On June 29, 2023
the Supreme Court held that colleges and universities making "admission
decisions" that relied, in part, on racial considerations violated the Constitution of the United States.
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access both the Syllabus and the full text of the decision posted on the
Internet.
N.B. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the
Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader and is
set out below for the convenience of NYPPL readers.
SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
Syllabus
STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v.
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 20–1199. Argued October 31, 2022—Decided
June 29, 2023*
Harvard College
and the University of North Carolina (UNC) are two of
the oldest institutions of higher learning in the United
States. Every
year, tens of thousands of students apply to each school; many fewer
are admitted. Both Harvard and UNC employ a highly selective ad-
missions process to make their decisions. Admission to each school can
depend on a student’s grades, recommendation letters, or extracurric-
ular involvement. It can also depend on their race. The question pre-
sented is whether the admissions systems used by Harvard
College
and UNC are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
At Harvard, each application for admission is initially screened by a
“first reader,” who assigns a numerical score in each of six categories:
academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support, personal, and over-
all. For the “overall” category—a composite of the five other ratings—
a first reader can and does consider the applicant’s race. Harvard’s
admissions subcommittees then review all applications from a partic-
ular geographic area. These regional subcommittees make recommen-
dations to the full admissions committee, and they take an applicant’s
race into account. When the 40-member full admissions committee
begins its deliberations, it discusses the relative breakdown of appli-
cants by race. The goal of the process, according to Harvard’s director
of admissions, is ensuring there is no “dramatic drop-off” in minority
admissions from the prior class. An applicant receiving a majority of
——————
* Together with No. 21–707, Students for Fair
Admissions, Inc. v. Uni-
versity of North Carolina et al., on certiorari before judgment to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Harvard College
and the University of North Carolina (UNC) are two of
the oldest institutions of higher learning in the United
States. Every
year, tens of thousands of students apply to each school;
many fewer
are admitted. Both Harvard and UNC employ a highly selective
ad-
missions process to make their decisions. Admission to each
school can
depend on a student’s grades, recommendation letters, or
extracurric-
ular involvement. It can also depend on their race. The
question pre-
sented is whether the admissions systems used by Harvard
College
and UNC are lawful under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Four-
teenth Amendment.
At Harvard, each application for admission is initially
screened by a
“first reader,” who assigns a numerical score in each of six
categories:
academic, extracurricular, athletic, school support,
personal, and over-
all. For the “overall” category—a composite of the five
other ratings—
a first reader can and does consider the applicant’s race.
Harvard’s
admissions subcommittees then review all applications from a
partic-
ular geographic area. These regional subcommittees make
recommen-
dations to the full admissions committee, and they take an
applicant’s
race into account. When the 40-member full admissions
committee
begins its deliberations, it discusses the relative
breakdown of appli-
cants by race. The goal of the process, according to
Harvard’s director
of admissions, is ensuring there is no “dramatic drop-off”
in minority
admissions from the prior class. An applicant receiving a
majority of
the full committee’s votes is tentatively accepted for
admission. At the
end of this process, the racial composition of the tentative
applicant
pool is disclosed to the committee. The last stage of
Harvard’s admis-
sions process, called the “lop,” winnows the list of
tentatively admitted
students to arrive at the final class. Applicants that
Harvard consid-
ers cutting at this stage are placed on the “lop list,”
which contains
only four pieces of information: legacy status, recruited
athlete status,
financial aid eligibility, and race. In the Harvard
admissions process,
“race is a determinative tip for” a significant percentage
“of all admit-
ted African American and Hispanic applicants.”
UNC has a similar admissions process. Every application is
re-
viewed first by an admissions office reader, who assigns a
numerical
rating to each of several categories. Readers are required
to consider
the applicant’s race as a factor in their review. Readers
then make a
written recommendation on each assigned application, and
they may
provide an applicant a substantial “plus” depending on the
applicant’s
race. At this stage, most recommendations are provisionally
final. A
committee of experienced staff members then conducts a “school
group
review” of every initial decision made by a reader and
either approves
or rejects the recommendation. In making those decisions,
the com-
mittee may consider the applicant’s race.
Petitioner, Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), is a
nonprofit or-
ganization whose stated purpose is “to defend human and
civil rights
secured by law, including the right of individuals to equal
protection
under the law.” SFFA filed separate lawsuits against Harvard
and
UNC, arguing that their race-based admissions programs
violate, re-
spectively, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After separate
bench
trials, both admissions programs were found permissible
under the
Equal Protection Clause and this Court’s precedents. In the
Harvard
case, the First Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted
certiorari. In
the UNC case, this Court granted certiorari before judgment.
Held: Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs violate the
Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 6–40.
(a) Because SFFA complies with the standing requirements for
or-
ganizational plaintiffs articulated by this Court in Hunt v.
Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.
S. 333, SFFA’s obligations un-
der Article III are satisfied, and this Court has
jurisdiction to consider
the merits of SFFA’s claims.
The Court rejects UNC’s argument that SFFA lacks standing
be-
cause it is not a “genuine” membership organization. An
organiza-
tional plaintiff can satisfy Article III jurisdiction in two
ways, one of
which is to assert “standing solely as the representative of
its mem-
bers,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.
S. 490, 511, an approach known as rep-
resentational or organizational standing. To invoke it, an
organization
must satisfy the three-part test in Hunt. Respondents do not
suggest
that SFFA fails Hunt’s test for organizational standing.
They argue
instead that SFFA cannot invoke organizational standing at
all be-
cause SFFA was not a genuine membership organization at the
time
it filed suit. Respondents maintain that, under Hunt, a
group qualifies
as a genuine membership organization only if it is
controlled and
funded by its members. In Hunt, this Court determined that a
state
agency with no traditional members could still qualify as a
genuine
membership organization in substance because the agency
repre-
sented the interests of individuals and otherwise satisfied
Hunt’s
three-part test for organizational standing. See 432 U.
S., at 342.
Hunt’s “indicia of membership” analysis, however, has no
applicability
here. As the courts below found, SFFA is indisputably a
voluntary
membership organization with identifiable members who
support its
mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith. SFFA is thus
enti-
tled to rely on the organizational standing doctrine as
articulated in
Hunt. Pp. 6–9.
(b) Proposed by Congress and ratified by the States in the
wake of
the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
State shall
“deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.”
Proponents
of the Equal Protection Clause described its “foundation[al]
principle”
as “not permit[ing] any distinctions of law based on race or
color.” Any
“law which operates upon one man,” they maintained, should
“operate
equally upon all.” Accordingly, as this Court’s early
decisions inter-
preting the Equal Protection Clause explained, the
Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed “that the law in the States shall be
the same
for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether
colored or
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States.”
Despite the early recognition of the broad sweep of the
Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the Court—alongside the country—quickly
failed to
live up to the Clause’s core commitments. For almost a
century after
the Civil War, state-mandated segregation was in many parts
of the
Nation a regrettable norm. This Court played its own role in
that ig-
noble history, allowing in Plessy v. Ferguson
the separate but equal
regime that would come to deface much of America.
163 U. S. 537.
After Plessy, “American courts . . . labored with the
doctrine [of sep-
arate but equal] for over half a century.” Brown v. Board of
Education,
347 U. S.
483, 491. Some cases in this period attempted to curtail the
perniciousness of the doctrine by emphasizing that it
required States
to provide black students educational opportunities equal
to—even if
formally separate from—those enjoyed by white students. See,
e.g.,
Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U. S. 337,
349–350. But the
inherent folly of that approach—of trying to derive equality
from ine-
quality—soon became apparent. As the Court subsequently
recog-
nized, even racial distinctions that were argued to have no
palpable
effect worked to subordinate the afflicted students. See,
e.g., McLau-
rin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U.
S. 637, 640–642.
By 1950, the inevitable truth of the Fourteenth Amendment
had thus
begun to reemerge: Separate cannot be equal.
The culmination of this approach came finally in Brown v.
Board of
Education, 347 U. S.
483. There, the Court overturned the separate
but equal regime established in Plessy and began on the path
of inval-
idating all de jure racial discrimination by the States and
Federal Gov-
ernment. The conclusion reached by the Brown
Court was unmistak-
ably clear: the right to a public education “must be made
available to
all on equal terms.” 347 U.
S., at 493. The Court reiterated that rule
just one year later, holding that “full compliance” with
Brown required
schools to admit students “on a racially nondiscriminatory
basis.”
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.
S. 294, 300–301.
In the years that followed, Brown’s “fundamental principle
that ra-
cial discrimination in public education is
unconstitutional,” id., at 298,
reached other areas of life—for example, state and local
laws requiring
segregation in busing, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.
S. 903 (per curiam);
racial segregation in the enjoyment of public beaches and
bathhouses
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U. S. 877 (per
cu-
riam); and antimiscegenation laws, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U. S. 1.
These decisions, and others like them, reflect the “core
purpose” of the
Equal Protection Clause: “do[ing] away with all
governmentally im-
posed discrimination based on race.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.
S. 429,
432.
Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of
it. Ac-
cordingly, the Court has held that the Equal Protection
Clause applies
“without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality”—
it is “universal in [its] application.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U. S. 356,
369. For “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean
one thing
when applied to one individual and something else when
applied to a
person of another color.” Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S.
265, 289–290.
Any exceptions to the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee
must
survive a daunting two-step examination known as “strict
scrutiny,”
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.
S. 200, 227, which asks
first whether the racial classification is used to “further
compelling
governmental interests,” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.
