Another case of Jobbery, i.e., the practice of using a public office or position of trust for one's own gain or advantage

On September 16, 2021, State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, Madison County District Attorney William Gabor, and New York State Police Superintendent Kevin P. Bruen announced that a former non-sworn state police mechanic has pleaded guilty to felony corrupting the government for the theft of more than $24,000 in auto parts and supplies from the state.

Charged with eight felony and three misdemeanor charges including corrupting the government, grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property and official misconduct, the mechanic pleaded guilty to felony corrupting the government in the third degree and was sentenced to interim felony probation and has already paid back $20,000.

The arrest was a result of a joint investigation between the State Comptroller’s Office, the New York State Police and Madison County District Attorney William Gabor.

Requirements for stating a justiciable claim alleging the employer intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the distressed employee

The motion court denied the complaint's [Plaintiff] motion for leave to amend his complaint alleging unlawful employment retaliation in violation of Not-For-Profit Corporation Law §715-b by adding claims alleging "intentional infliction of emotional distress" among others.

Sustaining the Supreme Court's decision, the Appellate Division explained that to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in such an action a party must allege:

1. "extreme and outrageous conduct;

2. an "intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress;

3. "a causal connection between the conduct and injury; and

4. "severe emotional distress."

Citing 164 Mulberry St. Corp. v Columbia Univ., 4 AD3d 49, the court said that "Whether the requisite 'outrageousness of the conduct' has been satisfied by the petitioner's allegations is, in the first instance, an issue of law for judicial determination."

In this instance, said the Appellate Division, although Plaintiff alleged, "in a conclusory fashion that the defendants [Respondents] engaged in a pattern of harassment that caused Plaintiff to suffer from anxiety and stress that eventually led to a serious cardiac event," it found that Plaintiff's allegations of abusive conduct directed at him in the context of his employment "do not rise to the level of outrageousness required to state a claim."

Further, opined the Appellate Division, Plaintiff's proposed amendment did not allege facts establishing that Plaintiff had an "imminent apprehension of harmful or offensive contact" to support a claim for assault.

The Appellate Division also addressed a "new claim for standard negligence" in the proposed amended complaint and opined that it "fails to allege with the requisite specificity that the [Respondent] board members acted with gross negligence in the training and supervision of [Plaintiff's supervisor] nor did Plaintiff present any specific allegations that the [Respondent] board members "acted intentionally."

Accordingly, the court found that Plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the qualified immunity defense available to uncompensated board members under §720-a of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision

Appealing the termination of a probationary teacher

In this appeal to the New York State Commissioner of Education a probationary teacher [Petitioner] challenged her termination from her position with the New York City Department of Education's [DOE]. 

The Commissioner sustained DOE's termination of the Petitioner, observing that "[e]ven if the appeal were not dismissed as untimely, it would be dismissed on the merits."

The Commissioner explained that pursuant to its authority under Education Law §2573(1)(a), DOE may discontinue the services of a probationary teacher “at any time and for any reason, unless the teacher establishes that the termination was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith,” citing Matter of Frasier v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 71 NY2d 763.

Further, the Commissioner's decision notes that the petitioner has the burden of:

[1] demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested; and 

[2] establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief in his or her appeal to the Commissioner of Education.

In this instance the Commissioner found that Petitioner has "neither alleged nor proven that her discontinuance was for a constitutionally impermissible reason or that it violated any statute."  Rather, said the Commissioner, Petitioner suggests that DOE acted in bad faith insofar as her discontinuance was the result of the principal’s personal animus toward her but offers no competent proof of this contention other than her own assertions.

DOE generally denied Petitioner’s allegations and submit numerous annual professional performance review [APPR] reports supporting their position that Petitioner’s discontinuance was based on the many “developing” and “ineffective” ratings that she received throughout the school years she served as a probationary teacher. 

Although Petitioner suggested that such feedback was insufficient and that her school administrators did not adequately address various challenges she faced during her probationary service, the Commissioner held that such assertions fail to render DOE's discontinuance of her probationary service impermissible.

Additionally, observed the Commissioner, Petitioner’s assertion that the APPR ratings she received lack a reasonable justification does not provide a basis to annul her discontinuance and reinstate her to a teaching position. 

The Commissioner's decision cited Education Law §3012-c, which section sets forth the procedures and requirements applicable to APPR ratings, provides that “nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the unfettered statutory right of a school district ... to terminate a probationary teacher ... for any statutorily and constitutionally permissible reason.” Accordingly, said the Commissioner, Petitioner’s objection to her APPR ratings is insufficient to establish her entitlement to the relief she requested. 

Addressing Petitioner's request the DOE be directed "to implement a regulation, policy, or procedure” requiring the superintendent to speak with a probationary teacher prior to discontinuance, the Commissioner said that Petitioner had failed to set forth an adequate basis for such relief.  

The Commissioner noted that the record reflected that Petitioner received ample notice that she may be discontinued from her position; that the superintendent’s initial letter invited Petitioner to submit a response; that Petitioner did, in fact, respond to the superintendent’s letter; and that the superintendent considered Petitioner’s response prior to rendering her final determination.  

Accordingly, the Commissioner said that she decline to compel DOE to implement a new procedure, beyond the requirements of Education Law §2573, obligating the superintendent to communicate with a probationary teacher in person or by telephone. 

Opining that Petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proving that DOE discontinued her probationary employment for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, in violation of a statute, or in bad faith, the Commissioner dismissed Petitioner's appeal.

Click HERE to access the full text of the Commissioner's decision.

 

New York City Emergency Executive Order 240 issued September 14, 2021

Emergency Executive Order 240 issued in response to Hurricane Ida

Download Emergency Executive Order 240

Employee serving a disciplinary probation period challenging his dismissal is required to show that his termination from employment was made in bad faith

Supreme Court rejected the CPLR Article 78 petition filed by a former New York City police officer [Plaintiff] seeking to annul the New York Police Department's [NYPD] decision to terminate his employment while he was serving "on dismissal probation." Plaintiff contended that the termination of his employment as a police officer was made in bad faith in an effort "to frustrate his application for Accidental Disability Retirement [ADR] benefits".*

Plaintiff appealed but the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling.

Plaintiff, said the court, "failed to demonstrate that [NYPD] dismissed him in bad faith," noting that Plaintiff's dismissal was recommended after ADR benefits had been denied him. 

Further, opined the court, any delays in Plaintiff's dismissal were explained by the investigation undertaken by NYPD, which took months to complete.

*  Section 13-173.1 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York requires an employee subject to its provisions to "be in service" on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits. If the employee is not "in service" on that date, he or she forfeits his or her retirement benefits.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision.