Code of Silence Litigation - Police Officer's use of force

Code of Silence Litigation - Police Officer's use of force

Source: AELE*

AELE reports that "In November, 2012, a federal jury in Chicago returned a verdict in favor of a plaintiff and against the city on a claim that the city had a persistent widespread custom or practice of protecting officers from citizen complaints. The article reveals how the plaintiff and two expert witnesses proved her allegations. At the end, there is an extensive list of references."

The article is posted on the Internet at http://www.aele.org/law/2013-01MLJ101.html

* AELE has a free search tool covering our database of more than 33,000 case summaries at http://www.aele.org/htdig/common/search.html

An appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 is not available to an individual seeking to challenge an administrative decision by the New York State Education Department

An appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 is not available to an individual seeking to challenge an administrative decision by the New York State Education Department

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,440

In this appeal the issue concerned an applicant's challenge to a decision by the New York State Education Department Office of Teaching Initiatives that the applicant for a permanent teaching certificate was not eligible for such a certificate.

Dismissing the appeal on the grounds that the Commissioner of Education does not have jurisdiction to consider such an appeal, the Commissioner explained that “it is well settled that Education Law §310 does not authorize an appeal to the Commissioner from actions taken by members of the staff of the State Education Department.

However, said the Commissioner, such a challenge may be advanced in a proceeding brought in a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume52/d16440.html

Only the employees of the public employer, a union acting on their behalf or the public employer itself may intervene in an improper action pending before PERB

Only the employees of the public employer, a union acting on their behalf or the public employer itself may intervene in an improper action pending before PERB

City of New York v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2012 NY Slip Op 09130, Appellate Division, Third Department

The State’s Public Employment Relations Board found that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York [Board] committed an improper employer practice in response to a complaint filed by the union representing certain employees employed by the Board. The union had alleged that the Board unilaterally changed a condition of employment by eliminating the automatic granting of parking permits after the City adopted a new plan aimed at reducing traffic congestion in the City. 

The City of New York filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking an annulment of PERB's decision. PERB counterclaimed seeking enforcement of its remedial order. Supreme Court dismissed the City’s petition and granted PERB's counterclaim.

Addressing a “procedural issue,” the Appellate Division, noting that PERB's order did not make any findings against the City nor did it order the City to do anything, ruled that the City did not have standing to commence a proceeding seeking to annul PERB's decision. Thus, said the court, Supreme Court properly dismissed that the petition brought by the City, explaining that the City and the Board are separate legal entities.

Further, said the court, the City was not a party to the PERB proceeding and although it was argued that “the City could have intervened,” the court noted that PERB’s regulations only permit intervention by public employees, a union acting on their behalf or the public employer, citing 4 NYCRR 212.1 [a]. In this instance, said the court, the relevant employer was the Board and not the City of New York.

As to PERB’s ruling concerning the merits of the alleged improper practice charge filed against the Board, the Appellate Division considered Board’s argument that it had no control over changes with respect to parking that was imposed upon it by the City and therefore had no power to negotiate anything regarding this parking permit situation.

Conceding that the power to regulate traffic and parking on city streets is expressly delegated to the City, the Appellate Division said that the relevant questions for it to address were [1] did the Board had any control over the change in producing and distributing parking permits and [2] did PERB intruded on an area under the authority of the City or its Department of Transportation [DOT].

The Appellate Division’s answer: it agreed with PERB that the Board did have control over some aspects of the new parking permit situation as DOT produced and provided to Board 10,007 site-specific placards and 1,000 three-hour permits for on-street parking and did not have any oversight responsibilities as to the distribution of such placards and permits.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_09130.htm

Retiree’s application to change the retirement option selected filed more than thirty days after her effective date of retirement rejected as untimely

Retiree’s application to change the retirement option selected filed more than thirty days after her effective date of retirement rejected as untimely

Feuer v State of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op 09129, Appellate Division, Third Department

Prior to retiring in June 2009, a teacher, a Tier 4 member of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System [TRS], met her financial advisor and a TRS representative for a preretirement consultation. The teacher then submitted her application for retirement, selecting the option entitled "Largest Lump Sum," which provided the "largest possible lump sum payment to a beneficiary" following the member's death (emphasis in the decision), and designated her niece and nephew as her beneficiaries.

