From the Office of the State Comptroller:

From the Office of the State Comptroller:

State Comptroller warns of lottery scam
On February 3, 2012 New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli issued a warning of a lottery scam involving mail containing fraudulent checks that appear to have been issued by New York State. “An offer of easy money is usually too good to be true and that is the case here.” DiNapoli said.

For additional information, click on http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb12/020312.htm

Audits of municipalities issued during the week ending February 3, 2012

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli’s office this week released the following audits: the Town of Avon; the Village of Granville; the Village of Hamilton; the Village of Monticello; the Village of Port Jefferson; and, the Clifton–Fine Central School District. Click on the name of the jurisdiction to access the Comptroller's audit report.

Property Tax Cap filing requirements

New York State’s property tax cap, effective for local fiscal years beginning in 2012 and for the 2012-13 school year limits annual increases in the total amount of property taxes local governments and school districts can levy to either 2 percent or the rate of inflation, whichever is less, with some limited exceptions. For information, visit www.osc.state.ny.us and click the “Real Property Tax Cap Information” link, or call the State Comptroller’s Office at (518) 473-0006.

Raising a “triable issue of fact” precludes the granting of summary judgment in an action alleging unlawful retaliation

Raising a “triable issue of fact” precludes the granting of summary judgment in an action alleging unlawful retaliation

Delrio v City of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op 00747, Appellate Division, Second Department

German Delrio sued the City of New York seeking to recover damages for alleged unlawful retaliation in violation of §8-107 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York

Although Supreme Court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss Delrio’s complaint; the Appellate Division reversed the decision “on the law,” setting out the events leading to its ruling as follows:

Delrio filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights [SDHR] alleging that the New York City Fire Department [NYFD] engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice relating to employment, in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law, because of his sex.

SDHR determined that there was no probable cause to believe that NYFD had engaged in the unlawful discriminatory practice complained of, and dismissed Delrio’s complaint.

Delrio than asked the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, [EEOC] to review his allegations. EEOC ultimately decided to adopt the findings of the SDHR.

Delrio than commenced an action against the City of New York and four FDNY Officers to recover damages for alleged unlawful retaliation in violation of Administrative Code of the City of New York §8-107.

The Appellate Division explained that in order to make out an unlawful retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that "(1) [he or she] has engaged in protected activity, (2) [his or her] employer was aware that [he or she] participated in such activity, (3) [he or she] suffered an adverse employment action based upon [his or her] activity, and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action."

If the plaintiff “has met this initial burden, the burden then shifts to defendants to present legitimate, independent and nondiscriminatory reasons to support their actions.”

If defendants meet this burden, plaintiff then is required to show that the reasons put forth by defendants “were merely a pretext."

In order to establish its entitlement to summary judgment in a retaliation case, a defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie claim of retaliation or, having offered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the challenged actions, that there exists no triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant's explanations were pretextual.

In this instance, said the court, while the City defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting nonretaliatory business reasons for the challenged actions, Delrio raised triable issues of fact as to whether the reasons given by the City defendants were pretextual.

The Appellate Division pointed out that Delrio had submitted an affirmation from his immediate supervisor wherein she stated that a reassignment of Delrio “violated FDNY internal procedure as well as known past practice.” Further, said the court, the record shows a “strong temporal correlation between [Delrio’s] protected activity, i.e., his involvement in the SDHR administrative complaint process, and the [City's] allegedly retaliatory actions.”

Concluding that Delrio had offered sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons put forth by the City were merely pretextual, the City defendants were not entitled to a summary judgment dismissing Delrio’s complaint.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_00747.htm

A ten-day suspension without pay recommended after employee is found guilty of refusing to comply with her supervisor’s instruction

A ten-day suspension without pay recommended after employee is found guilty of refusing to comply with her supervisor’s instruction

Human Resources Administration v Traylor, OATH Index #2162/11

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ingrid M. Addison found a clerical employee to be insubordinate when she refused her supervisor’s request to make corrections to ten cases records. 

