Terminating an employee while he or she is on Workers’ Compensation Leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §71

Terminating an employee while he or she is on Workers’ Compensation Leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §71

Still v City of Middletown, 2015 NY Slip Op 08741, Appellate Division, Second Department

After Terri Still had been absent from her position on Workers’ Compensation Law pursuant to §71 of the Civil Service Law for one than one year,* her employer, the City of Middletown, advised her that she would be terminated from her position.**

Prior to the effective date of Still’s termination, however, the City scheduled a meeting with Still and gave her an opportunity to present any evidence as to why the City should not proceed with the termination of her employment. Still failed to show that she was medically fit to return to work, with or without a reasonable accommodation, and she was terminated.

Still then initiated an Article 78 action challenging her termination. Supreme Court, Orange County, denied her petition, in effect dismissed the proceeding, and Still appealed the court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s determination, explaining that the standard of judicial review in this instance was whether the appointing authority’s action was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, in violation of lawful procedure, or affected by an error of law.  

Under the circumstances, said the court, "the City's decision to terminate [Still’s] employment was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion, in violation of lawful procedure, or affected by an error of law."

N. B. An individual unable to perform the duties of his or her position due to an injury or disease that is not “job related” and which did not result in a permanent disability is entitled to be placed on leave without pay pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law -- Leave  for  Ordinary  Disability -- for at least one year. Such an individual may be  terminated from his or her position pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law after one year of such leave at the discretion of the appointing authority.

* An employee sustaining a disability resulting from an assault suffered in the course of his or her employment is entitled to a leave of absence for at least two years unless his or her disability is of such a nature as to permanently incapacitate him or her for the performance of the duties of his or her position.

** Termination from Workers’ Compensation Leave pursuant to CSL §71 is not pejorative in nature and the individual may, within one year after the termination of his or her disability, file an application with the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction for reinstatement to his or her former position and is to be reinstated if then found qualified to resume the duties of his or her former position. If the position, or a similar position, is not available, the name of the individual is to be placed on a preferred list in accordance with §80 or §80-A of the Civil Service Law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_08741.htm

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Teacher seeking unemployment insurance benefits between school years found ineligible to receive benefits because she had a reasonable assurance of continued employment

Teacher seeking unemployment insurance benefits between school years found ineligible to receive benefits because she had a reasonable assurance of continued employment
Matter of Vazquez (Commissioner of Labor), 2015 NY Slip Op 08234, Appellate Division, Third Department

Ana M. Vazquez worked as a substitute teacher for the New York City Department of Education (DOE) during the 2013-2014 academic school year. Prior to the close of the academic school year DOE notified Vazquez, in writing, that it anticipated the same need for substitute teachers going forward into the 2014-2015 academic school year and that the terms and conditions of her employment would remain substantially the same.

Vazquez, after confirming that she received this letter, applied for unemployment insurance benefits. The Department of Labor found that she was ineligible to receive such benefits because she had received a reasonable assurance of continued employment during the 2014-2015 academic year. This determination of ineligibility was sustained by an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ]  following a hearing and later by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. Vazquez appealed the Board’s determination.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s ruling, noting that Labor Law §590(10), bars professionals who are employed by educational institutions from receiving unemployment insurance benefits during the period between two successive academic periods if they have received a reasonable assurance of continued employment*.

The court said that in the course of the administrative hearing before the ALJ DOE’s representative stated that Vazquez had worked 169 out of a total of 180 days during the 2013-2014 academic school year at a rate of $154.97 per day and indicated that Vazquez’s per diem rate would be $158.09 during the 2014-2015 academic school year. DOE’s representative also indicated that he anticipated that Vazquez would receive the same amount of work during the 2014-2015 academic school year because the DOE was not under any budgetary constraints.

The Appellate Division concluded that DOE correspondence to Vazquez advising her of the continued need for substitute teachers during the 2014-2015 academic year on substantially the same economic terms and conditions that were offered the year before constituted “substantial evidence” supporting the Board's conclusion that Vazquez had received a reasonable assurance of continued employment and was, therefore, ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits between the two school years.

