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August 08, 2017

Second Circuit Court of Appeals to again consider if discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII


Second Circuit Court of Appeals to again consider if discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited by Title VII
Zarda v Altitude Express dba Skydive Long Island, USCA, Docket No. 15-3775

In Simonton v Runyon, 232 F.3d 33,* the Second Circuit said that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, the role of a court is limited to discerning and adhering to legislative meaning." The court then ruled that "[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no cause of action under Title VII [the Civil Rights Act of 1964] because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation."

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has voted to conduct an en banc** rehearing of a three-judge panel’s decision in Zarda v Altitude Express*** declining Zarda's request that it overturn Simonton, a 2000 decision by the Second Circuit.

Following disposition of Zarda's appeal by the three judge panel, a judge of the Court requested a poll be taken on whether to rehear the case en banc. A poll was conducted and a majority of the active judges of the court voted in favor of rehearing Zarda's appeal en banc and it was so ordered.

However, rehearing Zarda's appeal en banc may present additional arguments for the Appellate Division to consider.

It has been reported that the U.S. Department of Justice will file an amicus brief contending that Title VII does not include protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation while it has been also reported that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will file an amicusbrief arguing that Title VII does prohibit discrimination based on the sexual orientation of the individual.  

* The decision in Simonton v Runyon  is posted on the Internet at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1203810.html

** A case heard by all the judges of a court rather than by a panel of judges selected from the entire court is said to heard en banc

*** This decision of the three-judge panel is posted on the Internet at:


August 07, 2017

School districts and other public employers in New York State may be considering providing paid family leave pursuant to the State's Paid Family Leave Act


School districts and other public employers in New York State may be considering providing paid family leave pursuant to the State's Paid Family Leave Act
Source: Shannon K. Buffum, Esq. writing for Harris Beach, PLLC's New York Municipalities Blog

Most private employers in New York State will be required to provide benefits under the New York Paid Family Leave Act [PFLA] effective January 1, 2018. In contrast, a public employer, including a school district, is not mandated to provide PFLA benefits but may to do so if it wishes. 

Ms. Buffum notes that "In the event a public employer currently provides disability benefits, but decides to not offer paid family leave benefits,  the public employer must notify its employees and the Workers’ Compensation Board of this decision no later than December 1, 2017."

However, in her PFLA article, posted on the Internet at: https://www.harrisbeach.com/new-york-municipalities-blog/caution-warranted-school-districts-considering-paid-family-leave/, Ms. Buffum also notes that some school districts in the state may be considering providing benefits for their officers and employees under the PFLA.

Workers' Compensation Board regulations implementing the Act, 12 NYCRR 355, et. seq.*, are posted on the Internet at http://www.wcb.ny.gov/PFL/pfl-regs.jsp.

It should be remembered that a public employer's unilaterally providing or withdrawing a benefit that constitutes a negotiable term or condition of employment may have committed an improper practice within the meaning of the Taylor Law [Civil Service Law Article 14].

* The Statutory Authority for promulgating 12 NYCRR 355, et. seq., is cited as Workers' Compensation Law §§117, 205, 221 and 206.

August 04, 2017

Termination of "over-65" retired former county employees reemployed on a part-time basis did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act


Termination of "over-65" retired former county employees reemployed on a part-time basis did not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Carson v Lake County, Indiana, USCA, 7th Circuit, No. 16-3665

Source: Article by Kathleen Kapusta, J.D. posted in Employment Law News from WK WorkDay

Age was a necessary but insufficient factor in a county’s decision to terminate part-time rehired retirees who were 65 years old or older, the Seventh Circuit stated, finding no evidence the county employer engaged in unlawful discrimination. Affirming summary judgment against their ADEA claims, the appeals court explained that a combination of current employment and participation in a supplemental insurance program was the decisive factor that distinguished the population of terminated employees from the larger workforce. Summary judgment was also affirmed against their equal protection claim (Carson v. Lake County, Indiana, July 26, 2017, Hamilton, D.).

The plaintiffs, retirees who had been rehired part time, received a Medicare supplemental health insurance policy through Aetna that was paid for by the county. In 2013, Aetna informed the county that current employees, including rehired retirees, could not participate in the supplemental insurance plan without the county risking either forfeiting its supplemental insurance coverage altogether or incurring substantial costs to bring the plan into compliance with federal rules and regulations governing group health insurance.

