ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

July 22, 2023

NYPPL's public personnel law handbooks, listed below, are available for purchase from BookLocker.com, Inc

The Discipline Book - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public officers and employees in New York State set out as an e-book. For more about this electronic handbook, click HERE. 

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances- The text of this publication focuses on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. For more information click HERE. 

Disability Benefits: payable to firefighters, police officers and other public sector personnel - an e-book focusing on retirement for disability under the NYS Employees' Retirement System, the NYS Teachers' Retirement System, General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and similar statutes providing benefits to employees injured both "on-the-job" and "off-the-job." For more information about this e-book click HERE. 

The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual -This e-book reviews the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. Click HERE for more information.

July 21, 2023

The anatomy of challenging an administrative determination by an appeals board affirming the findings and decision of an administrative law judge

A police officer issued Plaintiff a traffic summons for operating a motor vehicle while using a cell phone in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1225-d. Following an administrative hearing, at which the Plaintiff did not testify and appeared solely by counsel, an administrative law judge [ALJ] found Petitioner guilty of violating VTL §1225-d. Plaintiff appealed the ALJ's determination but the Administrative Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff then initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court challenging the Appeals Board's determination, which action was transferred to the Appellate Division pursuant to CPLR §7804(g).

The Appellate Division, citing Matter of Mannino v Department of Motor Vehs. of State of N.Y.-Traffic Violations Div., 101 AD3d 880, noted that "[to] annul an administrative determination made after a hearing directed by law at which evidence is taken, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence* to support the determination". 

As the Mannino court, [supra] opined "... courts may not ... reject the choice made by [an administrative agency] where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists" and "deference must be given to the fact-finding and credibility determinations of the administrative agency"**.

Further, explained the Appellate Division, credibility determinations were for the ALJ to make and there is no indication that the Plaintiff's "right to cross-examine the ... officer was so circumscribed as to deprive him of a fair hearing. " The court then confirmed the Appeals Board's decision, denied Plaintiff's petition, and dismissed the proceeding on the merits, with costs.

* Substantial evidence, said the court, is "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact."

** See Matter of LaChance v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 159 AD3d 1014 at 1015.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

July 20, 2023

Tenured employee terminated after refusing COVID-19 vaccine after employee's application for a religious exemption was denied

This proceeding reviews the termination of a tenured teacher's [Petitioner] employment by the New York City Board of Education [DOE] during, and as a result of, the COVID-19 pandemic.

DOE required all its teachers to receive a vaccine against COVID-19 before being allowed enter and work in DOE buildings, Petitioner applied for a religious exemption, citing her religious beliefs against receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. DOE denied Petitioner's application for a religious exemption and her employment with the DOE was terminated as a result of Petitioner's refusal to receive the vaccine for COVID-19.

Petitioner commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging DOE's decision and her resulting termination. Supreme Court sustained DOE's action.

Petitioner then moved "for leave to reargue and renew" her Article 78 action. Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion. The Supreme Court's decision rejecting Petitioner's motion "to reargue and review" is set out below:


2023 NY Slip Op 32352(U) Docket Number: Index No. 156145/2022

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.

TINA LYNCH,

Petitioner,

- V -

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL

DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMUNITY

SCHOOL DISTRICT 21 OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, UNITED FEDERATION OF

TEACHERS,

Respondents.

DAVID B. COHEN, J.S.C.

By notice of motion, petitioner moves for an order granting reargument and reconsideration of the decision and order dated January 25, 2023, by which the petition was denied and the proceeding was dismissd. Respondents oppose and by notice of cross motion, move for an order adjourning the return date of the instant motion in order to submit opposition papers. It appears that the cross motion was resolved by a referee, who extended respondents' time to oppose the motion (NYSCEF 75), and they subsequently submitted their opposition.