Traylor's defense: She had  told the supervisor that despite her initials on the records, they were not her cases and "insisted that [her initials] must have been inserted by someone else." 

Ultimately another employee had to make the corrections.

Judge Addison rejected the employee’s contention that the supervisor’s failure to use the word “order” or “command” when she asked Traylor to make the corrections.

The ALJ explaining that “Even if [Traylor] had not worked on the cases originally, she did not have a legitimate excuse for disobeying the directive," recommended that Traylor be suspended without pay for ten days.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-2162.pdf

Liquidation of leave credits upon separation

Liquidation of leave credits upon separation

A NYPPL reader asked for some citations to court decisions that address the liquidation of an individual’s claimed leave credits upon his or her separation from his or her employment.

Among such rulings in NYPPL's  files are the following:

Payment for unused vacation and sick leave.
Boakye-Yiadom v Roosevelt Union Free School Dist., 25 Misc 3d 1226(A), [see http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2007/2007_52657.htm ];

Payment for unused vacation, sick, and terminal leave pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-m 

Garrigan v Incorporated Vil. of Malverne, 59 AD3d 662, [see  http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2009/2009_01441.htm ];

Payment accrued unused compensatory, vacation and sick time pursuant to §207-m of the General Municipal Law upon separation 

Hauptman v Village of Elmira Hgts., 23 Misc 3d 439, [see

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2004/2004_24572.htm];

Including a retirement incentive payment  in the administrator's five-year final average salary for the purposes of determining the individual's retirement allowance 

Matter of Curra v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 18 Misc 3d 1144(A), [see http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2005/2005_52354.htm ]; Sustained 30 AD3d 666 http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_04216.htm 

Including salary increases and other compensation received prior to retirement in determining the three-year final average salary for the purposes of computing the individual's retirement allowance 

Matter of Palandra v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 27 Misc 3d 1214(A)], [see http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_50735.htm],

Affirmed 84 AD3d http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_04357.htm

Right to counsel in an administrative disciplinary hearing

Right to counsel in an administrative disciplinary hearing
Matter of Elmore v Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District, Board of Education, 273 A.D.2d 307

The Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District terminated the employee following an administrative disciplinary hearing held pursuant to Education Law §3020-a.

The employee appealed the dismissal, contending that the Hearing Officer’s ruling unfairly denied him his right to counsel during the hearing when the Hearing Officer ruled that the employee could not discuss his “cross-examination testimony” with his attorney during any adjournments in the proceding.*

The Supreme Court agreed and granted the employee’s petition to vacate the School District’s decision to terminate his employment.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, noting that under Education Law §3020-a(3)(c)(i), a teacher facing disciplinary charges shall have the right to be represented by counsel at any hearing held on those charges.

The court explained that while it was mindful that teacher disciplinary proceedings are not criminal actions, it was equally mindful that a tenured teacher has a protected property interest in his position which raises due process considerations when a teacher is faced with termination of his employment.

Noting that New York courts have disapproved similar prohibitions forbidding a defendant from discussing his trial testimony with his attorney for all but brief periods of time, the Appellate Division ruled that “In view of the due process considerations involved when a tenured teacher is threatened with termination of his employment, this is a sound approach, particularly in the instant case, where the time period involved was 10 weeks.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that the Supreme Court did not err in vacating the award and directing a new hearing.

* The cross-examination of the employee was conducted during five days which extended over a period of 10 weeks.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://weblinks.westlaw.com/result/default.aspx?cfid=1&cnt=DOC&db=NY-ORCS-WEB&eq=search&fmqv=c&fn=_top&method=TNC&n=11&origin=Search&query=%2205738%22&rlt=CLID_QRYRLT6702424942&rltdb=CLID_DB921112324942&rlti=1&rp=%2Fsearch%2Fdefault.wl&rs=NYOFF1.0&service=Search&sp=NYOFF-1000&srch=TRUE&ss=CNT&sskey=CLID_SSSA991112324942&tempinfo=word&vr=2.0