The criteria. After consulting with an employee benefits attorney who confirmed Aetna’s position and advised the county “not to rehire any retirees,” or, alternatively, to rehire them full-time and offer them regular benefits, the county, in 2013, terminated 28 part-time rehired retirees. In its letter to the retirees, the county explained that they were selected for termination because they met each of four criteria: (1) they had retired from county service and were later rehired part-time; (2) they were age 65 or older; (3) they were receiving Medicare as their primary insurance; and (4) they were enrolled in the Aetna supplement. A much larger group of employees age 65 or older who were not enrolled in the supplement continued their employment with the county.

Plaintiffs, a subset of the 28 part-time employees who were terminated, sued the county for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the district court granted the county’s motion.

Not facially discriminatory. Arguing on appeal that the county’s decision was discriminatory on its face, the plaintiffs asserted that since all part-time employees who were terminated were age 65 or older, and since age was one of the criteria listed in the termination letter, “age was a but-for cause, as their age was a necessary condition for the defendant’s decision to terminate them.” The problem with this argument, said the court, was that age was not the impetus for the decision.

Noting that the plaintiffs shared four characteristics—they were (1) age 65 or older, (2) enrolled in Medicare for their primary health insurance coverage, but also were (3) rehired retirees, and (4) most important, enrolled in the Aetna supplemental policy—the court explained that the county did not terminate them because of their ages. Rather, it terminated them because they were enrolled in a retiree-only insurance plan in which current employees could not participate.

Not a proxy. The plaintiffs also argued that Medicare eligibility, and presumably enrollment in a Medicare supplement, may function as a proxy for age, such that an employer’s decision to terminate an employee based on such insurance coverage is a form of implicit age discrimination. The court, however, found no evidence that the county engaged in any prohibited stereotyping. The county did not “suppose a correlation” between the plaintiffs’ Medicare status and age and “act accordingly,” the court observed, pointing out that instead it fired only those employees who were enrolled in the Aetna supplement, leaving unaffected a large number of employees age 65 or older who had not enrolled in the supplement. The undisputed facts, said the court, showed that economic and regulatory pressures—not generalizations about the capabilities of elderly employees—drove the county’s decision.

Government policy. Moreover, the court noted, even a government policy that affects different age groups differently may not necessarily discriminate because of age. Explaining that the question is fact sensitive, the court found that here there was “no evidence of stereotypical assumptions, the likes of which Congress sought to suppress through the ADEA.” Rather, the county asserted a clear non-age-related rationale for its policy: an effort to reserve affordable health insurance for retirees. And while the county could have explained its predicament to the small group of affected part-timers and then offered each a choice between continued insurance or continued employment, that did not change the “bottom-line result in this ADEA case,” said the court, noting that the county “could not fire its employees because of their age, but we see no evidence of such disparate treatment in the record.”

Burden-shifting framework. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that they could prove their disparate treatment claim through the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting frame-work, finding that they could not even establish a prima facie case as they could not show they were treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside their protected class. Noting that they were among the small group of rehired retirees who were employed part-time and insured under Medicare and the Aetna supplement, the court pointed out that all such employees were fired, all (regardless of age) who remain employed by the county are not enrolled in the Aetna supplement, and all retirees who benefit from the supplement are no longer employed by the county.

Disparate impact. As to their disparate impact claim, in which they alleged they were the victims of an impermissibly discriminatory policy, the court pointed out that the undisputed facts showed the county took an adverse action against a subset of older workers not because of their age but because it wished to preserve its supplemental insurance plan and to comply with federal law. Those reasonable factors other than age amply supported the county’s decision.

Equal protection. Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument failed for essentially the same reason that their McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting argument failed: They did not identify a suitable comparator group. Observing further that the Equal Protection Clause subjects age-based distinctions to rational-basis review, the court pointed out that the county chose to terminate a group of at-will part-time employees whose continued employment would have imperiled its fragile financial situation or jeopardized an insurance plan that benefited plaintiffs and many other retirees. Noting that the county’s choice preserved plaintiffs’ eligibility for the supplemental insurance, the court found that the choice was rational.