I. PRIOR DECISION

This proceeding arises from the termination of petitioner's employment as a tenured teacher with respondents during and as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In sum, in response to respondents' policy requiring all Department of Education (DOE) employees to receive a vaccine against COVID-19 before being allowed enter and work in DOE buildings, petitioner applied for a religious exemption, citing her religious beliefs against receiving a COVID-19 vaccme [sic]. After petitioner's application was denied, and her employment with the DOE was terminated, petitioner commenced the instant proceeding.

By decision and order dated January 25, 2023, the petition was denied on the grounds that DOE' s reasons for denying religious exemption requests, in general and in petitioner's case, were not irrational, arbitrary, or capricious.

II. ANALYSIS

At the outset, I observe that petitioner's memorandum of law in support of this motion is 46 pages long, and although plaintiff does not submit a word count certification even though required to do so (22 NYCRR 202.8-b[c]), a review of the memorandum reflects that it contains more than 10,500 words, far above the permitted 7,000 word limit (22 NYCRR 202.8-b[a]), which in and of itself may warrant denial of the motion.

Nevertheless, the motion is addressed.

A. Motion to reargue

"A motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221 is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may be granted only upon a showing that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or the law or for some reason mistakenly arrive at its earlier decision" (William P. Pahl Equip. Corp. v Kassis, 182 AD2d 22, 27 [1st Dept 1992] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed and denied 80 NY2d 1005 [1992]; see Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558, 567-568 [1st Dept 1979]).

Here, petitioner does not demonstrate that any issue of fact or law was overlooked or misapprehended. Rather, she makes the same arguments that she previously made, which were considered and rejected (William P. Pahl Equip. Corp., 182 AD2d at 27 [reargument not designed to give unsuccessful party successive opportunities to reargue issues already decided]).

Moreover, while petitioner argues that the majority of justices in this court have found that respondents' policy was arbitrary and capricious and that she is the victim of "the unfortunate arbitrary and capricious assignment of her case to a Judge in the City of New York" who ruled otherwise (NYSCEF 66, p. 7), not only are the other courts' decisions not binding on me, but petitioner does not acknowledge the cases wherein the vaccination policy was upheld (see e.g., Matter of Lebowitz v The Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 2022 WL 6776229 [Sup Ct, New York County 2023, Love, J.]; Matter of Hogue v The Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 2022 WL 7109657 [Sup Ct, New York County 2022, Love, J.]; Matter of Maniscalco v The Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 2022 WL 797971 [Sup Ct, New York County 2022, Kotler, J.]; Matter of Bryan v The Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 2022 WL 14044362 [Sup Ct, New York County 2022, Engoron, J.]). Nor did petitioner distinguish the cases cited in the prior decision.

Petitioner's arguments regarding the New York City Human Rights Law are improperly raised for the first time here as she did not assert a NYCHRL claim in her petition (NYSCEF 1), which she acknowledges in the memorandum of law she filed in support thereof ("Petitioner would be well within her rights to assert a [NYCHRL] religious accommodation claim" [NYSCEF 3, p. 16]). In any event, petitioner's assertion that respondents failed to engage her in a cooperative dialogue as required by the NYCHRL has no merit (see e.g., Matter of Marsteller v City of New York, AD3d , 2023 WL 4065500 [1st Dept 2023] [petitioner failed to show that process for resolving accommodation requests did not comply with NYCHRL, as respondents offered information on process for reviewing accommodation requests, informed employees how to apply for exemption and to appeal denials, petitioner availed himself of process, respondents explained denial, and parties further engaged in appeals process]).

Similarly, petitioner's newly-asserted New York State unspecified constitutional religious freedom argument may not be considered for the first time on reargument, and, in any event, it is unavailing (see Kane v De Blasio, 623 F Supp 3d 339 [SD NY 2022] [City policy requiring workers in school settings to be vaccinated not unconstitutional]).

