Reinstatement to his or her former position and salary grade after a disciplinary demotion constitutes all the relief to which an employee is entitled
Matter of Neeley v Town of Colonie, 2010 NY Slip Op 09606, Appellate Division, Third Department
William Neeley was appointed to the position of Public Works Operation Supervisor in 1998, while Thomas Romano was appointed to the position of Highway Maintenance Supervisor in 2005.
Both Neeley and Romano worked for the Town of Colonie Department of Public Works and both were suspended from their respective positions in July 2008 pending the resolution of certain disciplinary charges that had been filed against them.
Found guilty of misconduct, the penalty imposed on both Neeley and Romano was demotion in title and grade.
Neeley and Romano appealed to the Town's personnel officer and ultimately their respective demotions were rescinded and a new penalty - suspension without pay for 30 days - was imposed on each.
Although Neeley and Romano were reinstated to their titles, grades and salaries, they appealed contending that certain of their former duties had been curtailed and, therefore, they had been subject to a de facto demotion.
Supreme Court dismissed their Article 78 petition as moot and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s action.
The Appellate Division said that as it was “undisputed” that both Neeley and Romano had been restored to their original titles, grades and salaries in compliance with the decision issued by the Town's personnel officer, they had received “all the relief to which they were entitled.”
Accordingly, said the court, Supreme Court’s dismissal of their petition as moot was correct.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09606.htm
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
January 04, 2011
A school employee giving reasonable assurance of continued employment is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits between school years
A school employee giving reasonable assurance of continued employment is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits between school years
Matter of Sultana v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2010 NY Slip Op 09598, Appellate Division, Third Department
It is “black letter law” that "A professional employee of an educational institution is precluded from receiving unemployment insurance benefits during the time between two successive academic years where the claimant has received a reasonable assurance of continued employment"
Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 4, 2009, which ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she had a reasonable assurance of continued employment.
Chand Sultana, a per diem substitute teacher employed by the New York City Department of Education, worked a total of 138 days during the school year. At the end of the school year Sultana received a letter from the Department “assuring her of continued employment” during the upcoming school year. The letter indicated the amount of work available and that the economic terms and conditions of employment were to be substantially the same as in the school year then ending.
Sultana applied for unemployment insurance benefits for the intervening summer but Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that she was ineligible to receive them because she had received a reasonable assurance of continued employment pursuant to Labor Law §590(10).
The Appellate Division rejected Sultana’s appeal challenging the Board’s determination.
The court explained that the record indicated that a Department of Education representative testified that Sultana would have as many opportunities to work during the succeeding school year as she had the prior year inasmuch as more schools were to be opened, resulting in greater demand for substitute teachers and there had been no reduction in the budget. Such testimony, together with the letter sent to Sultana by the Department, constituted substantial evidence supporting the Unemployment Insurance Board's determination.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09598.htm
Matter of Sultana v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2010 NY Slip Op 09598, Appellate Division, Third Department
It is “black letter law” that "A professional employee of an educational institution is precluded from receiving unemployment insurance benefits during the time between two successive academic years where the claimant has received a reasonable assurance of continued employment"
Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed May 4, 2009, which ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because she had a reasonable assurance of continued employment.
Chand Sultana, a per diem substitute teacher employed by the New York City Department of Education, worked a total of 138 days during the school year. At the end of the school year Sultana received a letter from the Department “assuring her of continued employment” during the upcoming school year. The letter indicated the amount of work available and that the economic terms and conditions of employment were to be substantially the same as in the school year then ending.
Sultana applied for unemployment insurance benefits for the intervening summer but Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board determined that she was ineligible to receive them because she had received a reasonable assurance of continued employment pursuant to Labor Law §590(10).
The Appellate Division rejected Sultana’s appeal challenging the Board’s determination.
The court explained that the record indicated that a Department of Education representative testified that Sultana would have as many opportunities to work during the succeeding school year as she had the prior year inasmuch as more schools were to be opened, resulting in greater demand for substitute teachers and there had been no reduction in the budget. Such testimony, together with the letter sent to Sultana by the Department, constituted substantial evidence supporting the Unemployment Insurance Board's determination.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09598.htm
Health insurance for retirees
Health insurance for retirees
Erie County Retirees Assn. v County of Erie [PA], 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000), Certiorari denied, 121 S.Ct. 1247
Many public employers provide health insurance to retired public employees. Some employers may have elected to provide a different type or level of health insurance coverage to retirees eligible for Medicare than it provides to retirees not eligible for Medicare. This, as the Erie County case demonstrates, could prove dangerous.
