Courts must defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise

Courts must defer to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise

Abramoski v New York State Educ. Dept., 2015 NY Slip Op 08880, Appellate Division, Third Department

Reacting to declining enrollment at West Park Union Free School District Number Two [West Park #2], a special act school district created by special legislation in 1973 for the purpose of educating residents of a facility for adolescent girls with emotional disabilities, the West Park School Board [Board] resolved to begin the process of dissolving West Park #2.

The Board notified the State Education Department [SED] of its decision to cease operation of West Park #2 and SED informed the Board of its various responsibilities during the close-down period, including calculating the District's close-down costs.

These costs included the cost of [1] educating students during the final year of operation and [2] any outstanding financial obligations. In response to a question concerning whether the costs of certain contractual obligations that the Board had to pay employees for their post-retirement health and dental insurance coverage for their respective lifetimes would be included in the tuition rate for the close-down period, SED informed the Board that the cost of such lifetime insurance coverage for the District's retirees would not be included in the close-down tuition rate.

Maureen Abramoski and a number of other employees [Abramoski] challenged SED’s determination with respect to excluding the cost of Abramoski's post-retirement medical and dental insurance in the close-down tuition rate of a special act school district. Abramoski ultimately initiated a “combined CPLR Article 78 proceeding and plenary action against SED and other named defendants seeking, among other things, [1] a review of SED's determination excluding the costs related to Abramoski’s lifetime post-retirement health and dental insurance coverage in the close-down tuition rate, [2] an order directing the reinstatement of such post-retirement health insurance and dental insurance coverage and [3] damages for breach of contract. Supreme Court dismissed Abramoski’s various motions and petitions concerning such benefits and she appealed.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court rejection of Abramoski’s claims, explaining that a court's review of an administrative determination such as the one at issue in this action is limited to whether the determination was arbitrary and capricious, lacked a rational basis or was affected by an error of law. Here, said the court, SEC's determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious, was rational and was not affected by an error of law.

Further, said the Appellate Division, “courts must apply deference to an agency's ‘interpretation of its own regulations in its area of expertise,’" noting that 8 NYCRR 200.9(f)(1)(i) provides that the tuition rate at issue "shall include administration and direct care costs and the costs of operation and maintenance of instructional facilities." 

The court’s conclusion: Abramoski’s lifetime post-retirement health and dental insurance coverage should not be considered in the close-down tuition rate, sustaining SED’s interpreting of 8 NYCRR 200.9(f)(1)(i) to exclude long-term outstanding debt obligations "that were largely — if not entirely — unrelated to the costs of providing an education to the students attending the District during the relevant tuition period." SED’s interpretation, said the court, “is reasonable and is consistent with a statutory and regulatory scheme that evinces an intent to tailor tuition rates to those costs reasonably related to the special act school district's provision of services to students during the relevant tuition period.”

The Appellate Division also rejected Abramoski’s contention that SED violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection as being without merit, explaining that SED was not a party to the contracts that provided Abramoski’s rights to lifetime post-retirement health and dental insurance coverage. The fact that SED's determination may have incidentally affected Abramoski’s ability to collect such benefits, said the Appellate Division, does not support her allegations of constitutional violations.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_08880.htm

NYC school principal’s appeal of a disciplinary action brought by the NYC Department of Education pursuant to Education Law §3020 sustained in part

NYC school principal’s appeal of a disciplinary action brought by the NYC Department of Education pursuant to Education Law §3020 sustained in part

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,848

A NYC school principal [Principal] was found guilty of certain disciplinary charges by an arbitrator pursuant to Education Law §3020(3), appealed the arbitrator’s determination.

The Commissioner ruled that the Principal’s appeal must be sustained in part, noting that Education Law §3020, as amended by adding a new subdivision 3, the City School District of the City of New York and any employee organization representing employees or titles that are or were covered by any memorandum of agreement executed by the District and the Council of Supervisors and Administrators of the City of New York to negotiate agreements that modify or replace the procedures set forth in Education Law §§3020-a and 2590-j(7).  §3020(3). The Commissioner also noted that “the Commissioner shall review any appeals brought in accordance with such agreements.”

Pursuant to Education Law §3020(3), the Council and the District entered into an agreement [Agreement] establishing a modified disciplinary procedures that, to the extent relevant in this appeal, provided that “at the principal’s option, allegations of misconduct may be presented to an impartial arbitrator who will decide whether just cause exists for the proposed action.”