There is also no merit to petitioner's argument that this court erred in considering respondents' position statement (see Marsteller, 2023 WL 4065500 [where there has been no administrative hearing, "an agency may submit an official's affidavit to explain the information that was before the agency and the rationale for its decision, and this Court may consider such an affidavit even though it was not submitted during the administrative process"]). Leave to reargue is thus denied.

B. Motion to renew

Pursuant to CPLR 2221 (e ), a motion for leave to renew "shall be based upon new facts

not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination," and "shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion."

The new evidence proffered by petitioner - respondents' issuance of a policy in February

2023 which effectively repealed the vaccination mandate - is mentioned only in her counsel's affirmation, and she does not explain why the new policy is relevant to whether the prior policy was irrational, arbitrary and capricious, nor does she submit any supporting authority. In any event, "judicial review [of an Article 78 petition] is limited to the facts and record adduced before the agency" (Matter of Benjamin v Dept. of Haus. Preservation, 187 AD3d 433,433 [1st Dept 2020]). As the new policy would not change the prior decision, leave to renew is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, that petitioner's motion for leave to reargue and renew is denied; and it is further ORDERED, that respondents' cross motion is denied as academic.

DAVID B. COHEN, J.S.C.

 

July 19, 2023

Prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the jurisdiction's Common Council challenged

A federal district court granted the City of Kingston's motion to dismiss the petitioner's [Plaintiffs'] challenge to the City's prohibition against bringing signs and posters into public meetings of the Kingston Common Council held at Kingston City Hall.  

The City had contended that Common Council meetings "are limited public fora in which the City is permitted to reasonably restrict speech that undermines the purpose for which the forum had been opened." The district court agreed and granted the City’s motion.

The court opined that Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that the City’s sign prohibition was unreasonable in light of the potential disruption or distraction that signs at Common Council meetings might pose.  

The Second Circuit agreed, stating "We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court." 

In a footnote, the Circuit Court's decision noted "Many district courts have upheld similar sign prohibitions at public meetings" citing Madsen v. City of Lincoln, 574 F. Supp. 3d 683, among other decisions.

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.

 

July 18, 2023

Accumulating eligibility towards tenure via so-called "Jarema credit"

In this decision the Appellate Division explains why the Petitioner was not eligible for including "Jarema credit"* for his service as a substitute teacher outside of the respondent Smithtown Central School District.

Absent such credit, it is undisputed that the Petitioner did not serve the full probationary period of four years in the School District required by Education Law §3012, and therefore could not establish tenure by estoppel.

The Appellate Division described its decision, the text of which is set out below, as "apparently one of first impression for an appellate court in this State", wherein a teacher serving a probationary period claims to have accumulated "Jarema credit" for the purpose of attaining tenure in his current school district as the result of his earlier employment in a "different school district".

 

 Matter of DeNigris v Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist.

2023 NY Slip Op 03783

Decided on July 12, 2023

Appellate Division, Second Department

Ford, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on July 12, 2023 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
WILLIAM G. FORD
DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.


2021-09160
(Index No. 610064/20)

In the Matter of Christopher DeNigris, appellant,

v

Smithtown Central School District, respondent.

 

APPEAL by the petitioner, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of Smithtown Central School District dated January 29, 2020, in effect, terminating the petitioner's employment, from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Maureen T. Liccione, J.), dated November 10, 2021, and entered in Suffolk County. The judgment, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ricotta & Marks, P.C., Long Island City, NY (Thomas A. Ricotta of counsel), for appellant.

Ingerman Smith, LLP, Hauppauge, NY (Steven A. Goodstadt and Keith T. Olsen of counsel), for respondent.


FORD, J.

OPINION & ORDER

The narrow issue presented on this appeal, apparently one of first impression for an appellate court in this State, is whether a teacher may accumulate credit towards tenure, also known as "Jarema credit," pursuant to Education Law §3012, for time spent teaching as a regular substitute teacher in a district other than the district in which the teacher is seeking tenure. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that a teacher is only entitled to "Jarema credit" for regular substitute service if said service was completed in the district in which the teacher is seeking tenure.