According to the ruling in Erie County Retirees, a public employer may be sued for alleged age discrimination within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act if it modifies its health insurance plan to provide retirees who are 65 or older (and therefore eligible for Medicare) with less generous benefits than its retirees under age 65.*
The decision indicates that initially Erie classified employees and retirees into three main health insurance coverage groups:
1. Current employees;
2. Medicare-eligible retirees; and
3. Retirees not eligible for Medicare. Each group had separate but similar traditional indemnity health insurance coverage.
When the county subsequently initiated changes in carriers in response to increases in health insurance costs, the retirees age 65 or older were enrolled in a health insurance plan called the SecurityBlue Plan.
Claiming that SecurityBlue provided inferior coverage compared to other plans and to the traditional indemnity coverage previously available to age 65+ retirees, the Association sued. Its basic argument: the county’s action violated the ADEA by placing retired employee into SecurityBlue on the basis of their having attained age 65.
The County, on the other hand, argued that it based its decision to place Medicare-eligible retirees in SecurityBlue not because of their age but for three age-neutral factors: (1) active versus inactive employment status, (2) cost, and (3) availability of plans. Its theory: ADEA allows an employer to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.
The relevant provisions of the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer to:
1. Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; [or]
2. Limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way, which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his or her status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.
The district court dismissed the Association’s petition, holding that while eligibility for Medicare is an age-based factor ... the ADEA clearly was not intended to apply to retirees....
The Circuit Court, however, disagreed and said the issue should go to trial to determine if the County violated the ADEA by treating age 65+ retirees less favorably than retirees under age 65 with respect to health insurance.
As to the applicability of ADEA to retirees, the Circuit Court observed that the ordinary meaning of the term employee benefit should be understood to encompass health coverage and other benefits, which a retired person receives from his or her former employer.
The court said that:
It is clear that the ADEA covers discrimination in a post-employment benefit where the facially discriminatory policy is instituted while an individual is still an active employee, even if the event occurred one day prior to his or her retirement. Thus, it was inconceivable to the Third Circuit that Congress intended to allow an individual to challenge the employer’s action that occurred while still an employee but bar such action if the policy were adopted two days later, one day after the date of retirement....
The court decided that Congress did not intended to expressly prohibit discrimination in employee benefits for active workers, yet allow employers to discriminatorily deny or limit post-employment benefits to former employees at or after their retirement, although they had earned those employee benefits through years of service with the employer.
Agreeing with the position taken by EEOC, the Third Circuit ruled that the ADEA applies even if the retirees’ benefits are structured discriminatorily after retirement. The court said that the age 65+ retirees are individuals who have been treated differently by their employer with respect to [their] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The court said that the fact that the county’s action was the result neither of some malevolent motive nor due to some hostile age-based stereotypes was irrelevant.
Also of some significance is the Court’s rejection of the County’s argument that “... the underwriting criteria adopted by another of its carriers, Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield, disqualified Medicare-eligible retirees from enrollment ....” Why? Because, said the court, the Supreme Court has indicated that an employer cannot avoid responsibility for a facially discriminatory benefit plan simply because the discrimination arises from the criteria imposed by outside entities with whom the employer has contracted to participate in providing the benefit.
The court’s conclusion: the County has treated age 65+ retirees differently than other retirees with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... age. Accordingly, such retirees were found to have established a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, 29 USC 623(a)(1).
Presumably, the Association will prevail unless the county can prove that one of the ADEA’s safe harbors is found applicable -- i.e., there were some qualified, non-discriminatory reasons for its action.
What would satisfy this standard? The Circuit Court said that that the safe harbor provided [by the ADEA] is applicable if the County can meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard.
* The Association withdrew its claim alleging differences in benefits for retirees and active County employees violated the ADEA and proceeded only on its ADEA claim that the differences in benefits between the age 65 and older retirees and retirees under age 65 violate the ADEA.
