiving such a request for records maintained electronically, must retrieve the records if it has the ability to do so "with reasonable effort".

The Petitioner in the instant CPLR Article 78 action had requested all emails between the New York City Department of Education [DOE] and a certain domain name during the period April 2021 to August 2022. DOE responded that the documents sought were "not reasonably described" because it could not "launch an effective search to locate and identify the records sought with reasonable effort." 

In particular, DOE stated that attempts to search its emails "failed to execute" using the parameters provided by Petitioner, and asked Petitioner to focus the request on a narrower timeframe or specific parties or to provide key terms to search. Petitioner declined to do so and DOE deemed Petitioner's FOIL request to have been "withdrawn".

Petitioner filed an administrative appeal. The DOE acknowledged that it "understood" Petitioner was requesting emails having certain domain names but its electronic searches for those emails "failed to execute" whereupon DOE "concluded that the request was not reasonably described". 

Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a judgment directing DOE to provide access to the documents sought. DOE response indicated "that that all of its attempts to search its emails for the requested records timed out because there were over one million email accounts to search". 

Supreme Court denied the petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, holding that the documents were not "reasonably described" as required under Public Officers Law §89(3)(a) because "[t]he administrative record and the DOE's proffered affidavits demonstrate 'that the descriptions provided are insufficient for purposes of extracting or retrieving the requested document[s] from the virtual files through an electronic word search . . . [by] name or other reasonable technological effort' " 

The Court of Appeals conclude that DOE and the Appellate Division had "conflated Petitioner's obligation to reasonably describe the documents with the agency's obligation to retrieve the documents if it has the ability to do so with reasonable effort". The Court explained "The requirement that requested records be reasonably described exists to ensure that the responding agency has the ability to locate the records sought". Here, said the Court, DOE concedes that it understands what documents Petitioner seeks and knows they are located in the agency's electronic email database. Further, the record established that the description in the request was sufficient for the DOE to fashion and run electronic searches which, if successful, would have retrieved the records sought. 

However, said the Court of Appeals, "The fact that those searches timed out or failed to execute using the DOE's software is not determinative of the legal sufficiency of the request". Noting that "Whether the DOE can retrieve those documents with reasonable effort is a separate question". The Court of Appeals said it declined "decide that question today" and if DOE "can retrieve the documents with reasonable effort, it must do so."

Citing Matter of Data Tree, LLC v Romaine (9 NY3d 459, the Court of Appeals held that "if the records are maintained electronically by an agency and are retrievable with reasonable effort, that agency is required to disclose the information". The Court explained that it had articulated the reasonable effort requirement not as a facet of a petitioner's requirement to reasonably describe the documents sought, but as a requirement of the agency in responding to a written request in which the documents sought are reasonably described. 

The Court of Appeals also cited Chapter 223, §6 Laws of 2008, noting that "the legislature codified aspects of Data Tree, including the reasonable effort requirement, in Public Officers Law §89(3)(a)".

Opining that "On its face, the reasonable effort language, as codified, applies to all instances where an agency is asked to make electronic records available and is best understood as providing that the responding agency must 'retrieve or extract a record or data maintained' in a computer system unless doing so requires the agency to undertake unreasonable efforts".

In the words of the Court of Appeals, "The amendment conforms with FOIL's consistent employment of a reasonableness standard in setting forth the myriad obligations of government agencies ... and balances the importance of open government in a free society ... with the logistical complications encountered by agencies in making electronic records available upon request. Nothing suggests that the legislature, in amending the statute, intended to modify the reasonable description requirement."

Evaluating the reasonable description and reasonable effort requirements separately the Court opined should alleviate the confusion that the combined test has produced. Whether a requestor has reasonably described an electronic record does not turn on the degree of effort necessary to retrieve it, and the inability of an agency to retrieve a document with reasonable effort does not implicate whether the description in the request was sufficient to allow the agency to locate it.

Again, if a responding agency can retrieve the requested documents with reasonable effort, it must do so. What constitutes reasonable effort is necessarily a case-specific determination, and efforts are not unreasonable solely because the agency declined to execute the requestor's preferred document retrieval method. 

While FOIL imposes no obligation on the agency at the administrative level to describe its efforts to retrieve the requested records, the Court suggested that an agency might find it beneficial to describe its efforts in its correspondence with the requestor, since in a challenge to an agency's denial of access to the documents on this ground, the agency [1] has the burden to demonstrate that it cannot retrieve the requested documents with reasonable effort and [2] has the burden to establish that requested documents fall within a claimed statutory exemption.

While the DOE's claimed inability to retrieve the documents is not determinative of whether the request reasonably describes those documents, the Court observed that such an inability may bear on whether the DOE has the ability to retrieve the documents with reasonable effort. 

The Court of Appeals, concluding that the matter should be remanded to the DOE for a new determination using the proper standard, reversed the Appellate Division's order, with costs and ordered "further proceedings in accordance with the Court of Appeals' instant opinion.

Click HERE to access the opinion of the Court of Appeal posted on the Internet.

Settling a disciplinary action subject to compulsory arbitration by entering into a "Last Chance Agreement"

Plaintiff, a tenured teacher employed by a New York State school district [Employer] was served with  disciplinary charges alleging Plaintiff had failed to accurately document speech services during the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school years. 

Plaintiff and the Employer subsequently entered into a "Last Change Agreement" [LCA] to settle the disciplinary action whereby the parties mutually agreed that "if, at any time prior to the last day of the 2021-2022 school year following written notice and a 45-day period to cure", Plaintiff was determined by a hearing officer "after a hearing pursuant to Education Law §3020-a to have engaged in similar neglect, the [Employer] would be entitled to terminate the [Plaintiff's] employment."

On April 5, 2021, the Employer notified the Plaintiff that she was not in  compliance with the LCA due to her failure to accurately document speech services during the 2020-2021 school year and directed her to cure the deficiencies within 45 days.

Plaintiff failed to timely to cure alleged failure as required by the terms of the LCA and the Employer filed disciplinary charges against Plaintiff.

In the course of the Education Law §3020-a disciplinary action which followed, Plaintiff contended that the charged misconduct was not substantially similar to the misconduct giving rise to the LCA "because she had been assigned additional duties and responsibilities due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that she did enter the required information to accurately document the services she provided".

The hearing officer permitted the Employer to rebut Plaintiff's assertions by demonstrating that the additional entries submitted by Plaintiff "were entered after the 45-day period to cure and that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, she had failed to document her sessions during the 2019-2020 school year, which was outside of the charged period". 

The disciplinary hearing officer issued a determination which sustained the charges and specifications alleged by the Employer and authorized the termination of Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff appealed the hearing officer's decision in an effort to have it vacated, contending that the [disciplinary] arbitration did not conform with Education Law §3020-a. Supreme Court denied the Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal and ultimately granted Plaintiff's petition. The Employer appealed the Supreme Court's judgment.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court' ruling and granted the Employer's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's petition; explaining:

1. "The standard of review mandated by Education Law §3020-a (5)(a) is that of CPLR article 75, which provides that an arbitration award may be vacated only on a showing of misconduct, bias, excess of power, or procedural defects";

2. Where, as here, the obligation to arbitrate arises through statutory mandate, the hearing officer's determination is subject to closer judicial scrutiny than it would receive had the arbitration been conducted voluntarily;

3. The award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious; and

4. In addition, CPLR Article 75 reviews questions whether the decision was rational or had a plausible basis.

Citing Matter of Harvey v Board of Educ. of the Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 221 AD3d 899, the Appellate Division then observed that "When reviewing compulsory arbitrations in education proceedings such as this, the court should accept the hearing officer's credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists" and concluded that the determination recommending the termination of the termination of Plaintiff's employment was rational, had evidentiary support, and was not arbitrary and capricious.

The Appellate Division's decision also observed that a "last chance agreement constituted a valid, binding contract, and the neglect complained of [in the instant action], to wit, the failure to accurately document speech services during the 2020-2021 school year, was identical to the previously charged conduct".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Disability included in New York State's Aging Law and Policy

On October 8, 2025, Albany Law School's Government Law Center and the Office of the Chief Disability Officer of the State of New York [OCDO] hosted Albany Law School's Nancy M. Sills 76th Memorial Lecture. 

Leaders and advocates from the OCDO discussed the intersections of disability and aging and efforts being made to include the needs of individuals with disabilities in New York State's aging laws and policies.

Click HERE to access the Podcast of the presentation posted on the Internet.

Amending an application for Workers' Compensation benefits to include alleged consequential injuries

Claimant for Workers' Compensation benefits appealed the Workers' Compensation Board's [Board] decision disallowing Claimant's request to amend his earlier established claim to include consequential injuries.

Claimant had established a claim for workers' compensation benefits based upon an exacerbation of a preexisting chemical sensitivity and Claimant's employer reassigned Claimant to work at a different location. Subsequently, Claimant's treating physician advised Claimant's employer that Claimant's reassignment to the new location had resulted in "a complete resolution" of Claimant's symptoms and requested that the reassignment be made permanent. Claimant continued to work at the new location until January 2020 when he took a leave of absence to care for his ailing mother and commenced working from home. 

Claimant subsequently complained of certain mental health difficulties to his treating physician, asserting that, while working from home while on leave, he was harassed by his supervisor concerning his work. Claimant's physician diagnosed Claimant with a number of psychological conditions related to those complaints and Claimant then sought to amend his established chemical sensitivity claim claim "to include anxiety, depressed mood, major depressive disorder and insomnia as consequential injuries".

A Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] found that Claimant had not demonstrated that his psychological injuries were a direct or natural consequence of his initial chemical related injury and disallowed the claim for "consequential injuries". The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ's findings, and Claimant appealed the Board ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board's determination, noting:

1. Substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Claimant's alleged psychological injuries did not result from a fear of being assigned to work at his original location;

2. Claimant "has not demonstrated that the asserted psychological injuries resulted directly and naturally from his prior chemical insensitivity disability so as to establish a consequential injury"; and

3. Claimant's allegations with respect to harassment, "were too remote to establish a causal nexus to the prior disability, even if the actions could constitute a separate and distinct claim for work-related stress.

The Appellate Division said its "review of the record as a whole" found no basis to disturb the Board's determination that Claimant failed to demonstrate, "by competent medical evidence, a causal relationship between his established disability and his alleged consequential injuries", and held that the Board's decision to reject Claimant's alleged consequential injuries was supported by substantial evidence.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Selected items posted on blogs during the week ending October 17, 2025

How AI-Powered Agents Streamline State and Local Service Delivery Explore how AI agents can help state and local governments handle routine tasks, streamline operations, and give staff more time for complex issues. DOWNLOAD

Preparing Utilities & Local Governments for a Paperless World The paperless future is here. Is your utility or local government ready? From rising postage costs to time-consuming manual processes, the shift to digital billing and payments is no longer optional — it’s essential. This resource explores how utilities can embrace a paperless future to cut costs, improve operational efficiencies, and meet modern demands. DOWNLOAD

Transparency in Motion: Real-Time Data for Safer Streets and Stronger Communities Public safety agencies are under pressure to do more with less -- respond faster, operate more efficiently, and remain accountable to both leadership and the communities they serve. This paper explores how telematics and in-vehicle data are helping agencies meet those expectations and deliver measurable results.   DOWNLOAD

Human-Guided Automation: Smarter, Safer Endpoint Security Autonomous endpoint management keeps humans in control while boosting compliance, speed, and resilience.  READ MORE

Secure by Design: A Plan for Ransomware Defense From real-world examples of emerging extortion tactics to actionable guidance on vulnerability scanning, 24/7 detection, and incident response planning, this paper is a must-read for every government IT leader committed to safeguarding digital infrastructure and public trust. DOWNLOAD

When Disaster Strikes, Coordination Keeps Recovery Moving Who restores critical connections after natural disasters? See the teamwork behind recovery and the need for close coordination to speed recovery efforts. Watch the film.

Natural Disaster, National Attention Public Records Request Management Steps Up in Time of Need READ MORE

Key elements of the Court of Appeals' decision addressing the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices.

In 2023, the Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices. The Plaintiffs, including several counties with charter provisions setting local elections for odd-numbered years, challenge the constitutionality of the Even Year Election Law, claiming the statute violates the home rule provisions of Article IX of the State Constitution. 

