A delay in a disciplinary hearing resulting from an employee’s adjournment request may be properly counted against the employee for purposes of determining his or her entitlement to back pay

A delay in a disciplinary hearing resulting from an employee’s adjournment request may be properly counted against the employee for purposes of determining his or her entitlement to back pay

OATH Index No. 1355/17

A civil engineer failed to report for a mandatory overtime shift and a medical assessment of her fitness for duty, and refused to submit documentation concerning these matters when directed to do so.

One of the issues considered by the ALJ was the employee claim that she was entitled to be paid for certain absence without pay in excess of the statutory 30-days suspension without pay authorized by Section 75 of the Civil Service Law notwithstanding the fact that she was place on such leave without pay in excess of 30 days when her disciplinary hearing was adjourned at her request because her attorney was not available.

The Civil Service Law provides that an employee may be suspended without pay for a period not exceeding thirty days pending the determination of charges of incompetency or misconduct and the employee may recover back pay for any such suspension exceeding 30 days, provided that the delay is not the employee’s fault. In this instance the appointing authority argued that the employee should not be paid for delays resulting from its agreeing to an adjournment of the hearing at the employee's request.

The appointing authority contended that it did not object to the employee's hearing adjournment request "provided that there was no pay liability" against the employer attributable to the employee's  request for the adjournment. Thus, argued the appointing authority, the employee is not entitled to back pay for any period of suspension without pay attributable the adjournment of the hearing.

Judge Gloade, explained that "This tribunal may recommend restoration of pay for any period of pre-trial suspension that exceeds 30 days," citing Teachers’ Retirement System v. Barrett, , OATH Index No. 1210/99," and, citing Dep’t of Environmental Protection v. D’Amore, OATH Index No. 1307/17, said that an Administrative Law Judge may recommend payment of back pay if employee was placed on an involuntary disability leave prior to a hearing without justification. Further, said the ALJ, "Where an employee is suspended for more than 30 days, he or she may recover back pay for the period of suspension exceeding 30 days, provided that the delay in disposing of the charges is not the employee’s fault.

In contrast, said Judge Gloade, a delay occasioned by an employee’s adjournment request may be properly counted against the employee for purposes of determining his or her entitlement to back pay. "While the employee's request for adjournment appears to be bona fide, that does not exempt her from the general rule that the party responsible for the delay bears the cost."

Citing Transit Auth. v. Danese, OATH Index No. 1043/95, ALJ Gloade concluded that it was unclear from the record whether the employee was entitled to back pay and declined to undertake an accounting to determine how much, if any, back pay the employee would be entitled to receive "as it was beyond the purview of the tribunal."

The appointing authority adopted the findings, and the penalty recommended, by the ALJ.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/17_cases/17-1355.pdf

Employer's payment of employer contributions towards an employee's health insurance premiums discontinued during the employee's disciplinary suspension without pay

Employer's payment of employer contributions towards an employee's health insurance premiums discontinued during the employee's disciplinary suspension without pay

Board of Educ. of the Dundee Cent. School Dist. v Coleman, 29 Misc 3d 1204(A)

May an arbitrator require the appointing authority to continue its employer contributions for health insurance premiums during the employees disciplinary suspension without pay? This was one of the issues considered by Supreme Court in Board of Education of the Dundee Central School District v Coleman

Dundee had served Douglas Coleman, a tenured social studies teacher with disciplinary charges pursuant to Education Law §3020-a. Ultimately the Hearing Officer, finding Coleman guilty of some of the charges and dismissing others, suspended Coleman from "from all teaching duties without pay" but directed Dundee to continue paying employer contributions for Coleman's health insurance premiums during the period of his suspension without pay.

Typically an employee participating in an employer's health insurance plan who is removed from the payroll for a period of absence "without pay" is required to pay both the employer's and the employee's contribution for the required health insurance premiums.

Dundee filed a "hybrid application" pursuant to Articles 75 and 78 of the CPLR, seeking a partial vacation of the penalty imposed by the Hearing Officer with respect to, among other things, it continuing to pay its "employer contributions" towards Coleman's premiums for his health insurance during the period of his suspension without pay contending Education Law §3020-a(4)(a) necessarily involves "a suspension of all payments by Dundee for Coleman's benefit."*

In rebuttal, Coleman argued that §3020-a(4)(a) permits a penalty of suspension without pay to include of the suspension of the payment of an employer's contributions for "fringe benefits."

