Audit sought by New York State Nurses Association Benefit Fund held within the scope of the Supreme Court's ruling in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc.

New York State Nurses Association Benefit Fund [Fund] sought an audit of the Nyack Hospital’s [Hospital] payroll and wage records. The Hospital objected, claiming that the Fund had the authority to inspect only the payroll records of employees the Hospital identified as members of the collective bargaining unit. The federal district court held that the Fund was entitled to the records of all persons the Hospital identified as registered nurses but not to the records of any other employees.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirm in part.* To the extent the district court granted the Hospital’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the Fund’s motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court reverse. To the extent the district court granted the Fund’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Hospital’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling. 

The Circuit Court held that the audit sought by the Fund was authorized by the Trust Agreement. Further, the Circuit Court opined that the Hospital did not present evidence that the audit constituted a breach of the Fund’s fiduciary duty within the meaning of ERISA. 

Accordingly, the Circuit Court concluded that the audit was within the scope of the Fund trustees’ authority under the United States Supreme Court’s decision inCentral States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport,Inc., 472 U.S. 559.

*Judge Carney dissented in part in a separate opinion. 

Click HEREto access the Second Circuit's decision.

 

Union leader's arguments with fellow School District personnel held to have been made in his capacity as a School District employee and thus not within the ambit of the First Amendment

Plaintiff [Union Leader], in this appeal of an adverse decision by a federal district court to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, contends that his employer [School District] violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speech he claims to have made in his capacity as a union leader. 

However, the Second Circuit observed that in his complaint filed with the federal district-court Union Leader merely alleged that he had argued with "a School District mechanic – and later, a few School District officials" – over the frequency with which bus safety issues should be reported." Union Leader, however, did not allege that the School District’s existing policy permitted unsafe buses to remain on the roads, nor did he allege that daily reporting would improve public safety. Thus the court concluded that Union Leader's claims "suggest nothing more than a workplace dispute between School District employees about internal reporting protocols." 

The Circuit Court explaining that Union Leader did not plausibly allege that he spoke as a citizen or that he spoke on a matter of public concern thus being engaged "in speech protected under the First Amendment," affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Union Leader's complaint.* 

Although Union Leader argued that the School District"infringed his right to engage in speech protected by the First Amendment" the Circuit Court, citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410. noted that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties ... the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” In contrast, said the court, the First Amendment "protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern,” [Id. at 417]. 

The specific details provided in the Complaint suggest that Union Leader's arguments with fellow School District personnel were made in his capacity as a School District employee, not as a private citizen,  noting that the Second Circuit has expressly rejected any categorical rule “that when a person speaks in his capacity as a union member, he speaks as a private citizen,” citing Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386. 

Concluding that Union Leader "failed to establish that he engaged in protected speech, he cannot make out a prima facie case of First Amendment retaliation," the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Union Leader's complaint. 

* Judge Rosemary S. Pooler dissenting in a separate opinion. 

Click HEREto access the Second Circuit's decision.

 

Failure to "join" a necessary party in filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education a fatal omission

An individual and, or, an entity whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party in filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education pursuant to §310 of the Education Law and must be named in the petition as such. 

Dismissing this appeal seeking the termination of the superintendent of the school district, Commissioner of Education Betty A. Rosa noted that the petitioner's had failed to notify a necessary party of the filing of the appeal, the superintendent. The Commissioner explained that were the petitioner to prevail, superintendent's right "would be adversely affected" and thus the superintendent "is a necessary party and must be joined as such."

Citing Appeal of Sutton, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,331, and other decisions by the Commissioner, Dr. Rosa further explained that such "joinder" requires that the necessary party be clearly named in the caption of the appeal and served with a copy of the notice of petition and [the] petition".

As the petitioner failed to serve the superintendent with the copy of the petition and the superintendent’s contractual rights would be adversely affected by a determination in petitioner’s favor, the Commissioner ruled the petitioner's appeal "must be dismissed."

Click HEREto access the Commissioner's decision posted on the Internet. 

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more about this electronic handbook, click HERE.  Click to Read a FREE excerpt (requires Adobe Reader).  

 

Employee's request that his employer provide for his defense and indemnification in a civil action denied as the underlying act was beyond the scope of his employment

In this appeal to Commissioner of Education Betty A. Rosa, a former teacher [Educator] contended that the Board of Education of his former employer, a school district, should have granted his request for defense and indemnification with respect to a civil action initiated by a former student alleging, among other things, that Educator had sexually assaulted her while she was a student at the school district’s high school. 

Addressing the merits Educator's argument, the Commissioner Rosa said that Education Law §3811 identifies the circumstances under which a school district is required to defend and indemnify “member[s] of the teaching or supervisory staff” in civil “actions or proceedings.” Defense and indemnification, opined the Dr. Rosa, is only available if the alleged conduct arose out of the “exercise of [a teacher's] powers or the performance of [his or her] duties,” a phrase equivalent to the term “scope of employment.”

Citing N.X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 97 NY2d 247 and other decisions, the Commissioner noted that New York State's Court of Appeals has unambiguously held that sexual assault perpetrated by an employee is a “clear departure from the scope of employment, having been committed for wholly personal motives”. Thus, opined Commissioner Rosa, the Board of Education "appropriately denied [Educator's] request that the school district defend him against allegations of sexual assault."

The Commissioner also noted that "[t]he record does not reveal whether [the Board of Education had] adopted the protections of Public Officers Law §18" but concluding that this would not affect the outcome of this appeal as Public Officers Law §18(3)(a) imposes an identical “scope of employment” requirement, citing Matter of Dreyer v City of Saratoga Springs, 43 AD3d 586.

Click HEREto access the Commissioner's decision. 

 

Challenging the results of a school board election

In this appeal to the Commissioner of Education the Board of Education of the Monticello Central School District sought an order annulling the results its 2022 school district election to fill three "open seats" on the school board because the margin of victory for two of the three seats "was less than the total number of affidavit ballots", which valid affidavit ballots had not been included in the tally.

In the words of the Commissioner, to invalidate the results of a school district election, the petitioner, in this instance the Monticello Central School District's Board of Education, must either: "[1] establish not only that irregularities occurred but also that any irregularities actually affected the outcome of the election or were so pervasive that they vitiated the electoral process; or [2] demonstrate a clear and convincing picture of informality to the point of laxity in adherence to the Education Law."

Concluding that the School Board failed to satisfy its burden "of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which [it] seeks relief," the Commissioner dismissed the School Board's appeal.

Click the URL set out below to access the full text of the Commissioner's decision. 

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume62/d18167