The Court of Appels held that "there is no express or implied constitutional limitation on the legislature's authority to enact the Even Year Election Law" [hereinafter EYEL] and affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Division.

[*1]County of Onondaga, et al., Appellants,

v

State of New York, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant. (And Other Actions.)

Decided on October 16, 2025

No. 66

In the words of the court: 

"The issue for this Court is whether article IX limits the power of the legislature in such a way as to make the EYEL an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. We conclude that it does not.

"Plaintiffs first challenge the constitutionality of the statute under section 1, arguing that, because of the rights detailed in section 1 as implemented by the Municipal Home Rule Law, counties have a constitutional right to set the timing of county elections and terms of office. In other words, because counties are authorized to adopt alternative forms of government (NY Const, art IX, §1 [h] [1], and because those counties that do so are instructed by the Municipal Home Rule Law to provide for 'the manner of election' and 'terms of office' of its officials in those charters (Municipal Home Rule Law §33 [3] [b]), that statutory instruction from the Municipal Home Rule Law is transformed into a constitutional right barring the legislature from interfering with the manner of election or terms of office for local officials. Nothing in the text of these provisions, or in our jurisprudence, supports that view. Indeed, only the right to form an alternative form of government is guaranteed by section 1 (h) (1), that right does not implicitly include a right to set terms of office or timing of elections, and the authority delegated to local governments in the Municipal Home Rule Law is statutory. Nothing in the EYEL infringes the rights provided by article IX's 'bill of rights.'

"Next, plaintiffs argue that the EYEL is unconstitutional under article IX, section 2 (b) (2) because the legislature is only empowered to act in this manner pursuant to general law or a duly enacted special law and, in their view, the EYEL is neither. This is incorrect. As defined by article IX, §3 (d) (1), a general law is one 'which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages.' This Court has long held that a statute remains a general law where it is 'cast in general terms' but affects a smaller category of counties, and is "no less general because it classifies the [counties] affected on the basis of population or some other condition and extends its benefits only to" certain counties, so long as 'the classification be defined by conditions common to the class and related to the subject of the statute' (Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York, 50 NY2d 85, 90 [1980]; see also Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46, 51 [4th Dept 1978], affd 46 NY2d 760 [1978] [that Village Law exempts chartered villages does not 'make it any less a general law,' because the 'exception . . . is based on a reasonable classification and the law applies uniformly to all other villages throughout the state']). The EYEL, as the Appellate Division held, is a general law because it applies to all counties, with reasonable exceptions, and has an equal impact on a 'rationally defined class similarly situated' (238 AD3d at 1540-1541 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 NY2d 358, 373 [1978] [where a law 'has an equal impact on all members of a rationally defined class similarly situated, the law is thus a general' law]). While the EYEL contains exemptions, its terms are general, and the category of counties and offices it affects is defined by common conditions and related to the statute's purpose.

"Finally, plaintiffs challenge the EYEL on the basis that it runs afoul of the clause in article IX, §3 (b), which provides that the provisions of article IX 'shall not affect any existing valid provisions of acts of the legislature or of local legislation.' This language simply made clear, as the Appellate Division held, that existing local laws remained in force following the adoption of article IX, and expressly accounts for change through legislative action by stating that existing local provisions continue 'in force until repealed, amended, modified or superseded' (see 238 AD3d at 1541 [article IX, §3 'clarifies that the adoption of Article IX did not itself invalidate then-existing legislation . . . and does not preclude the Legislature from adopting a law such as the EYEL']).

"Nothing in article IX limits, expressly or by implication, the otherwise plenary authority of the legislature to mandate the timing of certain elections, as the EYEL does (see Matter of Burr v Voorhis, 229 NY 382, 388 [1920] ([T)he legislature is free to adopt concerning (voting) any reasonable, uniform and just regulations which are in harmony with constitutional provisions"]). Consequently, without any such constitutional limitation, the EYEL is a proper exercise of that authority.

"The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.

"Opinion by Judge Garcia. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur."