Supreme Court rejected Coleman's theory, stating that "The statutory scheme clearly contemplates suspension of all financial benefits upon a suspension without pay," citing the decision of the Commissioner of Education in the Appeal of the Board of Education of the Carthage Central School District re: Rosintoski, 33 Educ. Dept Rep. 693 [citing Adrian v. Board of Education of the East Ramapo Central School District, 60 AD2d 840].

The court then directed Coleman to reimburse Dundee "for any such costs already advanced on Coleman's behalf" and, in addition, ruled that "Dundee is immediately stayed from making any further contributions during the suspension period."

* Education Law §3020-a(4)(a), in pertinent part, provides "In those cases where a penalty is imposed, such penalty may be a written reprimand, a fine, suspension for a fixed time without pay, or dismissal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_51684.htm

The anatomy of an administrative disciplinary decision

The anatomy of an administrative disciplinary decision

Marentette v City of Canandaigua,, 2018 NY Slip Op 01764, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The §75 disciplinary Hearing Officer found the Fire Chief [Chief] of the City of Canandaigua guilty acts of misconduct, having committed acts of insubordination by repeatedly violated the directive of his superior, making unauthorized entries on his subordinates' time sheets, and acts of incompetence by authorizing the expenditure of public funds on several occasions in violation of the City's procurement policies.

The Hearing Officer recommended that the Chief be demoted. The appointing authority determined that termination was warranted given the gravity of the misconduct, the Chiefs "disciplinary record," earlier "unsuccessful attempts at remediation," and the loss of trust in the Chief.

In response to the Chief's appeal of the decision of the appointing authority, the Appellate Division, sustained the actions of the disciplinary action Hearing Officer and the appointing authority and:

1. Rejected the Chief's argument that preponderance of the evidence is the applicable evidentiary standard in this case explaining that "It is well established that substantial evidence is generally the applicable evidentiary standard for disciplinary matters involving public employees under Civil Service Law §75, and that due process requires application of the preponderance of the evidence standard only "when the penalty of dismissal is accompanied by some added stigma." Here, said the court, there was nothing in the record suggesting that stigma has resulted from the Chief's termination in that he has not been "[effectively] prohibited from obtaining future . . . employment [as a firefighter or an officer of a fire department], or that he is subjected to a public registry of any sort";

2. Ruled that the determination that the Chief committed acts of insubordination and incompetence was supported by substantial evidence; i.e., by "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact.";

3. Said that the Chief's exculpatory explanations for his conduct raised an issue of credibility that the Hearing Officer was entitled to resolve against him.;

4. Was unpersuaded by the Chief's contention that the termination of his employment was unjustified under the circumstances, indicating that the court's review of the penalty imposed by the appointing authority "is extremely limited" does not include "any discretionary authority or interest of justice jurisdiction in reviewing the penalty imposed."; and

5. Citing Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, [rearg denied 96 NY2d 854], concluded that the penalty of termination was "not so disproportionate to the offense[s] as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness"  and thus "did not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law ... particularly in light of [the Chief's] conduct underlying the charges and his history of disciplinary infractions during his tenure as Fire Chief."

Click here to Read a FREE excerpt from The Discipline Book concerning the due process rights of public employees in New York State.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_01764.htm

Employee served with disciplinary charges alleging he was "singing on the job"

Employee served with disciplinary charges alleging he was "singing on the job"

OATH Index No. 2524/17

 

A highway transportation specialist was charged with being unfit to perform the duties of his position due to singing in the workplace and other disruptive behavior.

OATH Administrative Law Judge Joycelyn McGeachy-Kuls ruled that the appointing authority's proof was insufficient to prove the employee was unfit to perform the duties of his position.

Judge McGreachy-Kuls found that the evidence established that the employee had been "singing on the job for over 30 years," and when he was instructed to stop, he complied.

As to the other charges filed against the employee, the ALJ determined that an isolated outburst in a meeting and an unsubstantiated complaint of unsafe operation of a city vehicle were not sufficient grounds to find the employee unfit to perform his duties.

Recommending that all disciplinary charges filed against the employee be dismissed, the appointing authority adopted the ALJ's findings and recommendations and dissmissed all the charges filed against the individual.

Posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/17_cases/17-2524.pdf

Correspondence exchanged between public officers and agencies and private consultants are within the ambit of the Freedom of Information Law

Correspondence exchanged between public officers and agencies and private consultants are within the ambit of the Freedom of Information Law
Rauh v de Blasio, 2018 NY Slip Op 03115, Appellate Division, First Department

The editor of NYPPL has consistently opined that:

1. The release of some public records is limited by statute [see, for example, Education Law, §1127 - Confidentiality of records; §33.13, Mental Hygiene Law - Clinical records; confidentiality] or specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal statute [i.e.,  New York State's Civil Rights Law §50-a (1) provides that "All personnel records [of sworn officers,] used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion, under the control of any police agency . . . shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review"].