The agreement further provides that, at the request of the principal, the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education [Chancellor] may review the arbitrator’s decision, “which review must be complete within 15 days of such decision.”  The Agreement provides that “[t]he employee shall be provided with written notice of the outcome of the Chancellor’s review.”  If the Chancellor implements the arbitrator’s decision against the principal, the principal may then apply to the Commissioner of Education for review of the arbitrator’s decision.

The arbitrator issued a final decision on June 20, 2015, finding Principal guilty of certain charges and specifications and imposed a penalty of suspension, such suspension to terminated effective July 1, 2014. 

Although the Principal wrote asking the Chancellor seeking a review the arbitrator’s decision within 15 days and providing her with a written notice of the outcome of the Chancellor’s review in timely fashion, the record indicates that Principal did not receive any response.  On August 19, 2015, the Principal commenced this appeal from the hearing officer’s determination, contending that the arbitrator’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and unsupported by the evidence. 

The Commissioner said that she would not render an advisory opinion on an issue before it becomes justiciable, explaining that Article VII(J)(4)(a)(6) of the Agreement clearly provides that either the superintendent or the principal [1] may request a review of the arbitrator’s decision by the Chancellor and if such a request is timely made, [2] requires the Chancellor to complete such review within 15 days and which further requires the Chancellor to provide the employee with written notice of the outcome of the review.  

Thus, said the Commissioner, the Agreement contemplates that the Chancellor “will review the arbitrator's decision, and render a decision of her own.” 

Noting that Commissioner’s regulations implementing Education Law §3020(3) are set out in 8 NYCRR Part 281 and are consistent with provisions in the Agreement, the Commissioner said that record before her contained no such decision by the Chancellor. 

Although the Principal interpreted the Chancellor’s silence as a default, entitling her to appeal the hearing officer’s decision directly to the Commissioner, the Commissioner said that there was no authority for such an action. 

Accordingly, the Commissioner ordered “the Chancellor to review the [arbitrator’s] decision and provide [the Principal] with written notice of the outcome of such review within 15 days of the date of [the Commissioner’s] decision in accordance with Article VII(J)(4)(a)(6) of the Agreement.”

The Commissioner also noted that the Principal “retains the right to commence a new appeal to the Commissioner in the event that the Chancellor implements the hearing officer’s decision” within 15 days from the Principal’s receipt of written notice of the Chancellor’s decision in the event the Principal is unhappy with the Chancellor’s decision.

 

The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume55/d16848

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The Discipline Book - A 458 page guide focusing on New York State laws, rules, regulations, disciplinary grievances procedures set out in collective bargaining agreements and selected court and administrative decisions concerning disciplinary actions involving state and municipal public officers and employees. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/5215.html

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Recent decisions by NYC Office of Administrative Tribunals and Hearing Administrative Law Judges

Recent decisions by NYC Office of Administrative Tribunals and Hearing Administrative Law Judges

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Unnecessary use of force on inmates

OATH Index No. 156/16

ALJ Alessandra F. Zorgniotti found that a New York City correction officer violated the Department's use of force directive on two occasions by using unnecessary force on inmates who were restrained and also filing a false report. 

ALJ Zorgniotti recommended termination of the correction office's employment.  

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/16_cases/16-156.pdf

Employee served with disciplinary charges after complaining about being denied a "day off" on a holiday

OATH Index No. 2686/15

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey recommended dismissal of charges alleging an New York City Environmental Police Officer was guilty of “conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline by using inappropriate language” to a superior after finding that the Department failed to show that the officer engaged in misconduct when he complained to a supervisor about being denied the day off on a holiday, in this instance Christmas Day.

The ALJ found that the employee’s supervisor had consented to his repeating his complaint to his co-workers and held that “[a] verbal disagreement or expression of dissatisfaction with a supervisor is not always misconduct, even in a paramilitary setting.”

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/15_cases/15-2686.pdf

Public Officers Law §36 provides for the removal of an individual from public office for self-dealing, corrupt activities, conflict of interest, moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing or violation of a public trust

Public Officers Law §36 provides for the removal of an individual from public office for self-dealing, corrupt activities, conflict of interest, moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing or violation of a public trust

Libordi v Isaman, 2015 NY Slip Op 08552, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Francis Libordi initiated an action in the Appellate Division, 4^th Department, pursuant §36 of the Public Officers Law in an effort to have Kenneth Isaman, a public officer, removed from his position of Town Supervisor of the Town of Hornellsville.*

Libordi alleged that Isaman had been involved in “self-dealing” and had a conflict of interest arising from his employment by an insurance agency that did business with the Town while serving as Town Supervisor. The Appellate Division said that Isaman "conclusively refuted those allegations” and that Libordi failed to present evidence to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to such allegations.

