Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
SUNY Campus Appeals Board's finding that a student violated the Student Code of Conduct by engaging in certain sexual activities vacated by Appellate Division as not supported by substantial evidence and all references to the Board's findings were ordered to be expunged from the student's academic record.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision.
Ultimately two separate promotion eligibility lists were established, one for Correction Sergeant and the other for Correction Sergeant (Spanish Language).
Plaintiffs in the action allege that the creation of this new position was arbitrary, capricious and unlawful, that it violated their state and federal constitutional equal protection and due process rights and that DOCCS violated Article V, §6, the Merit and Fitness Clause, of the New York State's Constitution. Additionally, petitioners sought certification to proceed as a class action. DOCCS moved to dismiss the action, asserting objections in point of law. Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiffs' petition and Plaintiffs appealed.
The Appellate Division, citing Cove v Sise, 71 NY2d 910, observed "Administrative determinations concerning position classifications are of course subject to only limited judicial review, and will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing that they are wholly arbitrary or without any rational basis" and rejected Plaintiffs' argument that DOCCS failed to present evidence of the need for this new position classification.
As to Plaintiff's contention that the establishment of positions of Correction Sergeant (Spanish Language) violated Article V, §6 of Constitution, the court noted that two eligible lists were established, one for Correction Sergeant and a separate list Correction Sergeant (Spanish Language). The court observed that it might be troublesome were there but one list of eligibles established for appointment to the Correction Sergeant and to the Correction Sergeant (Spanish Language) titles, here there were two eligible lists established and both lists the lists remain separate and distinct.
Addressing Plaintiffs' argument that their due process rights under the United States and New York State Constitutions as their property interests in promotion were adversely affected as the result of the establishment of the two titles by the Department of Civil Service at DOCCS' request, the Appellate Division, citing Matter of Andriola v Ortiz, 82 NY2d 320, explained "a person successfully passing a competitive [c]ivil [s]ervice examination does not acquire any legally protectable interest in an appointment to the position for which the examination was given, nor thereby gain a vested right to appointment to the position" and thus Plaintiffs' "contention is meritless."
Petitioners also advance the argument that "respondents violated their equal protection rights by conferring greater benefits on less qualified candidates who are proficient in speaking Spanish." Noting that for equal protection purposes, the appropriate standard for judicial review of a regulation is that it be sustained unless it bears no rational relation to a legitimate government interest, the Appellate Division said that the basis of the classification was proficiency in speaking Spanish, "which was required to effectively communicate with the Spanish-speaking inmate population and aid in the efficient and safe operations of DOCCS's facilities." Agreeing with the Supreme Court that the "differential treatment of Spanish-speaking and non-Spanish speaking employees was rationally related to a legitimate government interest," the Appellate Division held that the respondents "did not violate [the Plaintiffs'] equal protection rights under the NY or US Constitution."
*Although this is how DOCCS was named in the petition, the Appellate Division noted that DOCCS's correct name is Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.
Click HERE to access the text of the Appellate Division's decision.
In Matter of County of Nassau v Detectives Assn., Inc. of the Police Dept. of Nassau County,188 AD3d 1049, the Appellate Division rejected Nassau County's petition to permanently stay arbitration of contract grievance and granted the Union's motion to compel arbitration of the grievance. The grievance alleging that employees in the collective bargaining unit represented by the Detectives Association were not receiving longevity payments in accordance with "a memorandum of agreement" between the parties.
Nassau County had contended that the disputed memorandum of agreement between the County and the Association was invalid and unenforceable.
The Appellate Division disagreed, holding:
1. The County had not identified any constitutional, statutory, or public policy prohibition to arbitrating this grievance, citing Matter of Board of Educ. of the Yonkers CitySch. Dist. v YonkersFedn. of Teachers, 180 AD3d at 1042);
2. The issue was whether the County and the Association agreed to arbitrate this dispute; and
3. The arbitration provision of the relevant collective bargaining agreement was broad, and "there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute," which involved longevity payments, and the general subject matter of the collective bargaining agreement.
The full text of Detectives Association, set out below, has been cited in the decisions listed below involving similar grievances, to the same effect.
1. County of Nassau v Civil Service Employees Association, decision posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01748.htm;
2. County of Nassau v Nassau County Sheriff's Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc., et al., decision posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01749.htm;
3. County of Nassau v Superior Officers Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc., et al., decision posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01750.htm;
4. In the Matter of County of Nassau v Civil Service Employees Association, etc., decision posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01766.htm;
5. County of Nassau v Superior Officers Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc., et al., decision posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01750.htm;
6. In the Matter of County of Nassau v Nassau County Sheriff's Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc., decision posted on the Internet at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01767.htm; and
7. In the Matter of County of Nassau v Superior Officers Association of the Police Department of the County of Nassau, Inc., decision posted on the Internet at
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01768.htm;
| In the Matter of County of Nassau, Appellant, |
Bee Ready Fishbein Hatter & Donovan, LLP, Mineola, NY(Peter A. Bee, William C. DeWitt, and Jason Greenfield of counsel), for appellant.
Steven E. Losquadro, P.C., Rocky Point, NY(John Ciampoli of counsel), for respondent.
"In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of the respondent's grievance arising from a memorandum of agreement dated September 15, 2017, the petitioner appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Thomas A. Adams, J.), entered March 12, 2019. The order and judgment denied the petition to permanently stay arbitration and granted the respondent's motion to compel arbitration.
