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October 14, 2011

Employee found guilty of being AWOL when he absented himself from work notwithstanding disapproval of his request for a leave without pay to take a family vacation

Employee found guilty of being AWOL when he absented himself from work notwithstanding disapproval of his request for a leave without pay to take a family vacation
OATH Index No. 1997/11

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey sustained a charge that a highway repairer, K.M., was AWOL for 16 days without obtaining approval for absenting himself from work.

K.M. had assumed that his request for unpaid leave would be granted and he made reservations and paid for family vacation to Nigeria. When his request was denied because he had a poor attendance record and no available leave balance, K.M. decided to go on the trip anyway, presumably because the reservation was “non-refundable”.

In light of K.M.’s “long unblemished work record,” Judge Casey recommended the penalty of a ten-day suspension for the proven AWOL charges.

ALJ Casey, however, dismissed another AWOL charge where the evidence showed that K.M. took emergency leave to drive his wife to the hospital so she could see her seriously ill brother even though his request for the leave was denied. K.M. submitted a note from the hospital upon his return to work about this exceptional life and death situation.

Finally, Judge Casey dismissed “An excessive lateness charge” failed against K.M., finding that the agency did not place him on notice that his lateness would result in discipline. K.M. was late 10 times in 14 months, but four of those latenesses were less than ten minutes each. Thus, Judge Casey ruled that the agency’s failure to comply with the notice provisions in the citywide lateness policy was prejudicial.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-1997.pdf

Determining the distribution of a divorced pubic employee’s retirement allowance


Determining the distribution of a divorced pubic employee’s retirement allowance
Bodolato v Bodolato, Supreme Court, Judge Mills [subsequent appeal withdrawn, 305 A.D.2d 1124]

An individual's public pension benefit is a "marital asset" under New York State Law. Accordingly, it sometimes becomes necessary to determine the value of the pension and, or, the annuity available to a public employee in the course of a divorce action.

In Bodolato v Bodolato both parties conceded that each was entitled to one-half of the value of New York City police officer Bodolato's pension benefits and deferred annuity. But establishing the value of Bodolato's pension benefits and annuity proved to be another matter.

Mrs. Bodolato contended that she was entitled to one-half of the value of Bodolato's New York City Police Department pension and deferred annuity based on its value as of the date she commenced her action for divorce. Her spouse, in contrast, argued that the value of his pension and annuity should be determined on the basis of the pension's and annuity's "market or present value" at the time of the trial -- now several years later -- in order "to avoid [Mrs. Bodolato getting] a windfall."

In support of her claim, Mrs. Bodolato cited Majauskas v Majauskas 61 NY2d 481. Officer Bodolato, on the other hand, argued that the court's ruling in Burgio v Burgio, 278 AD2d 767, set out proper standard to be applied in this situation.

Justice Mills observed that there was a significant difference between the situation in Burgio and the situation in the Bodolato action for divorce. In Burgio the plaintiff wanted a lump sum payment of pension funds that had not yet vested. Here, in contrast, Bodolato had retired from the NYPD and thus, said the court, his pension and annuity benefits have been determined.

Mrs. Bodolato had commenced her divorce action before her husband had actually retired from the Police Department. Accordingly, Justice Mills ruled that the formula set by the Court of Appeals in Majauskas controlled and thus the value of the pension and the annuity to which Mrs. Bodolato was entitled should be determined:

1. As of the date of the commencement of the divorce action by Mrs. Bodolato; and

2. In accordance with the following "Majauskas formula."

The "percentage [of Bodolato's retirement and annuity allowance] to be derived by dividing the number of months the parties were married before the commencement of the action [divided] by the total number of months of credit [Bodolato] will have earned toward his pension as of the date of [his] retirement."

If nothing else, the Bodolato decision demonstrates the complex issues that the parties may experience in attempting to establish the value of an individual's retirement benefit in order to determine the "marital distribution" of the benefit in a divorce proceeding. If the marital distribution determination involves an individual entitled to a "vested retirement allowance" -- i.e., the individual has not actually retired but is entitled to "pension and annuity benefits" upon retirement -- there may be even more complex issues to address and resolve.

Duty of fair representation


Duty of fair representation
Bruns and Council 82, 35 PERB 2023

Unit member's dissatisfaction with his or her representation by the union in a grievance that resulted in a negotiated settlement rather than proceeding to arbitration, did not, without more, establish a prima facie case that the union breached its duty of fair representation as a member's "disagreement with the tactics utilized or his or her dissatisfaction with the quality and extent of representation" does not constitute a breach of the union's duty of fair representation. 

