Requesting a school board to approve a "voter proposition" submitted by a resident of the school district

Petitioner in this appeal to the Commissioner of Education challenged the school board rejection of certain proposed propositions for placement on the ballot for consideration by school district voters after the school board determined the two proposed propositions were not within the power of voters. 

The first proposition would extend the term of the lease between the school board and the school district's public library (the “lease proposition”) while the second would discontinue the lawsuit the school board brought against the school district library (the “litigation proposition”).

Noting that a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which they seek relief, the Commissioner held that the school board reasonably declined to adopt the lease and litigation propositions.

The Commissioner's decision is set out below.

Appeals of GLORIA SPRADLIN from action of the Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School District regarding a proposition.

Decision No. 18,561

(May 5, 2025)

Guercio & Guercio LLP., attorneys for respondent, Matthew J. Mehnert, Esq., of counsel

ROSA., Commissioner.--In two separate appeals, petitioner challenges determinations of the Board of Education of the Island Trees Union Free School District (“respondent” or “school board”) that two proposed propositions were not within the power of voters.  Because the appeals present common questions of fact and law, they are consolidated for decision (8 NYCRR 275.18).  The appeals must be dismissed.

Respondent leases space within one of its elementary schools to the Island Trees Public Library (“library”) to operate a library therein.[1] The current lease runs from July 2021 to June 2031.  In July 2023, the school board sued the library for failing to make payments required under the lease.

On or about March 18, 2024, petitioner requested that the school board approve two voter propositions.  The first would extend the term of the lease between the school board and library to 50 years (“lease proposition”) while the second would discontinue the lawsuit the school board brought against the library (“litigation proposition”).  At a special meeting on April 10, 2024, respondent declined to place these propositions on the ballot.  These appeals ensued.

Petitioner argues that sections 255 and 260 of the Education Law impliedly afford voters the authority to vote on the lease and litigation.  For relief, petitioner seeks determinations that the propositions are within the power of the district’s voters and orders placing them on the ballot.

Respondent contends that petitioner’s arguments are without merit.

Education Law § 2035 (2) provides, as relevant here, that “any proposition may be rejected by [a] … board of education if the purpose of the proposition is not within the power of the voters …” (see Appeal of Johnson, 44 Ed Dept Rep 382, Decision No. 15,206; Appeal of Lawson, 36 id. 450, Decision No. 13,774; Appeals of Cappa, 36 id. 278, Decision No. 13,724). 

In an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which they seek relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884). 

The school board reasonably declined to adopt the lease and litigation propositions.  With respect to the lease proposition, boards of education possess statutory power to lease unused real property for 10 or less years (Education Law § 403-a).[2]  “[B]ecause the Legislature has given the board this authority, it [would be] inappropriate to put a proposition before the voters that would override or limit [such] authority” (Appeal of Munch, 47 Ed Dept Rep 199, Decision No. 15,667; see also Appeal of Johnson, 44 Ed Dept Rep 382, Decision No. 15,206; Appeal of Rosenberg, 31 id. 398, Decision No. 12,680).  While petitioner argues that the Commissioner ordered a school board to “place the question of the conveyance of [a]... building to the board of library trustees before the voters” in Matter of the Board of the Library Trustees of the North-Merrick Public Library,[3] that appeal involved “unique circumstances” not applicable here (Appeal of the Board of Trustees of the Peninsula Public Library, 27 Ed Dept Rep 299, Decision No. 11,953).  Thus, I find that the school board appropriately declined to present the lease proposition to voters.[4]

Petitioner’s remaining arguments concerning the lease proposition are unpersuasive.  Education Law § 255, which concerns the “[e]stablishment of a public library,” is inapplicable.  And a provision in the lease agreement indicating that a “tentative lease agreement” for longer than 10 years must be approved by voters merely restates the requirements of Education Law § 403-a (see Education Law § 403-a [5] [a “board of education … [is] hereby authorized to enter into a lease agreement … for a period in excess of ten years subject, however, to voter approval by referendum”).

I further find that respondent appropriately rejected the litigation proposition.  A school board is responsible for the “superintendence, management and control” of its district and possesses “all the powers reasonably necessary to exercise powers granted [it] expressly or by implication” (Education Law § 1709 [13], [33]).  This includes the ability to initiate or discontinue litigation (see Matter of Board of Educ. of Roosevelt Union Free School Dist. v Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y., 282 AD2d 166, 171-72 [3d Dept 2001]).  As such, voters lack authority to dictate the course of litigation to which a school district is a party—and respondent was justified in rejecting a proposition indicating the same.

I have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

THE APPEALS ARE DISMISSED.

[1] The Island Trees Public Library is a school district public library. 

[2] In addition to the 10-year limitation, such a lease may only occur if:  (1) the property is not currently needed for school district purposes; (2) leasing is in the best interest of the school district; and (3) the lease is for fair market value (Education Law § 403-a [1]; see Appeal of Luciano, 52 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 16,308; Appeal of Forest, 53 id., Decision No. 16,501).  

[3] 25 Ed Dept Rep 321, Dec. No. 11,601. 

[4] Respondent acknowledges that it lacks statutory authority to lease its property for more than 10 years at a time.  Indeed, the lease agreement contemplates that, if the school board and library reach a “tentative … agreement” following “good faith negotiations,” the school board will submit a “voter referendum proposition at the next annual meeting” for a lease of more than 10 years (see Education Law § 403-a [5]).

Termination of employee by the New York City Police Commissioner following a disciplinary hearing unanimously confirmed by the Appellate Division

The New York City Police Commissioner terminated Petitioner's service with the New York City Police Department [NYPD] after Petitioner was found guilty disciplinary charges that alleged that he struck his wife, brandished a pistol at her, threatened her and his minor son, and failed to report his arrest to the NYPD's Operations Unit.