2. A FOIL request is not required as a condition precedent to obtaining public documents or records where access to such records is not barred by statute or exempted from disclosure by law.

3. A FOIL request is required only in the event the custodian of the public record[s] sought declines to “voluntarily” provide the information or record requested. In such cases the individual or organization is required to file a formal FOIL request to obtain the desired information or records.

4. Except were prohibited by law, there is no bar to a custodian of the record providing information pursuant to a FOIL request, or otherwise, that could be denied by the custodian pursuant to one or more of the exceptions that the custodian could rely upon in denying a FOIL request, in whole or in part.

The City of New York appealed a judgment by Supreme Court granting Grace Rauh's CPLR Article 78 petition to compel the City to disclose documents requested by Rauh  pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] to the extent of directing the City "to produce all withheld responsive records, granting attorney's fees, and referring the matter to a special referee to hear and report on the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded."

Rauh had sought documents issued by City of New York Mayor Bill de Blasio and, or, the Office of the Mayor of the City of New York and certain outside consultants "that were not retained by a government agency." The City contended that such documents fell within the statutory exemption for inter-agency and intra-agency materials under FOIL, citing Public Officers Law §87[2][g].

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling that the communications sought by Rauh [1] were not exempt and [2] that attorney's fees should be awarded because Rauh had substantially prevailed in her Article 78 proceeding and [3] the Office of the Mayor lacked a reasonable basis for withholding the communications Rauh had sought pursuant to her FOIL request.

The text of the Appellate Division's decision is set out below:

At issue on this appeal is whether communications between respondents Mayor Bill de Blasio and/or the Office of the Mayor of the City of New York and outside consultants that were not retained by a government agency fall within the statutory exemption for inter-agency and intra-agency materials under New York State's Freedom Of Information Law (Public Officers Law § 87[2][g]). We agree with Supreme Court that the communications are not exempt and that attorney's fees should be awarded because petitioners substantially prevailed in this article 78 proceeding and the Office of the Mayor lacked a reasonable basis for withholding its communications.

This proceeding arises from two FOIL requests seeking correspondence exchanged between the Mayor and/or certain members of his administration and various private consultants, including Jonathan Rosen, a principal of BerlinRosen, Ltd. BerlinRosen was retained by the Campaign for One New York (CONY), a nonprofit organization created by the Mayor's campaign in December 2013, between his initial election as Mayor and his January 1, 2014 inauguration.

In 2016, it was reported that CONY was shutting down and would not be participating in the Mayor's 2017 reelection campaign as it had achieved its goals, advocating for the Mayor's policy agenda.

The First FOIL Request

On February 18, 2015, petitioner Grace Rauh, a reporter at NY1 News, submitted a FOIL request to respondent Office of the Mayor of the City of New York(the Office of the Mayor) seeking "copies of correspondence that Mayor de Blasio and/or senior members of his administration conducted with Jonathan Rosen in the [M]ayor's first year in office."

On August 7, 2015, and April 1, 2016, the Office of the Mayor stated that records responsive to that request were being disclosed, while others were being withheld pursuant to Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g), which generally exempts "inter-agency or intra-agency materials" (the agency exemption).

On April 29, 2016, petitioner Rauh appealed from the partial denial of her request, and sought a "more detailed" explanation of why the withheld records were exempt from FOIL. The Office of the Mayor denied Rauh's appeal on or about May 13, 2016, finding that the withheld records were covered by the agency exemption [FN1].

The Second FOIL Request

On April 3, 2015, petitioner Yoav Gonen, a reporter for the New York Post, requested "a copy of any and all email communications to or from Mayor de Blasio — using his city-issued or private email account[s] — and any and all employees in the Mayor's Office, to or from Jonathan Rosen or any and all employees of BerlinRosen, between Jan. 1, 2014 and April 3, 2015."

On August 7, 2015 the Office of the Mayor stated that responsive records were being disclosed, while other records were being withheld pursuant to the agency exemption, and extended the time to search for additional responsive records to November 6, 2015.

On May 22, 2016, Gonen appealed from the partial denial of his FOIL request. The Office of the Mayor responded, by letter dated June 10, 2016, that further responsive records were being provided, but "some responsive materials ha[d] been redacted in part or withheld in entirety" pursuant to the agency exemption.