Union did not violate its duty of fair representation when union representative recommended that employer file disciplinary action


Union did not violate its duty of fair representation when union representative recommended that employer file disciplinary action
Mtr. of Donaldson and the UFT, et al., PERB case U-24893

PERB affirmed the decision of the ALJ dismissing the charge that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act when a UFT representative advised a Local Instructional Superintendent to initiate disciplinary charges against Donaldson, a negotiating unit member, and that the District violated §209-a.1(a) when it miscalculated his years of service, failed to approve his line-of-duty injury designation and issued an unsatisfactory performance evaluation.

PERB found that the settlement agreement Donaldson signed that provided for his resignation and the dropping of the Education Law §3020-a charges brought by the District against him waived his right to file a charge alleging that the District miscalculated his years of service. 

October 13, 2011

Out of title work assignments


Out of title work assignments
Murphy v Herik, NYS Supreme Court [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

Out-of-title work usually refers to an employer assigning an individual to perform the duties of the incumbent of different, typically higher level, position. Section 61.2 of the Civil Service Law provides that:

Prohibition against out-of-title work. No person shall be appointed, promoted or employed under any title not appropriate to the duties to be performed and, except upon assignment by proper authority during the continuance of a temporary emergency situation, no person shall be assigned to perform the duties of any position unless he has been duly appointed, promoted, transferred or reinstated to such position in accordance with the provisions of this chapter and the rules prescribed thereunder. No credit shall be granted in a promotion examination for out-of-title work.

Many collective bargaining agreements require that if the employer assigns an individual to perform "out-of-title" work for more than a designated period of time, he or she is to be compensated at the appropriate pay level of the higher position.

Detailing is used to describe a form of assigning an individual to perform "out-of-title" frequently encountered in law enforcement organizations. Its most common manifestation: assigning a police patrol officer to perform the duties of a detective or investigator. Officers detailed to perform the duties of a detective or an investigator typically are not permanently appointed to the position. Section 58.4.c(ii) of the Civil Service Law was enacted to address this practice and provides that:

In any jurisdiction, other than a city with a population of one million or more, which does not administer examinations for designation to detective or investigator, any person who has received permanent appointment to the position of police officer or deputy sheriff and is temporarily assigned to perform the duties of detective or investigator shall, whenever such assignment to the duties of a detective or investigator exceeds eighteen months, be permanently designated as a detective or investigator and receive the compensation ordinarily paid to persons in such designation.

By its terms, Section 58.4.c(11) does not cover New York City police officers. However, Section 14-103(b)(2) of the City's Administrative Code tracks Section 58.4.c[ii] and provides that a "permanent police officer who temporarily perform the functions of what is otherwise considered to be detective work for periods of 18 months or more are to be appointed as detectives and be compensated as such."

Michael Murphy, a New York City police officer, was assigned to the Harbor Unit, Vessel Theft Team. His duties included the investigation of stolen marine equipment; returning stolen property to its rightful owner and maintaining a working relationship with insurance companies for the purpose of identifying insurance fraud. After he had been performing these duties for over three years, Murphy's commanding officer, John Cassidy, recommended that Murphy be appointed to third-grade detective. Cassidy's justification for his recommendation: Murphy's primary responsibilities were those of a detective.

The Department rejected Cassidy's recommendation and Murphy filed a grievance challenging its decision. The Department denied Murphy's grievance and he commenced an Article 78 proceeding in March of 2001 seeking a court order directing his appointment as a detective.

The Department asked the court to dismiss Murphy's petition. It contended that its rejecting Murphy's appointment as a detective was justified because the Harbor Unit was specifically excluded from the career-path for detective by a lawful Department policy. Accordingly, the Department argued, Murphy can not be deemed to have been performing detective work as part of the Harbor Unit and therefore he was not eligible for appointment as a detective pursuant to Section 14-103(b) (2) of the Code.

The Department also contended that Murphy was aware of the fact that the Harbor Unit was not on the career path for detective when he accepted the assignment.

Murphy, on the other hand, contended that he was eligible for appointment as a detective pursuant to the Code, citing Ryff v Safir, 264 AD2d 349, as authority for this claim. In Ryff, the Appellate Division ruled that the fact that the Harbor Unit was not included in the Department's career-path for detective did not exempt it from the provisions of Administrative Code Section 14-103(b)(2).

