ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

September 18, 2016

Students with a “disability for the purposes of IDEA” cannot establish a prima facie of unlawful discrimination based on the student being disabled for the purposes of ADA and §504


Students with a “disability for the purposes of IDEA” cannot establish a prima facie of unlawful discrimination based on the student being disabled for the purposes of ADA and §504
B.C., et al. v. Mount Vernon School District, et al, USCA 2nd Circuit, No. 143603cv

In addressing a question of “first impression”, the United State Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that as the definition of “disability” for the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102(1), [ADA] claims and claims under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §705(20), [§504] differ from the definition of “disability” for the purposes of claims advanced pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1401(3)(A) [IDEA].*

Accordingly, said the court, an individual with a “disability” under the IDEA does not categorically qualify as an individual with a disability under the ADA and §504 and data relating to “child[ren] with a disability” under the IDEA cannot establish a prima facie case with respect to a claim predicated on the plaintiff having a disability under the ADA and §504.

The court explained that “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADAor §504, a plaintiff must show the following: (1) plaintiff is a “qualified individual with a disability;” (2) plaintiff was “excluded from participation in a public entity’s services, programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by [the] public entity;” and (3) “such exclusion or discrimination was due to [plaintiff’s] disability.”

Further, said  the Circuit Court, “[t]he ADAasks whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity,  while the IDEA trains on whether an impairment necessitates ‘special education and related services.’ Thus, a child might ‘need special education and related services’ by reason of an impairment, id., even if that impairment does not ‘substantially limit … [a] major life activit[y].’” Citing Ellenberg v. N.M. Military Inst., 572 F.3d 815, 821 (10th Cir. 2009), the court said “one may … qualify as ‘disabled’ under the IDEA for purposes of that statute without demonstrating a ‘substantially limit[ing]’ impairment.”

* The ADA and Section 504 define the term “disability” differently than the IDEA does. The ADA defines “disability” as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A). Section 504 expressly incorporates, with certain qualifications not applicable here, the ADA’s definition. 29 U.S.C. §705(20)(B). By contrast, under the IDEA, a “child with a disability” has one or more of an enumerated list of impairments requiring “special education or related services."




September 17, 2016

Selected reports issued by the New York State Comptroller during the week ending September 17, 2016


Selected reports issued by the New York State Comptroller during the week ending September 17, 2016
Source: Office of the State Comptroller

[Internet links highlighted in color]

Former Pennellville Fire Chief Pleads Guity to petit larceny
Pennellville Volunteer Fireman’s Association (VFA) former Fire Chief Duane Royal pleaded guilty to petit larceny for stealing VFA gas for his private process-serving business. http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/sept16/091516.htm?utm_source=weekly+news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=corruption&utm_content=20160918&utm_campaign=fiscal+oversight

Sunset Park, Brooklyn, an economic snapshot
The population, the number of jobs and businesses, and the wages being paid in Sunset Park, Brooklynare all growing at a rapid pace, according to a report released by New York State’s Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.


September 16, 2016

Disparate treatment on the basis of a foreign accent is evidence of discrimination based on race or national origin


Disparate treatment on the basis of a foreign accent is evidence of discrimination based on race or national origin
Jeudy v City of New York, 2016 NY Slip Op 06045, Appellate Division, First Department

St. Jean Jeudy, born in Haiti, emigrated to the United States in 1994 and received a bachelor's degree in forensic science in 2003. Employed as a Criminalist I-B at New York City’s Office of the Chief Medical Examiner [OCME], in 2007 he applied for promotion to Criminalist II in early 2007 and was rejected.

By late 2010, Jeudy had been by employed by OCME for more than six years, but was still in an entry-level Criminalist I-B position. In contrast, a number of "non-black, American-accented" criminalists who were junior to him were promoted to Criminalist II and III.

Jeudy continued applying for promotion, and continued to be rejected. In March 2011, at his 2010 year-end review meeting, his supervisor told him that he was not being promoted because of his foreign accent. According to Jeudy, management had a standing practice of not promoting foreign-accented criminalists to Criminalist II, the level at which criminalists would be expected to testify in court, because management did not believe that foreign-accented criminalists could testify effectively.

The Appellate Division’s decision reports that:

1. A “Criminalist III told Jeudy that, as a result of his persistence and repeated complaints about not being promoted, management was 'out to get him'.”

2. “Thereafter, managers, including the heads of the Homicide and Sex Crimes Group to which Jeudy was assigned, embarked on a campaign to write [him] up for minor errors and give him unfavorable year-end reviews.”

3. Jeudy was served with “disciplinary charges and a suspension, which were resolved by a probationary retraining period.”

4. Jeudy “was given an unfavorable "Conditional" final performance rating, which was inconsistent with the favorable preliminary review he had been given only a month earlier.”

