Employee terminated after being found guilty of excessive absence from work
Matter of Wallis v Sandy Cr. Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 2010 NY Slip Op 09814, Appellate Division, Fourth Department
The Sandy Creek Central School District served disciplinary charges against school bus driver Mary W. Wallis pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law charging Wallis with incompetency or misconduct because of her excessive absenteeism.
Found guilty, Sandy Creek terminated her employment with the school district. Wallis appealed, contending that Sandy Creek’s determination “must be annulled because all of her absences were for legitimate reasons, including a period of time during which she was absent due to a work-related injury.”
The Appellate Division rejected Wallis’ argument, holding that as she had been found guilty of incompetency or misconduct based on excessive absenteeism the school district was “entitled to terminate her on those grounds even in the event that her ‘excessive absences [were] caused by physical incapacity.’"
Accordingly, said the court, it was irrelevant that Wallis had legitimate reasons for missing work.
The issue with respect to the charge against Wallis, said the Appellate Division, was whether her excessive absences "and [their] disruptive and burdensome effect on the employer rendered [her] incompetent to continue [her] employment."
The decision reports that:
[1] There was substantial evidence in the record establishing that Wallis was insubordinate and
[2] That her absences had a disruptive and burdensome effect on the school district. Although the record indicated that Wallis had received several warnings about her excessive absenteeism, she had an absentee rate of over 60% for a period of approximately 1½ years.
Under the circumstances of this case the Appellate Division decided that the penalty of termination of employment is not " so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness' " and thus does not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.
The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_09814.htm
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
January 07, 2011
Existence of conflicting evidence in an administrative proceeding requires conducting a hearing “to fully develop the record”
Existence of conflicting evidence in an administrative proceeding requires conducting a hearing “to fully develop the record”
Matter of Carr v Cairo Fire Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 00056, Appellate Division, Third Department
James A. Carr, a volunteer firefighter, suffered an injury to the back of his right hand when it was struck by a rotating hose reel handle.
Initially unable to work, while recovering Carr resumed working as a house painter, apparently performing all of his work with his left hand. Subsequently Carr complained of numbness and significant pain in both hands and applied for Workers’ Compensation Benefits.
In the Workers’ Compensation hearing that followed the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] asked Carr two questions but no sworn testimony was taken, nor was Carr cross-examined by the insurance carrier's attorney notwithstanding the attorney's requesting a "full development of the record with testimony of [Carr] and treating physician,.
Rather, the WCLJ ruled that the carrier had no right to medical testimony and neither Carr’s testimony nor medical testimony was necessary. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the decision of the WCLJ, and the insurance carrier appealed.
The carrier argued that the WCLJ should have granted its request to develop the record by obtaining Carr's testimony and by cross-examining Carr's treating physician. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that "[E]ither the claimant or the employer or his insurance carrier may introduce witnesses . . . in compensation proceedings."
The court, noting that there was “conflicting medical evidence” and as “no formal testimony was taken at the . . . hearing,” ruled that the WCLJ’s denial of the insuance carrier's request to cross-examine Carr's attending physician to explore such issues “clearly prejudiced the employer."
The Appellate Division returned the matter to the Workers' Compensation Board “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_00056.htm
Matter of Carr v Cairo Fire Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 00056, Appellate Division, Third Department
James A. Carr, a volunteer firefighter, suffered an injury to the back of his right hand when it was struck by a rotating hose reel handle.
Initially unable to work, while recovering Carr resumed working as a house painter, apparently performing all of his work with his left hand. Subsequently Carr complained of numbness and significant pain in both hands and applied for Workers’ Compensation Benefits.
In the Workers’ Compensation hearing that followed the Workers’ Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] asked Carr two questions but no sworn testimony was taken, nor was Carr cross-examined by the insurance carrier's attorney notwithstanding the attorney's requesting a "full development of the record with testimony of [Carr] and treating physician,.
Rather, the WCLJ ruled that the carrier had no right to medical testimony and neither Carr’s testimony nor medical testimony was necessary. The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the decision of the WCLJ, and the insurance carrier appealed.
The carrier argued that the WCLJ should have granted its request to develop the record by obtaining Carr's testimony and by cross-examining Carr's treating physician. The Appellate Division agreed, holding that "[E]ither the claimant or the employer or his insurance carrier may introduce witnesses . . . in compensation proceedings."
The court, noting that there was “conflicting medical evidence” and as “no formal testimony was taken at the . . . hearing,” ruled that the WCLJ’s denial of the insuance carrier's request to cross-examine Carr's attending physician to explore such issues “clearly prejudiced the employer."
The Appellate Division returned the matter to the Workers' Compensation Board “for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_00056.htm
Contracts for personal and related services questioned by the State Comptroller’s auditors
Contracts for personal and related services questioned by the State Comptroller’s auditors
Source: Office of the State Comptroller
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli reports that during the period April 1, 2006 through December 21, 2009, the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance [OTDA] had 245 active personal and miscellaneous service contracts in place with a total value of more than $847 million.
