ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

April 07, 2016

Disability discrimination complaint dismissed upon showing that no reasonable accommodation was available



Disability discrimination complaint dismissed upon showing that no reasonable accommodation was available
Whitfield v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2016 NY Slip Op 02535, Appellate Division, First Department

The New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR), adopting the recommended order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dismissed the disability discrimination complaint Wade Whitfield filed against the New York City Department of Education (DOE). Whitfield appealed.

In considering Whitfield’s appeal of DHR’s determination the Appellate Division said that substantial evidence supported DHR's determination that Whitfield did not suffer from a disability for purposes of his claim under the New York State Human Rights Law. The decision indicates that:

1. Whitfield had been employed as a paraprofessional by DOE. His duties involved his lifting students weighing more that 40 pounds. 

2. An orthopedist who examined Whitfield had opined that the most he could lift was 40 pounds.

3. At his hearing DHR hearing Whitfield testified that most students in the school district where he was employed weighed more than 40 pounds. 

4. DOE witnesses at the DHR hearing had testified testified that, due to the fact that all students in District 75 were disabled, there were no District 75 paraprofessional positions that did not require the incumbent to have the ability to lift more than 40 pounds.

The ALJ credited this testimony and the Appellate Division said that those factual determinations are entitled to "substantial deference." In addition, the court said that given Whitfield's “medically prescribed weight limitations,” DHR properly determined that there was no "reasonable accommodation that would have enabled [Whitfield] to perform the essential functions of his … position."

The court, dismissing Whitfield’s appeal, noted that the record showed that DOE did attempt to accommodate Whitfield by encouraging him to apply for an extension of his leave of absence from his position as [1] his medical limitations would have qualified him for an extended leave of absence, and [2] his application would have been approved had he applied. 

The Appellate Division observed that Whitfield “inexplicably refused to apply for an extended leave of absence, however, despite being repeatedly urged to do so by the principal and other DOE representatives.”

Whitfield had also filed disability discrimination claims pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Appellate Division dismissed this branch of Whitfield’s appeal as well, explaining ADAclaims are governed by the same legal standards' as disability discrimination claims under the State HRL."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


April 06, 2016

A tenured employee who resigns from his or her position and is subsequently reemployed by his or her former employer in the same title is not automatically entitled to tenure in the position


A tenured employee who resigns from his or her position and is subsequently reemployed by his or her former employer in the same title is not automatically entitled to tenure in the position
Springer v Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of N.Y., 27 NY3d 102

In January 2011 Grant Springer, a tenured teacher then employed by the New York City School District [NYCSD], resigned from his position. In October 2011 Springer applied for and was employed to teach at another NYCSD school. During the 2011-2012 school year, a new principal was appointed at the school at which Springer was employed, Tyee Chin.

In April 2012, Chin informed Springer that he did not believed Springer had tenure in his position. On the advice of his union representative, Springer submitted a form to withdraw his January 2011 resignation. NYCSD, however, told Springer that his request to withdraw his January 2011 resignation would not be processed “because it was submitted too late.”

In May 2012, Springer received a rating of "unsatisfactory" for the 2011-2012 school year and was terminated from his position effective June 22, 2012.

In October 2012, apparently without have earlier filed an administrative grievance challenging NYCSD's refusal to consider his request to withdraw his resignation or his termination, Springer initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding against NYCSD contending that “under paragraphs 28 and 29 of Chancellor's Regulation C-205, as well as the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the teachers' union, he ‘was a tenured teacher upon his reappointment’ and, therefore, "[NYCSD’s] decision to terminate his employment without just cause and without following the [disciplinary] procedures" in Education Law §3020-a his termination was unlawful and "arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion." He asked the court to direct his reinstatement to his teaching position and to provide related relief.

NYCSD asked Supreme Court to dismiss Springer's petition, contending, among other things, that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that Springer failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Supreme Court granted NYCSD’s motion and dismissed the proceeding, concluding that the petition was "premature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies." Springer then appealed the Supreme Court’s decision.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the result of the Supreme Court's ruling, but on a different ground (see 121 AD3d 473}. The Appellate Division concluded that "[t]here is no question that [Springer] failed to comply with [Chancellor's Regulations] C-205(28) and C-205(29), which govern withdrawal of a resignation and restoration to tenure." Hence, when [Springer] was rehired by a principal, his tenure was not, ipso facto,* restored. That same panel of the Appellate Division then granted that portion of Springer’s  subsequent motion seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, certifying the following question of law: "Was the [Appellate Division] order . . . properly made?"

