Probationary employee terminated for alleged misuse of sick leave

Probationary employee terminated for alleged misuse of sick leave
Curcio v New York City Dept. of Education, 55 AD3d 438

The New York City Department of Education dismissed a probationary physical education teacher, Louis Curcio, from his position and simultaneously reemployed him as a tenured teacher under his common branch license.

In response to Curcio’s petition seeking reinstatement as a probationer in his former physical education teacher position Supreme Court, New York County Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich, denied the Department of Education’s motion to dismiss so much of the petition as sought review of the termination of Curcio's probationary employment under his physical education license. Justice Kornreich also reinstated petitioner's physical education license nunc pro tunc*  to May 15, 2006.

The Department appealed. The Appellate Division “unanimously reversed” Justice Kornreich’s reinstating Curcio’s physical education license and dismissed Curcio’s petition challenging his termination.

Curcio had sued the Department for terminating his probationary employment under his physical education license. The Department had dismissed him because of Curcio’s alleged premeditated misuse of sick leave. The Appellate Division said that Curcio petition challenging his dismissal from his probationary employment should have been dismissed as he failed to establish that his termination "was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith."

On a related issue, the Appellate Division noted the record shows that Curcio was not given the requisite 60-day statutory notice that his probationary employment was being terminated by the Department.

Typically such a lack of notice would have entitled Curcio to one day's pay for each day the notice was late. Here, however, the court determined that Curcio was not entitled to such payment because after being terminated from his probationary employment, he immediately resumed his duties at the same school and at the same rate of pay under his common branch license under which he was fully tenured.

* Nunc pro tunc [Latin for "now for then"] refers setting an earlier date for the effective date of an order or judgment, giving it a “retroactive” legal effect.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08020.htm

Petitioning for a separate negotiating unit

Petitioning for a separate negotiating unit
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, and Baldwin Union Free School District, PERB Decision C-5690

CSEA filed a petition seeking to represent Security Aides in a separate unit. The District opposed the petition.

PERB’s Administrative Law Judge found that the Security Aides were most appropriately added to the existing School Monitors and Health Aides unit represented by CSEA. A community of interest was found to exist based upon a similarity in mission, skill level and working conditions. The ALJ rejected CSEA's argument that a conflict of interest was created by CSEA's initiation of litigation that challenged the District's assignment of certain duties to Security Aides instead of School Monitors.

Also rejected was CSEA's argument that a conflict existed because the Security Aides perform a security function. The ALJ noted that the Security Aides are not charged with the primary duty of investigating or reporting the job related misconduct of District employees, but to protect students and District employees from outside intruders. The ALJ placed the position in the existing unit pursuant to New York Convention Center Operating Corp, 27 PERB 3034 (1994), since there was no contractual bar to the placement and adding the position effectuated a de minimus change to the unit.

Appeal dismissed after employee fails to prove efforts to exhaust her administrative remedy would have been an exercise in futility

Appeal dismissed after employee fails to prove efforts to exhaust her administrative remedy would have been an exercise in futility
Amorosano-LePore v Grant, 56 AD3d 663

This decision by the Appellate Division illustrates the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

Gina Amorosano-LePore filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a review of the City of New Rochelle’s decision to terminate her after she was found guilty of the disciplinary filed against her.

Instead of filling its answer to Amorosano-LePore’s petition, the City asked Supreme Court to dismiss the petition because Amorosano-LePore had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Civil Service Employee's Association.

Supreme Court granted the City’s motion and Amorosano-LePore appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Amorosano-LePore failed to avail herself of the available administrative remedies provided in the CBA.

While there are some exceptions to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as demonstrating that efforts to avail oneself of the available administrative procedures such as those that are set out in a statute or a collective bargaining agreement would be futile and thus excuse such failure to exhaust those remedies, the court said that in Amorosano-LePore's case she failed to prove that her pursuing her administrative remedies provided by the controlling collective bargaining agreement would have been an exercise in futility.

The court also rejected Amorosano-LePore argument that the City’s officials acted beyond the scope of their authority, noting that this directly related to questions of interpretation, application, and enforcement provisions of the CBA and thus was reviewable under the CBA. Similarly, Amorosano-LePore claim that she was deprived of due process the hearing officer’s conduct also could have been addressed through administrative review as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09073.htm

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Orth v Wisconsin State Employees Union Council 24 et al, USCA 7^th Circuit, Docket # 07-2778.

A collective bargaining agreement between the employer (Council 24 of the Wisconsin State Employees Union) and the union that represented Mr. Orth prior to his retirement provided for certain changes to the health insurance plan available to employees and retirees. Although the case involved alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA, it may be instructive to those entities and individuals not subject to these federal acts.

According to the decision, there was a “secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case” regarding certain changes in the health insurance plan. This, said the court, constituted a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

Further, said the Circuit Court, "The plan fiduciaries are to the plan participants and beneficiaries as the union is to the workers it represents;" the union too is a fiduciary, and its duty of fair representation is simply another name for “fiduciary duty” and “just as in the collective bargaining setting, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to change the plan without notice to those affected by the change.”

Without knowledge of their rights under the plan, participants cannot make intelligent decisions with regard to the purchase of private health insurance to replace or supplement their plan benefits. The secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case, said the court, was a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HW1FFQKO.pdf

Residence requirements for public officers

Residence requirements for public officers
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 2008-10

Public Officers Law §3 generally requires that a public officer reside in the political subdivision or municipality in which he or she holds such public office, i.e., the incumbent of a local office “must be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen, or within which the electors electing him [or her] reside, or within which his [or her] official functions are required to be exercised ….”

One of the exceptions to this general rule permits police officers to reside in a county in New York State that is contiguous to the county in which the political subdivision or municipality is located. Police officers are public officers for the purposes of Public Officers Law Section 3. Although not all public employees are public officers, all public officers are public employees.

With respect to police officers, other than police officers employed by the City of New York, POL Section 3.2 provides as follows:

2. Neither the provisions of this section or of any general, special or local law, charter, code, ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation, requiring a person to be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen or within which his official functions are required to be exercised, shall apply to the appointment of a person as a member of the police force of any political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state if such person resides (a) in the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (b) in a county within the state contiguous to the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (c) in a county within the state contiguous to such political subdivision or municipal corporation; or (d) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (c) hereof where the former is less than fifteen miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines; or (e) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (d) hereof where the former is less than thirty miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines. [N.B. Subdivision 19 of Section 3 sets out provisions applicable to police officers of the City of New York, i.e., a city of over one million population.]

Is it lawful for a municipality to permit a police officer to reside in a county that is not contiguous with the county in which the municipality is located? No, advised the Attorney General.

According to the Informal Opinion, “Contiguous” as used in Public Officers Law §3.2 means “sharing a border” or “touching.” In this instance the Attorney General said that police officers employed by the City of Syracuse may not live in Oneida County because that Oneida County is not contiguous to Onondaga County.

Failing to observe the mandates of Public Officers Law Section 3.2 could have other adverse consequences. For example, Kevin O'Connor, a Town of Clarkstown police officer, was terminated from his position by the Police Commission pursuant to Section 30.1.(d) of the Public Officers Law because O'Connor "ceased to be an inhabitant within the geographical restrictions" set by law. Public Officers Law Section 30.1(d) provides that the public office "shall be vacant" if the officer does not live in the appropriate geographical area.

Although Section 3.2 of the Public Officers Law permits a police officer to reside in the same or a contiguous county in which the political subdivision employing the officer is located, O'Connor had moved to Warren County. Clarkstown is in Rockland County. Warren and Rockland Counties are not contiguous.

In O’Connor v Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown, [221 A.D.2d 444], the Appellate Division said that there was ample evidence to support the Commission's determination that O'Connor had ceased to be an inhabitant of the geographical area required for members of the Clarkstown Police Department. Accordingly, the Commission's decision terminating O'Connor from his position was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Another issue involved O'Connor's receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law following a work-related injury at the time he moved to Warren County. Significantly, the Appellate Division ruled that "the fact that O'Connor was disabled and entitled to the benefits of General Municipal Law Section 207-c(1) does not render Public Officers Law Section 30 inapplicable."

In a case involving disability benefits under General Municipal Law Section 207-a, which provides firefighters injured on the job with benefits similar to those available to police officers pursuant to Section 207-c, the court decided that Section 207-a benefits were only available to firefighters while they remain members of the fire department. Payments are not made if a disabled firefighter ceases to be an employee of the fire department [Robinson v Cole, 193 Misc.717].

The Appellate Division also rejected O'Connor's claim that he satisfied Section 3.2's residence requirement because he "occasionally stayed" at an in-laws apartment that was within the geographical area."

The Informal Opinion is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/appeals_opinions/opinions/2008/Informal/I%202008-10%20pw.pdf