* "A reasonable assurance of continued employment" has been interpreted to have been satisfied by  a representation by the employer that substantially the same economic terms and conditions will continue to apply to the extent that the claimant would receive at least 90% of the earnings received during the first academic period during the second academic year.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_08234.htm

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Navigating the Digital Age, The Definitive Cybersecurity Guide for Directors and Officers
A publication of Palo Alto Networks, Inc. and the New York Stock Exchange

Palo Alto Networks Inc. CEO Mark McLaughlin, noting that “Frequent headlines announcing the latest cyber breach of a major company, government agency, or organization are the norm today, begging the questions of why and will it ever end?”, asks "Prevention: Can it be done?"

In 46 essays by experts in the field, this 355 page handbook covers many of the security issues facing the public and private sectors and provides “practical, actionable and expert advice on best practices for compliance, implementation, breach prevention and immediate response tactics.”

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Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction to review if reports of alleged child abuse by school administrators are made consistent with the Social Services Law

Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction to review if reports of alleged child abuse by school administrators are made consistent with the Social Services Law

Appeal of M.I.B., on behalf of his son, from actions of the Board of Education of the Tuxedo Union Free School District regarding reports of child abuse. Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,847

In this appeal M.I.B. challenged Tuxedo Union Free School District’s [Tuxedo] staff members filing, on at least three separate occasions, reports of suspected child abuse involving M.I.B.’s family with New York State Department of Social Services' Child Protective Services [CPS].

M.I.B. said that while he understood a school district had a duty to report any such abuse to CPS, the filing of “incorrect complaints on a regular basis” violated the law and asked the Commissioner, among other things, to investigate and take “appropriate action” against Tuxedo’s employees. 

The Commissioner noted that Tuxedo’s director of student services and human resources had earlier addressed the M.I.B.’s concerns that were set out in a letter to Tuxedo and explained that all professional staff members of the school “are mandated reporters of suspected child abuse to CPS,” and outlined the procedures followed in making such reports.  The director also stated, among other things, that it had been found that proper procedures had been followed regarding M.I.B.’s complaints. 

M.I.B. contended that Tuxedo was “harassing” his family by “repeatedly filing incorrect reports of [c]hild abuse” to CPS and alleged that between in an eight month period had filed three reports, all of which were dismissed by CPS as unfounded. 

After addressing two procedural matters the Commissioner ruled that the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

The Commissioner explained that the provisions of Article 6 of Title 6 of the Social Services Law (§§411-428) set forth the scheme for mandatory reporting by school officials of suspected cases of child abuse or maltreatment. 

In this instance, said the Commissioner, CPS investigated the reports about which M.I.B. complained and found them to be unfounded.  Therefore, the relief M.I.B. requests would be based on a finding that Tuxedo engaged in misconduct by making the reports to CPS.  

However, the Commissioner said that she has “no authority to review whether such reports are appropriately made in accordance with the Social Services Law” Further, said the Commissioner, she does not have jurisdiction to request that school officials stop filing reports of suspected abuse to CPS or that school officials contact the parents prior to doing so, opining that to do so “would undermine the legislative purpose in requiring that such reports be made by school officials.”

Thus, said the Commissioner, M.I.B.’s appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume55/d16847

Arbitrator directs the reinstatement of employees laid off in violation of the “meet and confer” provision mandated by the collective bargaining agreement

Arbitrator directs the reinstatement of employees laid off in violation of the “meet and confer” provision mandated by the collective bargaining agreement

Matter of Certain Controversies Between Social Serv. Empls. Union, Local 371 v City of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 08658, Appellate Division, First Department

Underlying this case is an arbitration award that ordered the City of New York[City] to reinstate laid-off employees with back pay.

The arbitrator found that the City had failed to comply with the "meet-and-confer" requirement of the relevant collective bargaining agreement [CBA]. This provision required that,  prior to any layoffs, the City meet and confer with the designated representatives of the appropriate employee organization or organizations, here Social Service Employees Union, Local 371 [Union], with the objective of considering feasible alternatives to all or part of the projected layoffs.

