An employee placed on Section 72 leave for ordinary disability subsequently terminated for "abandonment of position"

An employee placed on Section 72 leave for ordinary disability subsequently terminated for "abandonment of position"
Fronczak v NYS Dept. of Correctional Services, CA2, LEXIS 2167

Section 72 of the Civil Service Law -- leave for ordinary disability -- permits an appointing authority to place on employee on involuntary leave without pay if he or she is found unable to perform the duties of his or her position as a result of an illness or a disability that is not an occupational injury or disease as defined in the Workers' Compensation Law.*

The Fronczak case involved the placement of a state worker on an involuntary leave pursuant to Section 72 of the Civil Service Law.

Daniel T. Fronczak sued the New York State Department of Correctional Services [DOCS], claiming that this action violated Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC Sections 12112-12117 and subjected him to unlawful retaliatory adverse employment actions in violation of 42 USC 1983.

According to the decision by the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fronczak was a correctional officer employed by DOCS at its Wyoming facility.

Critical of the facility's handling of hazardous waste materials, he began "exhibiting both bizarre and threatening behavior."

In 1993 DOCS asked Fronczak to undergo a psychiatric examination to determine his ability to perform the duties of his job.

Dr. Jeffrey Bernstein, employed by the New York Department of Civil Service's Employee Health Service, examined Fronczak and determined that Fronczak was:"in need of psychiatric care ... was a risk for not being able to manage the inmates, possibly even losing control, further control of his emotions and his temper, and having difficulty working with co-workers ... [t]hat he was unable from a psychiatric perspective to continue his duties as a corrections officer."

Based on this evaluation, in 1993 Fronczak was placed on an involuntary leave of absence. He unsuccessfully appealed the determination to the Civil Service Commission.

Section 72.2 provides that an employee placed on leave pursuant to Section 72.1 may, within one year after the date of commencement of such leave of absence, or thereafter at any time until his or her employment status is terminated, make application to the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction over the position from which such employee is on leave, for a medical examination by a medical officer selected for that purpose by such department or commission.

In 1996, after a further evaluation, Fronczak was found fit to perform the duties of a corrections officer and, in accordance with DOCS policy, was required to undergo seven weeks of retraining prior to resuming active employment as a corrections officer.

During this training period Fronczak had "an altercation with an instructor" and ultimately "gathered his belongings, and departed" the facility.

Fronczak was sent a letter warning him that as provided under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in place, his absence for ten days would be considered "a constructive resignation."

When Fronczak failed to return with the ten-day period, DOCS notified him by mail that his absence had been deemed a constructive resignation and that his employment with DOCS was terminated.

After losing his administrative appeals before the State Civil Service Commission and exhausting his federal administrative remedies through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Fronczak filed a lawsuit in federal district court.

As set out in the Circuit Court's opinion:

"A liberal reading of [Fronczak's] complaint reveals the following alleged causes of action: (1) by placing Fronczak on involuntary leave in 1993 and terminating him in 1996, DOCS retaliated against Fronczak's exercise of his First Amendment rights, in violation of 42 USC Section 1983, for his complaints concerning its waste management; (2) the same 1993 involuntary leave and 1996 termination resulted from discrimination on the basis of a perceived mental disability in violation of the ADA."**

A federal magistrate judge dismissed Fronczak's petition on the grounds that he failed to establish a prima facie case that he had been discharged either as the result of discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability or in retaliation for his filing waste management complaints.

Instead, the magistrate concluded, "[t]he undisputed record reflects that ... [Fronczak] was discharged because he failed to show up for work." The Circuit Court sustained the magistrate's determination.

However, the Circuit Court went further. The court said that:

"assuming arguendo that Fronczak has presented a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of a perceived mental disability in 1993, DOCS has come forward with a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for placing him on involuntary leave at that time, namely that he was not capable of performing the essential job duties of a corrections officer."

In addition, said the court, Fronczak did not present any evidence indicating that DOCS' proffered explanation was a pretext for discrimination.

The court's conclusion: After considering "all of Fronczak's claims and finding them without merit," the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

* Section 71 of the Civil Service Law provides for leaves of absences in connection with an "occupational injury or disease" within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Law

** The US Supreme Court ruled that the states enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuit in federal court alleging violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act [Garrett v. University of Alabama, 193 F.3d 1214].

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Employee terminated after being found guilty of off-duty misconduct

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­Employee terminated after being found guilty of off-duty misconduct
Losada v Safir, 278 A.D.2d 59

The Appellate Division sustained the disciplinary termination of New York City police officer Fernando Losada based on a finding that Losada, while off-duty, was in a traffic-related altercation during which he "wrongfully punched and kicked the driver of the other vehicle, causing him physical injury."

Another element: Losada was found guilty of filing a criminal complaint regarding the incident "that falsely portrayed the other driver as the aggressor, which resulted in the other driver being arrested and placed in detention."

The court said that the penalty of dismissal does not shock its sense of fairness, particularly given that this was Losada's second adjudication of violent misconduct within 16 months.

Employee terminated after failing to follow the employer's policy denied unemployment insurance benefits

Employee terminated after failing to follow the employer's policy denied unemployment insurance benefits
Matter of Cruz , 288 A.D.2d 813

Angel Cruz was dismissed from his position of Director of Public Safety and Security at the City University's Queens College campus. The reason for his termination: he failed to report allegations of sexual harassment made against members of his staff to the Colle­ge's Sexual Harassment Panel. The College's policy required supervisors to report such incidents to the Panel.