Supreme Court Justice was to prevent the department rejected the Department's argument that appointment as a detective does not depend on the actual work performed but rather on whether or not the position is on the career path for detective. Justice Madden said that the legislative intent in both Section 58.4 of the Civil Service Law and Section 14-103(b)(2) of the City's Administrative Code "was to prevent the department, for budgetary reasons, from using non-detective track officers in detective track positions, while denying the officers the benefit of those positions."

In effect, the court decided that the Department's justification for its action placed form over substance. As Murphy's duties were substantially similar to that of detective, Justice Madden ruled that Murphy was entitled to appointment as a detective pursuant to Section 14-103(b)(2). Justice Madden pointed out that there was no dispute concerning Murphy's performing criminal investigative duties, noting that Murphy was awarded "Investigator of the Year" from the International Association of Marine Investigators.

Deciding that Department's ruling that Murphy was precluded from being appointed as detective simply because his position was not included in its designated "career path" for detectives was arbitrary and capricious, Justice Madden granted Murphy's petition and, in addition, ruled that Murphy was entitled to compensation as a detective beginning 18 months subsequent to his original appointment to the Harbor Unit.

The lesson of the Murphy decision is that employees may not be required to perform out-of-title duties except in cases involving a temporary emergency. If they are assigned, or permitted, to perform out-of-title duties when there is no temporary emergency, the employer may be held liable to pay any resulting salary differential.

One of the administrative procedures available to an individual who believes that he or she is being to required to perform higher level "out-of-title" work is to request that his or her position be reclassified to the higher level title -- i.e., a position allocated to a higher salary grade.

This is usually accomplished by filing a request for reclassification of the position with the responsible civil service commission or department.

The employer, also, may initiate a request for reclassification of a position. In some cases, the employer and the employee may file a "joint" application to have the position reclassified. Concerning a related point, classification and reclassification of a position focuses on the duties of a position while allocation or reallocation of a position is concerned with placing the position in the proper pay grade or setting its appropriate salary rate.

However, approval of an "out-of-title" reclassification application does not mean the individual has the right to be continued in the reclassified title. If a position in the competitive class is reclassified, the individual will have to qualify for permanent appointment to the new title by examination, despite the fact that he or she had been "performing the duties of the higher level position" and was instrumental in having it reclassified. The same applies with respect to qualifying for appointment to a higher level position in the noncompetitive class following reclassification of the lower level position.

In some instances this could result in the individual's being "reclassified out of his or her job." Some modest protections, however, may be available to the individual whose position has been reclassified to avoid this result, at least temporarily. For example, insofar as "employees of the State" are concerned, the State Civil Service Commission's Rules, [4 NYCRR 4.1(d) provide that:

A promotion eligible list shall not be certified for filling a permanent vacancy created by upward reclassification of a permanently encumbered position where promotion from such list would require the layoff of a permanent employee or the reassignment of a permanent employee to a different geographical location; but this provision shall not apply if the incumbent whose position was reclassified has, following such reclassification, twice failed to qualify for promotion to the reclassified position.

4 NYCRR 4.1(e) which applies to employees in the classified service of the State and public authorities, public benefit corporations and other agencies for which the Civil Service Law is administered by the State Department of Civil Service, provides similar protections with respect to the certification and use of an open competitive eligible list.

Many municipal civil service commissions have adopted similar rules.*

In another New York City Police Department [NYPD] "service as a detective" case, Finelli v Bratton, 298 A.D.2d 197, the issue was whether it was arbitrary and capricious for NYPD to determine that service by former Transit Authority [TAPD] police officer Nicholas G. Finelli did not qualify as "detective track" service.

According to the decision, such credit was properly denied since it was not established that Finelli performed investigative duties comparable to those performed in units given a detective track status after the TAPD's merger with the NYPD. In addition, the court said that detective track credit was properly refused for periods during which police officers were suspended from duty or on restricted, limited or modified duty.
 
* The Rules of the State Civil Service Commission specifically provide that "[e]xcept as otherwise specified in any particular rule, these rules shall apply to positions and employments in the classified service of the State and public authorities, public benefit corporations and other agencies for which the Civil Service Law is administered by the State Department of Civil Service” [4 NYCR 1.1]. However, rules adopted by a local commission or personnel officer are subject to the approval of the State Civil Service Commission [see generally Civil Service Law §20].

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard [See also https://www.linkedin.com/in/harvey-randall-9130a5178/]. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com