5. These actions resulted in Jeudy’s termination effective February 12, 2014.

In May Jeudy filed an Article 78 petition in Supreme Court asserting causes of action for racial and national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws [HRL].

Supreme Court granted the City motion to dismiss Jeudy’s complaint on the grounds that they were [1] time-barred and that [2] he failed to state a cause of action. Jeudy appealed.

With respect to the question of timeliness, the Appellate Division said that the statute of limitations under the State and City HRLs is three years. Thus, said the court, as Jeudy filed his complaint in this action on May 23, 2014, allegedly discriminatory acts committed before May 23, 2011 are facially untimely. However, said the court, his claims under the New York State HRL for failure to promote after May 23, 2011 are timely as Jeudy had alleged sufficient facts to meet his pleading burden for purposes of defeating the City’s motion to dismiss.

Further, said the court, his claims for failure to promote under the City HRL were also timely as Jeudy has adequately alleged "a single continuing pattern of unlawful conduct [starting from his first promotion rejection in 2007] extending into the [limitations] period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint” which permits consideration under the City HRL of all actions relevant to that claim, including those that would otherwise be time-barred.*

In the words of the Appellate Division, “it is undisputed that [Jeudy] made out the first three elements of his claim of invidious employment discrimination under the State and City HRLs. We find that he also made out the fourth element, that he was adversely or differently treated because of his race or national origin ... by alleging that management had a standing practice of refusing to promote foreign-accented criminalists, invoked this practice against him, and ultimately suspended and then terminated him when he persisted in seeking promotion and complaining about his rejections."

The court said that notwithstanding the City’s contentions to the contrary, “disparate treatment on the basis of a foreign accent is evidence of discrimination based on race or national origin.”

In addition, the court noted that Jeudy’s complaint also state a cause of action for retaliation under both the State and City HRLs, rejecting the City’s argument that  Jeudy had not been engaged in a protected activity. The Appellate Division explained that as Jeudy’s complaint was that he was not being promoted on account of his accent and a “plaintiff's foreign accent is inextricably linked with his national origin.”

The Appellate Division also rejected the City’s arguments that Jeudy failed to show a causal relationship between his complaints and his suspension and termination and the allegations in his complaint establish that the City's concerted campaign of excessive scrutiny following Jeudy's persistent applications for promotion and complaints about continual rejection was calculated to, and did, lead directly to his suspension and termination.

* The Appellate Division also noted that “… while, as plaintiff concedes, the continuing violations doctrine only applies to his claims of failure to promote under the City HRL [citations omitted], even under the State HRL, he ‘is not precluded from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.’”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

September 15, 2016

Are You a Micromanager? Get Over It.


Are You a Micromanager? Get Over It.
An article by Otis White posted on the Internet on September 14, 2016, by Governing. Copyrighted© 2016 by Otis White, otwhite@civic-strategies.com; re-posted by NYPPL with permission.

Fiorello La Guardia, New York's legendary mayor, ran every aspect of the city from his desk. That's nothing to emulate.

In February 1945, John Gunther sat at Fiorello La Guardia's elbow for eight hours and 20 minutes and watched him work. Gunther was a famous journalist. La Guardia was New York's mayor and was even more famous -- a short, profane whirling dervish of energy and ideas.

La Guardia did not disappoint. As Gunther watched, the mayor made decisions in machine-gun fashion, riffling through letters and reports on his desk, barking at this three secretaries, interrogating subordinates. He even found time to hold a press conference while seated at his desk.

No item, it seemed, was too small for La Guardia's attention. When the president of the New York Board of Education dropped by, he grilled her about lunchroom decorum, personnel transfers (he told her he would handle one of them personally) and pay raises. They argued a while about whether an administrator should get a $500-a-year raise or a $1,000 raise. At La Guardia's insistence, he got $500.

Gunther was stunned. As he wrote later, La Guardia "really runs the entire machinery of New York City, in all its dazzling complexity, singlehandedly."

Some regard Fiorello La Guardia as America's greatest mayor ever. Maybe, but he was a terrible manager. If you are a mayor, agency director or someone managing a complex civic project, think carefully about La Guardia's management style -- and then run from it as fast and far as possible.

That's because La Guardia was what we would call today a "micromanager," and by inserting himself into so many decisions he undermined those who worked for him. In short, we don't need mayors or top administrators to be involved in minutia. We need them to make strategic decisions that bring major results.

So consider this two-part test next time you're handed an issue: Can this decision be made at a lower level by those who will be directly involved in its implementation? And if the decision is made at that level, is it likely to affect other interests? If the answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second is no, then your response should be, "That's for you to decide." If the answer to the second question is yes, your response should be: "Pull together a group to make this decision and make sure these people are involved." Have a nagging sense that something might go wrong? Then add: "And when you reach a decision, run it past me."