On June 16, 2016, Gonen appealed from the decision to withhold some responsive documents, arguing that the agency exemption is inapplicable because "Rosen is a member of the public not paid by the administration and, as such, his and his firm's communications with and advice to the [M]ayor's [O]ffice should be provided under [FOIL]."

On June 30, 2016, the Office of the Mayor denied Gonen's appeal on the same grounds as in the previous appeal.

Petitioners brought this article 78 proceeding in September 2016, seeking disclosure of all responsive records being withheld. Alternatively, petitioners sought an in camera review of the records to determine the applicability of the agency exemption. Petitioners also requested attorney's fees.

In November 2016, the Office of the Mayor disclosed more than 1,500 pages of previously withheld communications between respondents and BerlinRosen, and stated that the Office of the Mayor had by that point disclosed "all responsive email communications with Jonathan Rosen and BerlinRosen which involve[d] any other client of BerlinRosen." Respondents estimated to have disclosed over 18,000 pages of responsive records and offered to turn over the remaining records for an in camera review.

Supreme Court granted the petition, without conducting an in camera inspection and ordered respondents to disclose "all previously withheld correspondence that the Mayor and senior members of his administration conducted with Jonathan Rosen and any and all employees of BerlinRosen, Ltd., between January 1, 2014 and April 3, 2015." The court reasoned that in order to be covered by the agency exemption, the outside consultants "must be formally retained by the agency that they were advising." Supreme Court also found that "respondents did not have a reasonable basis for considering the correspondence with Rosen and his public relations firm to be covered by the inter-agency or intra-agency exemption" and granted petitioners' request for attorney's fees.

Respondents argue that in finding that CONY was not a governmental agency, Supreme Court erred in limiting its inquiry to "a formalistic analysis where a practical, functional inquiry" would have been more appropriate. Respondents urge that the focus of the inquiry should be a review of the consultant's function as opposed to what entity paid the consultant. While CONY was not a governmental agency, it worked with the Office of the Mayor to promote the Mayor's agenda. BerlinRosen was retained by CONY to provide consulting services to promote the Mayor's policy agenda.

This argument is without merit. At the outset we emphasize that "[t]he Legislature enacted FOIL to provide the public with a means of access to governmental records in order to encourage public awareness and understanding of and participation in government and to discourage official secrecy" (Matter of Alderson v New York State Coll. of Agric. & Life Sciences at Cornell Univ., 4 NY3d 225, 230 [2005]). Access to records of governmental agencies may be withheld if they fall within one of the enumerated exemptions of Public Officers Law §87(2).

However, the Court of Appeals instructs that FOIL is to be "liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly interpreted so that the public is granted maximum access to the records of government" (Matter of Town of Waterford v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 18 NY3d 652, 657 [2012]; Matter of Buffalo News v Buffalo Enter. Dev. Corp., 84 NY2d 488, 492 [1994]; Matter of Russo v Nassau County Community Coll., 81 NY2d 690, 697 [1993]; Matter of Capital Newspapers, Div. of Hearst Corp. v Whalen, 69 NY2d 246, 252 [1987]). "When reviewing the denial of a FOIL request, a court . . . is to presume that all records of a public [*2]agency are open to public inspection and copying, and must require the agency to bear the burden of showing that the records fall squarely within an exemption to disclosure" (Matter of New York Comm. for Occupational Safety & Health v Bloomberg, 72 AD3d 153, 158 [1st Dept 2010]; see also Matter of Town of Waterford, 18 NY3d at 657).

The exemption relevant to this appeal provides that a governmental agency may deny access to records that are inter-agency or intra-agency materials (Public Officers Law §87[2][g][FN2]). The purpose behind the exemption is to "permit people within an agency to exchange opinions, advice and criticism freely and frankly, without the chilling prospect of public disclosure" (Matter of New York Times Co. v City of N.Y. Fire Dept., 4 NY3d 477, 488 [2005]).

It is well settled that for communications between a governmental agency and an outside consultant to fall under the agency exemption, the outside consultant must be retained by the governmental agency (Matter of Xerox Corp. v Town of Webster, 65 NY2d 131, 133 [1985] [records may be considered intra-agency material when prepared by an outside consultant retained by agency]; see also Matter of Town of Waterford, 18 NY3d at 658 [declining to extend the inter- and intra-agency exemption to a federal agency collaborating with the Department of Environmental Conservation because the federal agency "was not retained by the DEC and [did] not function as its employee or agent"]; Matter of Hernandez v Office of the Mayor of the City of N.Y., (100 AD3d 555 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 854 [2013] [Office of the Mayor required to disclose emails to or from a former nominee for New York City School Chancellor where the nominee "was not an agent of the City since she had not yet been retained as Chancellor"]; Matter of Tuck-It-Away Assoc., L.P. v Empire State Dev. Corp., 54 AD3d 154, 163 [1st Dept 2008] affd sub nom. West Harlem Bus Group v Empire State Dev. Corp., 13 NY3d 882 [2009] [exemption does not apply to a retained outside consultant where "consultant is communicating with the agency in its own interest or on behalf of another client whose interests might be affected by the agency action addressed by the consultant"]).