The Comptroller’s auditors examined whether the office was adequately justifying the need to initially contract out for such services and periodically reassessing whether such contracts could be deferred, eliminated or reduced to save state funds.
After reviewing a sample of 27 contracts the auditors found that OTDA was not able demonstrate that it had formally evaluated and justified the need for any of the selected contracts nor had it periodically reassessed whether such contracts could be deferred, eliminated or reduced.
The text of the Comptroller’s report is posted on the Internet at:
http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093011/09s101.pdf
Source: Office of the State Comptroller
New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli reports that during the period April 1, 2006 through December 21, 2009, the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance [OTDA] had 245 active personal and miscellaneous service contracts in place with a total value of more than $847 million.
The Comptroller’s auditors examined whether the office was adequately justifying the need to initially contract out for such services and periodically reassessing whether such contracts could be deferred, eliminated or reduced to save state funds.
After reviewing a sample of 27 contracts the auditors found that OTDA was not able demonstrate that it had formally evaluated and justified the need for any of the selected contracts nor had it periodically reassessed whether such contracts could be deferred, eliminated or reduced.
The text of the Comptroller’s report is posted on the Internet at:
http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093011/09s101.pdf
Commissioner of Education does not have jurisdiction to resolve FOIL or Title IX appeals
Commissioner of Education does not have jurisdiction to resolve FOIL or Title IX appeals
Application of Gary Berman to remove a member of the Boards of Education of the Valley Stream Central High School District and the Valley Stream Union Free District No. 13., Decisions of the Commissioner No. 15,537
Gary Berman asked the Commissioner of Education to remove Dr. Frank Chiachiere from his positions as president and member of the Board of Education of the Valley Stream Central High School District and as a member of the Board of Education of the Valley Stream Union Free School District No. 13. Berman, in support of his request, alleged that that Dr. Chiachiere ignored, and has permitted district officers to ignore, the requirements of the State Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law §§84-90) (usually referred to as “FOIL”) and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (see 20 USC §1681 et seq.).
The Commissioner said that Berman’s complaints involving alleged violations of FOIL requests in January 2006, must be dismissed because §89 of the Public Officers Law vests exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging FOIL violations in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Accordingly, alleged FOIL violations may not be adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner.
Similarly, the Commissioner said that he did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Title IX claims.
However, the Commissioner said that there was one additional administrative matter to consider in connection with Berman’s appeal -- Dr. Chiachiere’s request that the Commissioner grant him a certificate of good faith pursuant to Education Law §3811(1).
Granting such a certificate would allow the school board to indemnify Dr. Chiachiere for legal fees and expenses he incurred in defending a proceeding arising out of the exercise of his powers or performance of his duties as a member and, or, president of the board.
The Commissioner said that “[i]t is appropriate to issue such certification unless it is established on the record that the requesting board member acted in bad faith. Finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of Dr. Chiachiere in record before him, the Commission ruled that Dr. Chiachiere was entitled to receive a certificate of good faith.
Application of Gary Berman to remove a member of the Boards of Education of the Valley Stream Central High School District and the Valley Stream Union Free District No. 13., Decisions of the Commissioner No. 15,537
Gary Berman asked the Commissioner of Education to remove Dr. Frank Chiachiere from his positions as president and member of the Board of Education of the Valley Stream Central High School District and as a member of the Board of Education of the Valley Stream Union Free School District No. 13. Berman, in support of his request, alleged that that Dr. Chiachiere ignored, and has permitted district officers to ignore, the requirements of the State Freedom of Information Law (Public Officers Law §§84-90) (usually referred to as “FOIL”) and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (see 20 USC §1681 et seq.).
The Commissioner said that Berman’s complaints involving alleged violations of FOIL requests in January 2006, must be dismissed because §89 of the Public Officers Law vests exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging FOIL violations in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Accordingly, alleged FOIL violations may not be adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner.
Similarly, the Commissioner said that he did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate Title IX claims.
However, the Commissioner said that there was one additional administrative matter to consider in connection with Berman’s appeal -- Dr. Chiachiere’s request that the Commissioner grant him a certificate of good faith pursuant to Education Law §3811(1).
Granting such a certificate would allow the school board to indemnify Dr. Chiachiere for legal fees and expenses he incurred in defending a proceeding arising out of the exercise of his powers or performance of his duties as a member and, or, president of the board.
The Commissioner said that “[i]t is appropriate to issue such certification unless it is established on the record that the requesting board member acted in bad faith. Finding no evidence of bad faith on the part of Dr. Chiachiere in record before him, the Commission ruled that Dr. Chiachiere was entitled to receive a certificate of good faith.