The Court of Appeals commenced its review of Springer's appeal by noting that the Chancellor has the authority to promulgate regulations "necessary or convenient" to the administration of the New York City public school system and cited paragraph 28 of Chancellor's Regulation C-205, entitled "Withdrawal of Resignation Generally." C-205 sets out the general procedure for withdrawing a resignation and Paragraph 29, entitled "Withdrawal of Resignation Within Five Years by Tenured Staff, describes the procedure for the withdrawal of resignation by tenured teachers to permit them to return to teaching with tenure.

C-205(29) provides, in relevant part, that "[A] non-supervisory pedagogical employee who had attained permanent tenure prior to the date of resignation shall, remain tenured and, upon written request, be permitted to withdraw such resignation subject only to medical examination and the approval of the Chancellor, provided that reinstatement is made on or before the opening of school in September next following five years after the effective date of resignation. If reinstatement is made after this date, a two year probationary period will be required."

In the words of the Court of Appeals, “C-205(29) provides that a tenured teacher who has resigned may avoid a probationary term in a new position by submitting a ‘written request’ to withdraw the prior resignation. That request will be ‘subject only to medical examination and the approval of the Chancellor,’ so long as reinstatement is made in accordance with the timing requirements set forth in the Regulation. The CBA between the Board and the teachers' union contains a parallel provision.”

Springer argued that his written applications for various teaching positions satisfied the “written request to withdraw his resignation” requirement. He also contended that when “the [New York City Board of Education, Board,] rehired him in October 2011,  within five years of his prior resignation, the Board effectively accepted the withdrawal of his resignation.” Thus, said Springer, “he was a tenured teacher at the time of his termination in June 2012 and that the Board violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with the procedural protections required by Education Law §3020-a.”

NYCSD, on the other hand, argued that Springer “ignores the important role of the written request for withdrawal, most notably the Chancellor's role in the process.” Implying that a written request does not result in a “fait accompi,**insofar as regaining tenure is concerned, NYCSD said by submitting a written request, “the Chancellor is afforded the opportunity to assess the teacher's work history and competence and may reject a request to withdraw a resignation.” NYCSD also pointed out that the procedure permits important hiring information to be conveyed to a hiring principal, including the fact that the teacher would have full tenure rights in the teacher's new position or not, as the case might be.

The Court of Appeals concluded that “Because [Springer] did not withdraw his resignation through the mechanism of a written request, the requirements of C-205(29) were not met and [Springer] was not reinstated with tenure.” In the words of the court, “We hold that a tenured teacher who resigns, and later seeks to return as a tenured teacher, must strictly comply with the regulation and submit a written request to withdraw his or her prior resignation.”
Although Springer’s position was in the Unclassified Service,*** in the event a permanent employee in a position in the Classified Service**** of the State as the employer resigns from his or her position and subsequently wishes to withdraw his or her resignation he or she must obtain the approval of the appointing authority to do so. Rules for the Classified Service promulgated by the New York State Civil Service Commission, 4 NYCRR 5.3(c) provide that “A resignation may not be withdrawn, cancelled or amended after it is delivered to the appointing authority, without the consent of the appointing authority.”

Further, 4 NYCRR 5.4, Reinstatement following resignation provides, in pertinent part, that a former permanent State employee who has resigned from his or her position may be reinstated without examination within one year of the effective date of the resignation in the position from which he or she resigned, if then vacant. This rule, then further provides that “In an exceptional case, the commission may, for good cause shown and where the interests of the government would be served, waive the provisions of this section to permit the reinstatement of a person to his [or her] former position more than one year after resignation.”

Many local Civil Service Commissions have adopted rules similar to 4 NYCRR 5.4.

* Latin: By the very nature of the action or the act.

** Fait accompli is a French phrase which means literally "an accomplished deed". It is commonly used to describe an action which is completed.

*** See, generally, Civil Service Law §35.

**** See, generally, Civil Service Law §§40-45

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


April 05, 2016

Additional judicial scrutiny required in reviewing a compulsory arbitration proceeding


Additional judicial scrutiny required in reviewing a compulsory arbitration proceeding
Hamilton v Alley, 2016 NY Slip Op 01928, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

William E. Hamilton, a tenured administrator  employed by Jordan-Elbridge Central School District [District], was terminated from his position following a disciplinary hearing conducted pursuant to Education Law §3020-a(5). Hamilton initiated an Article 75 action challenging his dismissal by the District, seeking a court order directing his reinstatement to his former position with the District.*

With respect to Thomas’ contention that Supreme Court “failed to apply the correct standard of review,” the Appellate Division said that in its view the lower court “properly identified and applied the ‘additional layer of judicial scrutiny’ applicable to a compulsory arbitration proceeding,** and it recognized and appropriately decided the matter on the basis that the arbitrator's decision had evidentiary support and was not arbitrary and capricious.”

As the court held in City School District of New York v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, such “additional layer of judicial scrutiny” involves the court finding that the award has “evidentiary support” and “neither being arbitrary nor capricious.”

