Res judicata bars the granting of a wage increase awarded in a second arbitration after the initial arbitration award addressing the same issue involving the same parties was vacated by the Court of Appeals “in its entirety”

Res judicata bars the granting of a wage increase awarded in a second arbitration after the initial arbitration award addressing the same issue involving the same parties was vacated by the Court of Appeals “in its entirety”

Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn., Inc., IAFF Local 282 v Buffalo Fiscal Stability Auth., 2013 NY Slip Op 02931, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority [BFSA] prohibited the City of Buffalo from complying with an arbitration award known as “Rinaldo I” that set a wage increase for the collective bargaining agreement. The Rinaldo I arbitration award was vacated in its entirety by the Court of Appeals.*

Subsequently an arbitration award involving the same parties designated “Rinaldo II” was issued by the arbitrator. Rinaldo II provided for a wage increase with respect to the collective bargaining agreement in effect from July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2004 between Local 282 and the City. BFSA determined that the wage freeze applied to the wages awarded in Rinaldo II and adopted a resolution, Resolution 11-05, that froze the wages awarded in Rinaldo II..

Local 282 filed an Article 78 petition challenging the authority of BFSA prohibiting the City from effecting the wage increase awarded by the arbitrator in Rinaldo II. Supreme Court dismissed Local 282’s petition.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that “Supreme Court properly determined that the instant proceeding is barred by res judicata.”

Although Local 282’s petition challenged a resolution of the BFSA that applied to Rinaldo II rather than Rinaldo I, the Appellate Division ruled that both arbitrations were between the same parties in interest and concern the same cause of action, i.e., the application of the wage freeze to wage rates for the same CBA.” Thus, said the court, “the instant action therefore is barred by res judicata.…”

* Matter of Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn., Inc., Local 282, IAFF, AFL-CIO-CLC [Masiello], 13 NY3d 803.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_02931.htm

The lack of a full transcript of a disciplinary hearing for review by the court requires the annulment of the finding of guilt

The lack of a full transcript of a disciplinary hearing for review by the court requires the annulment of the finding of guilt
Farrell v New York State Off. of the Attorney Gen., 2013 NY Slip Op 05014, Appellate Division, Third Department

In this proceeding the Appellate Division reviewed a determination of Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision which found a prisoner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule.

The prisoner contended that, among other things, a meaningful review of the Commissioner’s decision by the court was precluded because a significant portion of the hearing was not transcribed.

The Appellate Division agreed, explaining that it appeared that only the first side of the audiotape made during the hearing was transcribed by the stenographer. The stenographer had noted that "[s]econd side of tape not audible - runs on fast speed only," and then “abruptly ended the transcript.”

The court said that it could not ascertain what was on the second side of the tape or if it would have been beneficial to the prisoner's defense. Accordingly, it ruled that the Commissioner’s determination must be annulled and remanded the matter for a new hearing.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05014.htm

Public officer automatically terminated from his or her position upon conviction of a crime or a violation of his or her oath of office

Public officer automatically terminated from his or her position upon conviction of a crime or a violation of his or her oath of office

Hodgson v McGuire, 75 A.D.2d 763

Public Officers Law §30 provides for an automatic forfeiture of office upon a public officer’s conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of his oath of office.

A police officer was dismissed following his entering a plea of guilty to a crime (official misconduct) that was a class A misdemeanor under the Penal Law.

The police officer admitted acceptance of $350 from an undercover police officer and was dismissed without a hearing.

The Appellate Division held that police officers are public officers and that the underlying crime, although not a felony, involved a violation of his oath of office. The court indicated that there is a strong public policy in favor of vacating the office of a public officer convicted of a violation of his oath of office.

As the office was automatically vacated by operation of law, no pre-termination hearing was required.

Suspensions without pay deemed appropriate penalties under the circumstances

Suspensions without pay deemed appropriate penalties under the circumstances

105 AD3d 613

The New York City Department of Correction suspended one correction officer, “M” for sixty days without pay and a second correction officer, “S” for thirty days without pay. M was found guilty using excessive force against an inmate and making false and misleading statements; S was found guilty of misconduct in preparing an official report and making false and misleading statements.

Finding that the Department’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence, the Appellate Division sustained the Department’s decision. As to the penalty imposed, citing the “Pell” standard, the court said that the “The penalty imposed does not shock one's sense of fairness” (Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_02698.htm

Determining mandatory subjects of Taylor Law negotiations

Determining mandatory subjects of Taylor Law negotiations

Town of Haverstraw v Newman, 75 A.D.2d 874

The Appellate Division sustained PERB’S determination that “legal insurance”, family sick leave, uniform cleaning allowances and a safety clause in connection with Taylor Law negotiations between the Town and its police officer’s union were mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.

That determination, said the court, was a permissible interpretation of §201.4 of the Civil Service Law and it saw no reason to distinguish legal insurance from health insurance or group life insurance.

 The Appellate Division also commented that PERB was the expert here and that it would not substitute its judgment for that of PERB in this area.