"Ordered that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.
"The County of Nassauand the Detectives Association, Inc., of the Police Department of Nassau County (hereinafter the DAI) are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter the CBA). In 2018, pursuant to the procedures set forth in the CBA, the DAI submitted a grievance alleging that its members were not receiving longevity payments in accordance with a memorandum of agreement dated September 15, 2017 (hereinafter the MOA). By verified petition, the County commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration. The DAI moved to dismiss the petition and to compel the County to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court denied the petition and granted the DAI's motion to compel arbitration. The County appeals. We affirm.
"[A] party who has not participated in the arbitration and who has not made or been served with an application to compel arbitration, may apply to stay arbitration on the ground that a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with" (CPLR 7503 [b]). "The 'valid agreement' referred to in CPLR 7503 concerns a valid agreement to arbitrate" (Matter of Prinze [Jonas]. . , 38 NY2d 570, 577 [1976]). "Thus even when it is alleged . that the contract itself is invalid in its entirety, the court's role is still confined to determining the validity of the arbitration clause alone" (id.at 577). "If the arbitration agreement is valid, any controversy as to the validity of the contract as a whole passes to the arbitrators" (id.).
"Public policy in New York favors arbitral resolution of public sector labor disputes" (Matter of Board of Educ. of the Yonkers City Sch. Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 180 AD3d 1041, 1042 [2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "However, a dispute between a public sector employer and an employee is only arbitrable if it satisfies a two-prong test" (id. at 1042 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "First, the court must determine whether there is any statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance" (id.). "If there is no prohibition against the arbitration, the court must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). Where "the relevant arbitration provision of the CBA is . a court should merely determine whether there is a reasonable . broad, . relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA" (Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 176 AD3d 1197, 1199 [2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "If there is none, the issue, as a matter of law, is not arbitrable" (id. at 1199 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "If there is, the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]).
"Here, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination denying the County's petition to permanently stay arbitration and granting the DAI's motion to compel the County to submit to arbitration. The County has not identified any constitutional, statutory, or public policy prohibition to arbitrating this grievance (see Matter of Board of Educ. of the Yonkers CitySch. Dist. v YonkersFedn. of Teachers, 180 AD3d at 1042). Thus, the issue is whether the County and the DAI agreed to arbitrate this dispute (see id.). The arbitration provision of the CBA is broad, and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute, which involves longevity payments, and the general subject matter of the CBA (see Matter of City of Yonkers v Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 176 AD3d at 1199). Accordingly, the grievance was arbitrable, and any issues regarding the validity and effect of the MOA were for the arbitrator to determine under the CBA's grievance procedures (see Matter of Prinze [Jonas], 38 NY2d at 577).
"The County's remaining arguments are without merit. Roman, J.P., Duffy, Barros and Connolly, JJ., concur."
The presiding hearing officer, NYPD's Deputy Commissioner - Trials, ruled that the CCRB was required to show by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the underlying facts, if proven in court, would constitute a crime in order to go forward with the disciplinary action. The Deputy Commissioner then found, "by a preponderance of the credible evidence", that Plaintiff was guilty of assault in the third degree, as charged in the first specification, in that Plaintiff acted recklessly in the course of his attempting to arrest an individual and his recklessness "was a significant factor" which contributed to the individual's death.
The Deputy Commissioner's Report to the Police Commissioner recommended Plaintiff's dismissal from the NYPD and the Commissioner approved the Report and Recommendation and issued a final order dismissing Plaintiff from the NYPD.
Plaintiff then initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking a court order annulling the Commissioner's determination and directing his reinstatement. Plaintiff contended that the CCRB failed to present substantial evidence of his guilt and that the penalty of dismissal was shocking to the conscience.
The Appellate Division found that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Plaintiff had "recklessly caused injury to [the individual] by maintaining a prohibited chokehold for 9 to 10 seconds after exigent circumstances were no longer present, thereby disregarding the risk of injury."
Citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, and other decisions, the Appellate Division said it did not find the penalty imposed on Plaintiff "so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" and opined that in Matter of Alfieri, 38 NY2d at 977, "[c]onduct far less serious than [Plaintiff's] has been found by the Court of Appeals to have a "destructive impact ... on the confidence which it is so important for the public to have in its police officers".
Click HEREto access the text of the Appellate Division's decision.
The court said that the record supported a finding that Plaintiff was terminated in good faith as it was based on Plaintiff's "declining performance evaluations and incidents of disciplinary misconduct" which the employer had documented over a period of several months.
As to Plaintiff's claim that he was terminated in retaliation for his reporting another teacher's alleged misconduct involving a student, the Appellate Division opined that this argument was speculative in light of the evidence in the record of Plaintiff's "deficient work performance and his disciplinary misconduct."
With respect to the termination of an employee before the competition of the appointee's maximum period of probation, in York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760, the Court of Appeals set out the basic rule with respect to the dismissal of probationary employees. In York the high court held that "[a]fter completing his or her minimum period of probation and prior to completing his or her maximum period of probation, a probationary employee can be dismissed without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, as long as there is no proof that the dismissal was done for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law, or the decision was made in bad faith."
In the event the appointing authority decides to dismiss an employee during the minimum probationary period, the employee is entitled to the notice and hearing that would otherwise be available to a tenure employee.
Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's decision.