Pushing decision-making to the appropriate level is one of the most important things a manager can do, for three reasons. First, all things being equal, it will result in better decisions. Believe it or not, teachers and cafeteria workers know more about lunchroom decorum than mayors. It makes sense, then, to have those closest to the decisions -- especially those who'll implement them -- involved in the solutions.

Second, it forces you to think about decision-making as a process and not just an act. And the more you think about the process, the better you can teach it to others. As you push decisions down, remind your managers of how good decisions are reached: with the right information, the right people, the right decision-making processes. Show them how to keep discussions open and frank, to consult widely about possible solutions and to consider testing solutions before fully implementing them.

Finally, pushing decisions down puts the emphasis where it should be, on hiring and training the right people. You cannot run a driver's license bureau, a downtown redevelopment project or the entire government of New York City by yourself. But you can, over time, staff it with good managers who'll make good decisions because they learned how to do so ... from you.

About the author

Otis White is president of Civic Strategies Inc., an Atlanta-based firm that does collaborative and strategic planning for local governments and civic organizations. He also writes frequently about civic leadership and change, in his blog at otiswhite.comand in national publications such as the New York Times. He originated the Urban Notebook feature on Governing.com in 2002, posting daily for five years.

In 2012, White published a multimedia book, "The Great Project: How a Single Civic Project Changed a City," for reading on an iPad. He hosts podcasts about civic leadership and is helping to create an annual event called the Civic Exchange to explore urban successes and how they come about. You can learn more about him at the Civic Strategies website.

September 14, 2016

From the Law Blogs


From the Law Blogs

Posted in Wolters Kluwer's WorkDay http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/

[Internet links highlighted in color]

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirms jury’s finding that “agency reorganization” was pretext for unlawful termination of assistant county solicitor

Declining to decide whether there is a “reorganization exception” to procedural due process requirements when a government employee with a protected property interest loses her job in a “reorganization,” the Third Circuit found that such an exception would not apply here because the evidence indicated the assistant county solicitor’s termination was based not on identity-neutral, cost-driven reasons, but on the defendants’ knowledge of her and of the people who would occupy the part-time positions created to replace her full-time position. Essentially, the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the reorganization was pretext for unlawful termination. The appeals court affirmed the $94,232 award on the employee’s Section 1983 claim and affirmed the award of $186,018 in attorneys’ fees and costs (Mancini v. Northampton County).

Ms. Park’s article is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/jury-found-reorg-was-pretext-to-oust-county-attorney-94k-award-upheld/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CCH-Workday+%28WK+WorkDay%29 


© 2016 CCH Incorporated. All rights reserved. The foregoing summary is reprinted with permission. This article was published in Wolters Kluwer Daily Reporting Suite on September 14, 2016. For more information, please click here [http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/files/DailiesReprintPermissionsAfter7Days.pdf]



Virginia courts find the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 does not entitle returning military personnel to a 2-year convalescence period after reemployment

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA 38 U.S.C. 4301-4335) [USERRA] afford returning service members protection only during the act of rehiring, ruled the Virginia Supreme Court, in affirming a state trial court’s grant of summary judgment against a deputy sheriff who claimed that her employer failed to sufficiently accommodate her service-related disabilities. The county sheriff’s office met its obligations under USERRA by promptly reemploying the plaintiff in the same position she held prior to leaving for service, the court found. It also determined that the sheriff was not required to allow her a two-year convalescence period following reemployment before terminating her employment (Huff v. Winston).

Ms. Hackeroff’s article is posted on the Internet at: http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/returning-service-member-not-entitled-to-2-year-convalescence-period-after-reemployment/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CCH-Workday+%28WK+WorkDay%29 

© 2016 CCH Incorporated. All rights reserved. The foregoing summary is reprinted with permission. This article was published in Wolters Kluwer Daily Reporting Suite on September 14, 2016. For more information, please click here [http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/files/DailiesReprintPermissionsAfter7Days.pdf]



United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, rules supervisors of county employee are immune from lawsuit alleging deliberate indifference to a known workplace danger

Although the widow of a health district employee who died due to workplace exposure to toxic mold had shown a violation of a due process right to be free from state-created danger, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit nonetheless reversed an order denying qualified immunity to two of the employee’s superiors because it was not clearly established, at the time of their allegedly unconstitutional actions, that the state-created danger doctrine applied to claims based on workplace conditions. Judge Noonan dissented and Judge Murguia dissented in part (Pauluk v. Savage).

Ms. Park’s article is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/supervisors-immune-from-suit-claiming-deliberate-indifference-to-known-danger-of-workplace-toxic-mold/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CCH-Workday+%28WK+WorkDay%29 

© 2016 CCH Incorporated. All rights reserved. The foregoing summary is reprinted with permission. This article was published in Wolters Kluwer Daily Reporting Suite on September 14, 2016. For more information, please click here [http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/files/DailiesReprintPermissionsAfter7Days.pdf]
 

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Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
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