ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

October 28, 2017

Trends in arbitration


Trends in arbitration

On October 24, 2017, the United States Senate, by a 51-50 vote, approved H.J.Res. 111 providing for congressional disapproval under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to "Arbitration Agreements." 

The Joint Resolution, in effect, nullified a rule adopted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau prohibiting banks from mandating that consumers resolve disputes with the bank through arbitration.

The Bureau's rule regulated the use of arbitration agreements in contracts for specific consumer financial products and services and prohibited "the use of a predispute arbitration agreement to prevent a consumer from filing or participating in certain class action suits." The rule also requires consumer financial product and service providers to furnish the CFPB with particular information regarding arbitrations."

In contrast, on October 26, 2017, a California appellate court handed down its decision in Baxter v. Genworth North America Corp., [California Courts of Appeals, First Appellate District, Docket Number A144244, ], sustaining a lower court's ruling that held that a employment agreement constituted  “procedural unconscionability.”

Genworth had acquired another company, AssetMark, and Maya Baxter, as a condition of continue employment by Genworth, was required to agree to resolving any dispute with Genworth through its "Resolve Employee Issue Resolution  Program," a four-step procedure culminating in arbitration of the matter[s].

Significantly, the court ruled that severing the offending provisions it found in Genworth's "Resolve Employee Issue Resolution  Program" was not an option because "the arbitration agreement is permeated by unconscionability."

October 27, 2017

Educator's unsatisfactory performance rating for the academic year supported by the "detailed descriptions" of educator's difficulties in the classroom in the record


Educator's unsatisfactory performance rating for the academic year supported by the "detailed descriptions" of educator's difficulties in the classroom in the record
2017 NY Slip Op 03891, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied the CPLR Article 78 petition filed by a teacher [Petitioner]seeking a court order annulling the determination of New York City Department of Education [DOE], thereby sustaining DOE's unsatisfactory performance rating of Petitioner for the 2013-2014 school year.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Supreme Court's ruling.

The court explained the DOE's determination that Petitioner's performance as a teacher of during the 2013-2014 school year was unsatisfactory was not arbitrary and capricious.

The Appellate Division pointed out that the determination was supported by Petitioner's  principal's detailed descriptions of Petitioner's difficulties in [1] developing learning objectives, [2] using lesson plans, [3] maintaining academic rigor, [4] meeting students' varying needs, [5] facilitating "accountable talk" through "higher order thinking questions," and [6] actively engaging students.

The Appellate Division also noted Petitioner's deficiencies including Petitioner's "persistent failure to improve despite the ongoing individualized professional development support she received."

The court also rejected Petitioner's contention that she was not provided with sufficient time or feedback to remedy perceived deficiencies as also "belied by the record."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_03891.htm

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The findings of fact made by a §75 hearing officer are given collateral estoppel effect in considering a terminated individual's application for unemployment insurance benefits


The findings of fact made by a §75 hearing officer are  given collateral estoppel effect in considering a terminated individual's application for unemployment insurance benefits
Matter of Schaefer (Commissioner of Labor), 2017 NY Slip Op 04335, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Claimant for unemployment insurance benefits had been terminated from her position as a school bus driver after having been served with disciplinary charges alleging  misconduct arising from her alleged [1] mismanagement of students on her bus during an incident, [2] being uncooperative with school district personnel during a field trip and [3] calling a parent of a student and requesting that the student wait for the bus at an unapproved bus stop without permission from the school district.

Following a disciplinary hearing held pursuant to Civil Service Law §75, the Hearing Officer sustained the charges [1] and [3] but dismissed the charge related to being uncooperative during the field trip. The Hearing Officer, considering that Claimant had received prior parental complaints, counseling memos from the school district and performance evaluations that were all critical of her student management skills, recommended that the appointing authority terminate Claimant.

The appointing authority accepted the Hearing Officer's findings and recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed and dismissed Claimant from her position.