August 03, 2017

Contracting with a former employee to assist in the training and transition his or her replacement


Contracting with a former employee to assist in the training and transition his or her replacement  
2017 NY Slip Op 02300, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

A retired Superintendent of Schools [Plaintiff] of the School District [District] commenced this breach of contract action seeking damages for the alleged breach of an agreement whereby the District agreed to pay Plaintiff $22,000 "as compensation for making himself available to assist the new Superintendent in the development of the school budget for the following fiscal year and such other duties as may be reasonably required to assist in the training and transition of the new Superintendent.'"

Prior to Plaintiff's retirement he had removed or destroyed a large number of documents that were kept in the Superintendent's office. The District wrote Plaintiff advising him that it had determined that the removal of these documents constituted a breach of the agreement and canceled the District's obligation under the agreement to issue payments to Plaintiff.

Supreme Court denied the District's motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint and for judgment on the District's counterclaim, for conversion.* The Appellate Division concluded that the District "failed to meet their initial burden" and thus Supreme Court properly denied its motion.

The Appellate Division's decision notes that:

1. Plaintiff's "deposition testimony" stated that he was at all times "ready, willing and able" to assist the District and the new Superintendent but was never called upon to do so;

2. Plaintiff testified that "at least 50%" of the documents destroyed were personal documents accumulated over his 52-year career and, otherwise, they were documents that he considered to be his copies of documents that existed in other parts of the District, either as hard copies or in electronic format;"

3. The District had submitted the deposition testimony of the newly-hired superintendent who testified that he called Plaintiff with respect to the discarded documents and that he interpreted Plaintiff's responses to his inquiries regarding the discarded documents as a "threat," and he did not again contact Plaintiff; and

4. The District also submitted the deposition testimony of a District employee who testified that he observed a personnel file in the documents removed from Plaintiff's office.

The Appellate Division said that viewing District's submissions in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, "as we must," it concluded that the District failed "to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact whether Plaintiff's actions constituted a repudiation of the contract." The court cited Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, which addressed the question of whether a plaintiff's actions "constitute[d] an unequivocal and overt communication of [his or her] intention not to perform agreed-upon obligations."

In addition, the court ruled that the District had failed to establish its entitlement of judgment on its counterclaim alleging "conversion."

* Conversion is any unauthorized act that deprives an owner of personal property without his or her or its consent.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


August 02, 2017

Resolving conflicts between the New York State Human Rights Law and the National Labor Relations Act


Resolving conflicts between the New York State Human Rights Law and the National Labor Relations Act
Figueroa v Foster, USCA, Second Circuit, Docket Nos. 16-1856-cv(L), 16-1864-cv(XAP)

The issue before the Court in this action concerned whether the duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act [NLRA] preempted the New York State Human Rights Law [NYSHRL] with respect to claims of unlawful discrimination filed by a union member against a labor organization when the labor organization was acting in its capacity as a collective bargaining representative in contrast to its acting as an employer.

If, said the court, the NLRA’s duty of fair representation preempts the NYSHRL, then Title VII as administered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will serve as the primary force protecting union members from "invidious discrimination by their labor organizations."

If, on the other hand, opined the Circuit Court, the NLRA’s duty of fair representation does not preempt the NYSHRL, then the NYSHRL as administered by the New York State Division of Human Rights will provide union members with additional protections against invidious discrimination by their labor organizations.

Holding that hold that the NLRA’s duty of fair representation did not preempt* the NYSHRL either on the basis of field preemption, i.e, the federal government has fully occupied the fieldit has chosen to regulate, or as a general matter on the basis of conflict preemption, i.e., is it impossible for a party to comply with both state law and federal law, the Circuit Court reversed the declaratory judgment of the district court.

The decision cautions that this opinion "addresses only the Local’s claim that the duty of fair representation preempts the NYSHRL in its entirety when applied to unions acting in their capacity as collective bargaining agents."

In the words of the Circuit Court: "We do not purport to address every potential conflict between the NYSHRL and federal law" in this ruling.

* Under the doctrine of preemption based on Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the United States, the so-called Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law, even when such laws are in conflict.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/27722fb4-6571-480b-ab91-18b80fd52a6b/8/doc/16-1856_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/27722fb4-6571-480b-ab91-18b80fd52a6b/8/hilite/

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
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NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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