Complaint alleging violations of the State’s and New York City’s Human Rights Laws dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination

Complaint alleging violations of the State’s and New York City’s Human Rights Laws dismissed for failure to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination

2014 NY Slip Op 02696, Appellate Division, First Department

State Supreme Court Judge Arthur F. Engoron granted the employer’s motion to dismiss the unlawful discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims under the State and City Human Rights Laws (HRL) (Executive Law §290 et seq.; Administrative Code of City of NY §8-101 et seq.), filed by one of its employees, [Plaintiff].

Construing the complaint liberally, presuming its factual allegations to be true, and according it the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling explaining that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead that she was subjected to an adverse employment action as none of the allegations set out in her complaint rises to the level of an actionable adverse employment action.

In addition the court found that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead discriminatory animus, which is fatal to both her discrimination and hostile environment claims as her complaint does not contain any allegations of any comments or references to Plaintiff's age or race made by any employee of employer.

Further, said the Appellate Division, Plaintiff’s petition does not contain any factual allegations demonstrating that similarly situated individuals who did not share Plaintiff's protected characteristics were treated more favorably than Plaintiff and her “conclusory allegations of a hostile environment are insufficient to state a claim under either the State or City Human Rights Laws.

Plaintiff’s allegations of “retaliation” faired no better as she failed to plead any facts regarding when the alleged retaliatory incidents occurred or how those incidents were causally connected to any protected activity, nor did she state the substance of her alleged complaints, to whom she allegedly complained, or when such complaints were made.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_02696.htm
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Security of government computer records

Security of government computer records

State Technology Law and other provisions of law

A town recently reported that its accounting program was the victim of hacking and a number of “payroll checks” were processed and presented for payment. Although the town’s bank “caught” the fraudulent checks, the town expressed concern that personal information in its system may have been compromised and asked its attorney to advise it as to its possible liability to individuals who may suffer as a result of the theft of personal data.

To assist public agencies to cope with the increasing number of attempts to breach computer security efforts, the New York State Office of Cyber Security has issued its Cyber Security Policy P03-002, Information Security Policy, posted on the Internet at http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ocs/resources/documents/cyber-security-policy-p03-002-v3.4.pdf, while the State Comptroller’s Division of Local Government and School Accountability has issued a “Local Government Information Security” statement that is posted on the Internet at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/snapshot/cybersecurity0811.pdf

A “Cyber Security Citizen’s Notification Policy” has been adopted by municipalities to deal with a breach of its computer security protocols. For example, the Village of North Hills has such a policy it has posted on the Internet [ http://ecode360.com/6309491] as has the Town of Massena [see http://ecode360.com/11058454]. 

In addition, General Business Law §899-aa, the Security Breach and Notification Act, addresses situations resulting from persons without valid authorization having acquired private information stored on an business  entity's computer..

Also relevant is §208(8) of the State Technology Law captioned “Notification; person without valid authorization has acquired private information,” requiring counties, cities, towns, villages and other governmental entities to adopt a computer security “breach notification policy.”

In addition, §308.1 of the act provides as follows with respect to personal privacy protection:

"Any information reported to the electronic facilitator by a government entity in connection with the authorization of an electronic signature shall continue to be withheld from public disclosure if such information was withheld from public disclosure by such government entity. Electronic records shall be considered and treated as any other records for the purposes of the freedom of information law as set forth in article six of the public officers law and the personal privacy protection law as set forth in article six-A of the public officers law.

“2. A person or an entity that acts as an authenticator of electronic signatures shall not disclose to a third party any personal information reported to it by the electronic signatory other than the information necessary to authenticate the signature unless the disclosure is made pursuant to a court order or statute, or if the information or data is used solely for statistical purposes in aggregate form. For purposes of this section, "personal information" shall mean data that identifies a specific person, including but not limited to home and work addresses, telephone number, e-mail address, social security number, birthdate, gender, marital status, mother's maiden name, and health data.”
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An employee who becomes unavailable for work as a result of other employment may be terminated from his or her position

An employee who becomes unavailable for work as a result of other employment may be terminated from his or her position

2014 NY Slip Op 02644, Appellate Division, Third Department

A part-time police officer [Plaintiff] serving with a police department was appointed to a full-time position with another police department. Plaintiff’s appointment with the new police agency was subject to his satisfactorily completing a probationary period. In addition, the decision of the Appellate Division notes that Plaintiff’s new employment precluded him from engaging in outside employment for at least one year.