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board subsequently rejected Cruz's claim for unemployment insurance benefits after finding that he was discharged for "disqualifying misconduct."

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board's ruling, holding that "[i]t is well settled that a claimant's knowing failure to comply with the employer's established policies and pro­cedures can constitute disqualifying misconduct, especially in cases where such failure could jeopardize the employer's best interest."

According to the decision, Cruz admitted that he had twice failed to report allegations of sexual harassment that had been filed against members of his staff. His failure to do so, said the court, prevented the College from taking prompt action to address the allegations, thereby exposing it to potential liability.

Under these circumstances, the Appellate Division said that there was "no reason to dis­turb the decision of the Board finding that [Cruz] lost his job under disqualifying circum­stances."

Former employee’s ADA retaliation claim survives the dismissal of her violation of the ADA complaint

Former employee’s ADA retaliation claim survives the dismissal of her violation of the ADA complaint
Ragusa v Malverne Union Free School Dist., USCA, 2nd Circuit, No. 08-5367-cv, June 21, 2010, [Unpublished]

Malverne Union Free School District mathematics teacher Biljana Ragusa sued the District, the school board and former school superintendent Mary Ellen Freeley, alleging that she had been the victim of unlawful discrimination because of her gender, age, and disability.

A federal district court judge granted the School Districts motion for summary judgment [Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 582 F. Supp. 2d 326], finding that Ragusa failed to adduce sufficient evidence to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment because of disability or that the district had retaliated against her because of her “engaging in ADA-protected activity.”

The Circuit Court sustained the district court’s ruling in part, stating that agreed with its finding that “Ragusa’s discrimination claim failed because of insufficient evidence that she is a ‘qualified individual’ with a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA.”*

Ragusa had alleged that surgery to remove a benign brain tumor left her impaired in the “major life activities” of seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking.” The court, however, ruled that the evidence did not support a finding of “substantial limitation” and that the only medical evidence in the record consisted of a physician’s note clearing Ragusa to return to work following her surgery.

Further, said the court, Ragusa failed to raise a “jury question” as to whether the school district and its officers and employees “regarded her as disabled” because of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.

Although Ragusa contended that she received critical evaluations concerning her teaching performance, the Circuit Court decided that such criticisms reflected that the district considered her “ineffective” and not disabled.

As to Ragusa’s allegations concerning “retaliation,” the court ruled that although she presented a prima facie case of retaliation, the school district rebutted this claim by providing a non-retaliatory rationale” for her dismissal, thereby shifting the burden of going forward to Ragusa to show that the explanation offered by the district was pretextual.**

The Circuit Court concluded that Ragusa had sufficiently demonstrated the possibility of “pretext” with respect to her 2004-2005 teaching assignment and vacated the district court’s decision dismissing her claim of retaliation and remanded the matter to the federal district court for further consideration.

* The Circuit Court noted that Congress amended the ADA in 2008 to expand its coverage but said that it had decided the case on the version of the statute in effect “during the time period at issue, which ended with Ragusa’s termination on June 30, 2005, noting that, in general, a statute “shall not be given retroactive effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary implication,” citing Bercerril v Pima County Assessor’s Office, 587 F3d 1162.

** Ragusa did not have to be disabled within the meaning of the ADA to pursue her retaliation claim as she demonstrated that she held a “good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying actions of the employer violated the ADA [see Sarno v Douglas Elliman-Gibbons and Ives, Inc., 183 F3d 155].

The decision has been posted on the Internet by the NYS Bar Association at:
http://www.loislaw.com/advsrny/flwhitview.htp?lwhitid=9639670

NLRB holds that union commited an unfair labor practice by disciplining a member for reporting another employee's safety violation

NLRB holds that union commited an unfair labor practice by disciplining a member for reporting another employee's safety violation
Source: Adjunct Law Prof Blog; http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/
Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2010, Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Esq., Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Johns Law School and New York Law School, All rights reserved.

Operating Engineers, 355 NLRB No. 25 (April 19, 2010), is an interesting case. The Board ruled 3-0 that a union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by fining a member $2,500 for reporting another employee's safety violation. As the Board stated:

The Respondent contends that by disciplining Overtonit did not restrain or coerce him in the exercise of his rights under Section 7 of the Act because Overton acted alone and not concertedly.

The Board has consistently found Section 8(b)(1)(A) violated, however, where a union disciplines an employee for reporting a work-rule infraction by another employee, if the disciplined employee is under a duty to make such reports, notwithstanding that the disciplined employee acted alone. See Teamsters Local 439 (University of the Pacific), 324 NLRB 1096 (1997); Carpenters District Council of SanDiego (Hopeman Bros.), 272 NLRB 584 (1984); Chemical Workers Local 604 (Essex International), 233 NLRB 1239 (1977), enfd. mem. 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978).

We find these precedents controlling.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Randall Comments: Although NLRB determinations are neither binding on PERB nor controlling with respect to constituting a precedent for the purposes of the Taylor Law (see Section 209-a.3, Civil Service Law), this decision is instructive as its rationale may be adopted by PERB, arbitrators and the courts under similar circumstances.