I. Relevant Facts

From January 2014 until September 2017, the petitioner was employed by the New York City Department of Education as a special education substitute teacher. He was then appointed to a probationary term as a special education teacher in the Smithtown Central School District (hereinafter the School District), located in Suffolk County. The School District noted in the petitioner's appointment letter that his anticipated probationary period would run from September 1, 2017, until August 31, 2021.

In a letter dated January 29, 2020, the School District's superintendent informed the petitioner that he would be recommending that the Board of Education terminate the petitioner's probationary appointment effective June 30, 2020, and that the Board of Education would vote on the recommendation at a meeting on May 12, 2020. The petitioner sent a letter requesting that he be provided with the reasons for his termination from the School District. In response, the superintendent stated that the petitioner was being terminated based upon his "instructional delivery, grading practices and record keeping, parent communication, [and] concerns related to interpersonal relationships with staff members."

The petitioner resigned from the School District prior to his termination. The Board of Education accepted his resignation effective June 30, 2020.

Thereafter, the petitioner commenced the instant CPLR article 78 proceeding to review the January 29, 2020 determination, in effect, terminating his employment. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that his termination was improper because he had acquired tenure by estoppel due to his prior service as a substitute teacher for the New York City Department of Education. The Supreme Court, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, determining that the petitioner was not entitled to tenure by estoppel because his service as a substitute teacher was performed outside of the School District. The petitioner appeals, and we affirm for the reasons set forth below.

II. Legislative History of the "Jarema credit"

"The Education Law specifically distinguishes between probationary teachers and tenured teachers" (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 129 AD3d 1067, 1070). The purpose of the probationary period is to provide "a school district an opportunity to evaluate an individual's performance as a teacher prior to granting tenure" (id. at 1071). A teacher's "probationary period can, however, be reduced . . . through 'Jarema credit,' named for the bill's sponsor, Assemblyman Stephen J. Jarema" (Matter of Speichler v Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., Second Supervisory Dist., 90 NY2d 110, 114).

In 1936, Jarema sponsored a bill that would reduce the probationary period for a teacher who had "rendered satisfactory service as a regular substitute for a period of two years" (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1936, ch 680 at 2 [emphasis omitted]). The reasoning for this Depression-era bill, as explained by Jarema, was that requiring the full statutory term of probationary service was "unfair to the teacher who has given many years as a substitute" (Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1936, ch 680 at 36). Jarema noted that "[t]he purpose of the probationary period is to find out whether the person is suited to the profession. This can be determined over a [specific time] period irrespective of whether one is called a substitute or a regular probationary teacher" (id. at 37). In a Memorandum for the Governor in relation to the bill, Deputy Commissioner and Counsel of the State Education Department, Ernest E. Cole, further explained that

"[t]he apparent purpose [of the bill] is to limit the probationary period . . . for a teacher appointed in a city who has already been serving in that city as a substitute teacher for a period of two years. The purpose of a probationary period, as I understand it, is to enable the school officials to become aware of a person's teaching ability. I assume that the sponsors of this bill believe that all of this information may be obtained while the person is serving as a substitute . . . . This seems reasonable to me" (Mem of the Deputy Commr & Counsel for the State Educ Dept, Bill Jacket, L 1936, ch 680 at 34 [emphasis added]).