Erie County Retirees Assn. v County of Erie [PA], 220 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2000), Certiorari denied, 121 S.Ct. 1247
Many public employers provide health insurance to retired public employees. Some employers may have elected to provide a different type or level of health insurance coverage to retirees eligible for Medicare than it provides to retirees not eligible for Medicare. This, as the Erie County case demonstrates, could prove dangerous.
According to the ruling in Erie County Retirees, a public employer may be sued for alleged age discrimination within the meaning of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act if it modifies its health insurance plan to provide retirees who are 65 or older (and therefore eligible for Medicare) with less generous benefits than its retirees under age 65.*
The decision indicates that initially Erie classified employees and retirees into three main health insurance coverage groups:
1. Current employees;
2. Medicare-eligible retirees; and
3. Retirees not eligible for Medicare. Each group had separate but similar traditional indemnity health insurance coverage.
When the county subsequently initiated changes in carriers in response to increases in health insurance costs, the retirees age 65 or older were enrolled in a health insurance plan called the SecurityBlue Plan.
Claiming that SecurityBlue provided inferior coverage compared to other plans and to the traditional indemnity coverage previously available to age 65+ retirees, the Association sued. Its basic argument: the county’s action violated the ADEA by placing retired employee into SecurityBlue on the basis of their having attained age 65.
The County, on the other hand, argued that it based its decision to place Medicare-eligible retirees in SecurityBlue not because of their age but for three age-neutral factors: (1) active versus inactive employment status, (2) cost, and (3) availability of plans. Its theory: ADEA allows an employer to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.
The relevant provisions of the ADEA make it unlawful for an employer to:
1. Fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age; [or]
2. Limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way, which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his or her status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.
The district court dismissed the Association’s petition, holding that while eligibility for Medicare is an age-based factor ... the ADEA clearly was not intended to apply to retirees....
The Circuit Court, however, disagreed and said the issue should go to trial to determine if the County violated the ADEA by treating age 65+ retirees less favorably than retirees under age 65 with respect to health insurance.
As to the applicability of ADEA to retirees, the Circuit Court observed that the ordinary meaning of the term employee benefit should be understood to encompass health coverage and other benefits, which a retired person receives from his or her former employer.
The court said that:
It is clear that the ADEA covers discrimination in a post-employment benefit where the facially discriminatory policy is instituted while an individual is still an active employee, even if the event occurred one day prior to his or her retirement. Thus, it was inconceivable to the Third Circuit that Congress intended to allow an individual to challenge the employer’s action that occurred while still an employee but bar such action if the policy were adopted two days later, one day after the date of retirement....
The court decided that Congress did not intended to expressly prohibit discrimination in employee benefits for active workers, yet allow employers to discriminatorily deny or limit post-employment benefits to former employees at or after their retirement, although they had earned those employee benefits through years of service with the employer.
Agreeing with the position taken by EEOC, the Third Circuit ruled that the ADEA applies even if the retirees’ benefits are structured discriminatorily after retirement. The court said that the age 65+ retirees are individuals who have been treated differently by their employer with respect to [their] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
The court said that the fact that the county’s action was the result neither of some malevolent motive nor due to some hostile age-based stereotypes was irrelevant.
Also of some significance is the Court’s rejection of the County’s argument that “... the underwriting criteria adopted by another of its carriers, Highmark Blue Cross/Blue Shield, disqualified Medicare-eligible retirees from enrollment ....” Why? Because, said the court, the Supreme Court has indicated that an employer cannot avoid responsibility for a facially discriminatory benefit plan simply because the discrimination arises from the criteria imposed by outside entities with whom the employer has contracted to participate in providing the benefit.
The court’s conclusion: the County has treated age 65+ retirees differently than other retirees with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... age. Accordingly, such retirees were found to have established a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA, 29 USC 623(a)(1).
Presumably, the Association will prevail unless the county can prove that one of the ADEA’s safe harbors is found applicable -- i.e., there were some qualified, non-discriminatory reasons for its action.
What would satisfy this standard? The Circuit Court said that that the safe harbor provided [by the ADEA] is applicable if the County can meet the equal benefit or equal cost standard.
* The Association withdrew its claim alleging differences in benefits for retirees and active County employees violated the ADEA and proceeded only on its ADEA claim that the differences in benefits between the age 65 and older retirees and retirees under age 65 violate the ADEA.
Judicial review of a disciplinary action
Judicial review of a disciplinary action
Horgan v Safir, 273 AD2d 135; Motion for leave to appeal denied, 95 NY2d 765
A court’s review of an administrative decision following a hearing is significantly more limited than would be the case when a higher court considers an appeal from a trial court’s ruling. This limitation proved critical in the Appellate Division, First Department’s consideration of the Horgan case.
New York City police officer John Horgan was found guilty of using discourteous and disrespectful remarks concerning race following an administrative disciplinary hearing. The penalty imposed: forfeiture of 20 days of vacation. Horgan appealed the Police Commissioner’s determination.
The Appellate Division dismissed Horgan’s appeal. The court, however, specifically commented that it had to dismiss the appeal despite the fact that if the Commissioner’s determination was reviewed under the standards applicable to a trial court decision, it would have been disposed to annul it as against the weight of the credible evidence.
The Appellate Division said that courts have very limited review powers over administrative agency determinations. Accordingly, it said that it was constrained to confirm [the Commissioner’s] findings in the disciplinary hearing, citing Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436.
Horgan v Safir, 273 AD2d 135; Motion for leave to appeal denied, 95 NY2d 765
A court’s review of an administrative decision following a hearing is significantly more limited than would be the case when a higher court considers an appeal from a trial court’s ruling. This limitation proved critical in the Appellate Division, First Department’s consideration of the Horgan case.
New York City police officer John Horgan was found guilty of using discourteous and disrespectful remarks concerning race following an administrative disciplinary hearing. The penalty imposed: forfeiture of 20 days of vacation. Horgan appealed the Police Commissioner’s determination.
The Appellate Division dismissed Horgan’s appeal. The court, however, specifically commented that it had to dismiss the appeal despite the fact that if the Commissioner’s determination was reviewed under the standards applicable to a trial court decision, it would have been disposed to annul it as against the weight of the credible evidence.
The Appellate Division said that courts have very limited review powers over administrative agency determinations. Accordingly, it said that it was constrained to confirm [the Commissioner’s] findings in the disciplinary hearing, citing Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436.
January 03, 2011
Leading by example, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo will return five percent of his statutory compensation of $179,000 to the State
Leading by example, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo will return five percent of his statutory compensation of $179,000 to the State
Source: Office of the Governor
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo today announced that he will reduce his salary by five percent. The salary for the Governor, $179,000, is set by state law and has not changed since 1999. The Governor said that he will return to the State the amount his salary reduction.
In addition, Lt. Governor Robert J. Duffy and newly hired senior members of the Cuomo Administration who are filling existing positions in the Executive Chamber are also taking salary reductions and have agreed to take a pay cut of 5 percent from their predecessors' salaries. This includes the Governor's Secretary, Counsel, Director of State Operations, Counselor and the Chief of Staff.
Governor Cuomo also directed that the budget for the Executive Chamber be reduced by five percent.
"Change starts at the top and we will lead by example," Governor Cuomo said. "Families and business owners in every corner of the state have learned to do more with less in order to live within their means and government must do the same."
The Secretary to the Governor has initiated a review of all Executive Chamber expenses to determine where the reductions will be made.
Source: Office of the Governor
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo today announced that he will reduce his salary by five percent. The salary for the Governor, $179,000, is set by state law and has not changed since 1999. The Governor said that he will return to the State the amount his salary reduction.
In addition, Lt. Governor Robert J. Duffy and newly hired senior members of the Cuomo Administration who are filling existing positions in the Executive Chamber are also taking salary reductions and have agreed to take a pay cut of 5 percent from their predecessors' salaries. This includes the Governor's Secretary, Counsel, Director of State Operations, Counselor and the Chief of Staff.
Governor Cuomo also directed that the budget for the Executive Chamber be reduced by five percent.
"Change starts at the top and we will lead by example," Governor Cuomo said. "Families and business owners in every corner of the state have learned to do more with less in order to live within their means and government must do the same."
The Secretary to the Governor has initiated a review of all Executive Chamber expenses to determine where the reductions will be made.
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Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL.
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