Footnotes

Footnote 1: The EYEL exempts offices whose terms are specified in the Constitution, offices for which elections must occur in odd numbered years pursuant to the Constitution, offices with a three-year term before January 1, 2025, offices in towns coterminous with villages, and offices in counties located in New York City (L 2023, ch 741, §§ 1-4; see also NY Const, art XIII, §§ 8, 10, 12, 13, 17).

Footnote 2: Individual voter plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the EYEL's consolidation of local elections with even-year elections "increases the burdens associated with casting a vote, fundraising, and generating support for candidates, among other essential campaigning activities, while contributing to voter fatigue due to higher numbers of issues and/or candidates on the ballot" and that "[w]ith more candidates on the ballot and higher turnout numbers, voters will face longer ballots, longer voting lines, voter fatigue, and 'ballot drop-off' or 'roll-off.' " These are not traditional voter suppression claims.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Court of Appeals posted on the Internet.

Key elements considered by the Commissioner of Education in adjudicating an appeal challenging the suspension of a student involved in an altercation with another student at school while school was in session

The Decision of the Commissioner of Education in this appeal challenging the disciplinary action taken against a student initiated by the school district and the penalty imposed on a student upon being found guilty of misconduct while attending school noted that:

1. A school district's decision to suspend a student from school pursuant to Education Law §3214 must be based on competent and substantial evidence that the accused student participated in the "objectionable conduct". 

2. In an appeal to the Commissioner of Education the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and has the burden of establishing the facts supporting the relief sought by the petitioner; and 

3. The school district must present "Competent and substantial evidence of the accused [student’s] guilt" supporting its determination and the penalty imposed.

Based on the record, the Commissioner found that Petitioners in the instant appeal failed to establish that school district lacked competent and substantial evidence of the student's guilt of the misconduct charged.  

The text of the Commissioner's decision in the instant matter is set out below:

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education

Appeal of J.C. and C.C., on behalf of their child, from action of the Board of Education of the Cold Spring Harbor Central School District regarding student discipline.

Decision No. 18,639

(September 29, 2025)

Frazer & Feldman, LLP, attorneys for respondent, Amanda Hickey, Esq., of counsel

ROSA., Commissioner. -- Petitioners challenge the determination of the Board of Education of the Cold Spring Harbor Central School District (“board” or “respondent”) to suspend their child (“student A”).  The appeal must be dismissed.

On May 31, 2024, student A and a classmate (“student B”) were involved in a physical altercation.  A security guard intervened and escorted both students to the principal’s office.  Soon thereafter, student A, stated, unprompted that he had “just beat the s*** out of” student B and “couldn’t be happier” about it.  The principal proceeded to interview student B, who stated that student A began “swinging” at him as he left the cafeteria.  The principal also reviewed security footage showing that student A confronted, and initiated an altercation with, student B.  Student A declined to speak to the principal about the incident unless petitioners were present.  Although petitioners arrived soon thereafter, Student A did not provide any further information regarding his role in the altercation.

In a letter dated May 31, 2024, the principal concluded that student A’s presence in school represented a continuing danger and/or an ongoing threat of disruption to the academic process and suspended him for five days.  This letter was hand-delivered to petitioners’ home that same day.  Appeals to the superintendent and board were denied, and this appeal ensued.

Petitioners argue that respondent failed to amend student A’s educational plan pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) to protect him from ongoing harassment from student B.  Petitioners further assert that student A, who they claim was the victim of longstanding bullying by student B, acted in self-defense.  Petitioners also allege, among other due process violations, that respondent wrongfully withheld security footage of the altercation.  For relief, petitioners seek expungement of the short-term suspension from student A’s record.

Respondent argues that the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to review petitioners’ Section 504 claims.  On the merits, respondent denies that it violated student A’s due process rights or that he acted in self-defense.  Respondent further contends that its decision to suspend student A was based on competent and substantial evidence.

