Discontinuing or postponing administrative disciplinary action while criminal action involving the same event is pending and related issues

Discontinuing or postponing administrative disciplinary action while criminal action involving the same event is pending and related issues
Levine v New York City Transit Authority, 70 AD2d 900, affirmed 49 NY2d 747

New York courts have considered discontinuing disciplinary action while criminal action is pending, holding that an appointing authority has no obligation to postpone administrative disciplinary action even if the county district attorney requests that the administrative disciplinary action be postponed. This was the point made by the court in Levine v New York City Transit Authority.

It may, however, sometimes be advantageous for the appointing authority to wait until the criminal matter has been adjudicated. New York courts have ruled that a criminal conviction compels an automatic finding of guilt in an administrative disciplinary hearing involving the same offense.

If an employee is found guilty in a court of law of a crime such as stealing, and disciplinary charges are filed related to that same incident of theft, there is no lawful way for a disciplinary hearing officer to find the employee not guilty of stealing. Probably the leading case illustrating this point is Kelly v. Levin, 440 NY2d 424. In Kelly the court ruled that is a reversible error for an administrative disciplinary body to acquit an employee if the individual has been found guilty of a criminal act involving the same allegations.

The reason this is true is that the standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding is greater than that in an administrative disciplinary proceeding. In a criminal case, the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast, the standard to be met to find an employee guilty of the charges filed against him or her in administrative disciplinary action is “substantial evidence” or, in some situations, “a preponderance of the evidence.”

Is an employee subjected to "double jeopardy" if the employer proceeds with an administrative disciplinary action at the same time as criminal charges are pending or following the criminal action should the employee be acquitted? Courts have ruled this is not double jeopardy.

In Bermudez v NYC Transit Authority, Appellate Division, upholding a lower court's determination, said that as to the "double jeopardy" issue,[1] "the dismissal of the criminal charges brought against [Bermudez], which were predicated upon the same acts which were the subject of the disciplinary proceeding commenced against him, has no bearing upon the determination terminating his employment."

In Matter of the Haverstraw-Stony Point CSD, 24 Ed. Dept. Rep. 466, the Commissioner of Education ruled that a Section 3020-a hearing panel is not required to adjourn an administrative disciplinary hearing when parallel criminal proceedings are underway.

A claim of double jeopardy is, however, more frequently encountered in efforts to suppress a disciplinary action in situations were the charges reflect the same acts or omissions that were the subject of counseling memoranda or performance evaluations. The courts have rejected this theory.

In Patterson v Smith, 53 NY2d 98 the Court of Appeals said that including charges concerning performance that were addressed in a counseling memorandum was not “double jeopardy.”

The court explained that a “proper counseling memoranda” contains a warning and an admonition to comply with the expectations of the employer. It is not a form of punishment in and of itself. Accordingly, case law indicates that giving the employee a counseling memorandum does not bar the employer from later filing disciplinary charges based on the same event or events.

The employer, however, may not use the counseling memorandum or a performance evaluation to avoid initiating formal disciplinary action against an individual as the Fusco and Irving decisions by the Commissioner of Education demonstrate [Fusco v Jefferson County School District, CEd, 14,396 and Irving v Troy City School District, CEd 14,373].

The point made in Fusco and Irving is that comments critical of employee performance do not, without more, constitute disciplinary action. On the other hand, counseling letters may not be used as a subterfuge for avoiding initiating formal disciplinary action against a tenured individual.

What distinguishes lawful “constructive criticism” of an individual’s performance by a supervisor and supervisory actions addressing an individual’s performance that are disciplinary in nature?

In Holt v Board of Education, 52 NY2d 625, the Court of Appeals decided that performance evaluations and letters of criticism placed in the employee’s personnel file were not “disciplinary penalties” and thus could be placed there without having to first hold a disciplinary proceeding. In other words, the act of placing correspondence critical of the employee’s conduct or performance in his or her personnel file did not constitute discipline.

The basic rule set out in Holt is that a statutory disciplinary provision such as Section 75 of the Civil Service Law does not require that an employee be given a hearing or permitted to grieve every comment or statement by his or her employer that he or she may consider a criticism. In contrast, alleged “constructive criticism” may not be used to frustrate an employee’s right to due process as set out in Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, Section 3020-a of the Education Law or a contract disciplinary procedure. In other words, an appointing authority may not frustrate an employee’s right to due process as set out in Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, Section 3020-a of the Education Law or a contract disciplinary procedure by claiming its action was merely “constructive criticism.”