S. 306, 326, and
second whether the government’s use of race is “narrowly
tailored,”
i.e., “necessary,” to achieve that interest, Fisher v. University
of Tex. at
Austin, 570 U. S.
297, 311–312. Acceptance of race-based state action
is rare for a reason: “[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free
people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”
Rice v. Cay-
etano, 528 U. S.
495, 517. Pp. 9–16.
(c) This Court first considered whether a university may
make race-
based admissions decisions in Bakke, 438 U.
S. 265. In a deeply splin-
tered decision that produced six different opinions, Justice
Powell’s
opinion for himself alone would eventually come to “serv[e]
as the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious
admissions
policies.” Grutter, 539 U. S.,
at 323. After rejecting three of the Uni-
versity’s four justifications as not sufficiently
compelling, Justice Pow-
ell turned to its last interest asserted to be
compelling—obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse
student body.
Justice Powell found that interest to be “a constitutionally
permissible
goal for an institution of higher education,” which was
entitled as a
matter of academic freedom “to make its own judgments as to
. . . the
selection of its student body.” 438 U.
S., at 311–312. But a university’s
freedom was not unlimited—“[r]acial and ethnic distinctions
of any
sort are inherently suspect,” Justice Powell explained, and
antipathy
toward them was deeply “rooted in our Nation’s
constitutional and de-
mographic history.” Id.,
at 291. Accordingly, a university could not
employ a two-track quota system with a specific number of
seats re-
served for individuals from a preferred ethnic group. Id.,
at 315. Nei-
ther still could a university use race to foreclose an
individual from all
consideration. Id.,
at 318. Race could only operate as “a ‘plus’ in a
particular applicant’s file,” and even then it had to be
weighed in a
manner “flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity
in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant.” Id., at 317.
Pp. 16–19.
(d) For years following Bakke, lower courts struggled to
determine
whether Justice Powell’s decision was “binding precedent.”
Grutter,
539 U. S.,
at 325. Then, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court for the first
time “endorse[d] Justice Powell’s view that student body
diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race
in university
admissions.” Ibid. The Grutter majority’s analysis tracked
Justice
Powell’s in many respects, including its insistence on
limits on how
universities may consider race in their admissions programs.
Those
limits, Grutter explained, were intended to guard against
two dangers
that all race-based government action portends. The first is
the risk
that the use of race will devolve into “illegitimate . . .
stereotyp[ing].”
Richmond v. J.
A. Croson Co., 488 U. S.
469, 493 (plurality opinion).
Admissions programs could thus not operate on the “belief
that minor-
ity students always (or even consistently) express some
characteristic
minority viewpoint on any issue.” Grutter, 539 U.
S., at 333 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The second risk is that race would
be used
not as a plus, but as a negative—to discriminate against
those racial
groups that were not the beneficiaries of the race-based
preference. A
university’s use of race, accordingly, could not occur in a
manner that
“unduly harm[ed] nonminority applicants.” Id.,
at 341.
To manage these concerns, Grutter imposed one final limit on
race-
based admissions programs: At some point, the Court held,
they must
end. Id., at
342. Recognizing that “[e]nshrining a permanent justifi-
cation for racial preferences would offend” the
Constitution’s unambig-
uous guarantee of equal protection, the Court expressed its
expecta-
tion that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences will
no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.” Id.,
at 343. Pp. 19–
21.
(e) Twenty years have passed since Grutter, with no end to
race-
based college admissions in sight. But the Court has
permitted race-
based college admissions only within the confines of narrow
re-
strictions: such admissions programs must comply with strict
scrutiny,
may never use race as a stereotype or negative, and must—at
some
point—end. Respondents’ admissions systems fail each of
these crite-
ria and must therefore be invalidated under the Equal
Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 21–34.
(1) Respondents fail to operate their race-based admissions
pro-
grams in a manner that is “sufficiently measurable to permit
judicial
[review]” under the rubric of strict scrutiny. Fisher v.
University of
Tex. at Austin,
579 U. S. 365,
381. First, the interests that respondents
view as compelling cannot be subjected to meaningful
judicial review.
Those interests include training future leaders, acquiring
new
knowledge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust
marketplace
of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens.
While these
are commendable goals, they are not sufficiently coherent
for purposes
of strict scrutiny. It is unclear how courts are supposed to
measure
any of these goals, or if they could, to know when they have
been
reached so that racial preferences can end. The elusiveness
of respond-
ents’ asserted goals is further illustrated by comparing
them to recog-
nized compelling interests. For example, courts can discern
whether
the temporary racial segregation of inmates will prevent
harm to those
in the prison, see Johnson v. California,
543 U. S. 499,
512–513, but
the question whether a particular mix of minority students
produces
“engaged and productive citizens” or effectively “train[s]
future lead-
ers” is standardless.
