A probationary employee may not be dismissed from his or her position in bad faith or for an improper or unlawful reason

A probationary employee may not be dismissed from his or her position in bad faith or for an improper or unlawful reason

Castro v Schriro, 2016 NY Slip Op 05105, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied Raymond Castro’s CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a court order annulling  his termination from his position as a probationary correction officer with the New York City Department of Corrections [DOC]. The Appellate Division, reversing the lower court’s action, reinstated Castro’s petition and remanded the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division summarized the events leading to Castro’s termination as follows: Castro was terminated “after an inmate died because [Castro’s] superior, a captain, thwarted the efforts of several people, including Officer Castro, to assist the inmate with his medical condition. Officer Castro cooperated in the investigation of the inmate's death and the federal prosecution of his superior.”

The decision sets out “the present record” with respect to the events that preceded Castro’s termination in some detail and opines that “Officer Castro's termination, without an explanation [by DOC], appears questionable and in bad faith. Under the circumstances, this Court is unable to conclude that his claim of wrongful termination as a probationary correction officer is without foundation to warrant a pre-answer dismissal based solely on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.”

Citing Swinton v Safir, 93 NY2d 758, the Appellate Division said that a “probationary employee may be dismissed for almost any reason, or for no reason at all, and the employee has no right to challenge the termination in a hearing or otherwise,* absent a showing that he or she was dismissed in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason” and the burden falls on the petitioner to demonstrate by competent proof that bad faith exists, or that the termination was for an improper or impermissible reason.”

DOC had asked Supreme Court to dismiss Castro’s Article 78 petition at the pre-answer stage on the sole ground that his petition failed to state a cause of action. The Appellate Division said it disagreed with Supreme Court's determination that the petition failed to sufficiently state a claim of improper termination of a probationary correction officer, noting that Castro alleged that his termination was arbitrary and capricious, and in bad faith and set out “a factual predicate for his allegations.”

Castro’s petition, said the court, “avers that despite serving as a correction officer who acted in complete accord with DOC's rules and proper protocol, pursuant to orders from his supervisor, and in full cooperation with the investigation of inmate Echevarria's death, which lead to Captain Pendergrass' indictment, Officer Castro was inexplicably terminated.”

Noting that in its appeal DOC made no attempt to refute Castro’s allegations but simply argued that, as a probationary employee, it was not required to furnish Castro with the charges against him and he could be dismissed without a reason being stated.

The Appellate Division rejected DOC’s argument, explaining that Castro’s termination was within the ambit of an exception to this general principle. The court ruled that where a substantial issue of bad faith is raised, as was here the case, in that the termination a probationary employee may not have been the result of the probationary employee's failure to perform his or her duties satisfactorily but may have been due to some improper basis, a petition should not be dismissed on the pleadings.

DOC presented nothing other than a pre-answer motion to dismiss Castro based on the sole ground that Castro’s petition failed to state a claim of improper termination. The Appellate Division said that although the burden falls squarely on Castro to demonstrate by competent proof at an evidentiary hearing that his termination was for an improper or impermissible reason, DOC, as the firing agency, “should be required to provide responsive pleadings so as to explain the basis of the termination.”  

Accordingly, the matter was remanded to Supreme Court for further consideration.

* Courts have ruled that probationers are entitled to notice and hearing if the appointing authority seeks to dismiss the individual during his or her minimum period of probation. The rationale for this was noted in McKee v. Jackson, 152 AD2d 54, where the court said that a probationer is entitled to a minimum period of time to demonstrate his or her ability to successfully perform the duties of the position. In contrast, as the Court of Appeals held in Gray v Bronx Developmental Center, 65 NY2d 904, a probationer may be dismissed without notice and hearing after completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to the expiration of his or her maximum period of probation.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_05105.htm

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Where the collective bargaining agreement so provides, an allegation that the employer violated the “whistle-blower” statute is adjudicated in accordance with the terms of the agreement

Where the collective bargaining agreement so provides, an allegation that the employer violated the “whistle-blower” statute is adjudicated in accordance with the terms of the agreement

DiGregorio v MTA Metro-N. R.R., 2016 NY Slip Op 04807, Appellate Division, First Department

A former employee of MTA Metro-North Railroad, Lisa DiGregorio, sued MTA Metro-North alleging it had violated §75-b of New York State’s Civil Service Law, the so-called “whistle-blower statute” applicable to employees of the State and political subdivisions of the State.