Respondents seek to broaden the agency exemption to shield communications between a governmental agency and an outside consultant retained by a private organization and not the agency. This attempt expands the agency exemption and closes the door on government transparency. Requiring an agency to retain an outside consultant to protect its communications comports with the fundamental principle that FOIL exemptions should be "narrowly interpreted so that the public is granted maximum access" to public records (see Matter of Town of Waterford, 18 NY3d at 657). Accordingly, we find that the communications between the respondents and BerlinRosen should be disclosed.

Next, turning to the issue of attorney's fees, Supreme Court granted petitioners attorney's fees under an earlier enactment of Public Officers Law §89(4)(c), which provided that the court "may assess" attorney's fees and costs. The court providently exercised its discretion in granting attorney's fees.

We note that during the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature amended the provision which now provides that the court "shall assess, against such agency involved, reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by such person in any case under the provisions of this section in which such person has substantially prevailed and the court finds that the agency had no reasonable basis for denying access" (Public Officers Law §89[4][c][ii] [emphasis added][FN3]). The language of the statute is mandatory and not precatory,* if the statutory requirements are met (see McKinney's Consolidated Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §171, Comment at 334 [1971 ed] ["where the word may' appearing in an act was changed to shall', the court would construe the amendment as being mandatory"]). Significantly, this evinces an unmistakable legislative intent that attorney's fees are to be assessed against an agency when the other party has substantially prevailed and the agency had no reasonable basis for denying access.

Here, there is no dispute that the petitioner has substantially prevailed (see Matter of Madeiros v New York State Educ. Dept 30 NY3d 67, 78-81 [2017]). Both in this appeal and in Supreme Court, the respondents have been directed to produce the documents requested by petitioners on the ground that the agency exemption does not apply.

Based on the substantial body of law discussed above, respondents had no reasonable basis to withhold the documents. Indeed, after the proceeding had commenced and more than a year after the FOIL requests were made, respondents produced approximately 1500 pages of previously withheld documents. These documents include examples of the Mayor and Mr. Rosen discussing issues important to BerlinRosen's private clients. The documents are the types of communications that the FOIL meant to make available to the public. Respondents' attempts to withhold these communications run counter to the public's interest in transparency and the ability to participate on important issues of municipal governance.

Accordingly, the judgment (denominated a decision and order) of the Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered March, 23, 2017, granting the petition brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 to compel respondents to disclose documents requested by petitioners pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law, to the extent of directing respondents to produce all withheld responsive records, granting attorney's fees, and referring the matter to a special referee to hear and report on the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, should be affirmed, without costs.

All concur

Judgment (denominated a decision and order), Supreme Court, New York County (Joan B. Lobis, J.), entered March, 23, 2017, affirmed, without costs.

Opinion by Singh, J. All concur.

Friedman, J.P., Sweeny, Gesmer, Kern, Singh, JJ.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: MAY 1, 2018, CLERK

Footnotes

Footnote 1: In relevant part, a letter dated May 13, 2016, from the Office of the Mayor to Rauh regarding the FOIL request states, "[T]he advice Mr. Rosen offered was part of the deliberative process. The withheld documents relate to communications in which Mr. Rosen was not acting on behalf of any clients nor interests they represent. In these particular communications Mr. Rosen's advice represents solely the interests of the Mayoralty and the City. As such, he meets that test and his advice is protected under the exemption. I therefore find that the determination to withhold the documents as exempt under the inter- and intra-agency exemption was correct and deny your appeal."

Footnote 2: Public Officers Law § 87(2)(g) provides that a governmental agency may deny access to records that "are inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not:

i. statistical or factual tabulations or data;

ii. instructions to staff that affect the public;

iii. final agency policy or determinations;

iv. external audits, including but not limited to audits performed by the comptroller and the federal government."

Footnote 3: The Legislature also removed the need for parties to show that the record was of "clearly significant interest to the general public" (L. 2006, c. 492, § 1, eff. Aug. 16, 2006).

* Expressing a wish, a request, or an entreaty, the granting of which is subject to a custodian of the record's exercising his or her discretion.  

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2018/2018_03115.htm