Although the Appellate Division concluded that “there was no rational basis for the Hearing Officer to apply the crime exception with respect to amended charges Nos. 7 and 8” and modified the order accordingly, this did not affect the penalty imposed on Thomas, termination.

Although Thomas contended that the Hearing Officer had imposed an inappropriate penalty, termination,” the Appellate Division opined that "[i]n light of the litany of specifications proven against [Thomas], the penalty of dismissal does not shock the conscience."

* The Appellate Division noted that Supreme Court erred in determining that Thomas’ special proceeding was not timely commenced and that his supporting papers and amended petition were not timely served. However, said the court, in any event Supreme Court addressed the merits of Thomas’ amended petition.

** See Powell v Board of Educ. of Westbury Union Free School Dist., 91 AD3d 955, summarized at http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2012/02/where-arbitration-is-statutorily.html

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
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The Discipline Book - A 458 page guide focusing on New York State laws, rules, regulations, disciplinary grievances procedures set out in collective bargaining agreements and selected court and administrative decisions concerning disciplinary actions involving state and municipal public officers and employees. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/5215.html
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April 04, 2016

Failing to provide a fair hearing requires the voiding a Civil Service Commission’s decision sustaining the termination of an employee by the appointing authority


Failing to provide a fair hearing requires the voiding a Civil Service Commission’s decision sustaining the termination of an employee by the appointing authority
Pinheiro v. Civil Service Comm. for the Cnty. of Fresno, California Court of Appeal, Docket F070473

John Pinheiro was dismissed from his position as the County of Fresno’s labor relations manager. The County of Fresno Civil Service Commission sustained Pinheiro termination and he filed a “writ of mandate” seeking a court order vacating the Commission’s decision.

Pinheiro contended that his right to a fair trial* was violated because the Commission:

(1) relied on evidence obtained outside the Commission hearing;

(2) used law enforcement records as a factor in sustaining his termination;

(3) relied on acts of alleged misconduct more than three years old;

(4) relied on evidence that was not admitted and excluding evidence relevant to his defenses; and

(5) relied on evidence of contact with another individual prior to any directive prohibiting such contact.

The trial court sustained the Commission’s action. However, the California Court of Appeals vacated the lower court’s ruling, explaining that Pinheiro had not been given a fair trial because the Commission considered and relied on information taken outside the hearing in reaching its decision.

Citing La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47, the court said “The decision … should be based on the record and not on off-the-record discussions from which the parties are excluded,” indicating that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers which are required to make a determination after a hearing cannot act on their own information and nothing may be treated as evidence which has not been introduced as such, inasmuch “as a hearing requires that the party be apprised of the evidence against him in order that he [or she] may refute, test and explain it.”

As Pinheiro had no opportunity to refute or explain such information, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling and remanded the matter to the Commission for a new hearing as “Pinheiro was denied a fair hearing” by the Commission.

* The court said that the “fair trial” requirement of California’s Code of Civil Procedure §1094.5 is not synonymous with constitutional due process and does not mandate “a formal hearing under the due process clause,” [see Pomona College v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.App.4th1716]. What is required, said the court is simply a “fair administrative hearing,” that affords the individual a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

An individual or organization must have “standing” in order to maintain an Article 78 action challenging an administrative decision


An individual or organization must have “standing” in order to maintain an Article 78 action challenging an administrative decision
Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2016 NY Slip Op 02154, Appellate Division, First Department

Michael P. Thomas, then a public school teacher, employed by the Manhattan Center for Science and Mathematics (MCSM), filed allegations with the New York City Department of Education [DOE’ that the court characterized as involving “a misappropriation of federal funds received by MCSM under Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Action of 1965, reauthorized as the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of 2001.”

DOE, following an administrative investigation, determined that Thomas’ allegations of misappropriation of Title I funds were unsubstantiated. Thomas then initiated the Article 78 action challenging DOE’s determination. Supreme Court dismissed Thomas’s petition; the Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s decision.

The Appellate Division ruled that Thomas, although a member of MCSM's School Leadership Team lacks standing to challenge the results of DOE's investigation of his allegations he had brought pursuant to "No Child Left Behind Written Complaint and Appeal Procedures" adopted by the New York State Education Department.

The court explained that Thomas’ status as a complainant who initiated an administrative investigation did not give him standing to maintain “a private right of action to challenge the agency's determination” unless he could demonstrate that he had suffered an actual injury as a result of DOE’s decision. The court concluded that Thomas had failed to demonstrate that he had “suffered and actual injury” as a result of DOE’s administrative determination.

Another obstacle to Thomas' ability to maintain the action, said the Appellate Division, was that Thomas did not "fall within the zone of interests . . . sought to be promoted or protected" by Education Law §2590-h or the NCLB”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com