The Appellate Division, citing Subdivisions (3)(b) and (3)(c) of Civil Service Law §75-b, affirmed Supreme Court’s dismissal of her petition, explaining that Lisa DiGregorio’s complaint “may not be litigated in this forum” because the relevant collective bargaining agreement contained provisions addressing situations involving the employer's taking of adverse personnel actions and which contains a final and binding arbitration provision.

Accordingly, said the court, DiGregorio was required to arbitrate her complaint.* 

CSL §75-b(2)(a) provides that “(a) A public employer shall not dismiss or take other disciplinary or other adverse personnel action against a public employee regarding  the employee's employment because the employee disclosed allegations of  “improper governmental action” to a  governmental body if the employee satisfies certain conditions.

CSL §75-b(3)(b) provides that “Where an employee is subject to a collectively negotiated agreement which contains provisions preventing an employer from taking adverse personnel actions and which contains a final and binding arbitration provision to resolve alleged violations of such provisions of the agreement and the employee reasonably believes that such personnel action would not have been taken but for the conduct protected under [subdivision 2 of CSL §75-b], he or she may assert such as a claim before the arbitrator. The arbitrator shall consider such claim and determine its merits and shall, if a determination is made that such adverse personnel action is based on a violation by the employer of such subdivision, take such action to remedy the violation as is permitted by the collectively negotiated agreement.” [Emphasis supplied].

In contrast, if a public employee is not subject to any of the provisions of CSL §75-b(2)(a) or §75-b(2)(b), the individual may commence “an action in a court of competent jurisdiction under the same terms and conditions as set out in Labor Law Article 25-c.”

Article 25-c[4] of the Labor Law provides that where an employer is alleged to have violated Article 25-c, “An employee who has been the subject of a retaliatory personnel action in violation of this section may institute a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction for relief as set forth in subdivision five of this section within one year after the alleged retaliatory personnel action was taken.”

* In Kowaleski v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 16 NY3d 85, the Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator’s refusal to hear an employee’s “whistle blower” defense in the course of disciplinary hearing required the vacating of the award.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04807.htm

A two-prong test is used by courts to determine if a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration

A two-prong test is used by courts to determine if a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration

Matter of Cortland County (CSEA, Inc., Local 1000 AFSCME, AFL-CIO), 2016 NY Slip Op 04481, Appellate Division, Third Department

Lawrence Jackson, a correction officer employed by the Cortland County Sheriff’s Department [County], was diagnosed with plantar fasciitis* in his left foot and was subsequently awarded workers' compensation benefits. However, his application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c was denied, which administrative determination was affirmed by the Appellate Division [see Matter of Jackson v Barber, 133 AD3d 958].

In August 2013, Jacksonsubmitted a physician's note stating that, as a result of his foot condition, he was restricted from working more than 40 hours and 35 minutes per week. Although the County initially accommodated Jackson's limitation, in September 2013, the County notified Jackson that his "availability to work mandatory overtime [wa]s an essential function of [his] position" and that his "limited availability pose[d] a safety issue . . . [that] could result in an understaffed shift," it could not accommodate his work "restriction on a continuing basis" and was therefore placing him on family and medical leave until such time as he was "able to complete all essential functions of [his] position."

Jackson’s employee organization for collective bargaining, CSEA, Inc., Local 1000 [CSEA], submitted a grievance on behalf of Jackson alleging the County had violated the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] between the parties by refusing to accommodate Jackson's work restriction. The County denied the grievance. In response to CSEA’s demand for arbitration the County filed a petition in Supreme Court pursuant to §7503(b) of the CPLR seeking a permanent stay of arbitration.

Concluding that the dispute was arbitrable, Supreme Court denied the County’s application for the permanent stay of arbitration. The County appealed and the Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division explained that "The court's role in reviewing applications to stay arbitration is . . . a limited one" and a two-prong test is used to determine if the dispute arbitrable.

The court initially considers if the subject of the claim sought to be arbitrated is the type authorized by Civil Service Law Article 14 [the Taylor Law] and is not barred by constitutional, statutory or public policy considerations, the first test. 

If the demand for arbitration meets this test, the court will then consider the grievance and arbitration provisions set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Where the arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement is broad, said the Appellate Division, courts "should merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA."