In the Fusco and Irving cases, the Commissioner of Education found that “critical comment” exceeded the parameters circumscribing “lawful instruction” concerning unacceptable performance.

In Fusco’s case, the Commissioner said that “contents of the memorandum” did not fall within the parameters of a “permissible evaluation” noting that the memorandum “contains no constructive criticism or a single suggestion for improvement.” Rather, said the Commissioner, the memorandum focused on “castigating [Fusco] for prior alleged misconduct.”

In Irving’s case, a school principal was given a letter critical of her performance and the next day reassigned to another school where she was to serve as an assistant principal. The Commissioner ruled that these two actions, when considered as a single event, constituted disciplinary action within the meaning of Section 3020-a of the Education Law.

* Bermudez attempt to vacate the award contending that he had been acquitted of criminal charges that had led to the administrative disciplinary action.

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NYPPL

Title VII does not bar the selection of an individual because of the individual’s personal relationship with the appointing authority

Title VII does not bar the selection of an individual because of the individual’s personal relationship with the appointing authority
Fella v County of Rockland, 297 A.D.2d 813

According to the court's decision, the Rockland County Director of Employee Rights and Equity Compliance concluded that Rockland County Commissioner of Hospitals Peter T. Fella had created a hostile work environment by promoting a person with whom he was then having a romantic relationship to a vacant assistant director of nursing position.*

The Director had determined that Fella violated the County's Equal Employment Opportunity Policy [EEOP] because some employees said that they felt uncomfortable at work because Fella had this "romantic relationship" with a co-employee. This, said the Director, constituted a hostile work environment and, as such, violated the EEOP.

As a result, C. Scott Vanderhoef, County Executive of the County of Rockland, suspended Fella from his position without pay for a period of 30 days.

Supreme Court vacated the County Executive's action and the Appellate Division sustained the lower court's ruling.

In its decision the Appellate Division noted that the County's EEOP defined sexual harassment as "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexual demands or conduct of a sexual nature which `had the purpose or affect [sic] of unreasonably interfering with an [affected] person's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment.'"

Citing DeCinto v Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F2d 304, the court explained that there is no sexual discrimination or harassment involved "where the conduct complained of by the employee involves an isolated act of preferential treatment of another employee due to a romantic, consensual relationship." Accordingly, said the court, the County Executive's finding that Fella created a hostile work environment in violation of the EEOP was arbitrary, capricious, and without a rational basis, and was therefore properly annulled but the Supreme Court.
NYPPL

Using tape-recorded testimony in an administrative proceeding

Using tape-recorded testimony in an administrative proceeding
Miller v Howard Safir, App. Div., 259 AD2d 337

John Miller, Jr. challenged the New York City police commissioner’s revocation of his designation as a Special Patrolman. The commissioner had determined that Miller was “unfit for the position of Special Patrolman” following an incident during which Miller assaulted an individual.

The Appellate Division noted that the police commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including Miller’s own admission that he knocked down the individual’s door and assaulted her.

However, Miller complained that the determination was based on a tape recording by the individual rather than her giving her personally testifying in the presence of the hearing officer.

The Appellate Division ruled that the tape-recorded evidence, which was sworn testimony, constituted substantial evidence, citing Abdur-Raheem v Mann, 85 NY2d 113 and Butler v Coughlin, 193 AD2d 973 in support of its ruling.
NYPPL

Term appointments of employees in the Classified Service

Term appointments of employees in the Classified Service
Wheeler v Washington Co., 259 AD2d 902

Term appointments are rare in the classified service. The Wheeler case involves such a type of appointment and considers the rights of an incumbent upon the expiration of his or her term of office.

Section 100 of the Highway Law provides that a county Superintendent of Highways is appointed for a four-year term and “may be removed from office for malfeasance or misfeasance before expiration of the term.”*

Kenneth F. Wheeler was initially appointed to the position of Superintendent of Highways for a four-year term in 1987 and was reappointed to an additional four-year term, beginning on January 1, 1993. In 1991, his job title was changed to Superintendent of Public Works. At the conclusion of his term on December 31, 1996, Wheeler was not reappointed but remained as Superintendent until a successor was appointed by the Board of Supervisors on February 3, 1997.