Discontinuing General Municipal Law Section 207-c disability benefits
Discontinuing General Municipal Law Section 207-c disability benefits
Gamma v Bloom, 274 AD2d 14
In Gamma, the Appellate Division concluded that an agreement negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law can set out the controlling procedures for resolving disputes concerning Section 207-c benefits, including resolving any dispute concerning light duty assignments and the continuation of such benefits through arbitration.
City of Newburgh police officer Stephen J. Gamma suffered a line-of-duty back injury in June 1996. Newburgh approved his claim for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law Section 207-c.
A year later Gamma was examined by a Newburgh police surgeon and found fit to perform light duty. Gamma reported to his light duty assignment as directed but he left work before the completion of his first shift, complaining of pain and fatigue.
When Gamma, contending that he was still disabled, failed to return to work following his initial reporting for light duty, Newburgh terminated his Section 207-c effective June 21, 1997. The City placed Gamma on sick leave and his absence charged to his leave accruals.
Effective October 22, 1997, Gamma’s Section 207-c benefits were restored to him. Gamma, however, sued, contending that he was entitled to benefits for the period June 21, 1997, through and including October 21, 1997.
Gamma argued that Newburgh improperly discontinued his Section 207-c benefits in violation of due process because it did not give him any pre-termination due process hearing. A New York Supreme Court judge directed Newburgh to (1) restore his Section 207-c benefits and, (2) recredit Gamma with any accumulated sick leave credits that Gamma had used to remain on the payroll.
Newburgh challenged the court’s ruling, claiming that Gamma had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because the collective bargaining agreement between the PBA and Newburgh mandated arbitration of any dispute over continuing Section 207-c benefits.
The City argued that the issues of Gamma’s qualification for light duty, the restoration of his sick leave credits and the reinstatement of his Section 207-c benefits should have been submitted to arbitration.
The PBA, on the other hand, asked the Appellate Division to affirm the lower court’s ruling, contending that Gamma could bring his Article 78 action because the collective bargaining agreement merely preserved Gamma’s rights under the statute and that he had the option of proceeding by way of arbitration or judicial review.
The Appellate Division said no, holding that Newburgh was correct -- arbitration was the only means available to Gamma if he wished to contest Newburgh’s decision.
The court declined to consider the merits of the issue, holding that the arbitrator had to resolve those issues as mandated by the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
The relevant contract provision provides that [i]f the [Union] and the Chief of Police fail to agree on an on-the-job injury or continuation of, then both sides agree to send the issue to grievance arbitration.
Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, whether Gamma remained disabled within the meaning of Section 207-c, and whether the collective bargaining agreement required arbitration prior to the termination of benefits, are issues for the arbitrator to resolve.
The court also indicated that disability benefits payable to police officers pursuant to Section 207-c, once awarded, are a property interest that may not be terminated without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals in Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes Local 2562, v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, addressed this issue, clarifying the requirements of due process in terminating such benefits under the procedures set forth under the statute, which include the ability to seek judicial review pursuant to CPLR article 78.
This, however, said the Appellate Division, did not mean that a union and an employer could not agree to follow different procedures in resolving disputes concerning Section 207-c matters, including the termination of Section 207-c disability benefits.
Finding that the collective bargaining agreement did not provide Gamma with the option of seeking arbitration or, in the alternative, judicial review, the court held that prior to the exhaustion of the contractual remedy of arbitration, judicial relief pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not warranted.
The court decided that the questions raised by Gamma must be submitted to arbitration as that was the exclusive remedy available to him under the collective bargaining agreement.
In another case involving essentially the same parties, Gamma v Ferrara, 274 AD2d 479, decided on the same day, the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed the issue of the reinstatement of the payment of Section 207-c benefits to Gamma pending receipt of an arbitration award.
This appeal concerned Newburgh’s petition pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to compel arbitration of Gamma’s Section 207-c claims.
The court said:
... because the continuation of Gamma’s General Municipal Law Section 207-c benefits during the pendency of the arbitration cannot be sustained as provisional relief granted pursuant to CPLR 7502(c), in that the failure to grant such relief will not render any subsequent arbitration award in Gamma’s favor ineffectual, the grant of such relief must be reversed. If Gamma prevails after arbitration, he will be entitled to reimbursement of all benefits found to have been improperly denied.
This means that if Newburgh elects to discontinue its payment of Section 207-c benefits to Gamma pending receipt of the arbitrator’s determination, Gamma must charge his absences to his leave accruals or be placed on leave without pay.
The same rationale would probably be applied in cases involving disputes arising under Section 207-a of the General Municipal Law. Section 207-c applies to law enforcement personnel injured in the line of duty while Section 207-a covers firefighters injured in the line of duty.