Subsequently Claimants application for unemployment insurance benefits was denied by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board based its finding that Claimant had been terminated from her position with the school district due to "disqualifying misconduct.*

Claimant appealed the Board's determination. The Appellate Division sustained the Board's ruling, explaining that "[A]s claimant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of misconduct at the disciplinary hearing, the Board properly accorded collateral estoppel effect to the Hearing Officer's factual findings."

In addition, the court noted that the Board made its own its own determination as to whether Claimant's behavior, which included creating a hostile environment for a student on her bus and failing to follow a known policy of the employer, constituted disqualifying misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes.

Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division said it found that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence and "will not be disturbed." 

* N.B. As the Appellate Division noted in Matter of Wrzesinski [Roberts], 133 AD2d 884, not every discharge for cause in a disciplinary action is misconduct within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Law, which defines such disqualifying misconduct  conduct as “a willful and wanton disregard of the employer's interest.” 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

October 26, 2017

An appointing authority's request for "any and all medical records relating to an employee's current state of health" may be too broad and not reasonably tailored to the scope of the relevant medical records


An appointing authority's request for "any and all medical records relating to an employee's current state of health" may be too broad and not reasonably tailored to the scope of the relevant medical records
2017 NY Slip Op 07129, Appellate Division, Second Department

This CPLR Article 78 was filed by an individual [Petitioner] seeking judicial review a determination by the appointing authority, a school district, that Petitioner was guilty of charges of insubordination and incompetence following a Civil Service Law §75 disciplinary hearing and that the appropriate penalty was termination.

The Appellate Division annulled the appointing authority's finding Petitioner guilty of insubordination and vacated the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. The matter was matter was remitted to the appointing authority for new consideration of the matter and the imposition of appropriate penalty, if any, under the circumstances.

The appointing authority had been advised that Petitioner had been admitted to a psychiatric facility after making threats of violence against his former spouse to his psychiatrist. Pursuant to Education Law §913, the appointing authority referred Petitioner to a psychiatrist for a medical examination to determine his mental capacity to continue working as a custodian and directed  Petitioner to provide the psychiatrist with "any and all medical records relating to [his] current state of health."

Petitioner attended the medical examination but did not bring any medical records, contending that production of such records was an invasion of his privacy. This failure resulted in Petitioner by charged with insubordination and incompetence.

The Appellate Division addressed a number of issues, finding:

1. A hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 was the proper means to adjudicate the charge of incompetence in consideration of the fact that the appointing authority's  examining psychiatrist opined that Petitioner presented a potential danger to the students and fellow staff members and was thereby unfit to continue working at the elementary school.

2.  The appointing authority's determination to sustain the charge of insubordination based on Petitioner's failure to provide the requested medical records was not supported by substantial evidence.
The Appellate Division said that there was no evidence the Petitioner failed to attend the medical examination to which he was directed and submit to the medical examination. Neither, said the court, was that any evidence that Petitioner was requested to submit to any additional medical examination by the same or another psychiatrist.

As Education Law §913 does not mandate that medical records be produced as a requirement of submitting to a medical examination, the Appellate Division held that "under the circumstances of this case, the [appointing authority's] determination that Petitioner's failure to provide requested medical records constituted a failure to submit to the medical examination is not supported by substantial evidence."

Further, the court opined that "the appointing authority's request for 'any and all medical records relating to [Petitioner's] current state of health' was overly broad and not reasonably tailored in scope in that it sought medical records beyond those that were relevant to [Petitioner's] mental capacity to perform his duties."

Noting that the request for medical records "lacked any time or subject matter limitation," the Appellate Division concluded that the appointing authority "was in error "to the extent that it found that Petitioner was insubordinate "for his failure to comply with this unreasonable directive."

