Six-month need for intermittent leave rendered employee unfit for duty

Six-month need for intermittent leave rendered employee unfit for duty
Source: The FMLA Blog - http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/
Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation

Charlene Wisbey was employed by the City of Lincoln, Nebraska as an emergency dispatcher. The position required Wisbey to receive calls for emergency services and dispatch emergency service units on a regular basis. Because of the potential life-saving aspect of her position, the City Expected Wisbey to function accurately while working under considerable pressure and to think and act quickly and calmly in emergency situations.

During January-February, Wisbey used a significant amount of sick leave for an upper respiratory infection, for which she received a letter of warning. To avoid further discipline, the City recommended that Wisbey apply for intermittent FMLA leave, which she did. The medical certification supporting her request for intermittent FMLA leave cited recurring cycles of depression and anxiety that interfered with her sleep, energy level, motivation, and concentration. It also stated that Wisbey was unable to perform the essential functions of her job. The certification concluded that Wisbey would need to take time off intermittently over the next 6 months or longer.

Concerned about her ability to perform her job as an emergency dispatcher, the City directed Wisbey to undergo a fitness-for-duty exam (FFD), which she did. The FFD concluded that Wisbey suffered from chronic relapsing depression which intermittently interfered wit her ability to function at full capacity at work, and that she was not fit for duty, especially regarding her ability to concentrate and her ongoing propensity to miss work. The City terminated Wisbey as unfit for duty. Wisbey filed suit alleging violations of the ADA and FMLA.

With respect to the ADA, the Court rejected Wisbey's argument that the City did not have a legitimate, non-discriminatory business necessity to require her to submit to the FFD. Citing a decision of the Second Circuit in Gajda v. Manhattan &Bronx Surface Transit Operating Autho., 396 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit agreed that representations made in an employee's FMLA medical certification that the employee is unable to perform the functions of his or her position may serve as a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for employer to require an FFD.

With respect to the FMLA, the Court rejected Wisbey's claim that the City interfered with her FMLA rights, noting that she was never denied FMLA leave. Significantly, quoting prior Eighth Circuit opinions, the Court noted that the FMLA "does not provide leave for leave's sake, but instead provides leave with an expectation an employee will return to work after the leave ends," Throneberry v. McGhee Desha County Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 978 (8th Cir. 2005), and that "the FMLA doe snot provide an employee suffering from depression with a right to unscheduled and unpredictable, but cumulatively substantial, absences or a right to take unscheduled leave at a moment's notice for the rest of her career. On the contrary, such a situation implies that she is not qualified for a position where reliable attendance is a bona fide requirement." Spangler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Des Moines, 278 F.3d 847, 853 (8th Cir. 2002).

Because Wisbey requested "intermittent leave" for "six months or longer," the Court concluded that she did not have a right to FMLA leave. Without the right to FMLA leave, the City "could not have interfered with Wisbey's rights under the FMLA." The Court also rejected Wisbey's FMLA retaliation claim, finding that the decision to terminate her was not casually related to her request for FMLA leave a month before, but was due to the results of the FFD.

Mr. Bosland Comments: Long-term intermittent absences with little predictability or notice is the bane of employers who need employees present to get the work done. Of course, from the perspective of the employee who needs intermittent leave due to their own serious health condition or to care for a family member with a serious health condition, this is why the FMLA exits- to protect the employee from having to make a choice between their job and caring for their own or a family members medical needs.

For my money, the Eighth Circuit went too far by stating that an employee who needs intermittent FMLA leave for "6 months or more" somehow forfeits the right to take FMLA leave. The statement is flat out wrong. If an eligible employee meets all of the criteria, the FMLA affords the employee the right to take up to 12 weeks of intermittent FMLA leave for their own serious health condition, or the serious health condition of a covered family member, over the course of a 12-month leave year. Except perhaps in the Eighth Circuit, an employer that denied an eligible employee intermittent FMLA leave after six months - even though they have a certification stating that they needed intermittent leave for more than six months - relying on Wisbey would, in my estimation, interfere with that employee's FMLA rights. That could cost the employer big time in an FMLA interference suit.

What employers should take away from Wisbey is that an employee who needs intermittent FMLA leave long-term or forever may not be qualified for their position. Obviously, this will depend on the job duties of the position, including whether regular and predictable attendance is required. If they are not fit for the position because of their FMLA-covered condition, employers do not have to continue to employ the individual. The fact that, if employed, the individual would have the right to take intermittent FMLA leave is not controlling. Think of it this way: the FMLA entitles an employee to leave. If the same FMLA covered-condition that entitles an employee to take leave also interferes with the employees’ ability to adequately perform their job when they are at work, the FMLA does not protect the employee from discipline for poor performance for the job they did when at work.

Employers would be well advised to proceed with caution in applying Wisbey. Other courts may less quick to find that an employee needing intermittent FMLA leave is unfit for duty and, therefore, may be terminated -particularly where the employee has not exhausted his or her annual entitlement to FMLA leave.

The decision is available at:
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/opns/opFrame.html

Sustaining an injury driving to work in agency vehicle not a performance of duties injury for the purposes of eligibility for GML §207-c benefits

Sustaining an injury driving to work in agency vehicle not a performance of duties injury for the purposes of eligibility for GML §207-c benefits
Matter of Cady v County of Oneida, Supreme Court, Oneida County, 14 Misc3d 1234(A), Affirmed 38 AD3d 1320

David Cady, a Deputy/Investigator for the Oneida County's Sheriff's Department, was assigned an unmarked Sheriff's vehicle. He was authorized to keep the vehicle at his residence and use it to transport himself to and from his work site. Cady was involved in an automobile accident while he was driving to work.* The accident occurred about 10 minutes before Cady was scheduled to be at work.

Cady was injured in the accident and applied for and received worker's compensation benefits. He also applied for disability benefits pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law. His application for §207-c benefits was denied by the County.

The reason advanced by the County: GML §207-c provides benefits for injuries to a deputy sheriff who has been injured in the performance of his duties and that at the time of the accident Cady had not commenced his work duty shift and therefore was not in the performance of his duties.

Cady appealed. The hearing officer concluded that Cady was not entitled to GML §207-c benefits because he was not injured in the performance of his duties. The hearing officer’s determination was adopted by the County. Cady sued, seeking a court order overturning the County’s determination.

Cady argued that he was in the performance of his duties because he is "on call" twenty-four hours a day and could be dispatched to emergencies or to investigate criminal acts. In addition, he claimed, he was directed to be observant for accidents and criminal activity while en route to work using the assigned car. Cady also contended the he was assigned a "take-home" vehicle for the Department's benefit.

The County claimed its conclusion that “Cady was not in the performance of his duties at the time the accident occurred” was neither irrational nor an abuse of discretion. It said that Cady conceded that during his drive to work on the day of the accident he was not dispatched to conduct any investigation nor did he observe any criminal activity.

Supreme Court Judge Grow ruled that the County’s determination that Cady does not qualify for GML §207-c benefits is not irrational, not based on an error of law, not arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion, and confirmed the Hearing Officer's determination.

* According to the decision, Cady was not at fault.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_52585.htm

Expanding exemptions from FOIL to protect "technology assets used to maintain public information"

Expanding exemptions from FOIL to protect "technology assets used to maintain public information"
Chapter 154 of the Law of 2010

The Governor has signed into law a bill amending the State’s Freedom of Information Law [Public Officers Law §87]. The bill, which amends Paragraph (i) of subdivision 2 of Section 87* is intended to providing agencies with authority to withhold disclosing of certain records when responding to FOIL requests.

Subdivision 2.1. now reads: (i) if disclosed, would jeopardize [an agency's] the capacity of an agency or an entity that has shared information with an agency to guarantee the security of its information technology assets, such assets encompassing both electronic information systems and infrastructures”

The amendment was proposed by the State’s Office of Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure and takes effect immediately.

* Deleted language in [brackets]; new language in italics.

Appeal to the Commissioner of Education dismissed for failure to name a necessary party

Appeal to the Commissioner of Education dismissed for failure to name a necessary party
Appeal of J.S. from action of the Board of Education of the Jordan-Elbridge Central School District and Superintendent Marilyn Dominick regarding a transfer.
Decision No. 16,077

J.S. served as the district’s elementary school principal of the Jordan-Elbridge Central School District and was granted tenure in the tenure area of “administrator.”

On June 8, 2009, the board authorized an investigation of complaints concerning the district’s elementary school and on the following day J.S. was transferred to the position of Special Project Administrator.

Contending that the transfer was made for disciplinary reasons in violation of the due process rights afforded her under Education Law §3020-a, J.S. asked the Commissioner to direct that the district to reinstate her as Elementary School Principal and that all references to the transfer be expunged from district records.

The Commissioner dismissed the appeal “for failure to join a necessary party.” Commenting that “A party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.

The Commissioner explained that the remedy sought by J.S. is “reinstatement to her previous position as Elementary School Principal and that position is currently held by Elizabeth Primo, the interim Elementary School Principal, Primo’s rights would be adversely affected by a determination in [J.S.’s] favor.” Thus Primo is a necessary party and the appeal must be dismissed because of the failure of J.S. to name, and serve her, in the appeal.

In addition, the Commissioner stated that the appeal “must also be dismissed as untimely.” An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, "unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown." The record indicated that J.S was reassigned to the Special Project Administrator position on June 9, 2009 but her petition was not served until October 13, 2009.

Finally, the Commissioner said that J.S.’s appeal, absent the above noted procedural defects, would have been dismissed on the merits.

In an appeal to the Commissioner, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and the burden of establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief.

The Commissioner said that a board of education has "broad discretion in assigning members of its professional staff, so long as the employee’s tenure rights are not infringed upon." In this instance, said the Commissioner, notwithstanding J.S.’s claim that she was reassigned for disciplinary reasons and she was not accorded the due process protections of Education Law §3020-a, he did not find that J.S. had adequately demonstrate that her transfer was for disciplinary reasons and J.S. did not offered any evidence that disciplinary action was being contemplated prior to the reassignment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume49/d16077.htm

Supplements to an official’s salary

Supplements to an official’s salary
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General, 98-16

A county Industrial Development Agency is authorized to issue bonds and grant tax exemptions as a means of providing financial assistance to business projects approved by the Agency. The employment contract between the Niagara County Industrial Development Agency [NCIDA] and its executive director provided that the director was to be paid an annual salary of $69,000 and, in addition, “would receive 1.5% of the agency fees” collected by NCIDA for “bond projects.”

There may have been some question concerning paying the director additional compensation based on a percentage of the fees received by NCIDA as the contract also provided that “in the event the additional payment was held unenforceable or in conflict with State Legislation, a minimum additional payment of $3,000 per year would be paid ... in place of the percentage payment.”

When asked if either of these provisions violated State Law, the Attorney General advised the Niagara County Attorney’s office that in his view, both provisions constituted violations of Section 858-a(1) of the General Municipal Law. The Attorney General first noted that the granting of the percentage of the agency fee collected by the Agency was “contingent upon the granting of financial assistance,” and thus violated the statute. He then observed that the alternative formula for supplementing the director’s salary -- the additional payment of $3,000 per year -- was unlawful for the same reason. The Attorney General viewed the supplement as being contingent on NCIDA’s collecting fees for its financial assistance, commenting that “[p]resumably, if [such payment] was unrelated to financial assistance to clients of [NCIDA], it would be a fixed amount that is part of the base salary of the executive director.”

The County Attorney’s office also wanted to know what NCIDA should consider doing if the Attorney General decided that its arrangement with its executive director violated the General Municipal Law. The Attorney General said that “contract provisions that are contrary to statutory requirements intended to protect the public and prevent fraud are void and unenforceable [and] [t]herefore the unlawful payments may be recoverable.”

Workers’ compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 71

Workers’ compensation leave pursuant to Civil Service Law Section 71
Bryant v City of New York, App. Div., 3rd Dept, 252 A.D.2d 777, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 92 N.Y.2d 813

Section 71 of the Civil Service Law, commonly referred to as “workers’ compensation leave,” requires a public employer to give an employee who is injured on the job and as a result is unable to perform his or her duties a leave of absence for at least one year unless he or she is permanently disabled. The standard applied: the employee’s disability must result from an occupational injury or disease as defined in the Workers’ Compensation Law [WCL].