I must first address three preliminary matters.  I lack jurisdiction over those portions of petitioners’ appeal claiming that respondent failed to amend student A’s Section 504 plan to protect against student B’s alleged bullying.  Section 504 prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities who are “excluded from ... participation in, ... denied the benefits of, or ... subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” which includes public schools (29 USC §794 [a]).  The Commissioner of Education has no authority to review Section 504 claims in an appeal under Education Law §310 (Appeal of J.B., 62 Ed Dept Rep., Decision No. 18,245; Appeal of K.V., 61 id., Decision No. 18,067).[1]

Next, I must address the scope of petitioners’ reply.  The purpose of a reply is to respond to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in an answer (8 NYCRR 275.3, 275.14).  A reply is not meant to buttress allegations in the petition or belatedly add assertions that should have been raised in the petition (Appeal of Nappi, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,300; Appeal of Caswell, 48 id. 472, Decision No. 15,920; Appeal of Hinson, 48 id. 437, Decision No. 15,908).  Therefore, while I have reviewed the reply, I have not considered those portions containing new allegations or exhibits that are not responsive to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in the answer.

Third, petitioners request that I accept numerous submissions into the record pursuant to 8 NYCRR 276.5.  That provision authorizes the acceptance of additional evidence submitted by a party if the Commissioner deems it necessary to render a decision.  Here, petitioners seek to bolster their contention that the student was bullied and acted in self-defense.  This evidence, however, should have been submitted with the petition or reply (Appeal of R.H. and S.H., 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,869; Appeal of Nappi, 57 id., Decision No. 17,300).  To the extent that these submissions also contain evidence that post-dates the pleadings, such evidence is not relevant to the claims presented herein.  Accordingly, I decline to accept the additional evidence submitted by petitioners.

Turning to the merits, the decision to suspend a student from school pursuant to Education Law §3214 must be based on competent and substantial evidence that the student participated in the objectionable conduct (Matter of Board of Educ. of Monticello Cent. School Dist. v Commissioner of Educ., 91 NY2d 133, 140-141 [1997]; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v Mills, 293 AD2d 37, 39 [3d Dept 2002]; Appeal of M.J., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,292; Appeal of B.M., 48 id. 441, Decision No. 15,909).  The Court of Appeals has described the substantial evidence standard as “proof within the whole record of such quality and quantity as to generate conviction in and persuade a fair and detached fact finder that, from that proof as a premise, a conclusion or ultimate fact may be extracted reasonably probatively and logically” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 181 [1978]; see Appeal of J.J., 46 Ed Dept Rep 270, Decision No. 15,505; Appeal of Wallen, 33 id. 313, Decision No. 13,060).

In an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884).

Turning first to petitioners’ due process claims, petitioners contend that respondent denied their district-level appeal “without explanation,” in an untimely manner, and without adequate investigation.  The record establishes that respondent complied with its own policy in issuing written determinations to petitioners after each level of review.  Moreover, respondent’s policy does not require that the board meet with petitioners, interview witnesses, or provide a written determination to petitioners within a certain timeframe.  Accordingly, petitioners’ procedural challenges to respondent’s internal review process are without merit.

Petitioners have also failed to establish that respondent lacked competent and substantial evidence of the student’s guilt.  During its investigation, respondent obtained a witness statement from student B, reviewed security footage of the altercation, and spoke to the security guard who broke up the altercation.  Most notably, respondent relied upon student A’s unprompted utterance that he “beat the s*** out of” student B.  Where a student admits the charged conduct, the admission is sufficient proof of guilt (Appeal of N.S., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,268; Appeal of S.U., 57 id., Decision No. 17,159; Appeal of M.K., 48 id. 462, Decision No. 15,916).  Based on this evidence, I find that respondent’s determination was based upon competent and substantial evidence (Appeal of F.P., 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,525).

Petitioners further contend that student A’s actions were justified on the ground of self-defense.  Students may not be disciplined for engaging in conduct necessary to protect themselves from attack, including proportionate force if necessary (See e.g. Appeal of A.C., 59 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,799; Appeal of G.J.-F., 58 id., Decision No. 17,608; Appeal of J.M., 57 id., Decision No. 17,335).  Petitioners have not submitted any direct evidence from student A, or any other persuasive evidence, demonstrating that the student acted in self-defense (Appeal of G.J.-F., 58 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,608; Appeal of a Student with a Disability, 49 id. 452, Decision No. 16,079).  While petitioners’ appeal to the board contained a lengthy narrative attributed to student A, this statement is uncorroborated hearsay entitled to minimal probative value.  Additionally, while petitioners claim to possess “dispositive student video footage of the brawl,” they have not submitted any such evidence on appeal.[2]  Thus, petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proving that student B initiated the altercation or that student A acted in self-defense (Appeal of G.J.-F., 58 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,608).[3]