The Union filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 75 seeking to confirm the arbitration award compelling the City to reinstate the employees to there former positions with back salary and benefits. The City, on the other hand, filed a petition seeking to vacate the award. Supreme Court confirmed the award, and the City appeal from that order to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division found that the arbitration award “merely compels the City to follow the procedure delineated in the citywide collective bargaining agreement” and was therefore properly confirmed the Supreme Court.

The court explained that the citywide CBA outlined various requirements the City must meet before laying off employees including providing the appropriate union or unions with notice of layoffs "not less than thirty days (30) before the effective dates of projected layoffs" and then the "designated representatives of the City” were to “meet and confer with the designated representatives of the appropriate union” to consider "feasible alternatives to all or part of such scheduled layoffs."

The Appellate Division said that this mandatory "meet-and-confer" provision was not a mere formality but set out a non-exhaustive list of potential "feasible alternatives" including:

"i. the transfer of employees to other agencies with retraining, if necessary, consistent with Civil Service law but without regard to the Civil Service title,

"ii. the use of Federal and State funds whenever possible to retain or re-employ employees scheduled for layoff,

"iii. the elimination or reduction of the amount of work contracted out to independent contractors, and

"iv. encouragement of early retirement and the expediting of the processing of retirement applications."

Significantly, the citywide CBA provides for dispute resolution by “final and binding” arbitration, whereby the arbitrator may direct "such relief as the arbitrator deems necessary and proper,” subject to "certain limitations and any applicable limitations of law."

Although it was conceded that City gave proper notice to the Union about the layoffs, the Unioncommenced arbitration in the City's Office of Collective Bargaining, alleging that the City terminated certain employees without satisfying the citywide CBA's meet-and-confer requirement. Although there actually was a meeting, the Appellate Division said that crux of the disagreement was that at the “meet and confer” meeting the City [1] did not offer any alternatives for the 18 employees to be laid off, [2] there were no discussions about other alternatives to layoffs, and [3] the Unionwas not asked to submit proposals to avoid the layoffs.

The arbitrator analyzed the record of the meeting and determined that meeting did not satisfy the meet-and-confer requirement, because "feasible alternatives" to layoffs were not properly discussed. As a remedy, the arbitrator ordered the reinstatement of the laid off employees to their former position with full back pay.

The Appellate Division said that it was “well settled” that courts review arbitration awards with a high level of deference and will not vacate and arbitration award unless it finds that "it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power." Further, said the court, an arbitrator's award will not be vacated when there is "some basis in the record for each of the arbitrator's findings," citing Branciforte v Levey, 222 AD2d 276.

The Appellate Division found that the arbitrator's determination had a basis in the record and that the arbitrator noted that some the employees received layoff letters the day after the meeting. This “suggested that the City had already made up its mind about the layoffs before the meeting.” The court concluded that “this evidence constitutes a rational basis for the arbitrator's determination that the ... meeting did not fulfill the meet-and-confer requirement.”

The City’s argued that “the remedy of reinstatement with back pay violated a strong public policy by infringing upon the ‘managerial prerogative’ reserved to the City and Administrative Code of the City of NY §12-307(b), which ‘specifically and clearly removes from collective bargaining considerations the right of the public employer to retire its employees from duty because of lack of work or for other legitimate reason.”

The Appellate Division said essentially City contended that the directive to reinstate the employees that had been laid off infringed on the discretion of the City to make firing decisions. The directive, said the court, “does no such thing.” In the works of the court, “Nothing in the arbitrator's award precludes the City from following the citywide CBA procedure to which it agreed and ultimately laying off the [employees]. There is no managerial prerogative to violate the contract. As a proper meet-and-confer must precede any layoff, the arbitrator's remedy simply restored the status quo pending a proper meet-and-confer.”

Thus, the court concluded that the arbitrator's award "merely returned [the employees laid off] to the status they would have occupied had they not been wrongfully dismissed." By ordering the reinstatement of the employees that had been laid off the arbitrator made it possible for the contract to be executed as intended.

Accordingly, said the Appellate Division, “the judgment of the Supreme Court … confirming the arbitration award … should be affirmed, without costs.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_08658.htm