A version of the "Jarema credit" has been adopted into Education Law § 3012, which provides as follows:

"Teachers . . . who are appointed on or after July first, two thousand fifteen, shall be appointed . . . for a probationary period of four years, except that in the case of a teacher who has rendered satisfactory service as a regular substitute for a period of two years and, if a classroom teacher, has received annual professional performance review ratings in each of those years, or has rendered satisfactory service as a seasonally licensed per session teacher of swimming in day schools who has served in that capacity for a period of two years and has been appointed to teach the same subject in day schools, on an annual salary, the teacher shall be appointed for a probationary period of two years; provided, however, that in the case of a teacher who has been appointed on tenure in another school district within the state, the school district where currently employed, or a board of cooperative educational services, and who was not dismissed from such district or board as a result of charges brought pursuant to [Education Law § 3020-a or § 3020-b], the teacher shall be appointed for a probationary period of three years; provided that, in the case of a classroom teacher, the teacher demonstrates that he or she received an annual professional performance review rating pursuant to [Education Law § 3012-c or § 3012-d] in his or her final year of service in such other school district or board of cooperative educational services" (id. § 3012[1][a][ii]).

This appeal requires this Court to decide whether the "Jarema credit," as memorialized in Education Law § 3012, applies to regular substitute teaching performed outside of the school district in which a teacher is seeking tenure.

III. Tenure by Estoppel

"The Legislature designed the tenure system 'to foster academic freedom in our schools and to protect competent teachers from the abuses they might be subjected to if they could be dismissed at the whim of their supervisors'" (Matter of Berrios v Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist., 87 AD3d 329, 331, quoting Ricca v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 47 NY2d 385, 391). "At the expiration of the probationary term, the superintendent of schools shall make a written report to the board of education recommending for appointment on tenure those persons who have been found competent, efficient and satisfactory" (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 129 AD3d at 1070). "The employment of probationary teachers can be terminated at any time during the probationary period, without any reason and without a hearing" (id.). "By contrast, tenured teachers hold their positions during good behavior and competent service, and are subject to dismissal only after formal disciplinary proceedings" (id.). "A teacher who is not to be recommended for tenure must be so notified in writing no later than 60 days before the expiration of his or her probationary period" (id.).

"Tenure by estoppel results when a school board accepts the continued services of a teacher or administrator, but fails to take the action required by law to either grant or deny tenure prior to the expiration of the teacher's probationary term" (Matter of Berrios v Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist., 87 AD3d at 332 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "A teacher who has acquired tenure by estoppel, but is nonetheless improperly terminated, is entitled to reinstatement, retroactive to the last date of employment, back pay, and all accrued benefits" (Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 129 AD3d at 1071). Here, the petitioner claims that he has established tenure by estoppel pursuant to Education Law § 3012, based upon his service as a regular substitute teacher in the New York City Department of Education prior to his appointment as a probationary teacher in the School District. Accordingly, he contends that his termination, in effect, by the School District, without formal disciplinary proceedings, was affected by an error of law (see CPLR 7803[3]).

IV. Analysis

The Supreme Court correctly determined that, pursuant to Education Law § 3012, a probationary teacher may receive "Jarema credit" towards tenure only for substitute teaching performed in the same district in which the teacher is seeking tenure. The "well-established rules of statutory construction direct that" an analysis of a statute "begins with the language of the statute" (Colon v Martin, 35 NY3d 75, 78 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "This is because the primary consideration is to ascertain the legislature's intent, of which the text itself is generally the best evidence" (id. at 78 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Walsh v New York State Comptroller, 34 NY3d 520, 524). A court should construe unambiguous language to give effect to its plain meaning (see Matter of Lemma v Nassau County Police Officer Indem. Bd., 31 NY3d 523, 528). "Further, a statute must be construed as a whole and . . . its various sections must be considered together and with reference to each other" (Colon v Martin, 35 NY3d at 78 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applie[s] in the construction of the statutes, so that where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded" (Matter of Benjamin v New York City Empls. Retirement Sys., 170 AD3d 714, 716 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "In other words, the doctrine is an 'interpretive maxim that the inclusion of a particular thing in a statute implies an intent to exclude other things not included'" (Colon v Martin, 35 NY3d at 78, quoting Cruz v TD Bank, N.A., 22 NY3d 61, 72).

