Plaintiffs in this action alleged law enforcement personnel engaged in malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and false arrest

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's summary of its decision in this action, Carruthers v Colton - 22-3232-cv, is set out below:

"Judgment, entered on November 29, 2022, by the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., Judge), granting the motion to dismiss Carruthers’s complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), filed by Defendants-Appellees Kimberly Colton, Charles Humphreyville, and Kristen Weston (hereinafter, “Defendants”). 

"Carruthers brought claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, false arrest, and failure to intervene against Defendants, who are all New York State Troopers. 

"The claims arose from Defendants’ alleged participation in a traffic stop of Carruthers’s vehicle on September 4, 2017, in Oneida County, New York, and in his subsequent arrest and prosecution for a felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) offense, multiple lesser DWI-related offenses, and a traffic infraction. 

"We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Carruthers’s false arrest claim and the portion of his malicious prosecution claim based on the DWI related charges that were dismissed as part of his guilty plea to the traffic infraction but erred in dismissing Carruthers’s malicious prosecution claim as to the terminated felony charge and his fabrication of evidence claim.

"First, with respect to the false arrest claim, we agree with the district court that Carruthers’s guilty plea to the traffic infraction established probable cause for his arrest and defeats that claim. Second, as to the malicious prosecution claim, the district court correctly held that Carruthers does not have a viable claim as to the DWI-related charges dismissed as part of the negotiated guilty plea. 

"We generally assess the favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution claim charge by charge. Applying that rule to the guilty plea context, when a charge is dismissed as part of a negotiated agreement in which the defendant agrees to plead guilty to a different charge, that dismissal does not constitute a favorable termination for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. However, even if a guilty plea has been entered into for one or more charges, a favorable termination can be established for another dismissed charge in the same criminal case if the dismissal was unrelated to the plea disposition. 

"Thus, Carruthers has a plausible claim as to the terminated felony charge because the amendment of that charge to a misdemeanor (which effectively dismissed the felony charge) does not appear, based upon the complaint, to have been terminated as part of the guilty plea disposition. 

"Finally, with respect to the fabrication of the evidence claim, we conclude that Carruthers has adequately alleged particularized facts that, when construed in his favor, could reasonably give rise to the inference that Trooper Colton intentionally fabricated evidence to justify the DWI-related charges. 

"Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to the false arrest claim and the malicious prosecution claim insofar as it relates to the DWI related charges dismissed as part of the plea agreement, we VACATE the judgment of the district court as to the malicious prosecution claim only as it 3 relates to the terminated felony charge and the fabrication of evidence claim, and we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."

Click HERE to access the full text of the Second Circuit's decision in this matter.

Employment opportunities with New York City's Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings

The New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH] Trial Division is seeking recent law school graduates for appointment to positions of Law Clerk. 

Working directly with OATH’s Administrative Law Judges, Law Clerks engage in legal research and writing on cases involving civil servant discipline, consumer and worker protection matters, taxi and rideshare licensing, contract disputes involving the city, as well as cases falling under the Campaign Finance Law, Human Rights Law, Conflict of Interest Law, and more.

OATH is also seeking to fill the position of Supervising Law Clerk to head OATH's legal research unit and supervise its staff of Law Clerks. 

The Supervising Law Clerk position requires admission to the New York State Bar; four years of recent full-time responsible, relevant, satisfactory legal experience following admission to any bar, 18 months of which must have been in the supervision of other attorneys, in an administrative, managerial or executive capacity. Experience handling highly complex and significant legal work is a plus. 

Incumbents serving these positions must remain members of the New York State Bar in good standing while so employed by OATH and work to promote access to justice in New York City.

For more details visit https://cityjobs.nyc.gov/ and search for Job ID 720154 (Supervising Law Clerk) or Job ID 720158 (Law Clerk).

Judicial officers act in a judicial capacity when they decide firearms license applications and have absolute immunity from suit in their individual capacities

The Plaintiffs in this action, brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, are New York State residents who applied for concealed carry licenses pursuant to New York State’s firearms licensing laws*. 

A New York State court judge, Judge Jonathan D. Nichols, serving as a statutory firearms licensing officer, had reviewed and denied the Plaintiffs' applications for failing to meet the statutory criteria for eligibility for such a license. 

The Plaintiffs sued Judge Nichols in his individual and official capacities under color of 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that New York’s firearms licensing laws violate their rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. A Federal District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ §1983 claims, holding:

1. Absolute immunity barred Plaintiffs' individual-capacity claims because Judge Nichols acted in his judicial capacity in ruling on their respective applications; and 

2. U.S.C. §1983 and Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement barred Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief and declaratory relief".

The Plaintiffs appealed the District Court's rulings. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decisions.

In so doing the Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed its precedent that judicial officers are acting in a judicial capacity when they decide firearms license applications and therefore, "enjoy absolute immunity from suit in their individual capacities". 

The Circuit Court further explained that "Plaintiffs’ specific claims for injunctive relief and declaratory relief against Judge Nichols in his official capacity are barred by Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement". 

* See New York State’s Penal Law §400.00, et seq.

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.

The Real Risk Isn’t the Cloud—It’s Premises-Based Software -

Cloud Computing for Lawyers by Rochester, New York Attorney Nicole Black, was published by the American Bar Association. Click HERE to read the whole story.

Jurisdiction's motion for summary judgment denied in an action alleging its law enforcement personnel used excessive force in responding to an incident

The Plaintiffs in this action sought to recover damages based on the alleged use of excessive force by certain officers of a Town's Police Department and other named defendants [Defendants] in the course of certain Defendants' responding to an incident. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs' complaint insofar as asserted against them. Supreme Court denied Defendants' motion and the Defendants' appealed the court's ruling. 

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling. explaining:

1. "'Claims that law enforcement personnel used excessive force in the course of an arrest are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its standard of objective reasonableness", citing Combs v City of New York, 130 AD3d 862, quoting Moore v City of New York, 68 AD3d 946; and 

2. Determining an excessive use of force claim involving law enforcement personnel requires an analysis of the facts of the particular case, including:

    a: "the severity of the crime at issue; 

    b. "whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and 

    c. "whether [the suspect was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight".

Further, citing Holland v City of Poughkeepsie, 90 AD3d 841, the Appellate Division opined that "The question of whether the use of force was reasonable under the circumstances is generally best left for a jury to decide".

Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.