Finding that the penalty of termination of Petitioner's employment was based on the Board's adoption of the hearing officer's recommendation to sustain both the charge of insubordination as well as the charge of incompetence, the court said that the matter must be remitted to the appointing authority to give it the opportunity to consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon [Petitioner] in connection with the charge of incompetence, and the imposition of that penalty thereafter."

Editor's Note:

In situations such as the one confronting Petitioner, a number of disciplinary hearing officers have suggested that the employer consider that the is employee is incompetent within the meaning of §72 of the Civil Service Law, Leave for Ordinary Disability, rather than be deemed incompetent within the meaning of §75 of the Civil Service Law for the purpose of initiating disciplinary action.

Indeed, in Gooshaw v Village of Massena, 216 AD2d 819, the Appellate Division said that it is inappropriate to file disciplinary charges against an individual who is unable to report for work because of his or her conceded disability while in Penebre v Dzaluk, 51 AD2d 574, the Appellate Division ruled that §75 charges for misconduct should not have been served on the employee but that the employer should have proceeded under §72, Ordinary Disability Leave, instead.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:.


October 25, 2017

A decision issued pursuant to a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support, cannot be arbitrary and capricious and meet the requirements of administrative due process


A decision issued pursuant to a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support, cannot be arbitrary and capricious and meet the requirements of administrative due process
Mazzella v Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 2017 NY Slip Op 07127, Appellate Division, Second Department

An Education Law §3020-a hearing officer sustained sustained five of the seven specifications supporting the charge of incompetence that Bedford Central School District [Employer] had alleged in disciplinary the charge it had filed against Ava Mazzella [Petitioner]. The penalty imposed by the hearing officer: termination of Petitioner from her position.*

Petitioner challenged the hearing officer's findings and the penalty imposed and initiated a CPLR Article 75 proceeding in Supreme Court seeking to have the arbitration award vacated. Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion to vacate the award and Petitioner appealed the Supreme Court's ruling to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division said that in a CPLR Article 75 proceeding the grounds for vacating a hearing officer's decision rendered pursuant to Education Law §3020-a "include misconduct, abuse of power, and procedural irregularities." Where, as here, the parties are subject to compulsory arbitration, the decision "is subject to closer judicial scrutiny under CPLR 7511(b) than it would receive had the arbitration been conducted voluntarily."

To be sustained, said the Appellate Division, a decision in a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious and must be in accord with administrative due process. In an appeal of a compulsory §3020-a arbitration decision, the Appellate Division said that "the court should accept the arbitrators' credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists."

Finding that the hearing officer's decision was rational, supported by adequate evidence, and not arbitrary and capricious, the court noted that under the controlling provisions of the Education Law "two consecutive annual ineffective ratings" constituted "a pattern of ineffective teaching or performance" and "a pattern of ineffective teaching or performance" constituted "very significant evidence of incompetence for purposes of this section."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that "It was rational for the hearing officer to rely on the 'ineffective' APPR ratings that Petitioner received during the relevant rating periods", as well as all the other evidence presented at the hearing, in sustaining the charge of incompetence.

Citing the so-called Pell Doctrine,** the Appellate Division said that "[u]nless an irrationality appears or the punishment shocks one's conscience, sanctions imposed by an administrative agency should be upheld" and then opined "[h]ere, the penalty of termination of [Petitioner's] employment was not irrational or shocking to one's sense of fairness." 

* Education Law §3020-a, as amended, provides for the compulsory arbitration of disciplinary charges filed against an educator by the appointing authority. The appointing authority or the employee may seek to confirm or vacate the arbitration award, as the case may be, in accordance with Subdivision 4 of §3020-a of the Education Law , which, in pertinent part, provides that "Not later than ten days after receipt of the hearing officer's decision, the employee or the employing board may make an application to the New York state supreme court to vacate or modify the decision of the hearing officer pursuant to section seventy-five hundred eleven of the civil practice law and rules. The court's review shall be limited to the grounds set forth in such section ...." 

** Pell v Board of Education. of Union Free School District. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
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NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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