Petitioner appealed the Commissioner's decision and the penalty imposed by the Police Commissioner.

The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed the Commissioner's decision, noting that the Hearing Officer's determinations that:

1. Hearsay statements of Petitioner's wife and son were credible;

2. Petitioner's testimony was not credible; and 

3. That the photograph introduced by NYPD was sufficiently authenticated.

The court, citing Matter of Benjamin v Department of Housing Preserv. & Devel. of City of N.Y., 187 AD3d 433, also pointed out that Petitioner may not rely on a notification of disposition from the NYPD Transit Bureau's internal investigation, submitted for the first time with his petition, because "judicial review is limited to the facts and record adduced before the agency".

The Appellate Division also noted that it did not have the discretionary authority to review Petitioner's unpreserved challenges to the admission of sealed arrest records at the hearing, NYPD's reliance on Civil Service Law §75, or the Hearing Officer's representation of the evidence.

Considering Petitioner's challenge to the penalty imposed, termination of his employment with NYPD, the Appellate Division opined that "The penalty of termination does not shock one's sense of fairness in light of [Petitioner's] egregious conduct", citing Matter of Marks, 234 AD3d at 413; and Matter of Castillo v Shea, 226 AD3d 531, lv dismissed 42 NY3d 1071.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Attorney's failure to appear in Supreme Court for oral argument reviewed by the Appellate Division

In this appeal concerning seeking public records pursuant to New York State's Freedom of Information Law, the New York City Fire Department [NYFD], NYFD sought to have the Appellate Division vacate its default in appearing in Supreme Court for oral argument. 

The Appellate Division said FDNY was required to show it had a reasonable excuse for its default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the amended petition.

Citing HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Hutchinson, 215 AD3d 645, the Appellate Division opined that "Where the claim is supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the default, the court may accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse". The court then opined that the ill health of the litigant's attorney is an acceptable excuse for a default and that FDNY demonstrated that its attorney failed to appear at oral argument due to illness, which was corroborated by medical documentation. 

The Appellate Division noted that:

1. FDNY's attorney had notified the petitioner's attorney and the Supreme Court of her illness several hours before the scheduled oral argument;

2. Petitioner had consented to an adjournment of the oral argument; and

3. FDNY's attorney reasonably believed that her appearance was not required.

Under these circumstances, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court should have granted FDNY's motion to vacate its judgment and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for a determination of the amended petition on the merits.

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.

Concerning courts consideration of an inference of unlawful discrimination advanced by a plaintiff to show that the employer subjected the plaintiff to disparate treatment

In an action the Plaintiff, who had been employed by the City University of New York [CCNY] as a peace officer on a CCNY campus, sought to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin and for alleged unlawful retaliation.

Supreme Court granted the Employer's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's granting the Employer's motion. In so doing, the Appellate Division, citing Graham v Long Is. R.R., 230 F3d 34, noted that "To prevail on a summary judgment motion in an action alleging discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law [NYSHRL]:

1. An employer must demonstrate either a plaintiff's failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, 

2. If the employer offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged actions, the plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the employer's explanations were pretextual.

In this instance, the court, with respect to the "employment discrimination cause of action", observed that the Employer argued the Plaintiff failed to satisfy the fourth element: that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Addressing this "fourth element", the Appellate Division said an employer can demonstrate that the termination did not occur under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination by providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination, and "demonstrating the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether its reason for termination was merely pretextual."

Citing Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d at page 308, footnote 5, the Appellate Division opined that "[It] matters not whether the [employer's] stated reason for terminating plaintiff was a good reason, a bad reason, or a petty one. What matters is that the [employer's] stated reason for terminating plaintiff was nondiscriminatory".

In this instance the court concluded the Employer "met its prima facie burden by offering legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the [Plaintiff's] termination and by demonstrating the absence of material issues of fact as to whether its explanations were pretextual". In contrast, "Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding pretext for discrimination".

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that "Supreme Court properly granted the [Employer's] motion for summary judgment dismissing the [Plaintiff's] complaint".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Denise M. Miranda confirmed as Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights

On June 2, 2025, the New York State Division of Human Rights announced that Denise M. Miranda, Esq. was confirmed as Commissioner of the Division by the New York State Senate following her historic nomination by Governor Kathy Hochul. 

The Division's announcement noted:

"Commissioner Miranda becomes the first Afro-Latina to serve in this role at the Division, and her confirmation follows her service as the Acting Commissioner since March 2024. 

"Under the Commissioner’s leadership, the Division has launched ambitious efforts to overhaul the agency’s discrimination complaint intake and case management processes while also implementing vital organizational changes and operational improvements. 

"These essential upgrades will result in a bolder, more powerful, and more efficient Division that is prepared to protect the rights of all New Yorkers at a time when that mission has never been more critical.

"Commissioner Miranda was appointed by Governor Hochul in March 2024 to serve as the Acting Commissioner of the Division of Human Rights. 

"Prior to this, Commissioner Miranda served as the Executive Director of the New York State Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs for seven years. She oversaw the agency’s operations, which included investigations into abuse and neglect, criminal prosecutions, and administrative disciplinary proceedings. Under her leadership, the Justice Center managed the care of over one million individuals, with a workforce of more than 425 employees and a $41 million operating budget. 

 

"For nearly 30 years, Commissioner Miranda has been actively engaged in the practice of law and focused the majority of her career on social justice issues and protecting the rights of vulnerable individuals. Beyond her professional accomplishments, she is deeply committed to community service and embodies the values of justice, inclusion, and strategic leadership."