Infringing on constitutionally protected speech

Infringing on constitutionally protected speech
Timothy M. Wrobel v County of Erie, CA2, 2007 WL. 186264

In reviewing Wrobel’s claim that Erie County had violated his right to free speech and association, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said:

1. Government employees who are not policymakers have the right not to affiliate with or support a particular party or faction as a condition of employment.

2. Conditioning public employment on the provision of support for the favored political party “unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association”.*

The court concluded, “When reasonable inferences are drawn in Wrobel’s favor, the amended complaint sufficiently alleges that Wrobel was retaliated against for his lack of political affiliation with, or his refusal to pledge his allegiance to, the new Erie County administration.”

The Circuit Court also noted that in Zelnik v. Fashion Institute of Technology, 464 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2006), it explained that “actionable retaliation” in the context of the First Amendment was employer actions that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker [from asserting First Amendment-protected rights]”.**

As to Wrobel’s claim that the County had violated his First Amendment free speech rights, the Circuit Court said that "While we agree with the District Court that Wrobel’s pre-transfer speech was not on a matter of public concern, and was therefore not constitutionally protected we do not agree with its conclusion that Wrobel had not sufficiently alleged actionable retaliation following his expression of protected speech.”

Wrobel alleged that “defendant Douglas Naylon implicated him as the perpetrator of a theft of government property shortly after Wrobel discussed the corruption and politicization of his place of employment with an FBI agent.” Wrobel also alleged that other county officials had bribed others to testify against him at an arbitration hearing shortly after he engaged in protected speech.

In Conrick v Myers, 461 US 1l38, the United States Supreme Court established a two-prong test with respect to claims of dismissal in retaliation for "whistle blowing." To win, the individual must prove that (1) his or her speech is protected, i.e., the speech was a matter of public concern, and (2) that the protected speech was a substantial factor in motivating the termination

These adverse actions, said the court, “are sufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation claim,” because Wrobel’s petition “sets forth the necessary nexus between [Wrobel’s] statements concerning a matter of public concern and the defendant[s’] subsequent alleged retaliatory acts.”

Essentially public officers and employees enjoy "protected speech" in connection with their public comments concerning a State or municipal employer's activities that are a matter of public concern.

In contrast, comments by a public officer or employee concerning his or her personal unhappiness with a public employer, such as complaints about working conditions or his or her personal disagreements concerning internal operations of the department or the agency that does not rise to the level of a “public interest,” do not appear to be protected by the Constitution.***

The decision is posted on the Internet at:  

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/01/freedom-of-association.html

* See also §107 of the Civil Service Law setting out certain prohibitions against certain political activities and improper influence.

** The court commented that monitoring of Wrobel’s phone calls, transfer of Wrobel to a faraway location, initiation of a criminal investigation against Wrobel, and other adverse actions alleged in the amended complaint—if proven true—would be sufficient to dissuade a reasonable worker from asserting his First Amendment rights. Wrobel, said the court, adequately alleges that the adverse actions were taken in retaliation for his protected associational activity.

*** See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, where the court held that a public employee’s speech was not constitutionally protected where the speech was “motivated by and dealt with her individual employment situation”.

Disciplinary penalty of dismissal sustained as consistent with the “Pell Doctrine”

Disciplinary penalty of dismissal sustained as consistent with the “Pell Doctrine”

In re Police Officer Ruben Olavarria, etc., v Raymond W. Kelly, as Police Commissioner of the City of New York, et al., 37 AD3d 191

The so-called Pell Doctrine frequently is cited as the standard against which a disciplinary penalty imposed on a public employee by the appointing authority is to be measured.*

In Olavarria, the Appellate Division affirmed the imposition of the penalty of dismissal on a New York City police officer found guilty of a number of alleged acts of misconduct, including assault, insubordination, being discourteous to superior officers, violating an order of protection, and being asleep on duty.

Ruling that it found no basis to question the credibility of the findings underlying holding that Olavarria was guilty of these charges, the Appellate Division said the “Under the circumstances, the penalty of dismissal does not shock the judicial conscience,” citing another leading decision addressing the imposition of the “ultimate” administrative disciplinary penalty, -- dismissal. Harp v New York City Police Dept., 96 NY2d 892.

For the full text of this decision, go to:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2007/02/penalty-of-dismissal-sustained.html

* Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222, a disciplinary penalty imposed by an appointing authority will not be overturned unless the court finds that it is shocking to one's sense of fairness.

A coda to "Request for reconsideration of a final administrative decision does not toll the running of the relevant statute of limitations"

A coda to "Request for reconsideration of a final administrative decision does not toll the running of the relevant statute of limitations"

Source: Administrative Law Professor Blog. Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2011, All rights reserved http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adminlaw/

“Important practice reminder

An important reminder that applies in most administrative jurisdictions: "Request for reconsideration of a final administrative decision does not toll the running of the relevant statute of limitations", on the New York Public Personnel Law blog. Neither do settlement negotiations or even (sometimes) administrative appeals. And, as in the case discussed in [another post*], the statutes of limitations for judicial review of administrative decision are often very short (four months for a personnel decision in this case). In my practice days, one of the first research tasks I set myself when taking on an administrative matter was "how many days do I have to take this to the Court of Appeals if it goes south?" Or north, as the case may be. Just in case.

“And typically the S/L is measured from the promulgation of a "final" order. When is "final" in this context in this jurisdiction? Do you know?” 