When Plaintiff was notified by his former employer that his employment was terminated because his new position rendered him unavailable for work, he filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 contending that his former employer’s action violated Civil Service Law §80 [sic].* Plaintiff asked Supreme Court to annul his termination and an order directing that his former employer immediately reinstate him.

Supreme Court dismissed the petition and plaintiff appealed.

Petitioner argued that his former employer improperly abolished his position and that he is entitled to remain employed despite being unavailable to perform any services for his employer for at least a year. The Appellate Division disagreed and affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The court explained Civil Service Law §80 applies where a  “where a civil service position is eliminated due to ‘economy, consolidation or abolition of functions, curtailment of activities or otherwise,’ then suspension, demotion or termination must occur ‘in the inverse order of original appointment.’”

Here, however, the Appellate Division said that §80 “is entirely inapplicable here” as Plaintiff’s former employer did not eliminate or abolish petitioner's position. Rather, as the termination letter sent to Plaintiff indicates, Plaintiff was simply terminated so that his former employer could fill the position with someone who was available to work.

* Civil Service Law §80 applies in situations where a permanent employee of the State or a political subdivision of the State in the competitive class of the classified service is laid off as the result of the abolishment of his or her position. Civil Service Law §80-a applies to an employee of the State as the employer serving in a position in the noncompetitive class of classified service if the event his or her position is abolished.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_02644.htm

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Extending a probationary period

Extending a probationary period

76 AD2d 973

An individual was permanently appointed to a position with the State subject to his satisfactorily completing a 52-week probationary period.

As a result of his being absent from work 24 days due to job-related injury, he was told that his probationary period was extended “24 days”. The employee was subsequently dismissed from his position “for failure to satisfactorily complete the probationary period.”

The individual sued, seeking a court order directing his reinstatement to the position. The Appellate Division, however, rejected his argument that he became permanent at the end of 52 weeks, holding that the Rules for the Classified Service* for employees of the State as the employer, provided that the “Maximum period of probationary term of any employee shall be extended by the number of work days of his absence which ... are not counted as time served in the probationary term."

The court explained that the "rationale of the regulation is to add to the expiration date of the probationary period the same period of time that the (employee) had missed during his probationary period, so that his performance of duty could be fully observed and evaluated for an entire 52 week period."

* See 4 NYCRR 4.5(g). A number of municipal civil service commissions and personnel officers have adopted similar rules.
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State voters may amend a state's constitution to prohibit consideration of racial preferences with respect admission to colleges and universities if it does not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose

State voters may amend a state's constitution to prohibit consideration of racial preferences with respect admission to colleges and universities if it does not reflect a racially discriminatory purpose

Schuette v. Coal. Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigration Rights, USSC, Docket 12-682

The summary of the decision set out below was prepared by Justia. The text of the decision, the several concurring opinions and the dissent are posted on the Internet at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/12-682

After the Supreme Court decided that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions plan’s use of race-based preferences violated the Equal Protection Clause, but that its law school admission plan’s limited use did not, Michigan voters adopted a new section of the state constitution (Proposal 2), prohibiting use of race-based preferences in the admissions process for state universities.

The district court upheld Proposal 2, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that it violated Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, reasoned that the principle that consideration of race in admissions is permissible when certain conditions are met was not challenged; the issue was whether, and how, state voters may choose to prohibit consideration of such racial preferences. The decision by Michigan voters reflects an ongoing national dialogue; there was no infliction of a specific injury of the type at issue in cases cited by the Sixth Circuit. Individual liberty has constitutional protection, but the Constitution also embraces the right of citizens to act through a lawful electoral process, as Michigan voters did. Justices Scalia and Thomas stated that the question here, as in every case in which neutral state action is said to deny equal protection on account of race, is whether the challenged action reflects a racially discriminatory purpose. Stating that it did not, the Justices stated that the proposition that a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a disparate racial impact “has been squarely and soundly rejected.”

Justice Breyer agreed that the amendment is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, but reasoned that the amendment only applies to, and forbids, race-conscious admissions programs that consider race solely in order to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student body; the Constitution permits, but does not require, the use of that kind of race-conscious program. The ballot box, not the courts, is the instrument for resolving debates about such programs. This case does not involve a diminution of the minority’s ability to participate in the political process.

A press release advising of the publication of Professor John D. Skrentny’s latest book, AFTER CIVIL RIGHTS, [Princeton University Press, 2013] notes that this year marks the 50^th anniversary of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, but talking about race at work remains as difficult as ever.

Professor Skrentny brings together the latest social science studies and evidence to provide a comprehensive picture of how employers manage racial difference in the 21^st century—and sets out his views as to why the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is no longer in sync with that picture.

For additional information about this book, click on:

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10095.html
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