Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Orth v Wisconsin State Employees Union Council 24 et al, USCA 7^th Circuit, Docket # 07-2778.

A collective bargaining agreement between the employer (Council 24 of the Wisconsin State Employees Union) and the union that represented Mr. Orth prior to his retirement provided for certain changes to the health insurance plan available to employees and retirees. Although the case involved alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA, it may be instructive to those entities and individuals not subject to these federal acts.

According to the decision, there was a “secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case” regarding certain changes in the health insurance plan. This, said the court, constituted a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

Further, said the Circuit Court, "The plan fiduciaries are to the plan participants and beneficiaries as the union is to the workers it represents;" the union too is a fiduciary, and its duty of fair representation is simply another name for “fiduciary duty” and “just as in the collective bargaining setting, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to change the plan without notice to those affected by the change.”

Without knowledge of their rights under the plan, participants cannot make intelligent decisions with regard to the purchase of private health insurance to replace or supplement their plan benefits. The secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case, said the court, was a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HW1FFQKO.pdf

Residence requirements for public officers

Residence requirements for public officers
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 2008-10

Public Officers Law §3 generally requires that a public officer reside in the political subdivision or municipality in which he or she holds such public office, i.e., the incumbent of a local office “must be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen, or within which the electors electing him [or her] reside, or within which his [or her] official functions are required to be exercised ….”

One of the exceptions to this general rule permits police officers to reside in a county in New York State that is contiguous to the county in which the political subdivision or municipality is located. Police officers are public officers for the purposes of Public Officers Law Section 3. Although not all public employees are public officers, all public officers are public employees.

With respect to police officers, other than police officers employed by the City of New York, POL Section 3.2 provides as follows:

2. Neither the provisions of this section or of any general, special or local law, charter, code, ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation, requiring a person to be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen or within which his official functions are required to be exercised, shall apply to the appointment of a person as a member of the police force of any political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state if such person resides (a) in the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (b) in a county within the state contiguous to the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (c) in a county within the state contiguous to such political subdivision or municipal corporation; or (d) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (c) hereof where the former is less than fifteen miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines; or (e) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (d) hereof where the former is less than thirty miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines. [N.B. Subdivision 19 of Section 3 sets out provisions applicable to police officers of the City of New York, i.e., a city of over one million population.]

Is it lawful for a municipality to permit a police officer to reside in a county that is not contiguous with the county in which the municipality is located? No, advised the Attorney General.

According to the Informal Opinion, “Contiguous” as used in Public Officers Law §3.2 means “sharing a border” or “touching.” In this instance the Attorney General said that police officers employed by the City of Syracuse may not live in Oneida County because that Oneida County is not contiguous to Onondaga County.

Failing to observe the mandates of Public Officers Law Section 3.2 could have other adverse consequences. For example, Kevin O'Connor, a Town of Clarkstown police officer, was terminated from his position by the Police Commission pursuant to Section 30.1.(d) of the Public Officers Law because O'Connor "ceased to be an inhabitant within the geographical restrictions" set by law. Public Officers Law Section 30.1(d) provides that the public office "shall be vacant" if the officer does not live in the appropriate geographical area.

Although Section 3.2 of the Public Officers Law permits a police officer to reside in the same or a contiguous county in which the political subdivision employing the officer is located, O'Connor had moved to Warren County. Clarkstown is in Rockland County. Warren and Rockland Counties are not contiguous.

In O’Connor v Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown, [221 A.D.2d 444], the Appellate Division said that there was ample evidence to support the Commission's determination that O'Connor had ceased to be an inhabitant of the geographical area required for members of the Clarkstown Police Department. Accordingly, the Commission's decision terminating O'Connor from his position was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Another issue involved O'Connor's receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law following a work-related injury at the time he moved to Warren County. Significantly, the Appellate Division ruled that "the fact that O'Connor was disabled and entitled to the benefits of General Municipal Law Section 207-c(1) does not render Public Officers Law Section 30 inapplicable."

In a case involving disability benefits under General Municipal Law Section 207-a, which provides firefighters injured on the job with benefits similar to those available to police officers pursuant to Section 207-c, the court decided that Section 207-a benefits were only available to firefighters while they remain members of the fire department. Payments are not made if a disabled firefighter ceases to be an employee of the fire department [Robinson v Cole, 193 Misc.717].

The Appellate Division also rejected O'Connor's claim that he satisfied Section 3.2's residence requirement because he "occasionally stayed" at an in-laws apartment that was within the geographical area."

The Informal Opinion is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/appeals_opinions/opinions/2008/Informal/I%202008-10%20pw.pdf

Procedural matters to satisfy when filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education

Procedural matters to satisfy when filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education
Appeal of Carl Stieffenhofer from actions of Donna Pieszala, President of the Board of Education of the Newfane Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education No. 15,846

Although the Commissioner dismissed Stieffenhofer’s appeal as untimely, he addressed a number of relevant procedural matters that are instructive. The Commissioner pointed out that:

1. A petition must contain “a clear and concise statement of the petitioner’s claim showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, and shall further contain a demand for the relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled … which statement must be sufficiently clear to advise a respondent of the nature of petitioner’s claim and of the specific act or acts complained of.”