Petitioners also argue that student A’s conduct was justified as he had been previously bullied and harassed by student B.  The Commissioner has previously held that bullying or harassment does not affect a student’s guilt in a disciplinary matter (Appeal of J.M., 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,002).  However, “respondent has an ongoing obligation to address all incidents of bullying and harassment” (Appeal of M.C. and T.H., 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,550).  Thus, if it has not already, respondent must investigate petitioners’ claims presented herein pursuant to the Dignity for all Students Act.  If respondent concludes that student A was bullied or harassed, “nothing would preclude respondent … from expunging [the instant] suspension … as a remedy ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment, bullying, and/or discrimination, eliminate any hostile environment, create a more positive school culture and climate [or] prevent recurrence of the behavior’” (Appeal of J.M., 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,002, quoting Education Law §13 [1] [e]).

Finally, even assuming that respondent wrongfully refused to allow petitioners to view the district’s surveillance footage of the altercation, this constitutes harmless error under the circumstances.  As indicated above, respondent possessed competent and substantial evidence of the student’s guilt, including student A’s unprompted admission that he “beat the s***” out of student B.  Moreover, the surveillance video, which I have obtained and reviewed in camera, does not support petitioners’ claim of self-defense.  Thus, even if petitioners had a right to view the footage, it would not affect the outcome of this appeal.[4]

To the extent they are not addressed herein, I have considered petitioners’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.

THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

[1] I note that Section 504 claims alleging a denial of a free appropriate public education are subject to the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) exhaustion procedures (20 USC §1415 [l]; see L.K. v Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 641 Fed Appx 56 [2d Cir 2016]).

[2] In their reply, petitioner submitted social media and text message conversations from students as well as still images of the confrontation from an unidentified videographer.  While I have not accepted this evidence into the record for the reasons articulated above, it would not, if accepted, prove that student A acted in self-defense. 

[3] I further note that student A did not allege that he acted in self-defense when he met with the principal. 

[4] The United States Department of Education has opined that a video recording maintained by a school district for disciplinary purposes constitutes an education record under the Family Education Rights & Privacy Act (U.S. Dept. of Education, “FAQs on Photos and Videos under FERPA,” https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-and-videos-under-ferpa(link is external) [last accessed Aug. 27, 2025]; see also U.S. Dept. of Education, Student Privacy Policy Office, Letter to Wachter, Dec. 7, 2017, available at https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/resources/letter-wachter-regarding-surveillance-video-multiple-students(link is external) [last accessed Sept. 18, 2025] and N.Y. State Educ. Dept. Privacy Office, Matter of a Privacy Complaint filed against the Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist, Jul. 28, 2022, https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/final-determination-7.28.22-_redacted.pdf [last accessed Sept. 18, 2025]).  Therefore, if parents request access to such a video, they must be provided with the opportunity to inspect and review, or be informed of the contents of, the video (20 USC § 1232g [a] [1] [A]; 34 CFR 99.12 [a]).
(link is external [last accessed Aug. 27, 2025]; see also U.S. Dept. of Education, Student Privacy Policy Office, Letter to Wachter, Dec. 7, 2017, available at https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/resources/letter-wachter-regarding-surveillance-video-multiple-students(link is external)[last accessed Sept. 18, 2025] and N.Y. State Educ. Dept. Privacy Office, Matter of a Privacy Complaint filed against the Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist, Jul. 28, 2022,  https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/final-determination-7.28.22-_redacted.pdf [last accessed Sept. 18, 2025]).  Therefore, if parents request access to such a video, they must be provided with the opportunity to inspect and review, or be informed of the contents of, the video (20 USC §1232g [a] [1] [A]; 34 CFR 99.12 [a]).

Click HERE to access the Decision of the Commissioner Education No. 18,639 posted on the Internet.