Education Law § 3012(1)(a)(ii) specifically delineates that a reduced, three-year probationary period applies both to teachers who were granted tenure in the same school district and to teachers who were granted tenure in a different school district within the state. Thus, the legislature explicitly indicated its intent that a prior grant of tenure would entitle a teacher to a three-year probationary term rather than a four-year probationary term if they sought tenure for a second time, regardless of where in New York they had previously been granted tenure. The legislature included no such qualifying language when discussing teachers who had worked as regular substitutes (see id.). Accordingly, construing the statute as a whole, the exclusion of qualifying language regarding teaching in a different school district when discussing substitute teaching supports the conclusion that the petitioner was not entitled to "Jarema credit" for substitute teaching outside of the School District (see e.g. Colon v Martin, 35 NY3d 75).

This conclusion is also consistent with the legislative history of the "Jarema credit." As evidenced by Jarema's memorandum in support of his bill, his proposal was not intended to provide teachers who had served as regular substitutes shorter probationary periods than other individuals. Rather, he intended for school districts to begin their evaluations of teachers during their time as regular substitutes, as opposed to forcing regular substitutes to start their pre-tenure time anew when they obtained a probationary appointment. Specifically, Jarema recognized that a teacher's abilities could be evaluated within a particular number of years regardless of whether the teacher was a substitute or probationary teacher during those years (see Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1936, ch 680 at 37). This interpretation is further strengthened by the understanding of the Deputy Commissioner and Counsel of the State Education Department, who specified that the bill was intended to help teachers "appointed in a city who [have] already been serving in that city as a substitute teacher for a period of two years" (Mem of the Deputy Commr & Counsel for the State Educ Dept, Bill Jacket, L 1936, ch 680 at 34 [emphasis added]).

Education Law § 3012(1)(a)(ii) provides for a four-year probationary period for teachers generally and a two-year probationary period for teachers who have worked as regular substitutes for two years. Where a teacher works as a regular substitute for two years and as a probationary appointment for two years, all within the same school district, that school district will have had a full four years to evaluate the teacher's performance before making a tenure decision. Thus, regular substitutes within one school district are in the same position as probationary teachers who did not begin as regular substitutes. On the other hand, if this section were construed to include substitute service performed outside of the current school district, then the current school district would only have two years to evaluate the teacher's performance. This result would be inconsistent with Jarema's stated intent (see Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1936, ch 680 at 37).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioner was not entitled to "Jarema credit" for his service as a substitute teacher outside of the School District. Without this credit, it is undisputed that the petitioner did not serve the full probationary period of four years in the School District required by Education Law § 3012, and therefore could not establish tenure by estoppel. Thus, the School District's determination, in effect, to terminate the petitioner's employment was not affected by an error of law (see CPLR 7803[3]).

Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., MILLER and DOWLING, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

ENTER:

Maria T. Fasulo

Clerk of the Court

* Other decision concerning Jarema Credit summarized in NYPPL include:

Jarema credit and eligibilty for tenure [Barbaccia v Locust Valley CSD, 282 AD2d 674]

Jarema Credit and probationary service (Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, 14,557, April 12, 2001 [MacDonald and the North Tonawanda City School District])

Accumulating tenure eligibility credit while serving as an “intern teacher” not authorized [Matter of Berrios v Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 05804, Appellate Division, Second Department]

Determining the availability of Jarema credit for the purposes of attaining tenure [2015 NY Slip Op 04847]

Only educators holding valid New York State teacher’s certificate are entitled to Jarema service credit in meeting probationary service requirements [Goldberg and the NYC Department of Education, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education 15763.]

Determining service credit for the purpose of attaining tenure by educators serving as substitute employees [https://www.leagle.com/decision/199720090ny2d110119]

Tenure by estoppel (Matter of Andrews v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2010 NY Slip Op 32963(U), [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]); http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2010/2010_32963.pdf

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard [See also https://www.linkedin.com/in/harvey-randall-9130a5178/]. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
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