2. Where the complaint relates to allegedly "illegal" actions taken while the Board was in “executive session,” such matters fall “squarely within the ambit of the Open Meetings Law [and] Public Officers Law §107 vests exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and alleged violations thereof may not be adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner.”

3. The failure to join as a necessary party is fatal to the petition as a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such, named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and petition to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.

Although the Commissioner dismissed the appeal, he did address a motion by Pieszala that he issue her a certificate of good faith pursuant to Education Law §3811(1) thereby authorizing the board to indemnify her for legal fees and expenses incurred in defending this proceeding which arose out of the exercise of her powers or performance of duties as a board member.

The Commissioner ruled that it was appropriate to issue such certification as there was nothing in the record to indicate that Piezala acted in bad faith.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume48/d15846.htm

Statutory presumption that an individual suffered a disease of the heart as a result of the performance of duty rebutted by medical evidence to the contrary

Statutory presumption that an individual suffered a disease of the heart as a result of the performance of duty rebutted by medical evidence to the contrary
Lawless v DiNapoli, 56 AD3d 1114

A member of the New York State Employees’ Retirement System [NYSERS] applied for performance of duty disability retirement benefits alleging that he was permanently incapacitated as the result of a heart attack he suffered approximately six months earlier. The member filed his application relying upon the statutory presumption contained in Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c).

§507-b(c) provides that “…any condition of impairment of health caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a member covered by this section, presently employed and who shall have sustained such disability while so employed, who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into service as a correction officer or security hospital treatment assistant, which examination failed to disclose evidence of any disease or other impairment of the heart, shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.”

NYSERS conceded that the individual was permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties, but decided that his disability was not sustained as a result of the discharge of his duties as a correction officer and rejected his application for line-of-duty disability benefits. The Hearing Officer upheld the denial, concluding that the proof submitted by the Retirement System was sufficient to rebut the statutory "incurred in the line of duty presumption" set out in Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c).

The Appellate Division, noting that the Retirement System did not dispute that the member had successfully passed his pre-employment physical or that he is now permanently disabled from performing his duties as a correction officer due to his heart attack and underlying coronary artery disease, said that because the applicant elected to rely upon the statutory presumption contained in §507-b(c), the issue to resolve was whether the Retirement System had rebutted this presumption with competent medical evidence.

The court said that its conclusion, after its review of the record as a whole, was that the Retirement System successfully rebutted the statutory presumption and thus properly rejected the member’s application for benefits.

The full text of the decisions is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09335.htm

The duties and responsibilities of the position control with respect its classification and allocation to a salary grade

The duties and responsibilities of the position control with respect its classification and allocation to a salary grade
Matter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v State of New York Unified Court System, 55 AD3d 1070

Following the reallocation of positions previously titled "Hearing Examiner" to “Support Magistrates, JG-31” and the adoption of a new title standard, individual Support Magistrates and the labor union representing them [petitioners], commenced a proceeding seeking to rescind the allocation of the title to JG-31, and place the Support Magistrate title in a higher salary grade -- JG-33. The title change and level of compensation had been determined by the Chief Administrative Judge.

Supreme Court concluded that the classification of the position and its allocation to JG-31 had a rational basis, was not arbitrary and capricious and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s determination.

In the course of the proceeding the Administrative Director of the Unified Court System submitted an affidavit in support of the classification of the position and the allocation of the title Support Magistrates to JG-31 in which he stated that the allocation of the Support Magistrate title to salary grade JG-31 was based upon the Chief Administrative Judge's finding that duties, responsibilities and functions of Support Magistrates are comparable to those of Court Attorney-Referees. Court Attorney-Referees act as special referees in a number of courts, including Family Court, and are also allocated to grade JG-31.

In addition, the Administrative Director said that “Court Attorney-Referees, when authorized by a Family Court judge and upon consent of the parties, perform the same quasi-judicial functions that Support Magistrates do and in the same court both conduct trials, take evidence and issue orders, including orders of protection.”

Conceding that the reasons underlying the determination, are "facially legal," the petitioners argued that the two titles are not comparable because a Support Magistrate is directly empowered by statute to decide certain issues while a Court Attorney-Referee has no original jurisdiction conferred by statute and the Court Attorney-Referee must be appointed by a court to hear and report or, with the consent of the parties, hear and determine, the issues.

The Appellate Division was not persuaded by the petitioners’ argument, ruling that “the difference in the origin of authority to entertain issues does not contradict [the Chief Administrative Judge’s] conclusion that the duties, responsibilities and functions of the two titles are similar.” In other words, it is the duties and responsibilities of the position that are controlling in classifying the position and allocating it to a salary grade, not the source of the authority that the incumbent of the title exercises.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08043.htm