Libordi also alleged another conflict of interest in that Isaman voted at Town Board meetings in favor of appointing his wife to positions with the Town Board, and approving the salaries for her positions.

Noting "[R]emoval from office pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 is an extreme remedy reserved for officials engaged in self-dealing, corrupt activities, conflict of interest, moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing or violation of a public trust," the court said that [1] Isaman admitted that he should have abstained from those votes and [2] his failure to do so "does not constitute the type of conduct that would warrant removal from office."

The court then unanimously dismissed Libordi’s action.

* Any citizen resident in the jurisdiction, or the appropriate district attorney, may file an application seeking the removal of a public officer enumerated in §36 of the Public Officers Law with the Appellate Division in the appropriate judicial department. §36 requires that a copy of the application and the charges upon which the application is to be made must be served upon the officer at least 8 days prior to such filing. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_08552.htm

Where there is conflicting medical evidence Retirement System may rely on its expert’s opinion when such opinion is supported by substantial evidence

Where there is conflicting medical evidence Retirement System may rely on its expert’s opinion when such opinion is supported by substantial evidence 

Gonzalez v DiNapoli, 2015 NY Slip Op 08491, Appellate Division, Third Department

New York State and Local Police and Fire Retirement System [NYSLPFRS] denied Michael Gonzalez’s application for performance of duty disability retirement benefits.*

Gonzalez, a police officer, was diagnosed with coronary artery disease and underwent triple bypass surgery in 2010. After his application was denied by NYSLPFRS Gonzalez requested a hearing and redetermination. At the subsequent hearing, NYSLPFRS conceded that Gonzalez's heart disease was causally related to his employment pursuant to the statutory presumption set out in §363-a of the Retirement and Social Security Law, but challenged his claim that he was permanently disabled from performing his job duties.

The Hearing Officer found, among other things, that Gonzalez had failed to demonstrate that he was permanently disabled. After NYSLPFRS adopted the findings and conclusions of the Hearing Officer and denied Gonzalez’s application, he initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a court order vacating NYSLPFRS’ decision. 

The Appellate Division affirmed NYSLPFRS’ ruling, explaining that "In connection with any application for . . . performance of duty disability retirement benefits, the applicant bears the burden of proving that he or she is permanently incapacitated from the performance of his or her job duties."

Moreover, respondent "is vested with the authority to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence and to credit the opinion of one expert over another, and its determination will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence."

Gonzalez had presented the report of his treating cardiologist, Dr. Kenneth Kaplan, who opined that Gonzales should not return to his usual police duties due to the stress involved in the job and that petitioner was permanently disabled.

In contrast, NYSLPFRS presented the report and testimony of cardiologist Dr. Sydney Mehl, who had examined Gonzalez and reviewed his medical records at NYSLPFRS’ request. Dr. Mehl opined that Gonzalez was not permanently incapacitated from performing his job duties, including running and physical altercations based on the successful outcome of his by-pass surgery, normal results from his cardiac examination and an electrocardiogram and Gonzalez’s report of having a "good" cardiac stress test.

While Gonzalez had challenged Dr. Mehl's opinion on the ground that Dr. Mehl did not include a list of the records he had reviewed in forming the opinion, Dr. Mehl had testified that he had reviewed all the records sent to him, including Gonzalez's job duties.

The Appellate Division said that notwithstanding the evidence in the record that would support a contrary result, insofar as Dr. Mehl's opinion was rational, fact-based and founded upon a physical examination of Gonzalez and a review of the relevant medical records, NYSLPRS’ determination was supported by substantial evidence and “it will not be disturbed.”

* Gonzalez had also filed an application for accidental disability retirement contending that he was permanently disabled due an accident that occurred on August 12, 2010 while performing his job duties. A hearing addressing his application for accidental disability retirement was conducted with Gonzalez's performance of duty disability retirement application hearing. Gonzalez's application for accidental disability retirement was denied. The court said that as Gonzalez had not addressed the denial of his accidental disability application in his appeal brief, it was deemed abandoned.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_08491.htm