The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction explained

The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction explained 

Razzano v Remsenburg-Speonk UFSD, 2012 NY Slip Op 04178, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Board of Education of Remsenburg-Speonk UFSD reclassified Janice Razzano’s from a full-time position to a part-time position. Razzano filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a court order compelling Board to reinstate Razzano to her former full-time position.

Razzano alleged that the reclassification of her position from full-time to part-time was undertaken in retaliation for various complaints she had made regarding alleged hazardous health conditions in the school building in which she worked. She also contended that school district improperly attempting to circumvent tenure rules by engaging the services of “an outside contractor to undertake the job responsibilities that she had previously undertaken” when she was employed full-time.*

Supreme Court dismissed Razzano’s on the ground that primary jurisdiction over the dispute lies with the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education. The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings.

Supreme Court had based its denial of the petition and dismissed the proceeding, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, i.e., (1) the Commissioner has the specialized knowledge and expertise necessary to resolve the factual question of whether an independent contractor assumed some of the responsibilities of Razzano, who held tenure in the position, and (2) whether the school district's conduct in reclassifying Razzano‘s full-time position to a part-time position was undertaken in good faith.

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court erred in dismissing Razzano’s petition on basis of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court explained that "The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that [w]here the courts and an administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute involving issues beyond the conventional experience of judges . . . the court will stay its hand until the agency has applied its expertise to the salient questions," citing Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 35.

The doctrine, said the court, is applied whenever a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play “whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body.” In such situations the judicial process is suspended, rather than being dismissed, pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.

In this instance, said the Appellate Division, the crux of Razzano’s threshold claim is that the reclassification and subsequent "excessing" of her employment from her full-time position and her “reinstatement” to a part-time position was undertaken in bad faith in that it was effected in retaliation for her engagement in a protected activity, in violation of the New York State Public Sector Whistleblower Law (see Civil Service Law §75-b).

In addition, Razzano contended that the school district’s "purported rationale was a fiction, and was not an issue within the Commissioner's special competence.”

The Appellate Division agreed, ruling that in light of the nature of Razzano’s allegations, Supreme Court should have retained jurisdiction to decide her claim of retaliation. Thus, said the court, the matter must be remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings on that branch of the petition alleging that the reclassification of Razzano’s position was undertaken in bad faith and, thus, constituted an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

As to next steps, the Appellate Division explained that:

1. If the Supreme Court ultimately determines that Razzano’s employment was reclassified in bad faith, she is entitled to reinstatement.

2. If the Supreme Court ultimately determines that Razzano’s position was not reclassified in bad faith, then it would be proper for the Supreme Court to refer the remaining issues raised by the petition to the Commissioner for determination of questions arising under Education Law §3012, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

* Razzano had also filed administrative petitions with the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education pursuant to Education Law §310 challenging the district's decision to reclassify her position as a part-time position.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04178.htm

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Serving notices by mail

Serving notices by mail

Cook v Village of Greene, 2012 NY Slip Op 04264, Appellate Division, Third Department

This decision by the Appellate Division sets out a number of points concerning effectively serving a notice to an individual to appear for a General Municipal Law §50-h when sending such a notice by mail.

The Village of Greene served a demand for examination by certified mail to the address verified by Wayne C. Cook in his notice of claim as his address. Cook failed to appear for the examination, but subsequently commenced an action against the Village and others. The Village moved to dismiss the action asserting, among other things, Cook's failure to attend the General Municipal Law §50-h examination.

The Appellate Division said that complying with a proper request for an examination pursuant to General Municipal Law §50-h is a condition precedent and failure to comply, absent exceptional circumstances, generally is a ground for dismissal of the action.

General Municipal Law §50-h [2] provides that certified mail is authorized manner of notifying a litigant not represented by an attorney to appear for an examination and the Village’s motion papers included a duly executed affidavit of service. The court noted that "A properly executed affidavit of service raises a presumption that a proper mailing occurred."