The retirement application the teacher completed also detailed another option available to a retiree entitled the "Maximum" option. It described this option as follows: "MAXIMUM — Do notdesignate a beneficiary if you select this option. This election will provide you with the largest possible annual benefit. All payments will cease at your death."

In addition, the application stated that, in the event an applicant wished to change options, notice of such a change had to be received by the Retirement System "within 30 days after [the] effective date of retirement" —  in this retiree's case, no later than July 30, 2009.

After submitting her application, the retiree received a letter from the Retirement System dated March 23, 2010, summarizing her retirement benefits and established her monthly pension payment. More then 30 days after the effective date of her retirement, however, the now retired teacher notified the Retirement System that she wanted to change her retirement option selection from "the Largest Lump Sum" option to the "Maximum" option.

The Retirement System denied her request and the retiree filed a petition with the Court of Claims seeking permission to file a late notice of claim.*

The Court of Claims denied her request because the retiree, by her own admission, did not notify the Retirement System that she wanted to change her retirement option within 30 days of the effective date of her retirement. The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims’ ruling, explaining that the Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction that has no capacity "to grant strictly equitable relief, [although it] may grant incidental equitable relief so long as the primary claim seeks to recover money damages in appropriation, contract or tort cases."

Although the relief that the retiree seeks is couched in money damages,** the Appellate Division characterized her application as requiring  the review of an administrative agency's determination. In that regard, the Appellate Division noted that the money damages that the retiree sought were calculated by using as a base figure what she would have received as her pension benefit had she initially selected the "Maximum" option.

The bottom line: The Appellate Division ruled that as the retiree, in essence sought judicial review and reversal of an administrative determination made by the Retirement System, the Court of Claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction and it properly denied the retiree's motion for leave to file a late notice of claim.

* The retiree also sued TRS’ representative in Supreme Court, contending that the representative was negligent regarding the her retirement options. Supreme Court dismissed this action as it sought money damages from a state employee in connection with the performance of her duties and, as such, could only be commenced in the Court of Claims.

** The Appellate Division said that the relief that the retiree sought would result in her receiving “windfall, because not only would she receive the monthly pension benefit under the Maximum option, but she still would have a lump sum available to her beneficiaries upon her demise.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_09129.htm

The relationship of a statute to the provisions of a Taylor Law agreement

The relationship of a statute to the provisions of a Taylor Law agreement

Civil Service Employees Association v. Town of Harrison, 48 NY2d 66

Where the court determines that a statute sets out a strong public policy, that provision will trump a  provision in a collective bargaining agreement inconsistent with the statute.

In the Town of Harrison case the Court of Appeals said that there is only one way a new position in the classified service of a municipality may be created: the way the controlling law requires.

In this instance the statutory imperatives of §22 of the Civil Service Law were viewed as reflecting such a strong public policy with respect to establishing new positions that it may not be ignored nor may it be circumvented under color of an “alternative” to the provisions of §22 contained in a collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to the Taylor Law (§200 et seq, Civil Service Law). Failing to comply with the mandates of Civil Service Law §22 was fatal and no new position can come into being unless it is created as prescribed by Section.

Although the court did not address the “status” of the incumbent of the “new position” in its decision, it would appear that the “status” of the individual is not dependent on the “existence” of any position and, presumably, other relevant provisions of the Civil Service Law (i.e., §80, Layoff) would control if the “nonexistent new position” could no longer serve as a “position” for payroll purposes.

Another example of a provision in the Civil Service Law nullifying a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is City of Plattsburgh v Local 788, 108 AD2d 1045. In Plattsburgh the issue concerned the application of a Taylor Law contract provision dealing with seniority in a demotion involving a layoff situation.

The collective bargaining agreement between the City and Local 788 provided if there were to be demotions in connection with a layoff, the "date of hire" was to be used to determine an employee's seniority. However, the "date of hire" might not necessarily be the same date used to determine an individual's service for seniority purposes for layoff under State law, i.e., the individual's date of initial permanent appointment in public service.

In this instance the employee retained by the City had been initially appointed after the individual that Plattsburgh had been demoted. However the retained employee had been permanently appointed to the position prior to the effective date of the permanent appointment of the individual Plattsburgh had demoted.

The Court said that §80 of the Civil Service Law "reflects a legislative imperative" that the City was powerless to bargain away and granted the City’s Article 75 petition to permanently stay the Local from submitting its grievance alleging a contract violation to arbitration.