Second, respondents’ admissions programs fail to articulate
a mean-
ingful connection between the means they employ and the
goals they
pursue. To achieve the educational benefits of diversity,
respondents
measure the racial composition of their classes using racial
categories
that are plainly overbroad (expressing, for example, no
concern
whether South Asian or East Asian students are adequately
repre-
sented as “Asian”); arbitrary or undefined (the use of the
category “His-
panic”); or underinclusive (no category at all for Middle
Eastern stu-
dents). The unclear connection between the goals that
respondents
seek and the means they employ preclude courts from
meaningfully
scrutinizing respondents’ admissions programs.
The universities’ main response to these criticisms is
“trust us.”
They assert that universities are owed deference when using
race to
benefit some applicants but not others. While this Court has
recog-
nized a “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university’s aca-
demic decisions,” it has made clear that deference must
exist “within
constitutionally prescribed limits.” Grutter, 539 U.
S., at 328. Re-
spondents have failed to present an exceedingly persuasive
justifica-
tion for separating students on the basis of race that is
measurable
and concrete enough to permit judicial review, as the Equal
Protection
Clause requires. Pp. 22–26.
(2) Respondents’ race-based admissions systems also fail to
com-
ply with the Equal Protection Clause’s twin commands that
race may
never be used as a “negative” and that it may not operate as
a stereo-
type. The First Circuit found that Harvard’s consideration
of race has
resulted in fewer admissions of Asian-American students.
Respond-
ents’ assertion that race is never a negative factor in
their admissions
programs cannot withstand scrutiny. College admissions are
zero-
sum, and a benefit provided to some applicants but not to
others nec-
essarily advantages the former at the expense of the latter.
Respondents admissions programs are infirm for a second
reason as
well: They require stereotyping—the very thing Grutter
foreswore.
When a university admits students “on the basis of race, it
engages in
the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a
particu-
lar race, because of their race, think alike.” Miller v.
Johnson, 515
U. S.
900, 911–912. Such stereotyping is contrary to the “core purpose”
of the Equal Protection Clause. Palmore, 466 U.
S., at 432. Pp. 26–
29.
(3) Respondents’ admissions programs also lack a “logical
end
point” as Grutter required. 539 U.
S., at 342. Respondents suggest
that the end of race-based admissions programs will occur
once mean-
ingful representation and diversity are achieved on college
campuses.
Such measures of success amount to little more than
comparing the
racial breakdown of the incoming class and comparing it to
some other
metric, such as the racial makeup of the previous incoming
class or the
population in general, to see whether some proportional goal
has been
reached. The problem with this approach is well established:
“[O]utright racial balancing” is “patently
unconstitutional.” Fisher,
570 U. S.,
at 311. Respondents’ second proffered end point—when stu-
dents receive the educational benefits of diversity—fares no
better. As
explained, it is unclear how a court is supposed to
determine if or when
such goals would be adequately met. Third, respondents
suggest the
25-year expectation in Grutter means that race-based preferences
must be allowed to continue until at least 2028. The Court’s
statement
in Grutter, however, reflected only that Court’s expectation
that race-
based preferences would, by 2028, be unnecessary in the
context of ra-
cial diversity on college campuses. Finally, respondents
argue that the
frequent reviews they conduct to determine whether racial
preferences
are still necessary obviates the need for an end point. But
Grutter
never suggested that periodic review can make
unconstitutional con-
duct constitutional. Pp. 29–34.
(f) Because Harvard’s and UNC’s admissions programs lack
suffi-
ciently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use
of race,
unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial
stereo-
typing, and lack meaningful end points, those admissions
programs
cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal
Protection
Clause. At the same time, nothing prohibits universities
from consid-
ering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the
applicant’s life,
so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality
of character or
unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute
to the uni-
versity. Many universities have for too long wrongly
concluded that
the touchstone of an individual’s identity is not challenges
bested,
skills built, or lessons learned, but the color of their
skin. This Nation’s
constitutional history does not tolerate that choice. Pp.
39–40.
No. 20–1199, 980 F. 3d 157; No. 21–707, 567 F. Supp. 3d 580,
reversed.
ROBERTS , C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which THOMAS ,
ALITO , G ORSUCH, K AVANAUGH, and BARRETT , JJ., joined.
THOMAS , J.,
filed a concurring opinion. G ORSUCH, J., filed a concurring
opinion, in
which THOMAS , J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring
opinion.
SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN,
J., joined, and
in which JACKSON, J., joined as it applies to No. 21–707.
JACKSON, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in No. 21–707, in which SOTOMAYOR
and K A-
GAN, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., took no part in the
consideration or deci-
sion of the case in No. 20–1199.
_________________
Cite as: 600 U. S.
____ (2023).