______________
General Municipal Law§§ 207-a and 207-c - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder. Click on http://section207.blogspot.com/
Gamma v Bloom, 274 AD2d 14
In Gamma, the Appellate Division concluded that an agreement negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law can set out the controlling procedures for resolving disputes concerning Section 207-c benefits, including resolving any dispute concerning light duty assignments and the continuation of such benefits through arbitration.
City of Newburgh police officer Stephen J. Gamma suffered a line-of-duty back injury in June 1996. Newburgh approved his claim for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law Section 207-c.
A year later Gamma was examined by a Newburgh police surgeon and found fit to perform light duty. Gamma reported to his light duty assignment as directed but he left work before the completion of his first shift, complaining of pain and fatigue.
When Gamma, contending that he was still disabled, failed to return to work following his initial reporting for light duty, Newburgh terminated his Section 207-c effective June 21, 1997. The City placed Gamma on sick leave and his absence charged to his leave accruals.
Effective October 22, 1997, Gamma’s Section 207-c benefits were restored to him. Gamma, however, sued, contending that he was entitled to benefits for the period June 21, 1997, through and including October 21, 1997.
Gamma argued that Newburgh improperly discontinued his Section 207-c benefits in violation of due process because it did not give him any pre-termination due process hearing. A New York Supreme Court judge directed Newburgh to (1) restore his Section 207-c benefits and, (2) recredit Gamma with any accumulated sick leave credits that Gamma had used to remain on the payroll.
Newburgh challenged the court’s ruling, claiming that Gamma had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because the collective bargaining agreement between the PBA and Newburgh mandated arbitration of any dispute over continuing Section 207-c benefits.
The City argued that the issues of Gamma’s qualification for light duty, the restoration of his sick leave credits and the reinstatement of his Section 207-c benefits should have been submitted to arbitration.
The PBA, on the other hand, asked the Appellate Division to affirm the lower court’s ruling, contending that Gamma could bring his Article 78 action because the collective bargaining agreement merely preserved Gamma’s rights under the statute and that he had the option of proceeding by way of arbitration or judicial review.
The Appellate Division said no, holding that Newburgh was correct -- arbitration was the only means available to Gamma if he wished to contest Newburgh’s decision.
The court declined to consider the merits of the issue, holding that the arbitrator had to resolve those issues as mandated by the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
The relevant contract provision provides that [i]f the [Union] and the Chief of Police fail to agree on an on-the-job injury or continuation of, then both sides agree to send the issue to grievance arbitration.
Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, whether Gamma remained disabled within the meaning of Section 207-c, and whether the collective bargaining agreement required arbitration prior to the termination of benefits, are issues for the arbitrator to resolve.
The court also indicated that disability benefits payable to police officers pursuant to Section 207-c, once awarded, are a property interest that may not be terminated without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court of Appeals in Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes Local 2562, v City of Cohoes, 94 NY2d 686, addressed this issue, clarifying the requirements of due process in terminating such benefits under the procedures set forth under the statute, which include the ability to seek judicial review pursuant to CPLR article 78.
This, however, said the Appellate Division, did not mean that a union and an employer could not agree to follow different procedures in resolving disputes concerning Section 207-c matters, including the termination of Section 207-c disability benefits.
Finding that the collective bargaining agreement did not provide Gamma with the option of seeking arbitration or, in the alternative, judicial review, the court held that prior to the exhaustion of the contractual remedy of arbitration, judicial relief pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not warranted.
The court decided that the questions raised by Gamma must be submitted to arbitration as that was the exclusive remedy available to him under the collective bargaining agreement.
In another case involving essentially the same parties, Gamma v Ferrara, 274 AD2d 479, decided on the same day, the Appellate Division, Second Department, addressed the issue of the reinstatement of the payment of Section 207-c benefits to Gamma pending receipt of an arbitration award.
This appeal concerned Newburgh’s petition pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules to compel arbitration of Gamma’s Section 207-c claims.
The court said:
... because the continuation of Gamma’s General Municipal Law Section 207-c benefits during the pendency of the arbitration cannot be sustained as provisional relief granted pursuant to CPLR 7502(c), in that the failure to grant such relief will not render any subsequent arbitration award in Gamma’s favor ineffectual, the grant of such relief must be reversed. If Gamma prevails after arbitration, he will be entitled to reimbursement of all benefits found to have been improperly denied.
This means that if Newburgh elects to discontinue its payment of Section 207-c benefits to Gamma pending receipt of the arbitrator’s determination, Gamma must charge his absences to his leave accruals or be placed on leave without pay.
The same rationale would probably be applied in cases involving disputes arising under Section 207-a of the General Municipal Law. Section 207-c applies to law enforcement personnel injured in the line of duty while Section 207-a covers firefighters injured in the line of duty.
______________
General Municipal Law§§ 207-a and 207-c - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder. Click on http://section207.blogspot.com/
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
CAUTION
Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL.
For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf.
Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law.
Email: publications@nycap.rr.com