Many Taylor Law agreements provided for workers’ compensation leave, incorporating by reference the provisions of Section 71 of the Civil Service Law. However, not every injury or disease suffered at work that prevents an individual from performing the duties of the position is an “occupational injury or disease” within the meaning of WCL. As the Court of Appeals held in Mack v Rockland County, 71 NY2d 1008, for the purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits, “an occupational disease derives from the very nature of the employment, not a specific condition peculiar to the employee’s place of work.”

The Bryant case illustrates the fact that not every disease or injury arising in the work place is an occupational injury or disease for the purposes of receiving workers’ compensation benefits and thus such a claim does not automatically trigger eligibility for workers’ compensation leave.

Meridie Bryant, a word processor employed by the City of New York, applied for workers’ compensation benefits claiming that neck, shoulder and back ailments she suffered were caused by the physical layout of her work site and the chair in which she sat while at work. The Workers’ Compensation Board rejected her application on the grounds that she had not suffered an occupational injury or disease within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

Byrant’s appeal from the Board’s ruling was rejected by the Appellate Division.

The court, citing the Court of Appeals’ decision in Mack, said that in order to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, the applicant “was required to demonstrate a recognizable link between the disease from which [he or] she allegedly suffers and some distinctive feature of [his or] her employment.”

The Appellate Division decided that Byrant’s condition related to her particular work area and not the “very nature of her employment.” Accordingly, the court upheld the Board’s determination rejecting Byrant’s workers’ compensation claim and dismissed her appeal.

The practical effect of this for the purposes of Section 71, however, is not as drastic as it might appear. Section 71 leave is provided as a leave without pay, although the employee may be continued on the payroll using his or her leave credits in order to continue to be paid.

If the individual viewed as being on workers’ compensation leave by the employer is later found not to have suffered an occupational injury or disease as was the situation in Bryant’s case, all that need be done is to amend the employee’s personnel record to show that he or she is on Section 72, rather than Section 71 leave.

Section 72 leave is available to an employee who is unable to perform his or her duties because of a disability other than a disability resulting from an occupational injury or disease as defined in WCL. Again employees are entitled to such a leave of absence without pay as a matter of law. As is the case in a Section 71 situation, “an employee on such leave of absence shall be entitled to draw all accumulated, unused sick leave, vacation, overtime and other time allowances standing to his [or her] credit” while on such leave.

There is, however, one significant difference between Section 71 leave and Section 72 leave. The one-year leave period allowed under Section 71 is determined on the basis of the individual’s cumulative absence while the minimum leave period under Section 72 is based on the employee’s consecutive absence for one year.

In other words, under Section 72, the employee may be terminated pursuant to Section 73 of the Civil Service Law if he or she has been absent from work for an uninterrupted period of at least one year. On the other hand, an employee absent on Section 71 leave may be terminate after he or she has been absent for a cumulative total of at least one year, even if such absences are intermittent whereby the employee returns to work and then goes on Section 71 leave again because of the same injury or disease.

It should be remembered that under both Section 71 and Section 72, separating an employee from service after the employee has been absent for the minimum period mandated for such leave is discretionary and the appointing authority is not required to terminate the employee.

In an administrative disciplinary hearing, conflicting testimony merely "raised issues of credibility" for the hearing officer to resolve

In an administrative disciplinary hearing, conflicting testimony merely "raised issues of credibility" for the hearing officer to resolve
Matter of Weymer v New York State Div. of State Police, 2010 NY Slip Op 05779, Appellate Division, Second Department

Harry J. Corbitt, the Superintendent of the New York State Division of State Police, adopting the findings of a hearing board made that Craig J. Weymer “improperly impounded a motor vehicle and failed to act in a courteous, dignified, and businesslike manner in violation of New York State Police Rules and Regulations.”

The Superintendent also adopted the hearing boards finding that Weymer “acted in a manner tending to bring discredit upon the New York State Division of State Police in violation of the New York State Police Rules and Regulations.”

The penalty imposed: Weymer was formally censured and suspended for one day without pay.

The Appellate Division rejected Weymer’s appeal, holding that the determination was supported by substantial evidence.” Further, said the court, although there were a few instances of conflicting testimony, this merely "raised issues of credibility for the Hearing [Board] to resolve," citing Leong v Safir, 259 AD2d 751.

As to Weymer’s challenge to the penalty imposed, the Appellate Division concluded that the penalty imposed was not "so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." Accordingly, it did not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_05779.htm