Claiming that his termination was unlawful, Wheeler sued.

According to the decision, Wheeler’s most recent term of office as Superintendent of Public Works commenced on January 1, 1993 and expired on December 31, 1996. The issue, as the Appellate Division saw it, was “whether the rights afforded a permanent, competitive employee under Civil Service Law Section 75 extended to [Wheeler] after the expiration of his term of office.”

Wheeler contended that his position was wrongfully reclassified in 1996 from competitive to “unclassified” or noncompetitive status and that his position did not meet the requirements for “unclassified” status. Relying on his alleged permanent, competitive status in the classified service, Wheeler argued that Section 75 barred his termination except for misconduct or incompetence.

The court said that contrary to Wheeler’s contention, he was not terminated or removed from office but rather, his four-year term pursuant to Highway Law Section 100 merely expired. Since he was not reappointed and his successor had not yet been chosen, the position became vacant at the expiration of his term on December 31, 1996.

However, until his successor took office in February 1996, Wheeler was a holdover and an at-will employee as provided by Section 5 of the Public Officers Law. Therefore, the court concluded, Section 75 was inapplicable and thus Wheeler was not entitled to a review of the County’s decision not to reappoint him after completion of his then current term of office.

As to the question of whether Wheeler’s position was wrongfully reclassified from the competitive class to another jurisdictional classification, the Appellate Division said that the change in jurisdictional classification was irrelevant since Wheeler was not removed from his position prior to the expiration of his term of office.

The decision implies that a person holding a term appointment authorized by law, unless reappointed, is to be deemed terminated upon the expiration of his or her term “by operation of law” notwithstanding the fact that he or she may otherwise be protected against removal except for incompetence or misconduct by the provisions of Section 75 of the Civil Service Law.

* Among others in the classified service holding a “term appointment” is the personnel officer of a county, suburban town, or a city where such a position has been established. Such a personnel officer is appointed for a term of six years [Section 15.1.(b), Civil Service Law].
NYPPL

Termination of employment pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 73

Termination of employment pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 73
Fallon v Triboro. Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 259 AD2d 377

An individual who is terminated pursuant to Section 71 or Section 73 of the Civil Service Law because of his or her absence caused by a disability may decide to sue the employer, claiming the termination was unlawful.* Such was the situation underlying the Fallon case.

The Triboro Bridge and Tunnel Authority terminated Gregory Fallon pursuant to Section 73 of the Civil Service Law after he had been continuously absent in excess of one year. Fallon sued, claiming various violations of his civil rights under federal and state law. The court found that Fallon had been absent on disability leave for 12 years and had never sought to return to work, with or without accommodation, even after he was denied ordinary disability retirement benefits.

The Authority had told Fallon that it would terminate him if he failed to qualify for ordinary disability retirement. This, said the Appellate Division, constituted “adequate pretermination notice,” commenting that “[i]n the context of Section 73 discharges, [due process] amounts to no more than an opportunity for the employee to present opposing views as to whether [he] has been absent for one year or more and whether [he] was able to return to [his] position.”

As to any post-termination rights, the Authority “in language tracking the provisions of Civil Service Law Section 73,” had written Fallon advising him of his termination and “that he could apply for a medical examination within a year of the termination of his disability, and if found fit, could apply for reinstatement.” This, said the court, was sufficient to meet due process requirements.

The Appellate Division also ruled that Fallon failed to make a prima facie case of disability-based discrimination under the Vocational Rehabilitation Act (29 USC Section 794) because the Authority “is not a recipient of federal funds.”

Fallon also contended that the Authority had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court determined that his ADA rights had not been violated “since he makes no allegation that he requested an accommodation for his alleged disability and was refused.”

In view of this, the court ruled, “there is no ground to conclude that [the Authority] violated the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law Section 296), prohibiting disability-based discrimination” and dismissed Fallon’s appeal.

* Section 71 provides for leave in connection with a work-connected injury or disease. Section 73 provides for the termination of an individual who is on leave pursuant to Section 72, which mandates leaves of absence in the event an employee is unable to work because of an injury or disease that did not result from a work-related incident.
NYPPL