Not discerning any constitutional, statutory or public policy considerations that prohibit arbitration of the dispute, the Appellate Division considered the second prong of the test. Noting that the CBA defines an arbitrable grievance as "any alleged violation of the terms and conditions of employment,” as defined in the CBA, including any misinterpretation or misapplication of the agreement or past practices, the court noted that Article 5 of the CBA addresses employee work schedules, including certain required overtime, and includes a section on "Light Duty Assignments." **

As the CBA specifically addresses overtime and contemplates the availability of light-duty assignments, the Appellate Division found that there was a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA for the purpose of resolving the matter by arbitration. 

Recognizing that certain substantive clauses in the CBA might not support the grievances, the court said that  issue was irrelevant with respect to the threshold question of arbitrability, as the arbitrator, and not the court, is to resolve any uncertainty concerning the substantive rights and obligations of the parties."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court had properly determined that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration.

* A pain in the heel resulting from the inflammation the plantar, a thick band of tissue in the heel.

** Additionally, said the court, “Article 20 of the CBA discusses overtime and sets forth the procedure for assigning mandatory overtime shifts.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04481.htm

Member service credit in the New York State Teachers' Retirement System upon the reemployment of an individual receiving a disability retirement allowance by a New York State public employer

Member service credit in the New York State Teachers' Retirement System upon the reemployment of an individual receiving a disability retirement allowance by a New York State public employer

Porco v New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 2016 NY Slip Op 04777, Appellate Division, Third Department

Supreme Court dismissed Joan Porco's application seeking a review of the New York State Teachers' Retirement System’s [TRS] determination denying her years of service credit for retirement purposes for certain months of service.

Porco joined TRS as a “Tier 2” member upon commencing employment as a public school teacher. Subsequently Porco sustained a serious injury and applied for, and was granted, disability retirement pursuant to Education Law §511. Later Porco returned to work for a period of three months, during which period she continued receiving her disability retirement allowance. In response to Porco's request for clarification regarding earning "member service credit" for those three months of employment, TRS advised Porco that she was ineligible to receive such credit for that period of employment.

Ultimately TRS issued a final determination denying Porco member service credit for the disputed three-month period. Porco then initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging that determination. Supreme Court upheld TRS’s decision and dismissed Porco’s petition, which ruling was sustained by the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division, citing Maillard v New York State Teachers Retirement System, 57 AD3d 1299, explained when an administrative determination is rendered without a hearing, a court’s review "is limited to whether [the determination] is arbitrary, capricious or without a rational basis." Further, said the court, “given that [TRS] is charged with administering the retirement statutes at issue, its interpretations are entitled to deference and should be upheld unless they are irrational, unreasonable or inconsistent with the governing law.”

As a general rule, said the court, "retirement on a pension" causes a person's membership in the retirement system to cease. With respect to an individual receiving a retirement allowance from TRS, Education Law §511(5) permits "Tier 2 disability retirees" to resume active service while still receiving disability retirement benefits subject to certain limitations salary limitations. Such a retiree, however, "shall not become a member of [TRS]."

In contrast, should the retiree be restored to active service at a salary as great as, or greater, than his or her final average salary, "his [or her] retirement allowance shall cease, and he [or she] shall again become a member of [TRS]." Education Law §511[6] provides that such an individual’s "prior service certificate on the basis of which his [or her] service was computed at the time of his [or her] retirement shall be renewed." Upon such individual’s subsequent retirement, he or she "shall be credited" with both the service credit reflected in the prior service certificate and "all [of] his [or her] service as a member subsequent to the period covered by his [or her] prior service certificate"

Finding that TRS’s interpretation of these statutes was rational and reasonable, the Appellate Division concluded that Porco’s membership in TRS cease when she began receiving disability retirement benefits and although she had returned to work during the disputed three months, because her salary did not exceed the statutory cap, Education Law §511(5) explicitly barred her from becoming a member of TRS during that period of time.  

Accordingly, ruled the Appellate Division, TRS’s determination denying years of service credits to Porco for this three-month period would not be disturbed.

Similar rules apply is situations where an individual is receiving a retirement allowance from another New York public retirement system [see §150 of the Civil Service Law, Suspension of pension and annuity during public employment, and, generally, §§210 – 217 of the Retirement and Social Security Law] with respect to the re-employment of such retired individuals in public service of the State or a political subdivision of the State.

* The decision notes that Porco received $6,809.91 in disability retirement benefits as well as her salary during this three-month period.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2016/2016_04777.htm

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