The Village, however, did not send the notice with a return receipt requested. Although the Appellate Division commented that a “return receipt” is not required by the statute as a general rule sending the notice "certified mail, return receipt requested" or "registered mail, return receipt requested," is viewed as appropriate and desirable.

Other provisions of law may authorize the delivery of certain notices by mail.

For example, Civil Service Law §76.1 provides that a §75 disciplinary determination is to be delivered “personally or by registered mail to the last known address of such person” while Education Law §3020-a provides that disciplinary charges shall be served on an educator “by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested or by personal delivery to the employee.”

The decision if posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04264.htm

Selected Rulings posted by PERB – A question of jurisdiction

Selected Rulings posted by PERB – A question of jurisdiction

United Federation of Teachers and the Board Of Education of the City School District of the City of New York, PERB U-28996

Although the Board dismissed exceptions filed by the employee after finding that she did not timely serve her exceptions upon UFT and the School District pursuant §213.2(a) of the Rules of Procedure, it noted that had it addressed the merits of her exceptions it would have dismissed them as PERB “does not have authority to determine alleged violations of Education Law §3020-a, or alleged violations of the terms of an unexpired agreement.”

Employee’s ADA claim for damages survives promotion to a higher grade position

Employee’s ADA claim for damages survives promotion to a higher grade position
Matter of Jochelman v New York State Banking Dept., 56 AD3d 375

After the New York State Banking Department denied Irving Jochelman a promotion to the position of Principal Bank Examiner I, Jochelman sued

Supreme Court granted Banking’s motion to dismiss his petition because Jochelman had been given the promotion underlying his complaint prior to his appeal, which also had the effect of “rendering moot that portion of his complaint seeking back pay.”

The Appellate Division, however, reversed the lower court’s dismissal of Jochelman’s petition “as a matter of law” explaining that his complaint also sought damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Reinstating Jochelman’s ADA claim, but dismissing the remainder of his appeal as moot, the court explained that Jochelman's “separate claim for damages related to [Banking’s] allegedly discriminatory behavior has not been rendered moot by [Jochelman’s] promotion.”

Finding that Jochelman’s “ADA claim “was not without merit as a matter of law,” the Appellate Division indicated that the record raised factual issues as to whether Banking failed to make reasonable accommodations for the alternative workspace that Jochelman had requested for medical reasons and remanded the case to Supreme Court for its further its consideration of that issue.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09267.htm

Appellant required to meet a high burden by showing, with clear and convincing evidence, that the disciplinary hearing officer was partial

Appellant required to meet a high burden by showing, with clear and convincing evidence, that the disciplinary hearing officer was partial

Batyreva v N.Y.C. Dept. of Educ., 2012 NY Slip Op 04234, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court, New York County denied the CPLR Article 75 petition seeking to vacate an arbitration award which found that the New York City Department of Education had just cause to terminate the employee, Olga Batyreva. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the lower courts ruling.

Explaining that the award was made in accord with due process, is supported by adequate evidence, is rational and is not arbitrary and capricious, the court noted “(e)ach of the sustained specifications was well supported by both documentary evidence and witness testimony.”

Batyreva, said the Appellate Division, failed to meet the high burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the hearing officer was partial, noting that it had not found any basis in the record to support a finding of partiality. Further, said the court, to the extent that Batyreva’s contention “is premised upon the hearing officer's credibility determinations, her arguments are unavailing because she failed to show that the hearing officer's credibility findings evince a bias against her.”

As to the penalty imposed, termination, the court rejected Batyreva’s claim that it is unwarranted and shocks the conscience.

In the words of the Appellate Division: “Not only does the high volume of sustained specifications of misconduct, standing alone, justify termination … but also [Batyreva] repeated unsuccessful attempts to cast [the employer], the witnesses, the hearing officer, a federal judge, and a Supreme Court Justice as somehow biased against her tend to show her "failure to take responsibility for her actions."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04234.htm