* Dean Patty Salkin (Albany Law School) describes such a situation in "Fed. Dist. Court Prevents Performing Arts Center From Relocating to Dilapidated Historic Warehouse" on her Law of the Land blog: 

Edward M. McClure

Malpractice in disciplinary actions

Malpractice in disciplinary actions

Tinelli v Redl, CA2, 199 F.3d 603, Affd. 121 S.Ct. 47

After being found guilty of disciplinary charges, an individual decides to sue his or her attorney, contending that the lawyer’s action, or failure to act, in the disciplinary hearing or an appeal constituted malpractice.

In the Tinelli case, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit considered such a malpractice claim. The decision sets out a test for determining if there is a basis for such an action against the attorney.

Joseph Tinelli was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law. He retained an attorney, Frank Redl, to represent him in the matter. Following a two-day hearing, the hearing officer found Tinelli guilty of three charges of “misconduct and incompetence.”

The appointing authority adopted the findings of the hearing officer and imposed the penalty recommended by the hearing officer: termination.

Tinelli appealed. According to the decision, Redl failed to take any “further action ... after the initial filing of the petition for Tinelli’s appeal” in New York State Supreme Court. As a result, six months later Tinelli’s “appeal expired.”

Tinelli sued Redl, contending that the attorney’s (1) failure to perfect the Article 78 appeal and (2) his failure to ask the court for an extension of time to perfect the appeal, constituted malpractice.

He also charged that Redl’s performance at the administrative disciplinary hearing constituted malpractice.

The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decided that whether or not Redl’s handling the appeal constituted malpractice depended on whether or not Tinelli’s appeal would have been successful. In other words, if Tinelli would not have won the appeal regardless of the action or inaction of his attorney, there was no basis for holding the attorney liable for malpractice.

After reviewing the record, the circuit court said that “Tinelli’s appeal would not have succeeded because the hearing officer’s findings of misconduct and incompetence were supported by substantial evidence and because there was no abuse of discretion in recommending Tinelli’s termination under the circumstances.”

The court dismissed Tinelli’s claim, holding that his attorney could not be held liable for malpractice because he failed to perfect the appeal since Tinelli would not have been able to overturn either the administrative disciplinary determination or the penalty imposed.

As to Tinelli’s claim that “Redl’s poor performance at the administrative hearings constituted malpractice,” Redl’s motion for summary judgment dismissing this allegation was also granted.

Mandatory subjects of negotiations

Mandatory subjects of negotiations

Carmel PBA v PERB, 267 AD2d 858

The Carmel PBA case involves a “legal interpretation” made by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board [PERB].

The Appellate Division ruled that the administrative agency’s determination would be upheld if it is not affected by an error of law, is neither arbitrary nor capricious, and does not constitute abuse of discretion.

The case arose when PERB ruled that Town of Carmel’s changing an “early vacation procedure” was a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining. The PBA challenged PERB’s decision, claiming that in addition to being arbitrary and capricious and against the substantial weight of the evidence, the ruling constituted “an error of law.”

Carmel had in place a scheme for selecting vacation to be taken during the year -- “vacation picks.” PBA members could select their vacation before the beginning of the year in which vacation time is to be taken (“early vacation picks”) or during the year prior to the taking of the requested vacation time (“later vacation picks”). In addition, a “minimum staffing level rule” required that at least four police officers be assigned to patrol shift.

The Town changed the “staffing” requirements to be observed in selecting vacations in October 1995. The new procedure:

1. Barred the “overlap of vacations” by police officers and sergeants on the same tour; and

2. If the department had only one lieutenant, the chief of police, lieutenant and/or sergeant could not “overlap [their respective] vacations.”

PBA filed an improper practice charge with PERB contending that the Town violated Section 209-a(1)(d) of the Civil Service Law when it unilaterally imposed the new policy.

Initially, PERB deferred its consideration of the charge because a grievance arbitration concerning the matter was pending.

The arbitrator ruled that the parties’ 1994 agreement’s provision concerning vacation selection did not apply after 1995. After the arbitrator’s issued the award, PERB accepted jurisdiction and addressed the merits of the PBA’s petition.

PERB decided that “the vacation selection procedure was necessarily and “inextricably entwined with the Town’s staffing determination.” This, it held, meant that it was not a mandatory subject of negotiation. The PBA appealed.

The Appellate Division commenced its review by pointing out that while “the refusal of public employers to negotiate in good faith with recognized employee organizations concerning the terms and conditions of employment constitutes an improper employment practice within the meaning of Section 209-a,” not all terms and conditions of employment are subject to mandatory negotiation.

What is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining?

The court said that PERB has the authority to make this determination and so long as its “interpretation is legally permissible and * * * there is no breach of constitutional rights and protections, the courts have no power to substitute another interpretation.”

Accordingly, said the court, PERB’s determination that the Town’s policy prohibiting certain overlaps of vacation was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law must be confirmed.

In explaining its ruling the Appellate Division cited International Assn. of Firefighters of City of Newburgh, Local 589 v Helsby, 59 AD2d 342, 345, leave to appeal denied, 43 NY2d 649.

In that decision the court held that the number of employees the municipality will hire “is clearly a basic policy decision to be made solely by the municipal governing body as to the allocation of its resources and the extent and quality of fire protection to be provided by the [municipality] for its citizenry.”

How does this impact on the PBA’s claim that the Town should be required to negotiate the policy change? The Appellate Division’s answer:

Since the Town’s determination to increase its minimum staffing level is clearly a basic policy question for it to make, to hold that here is a duty to bargain the early approval of overlapping vacations is incompatible with the Town’s managerial prerogative to set and change minimum staffing levels at the employer’s discretion.

Finding that PERB’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious or based on an error of law, the Appellate Division dismissed the PBA’s appeal.