The Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, said in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint’s “allegations must meet the plausibility standard set out in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662. Citing Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, the Second Circuit then opined "to state a quid pro quo sexual harassment the plaintiff must show a tangible employment action, i.e., that an explicit alteration in the terms or conditions of employment resulted from her refusal to submit to [a] sexual advance.”
In this action the court concluded that Plaintiff's quid pro quo claim failed because she made only “conclusory allegations of implied sexual advances” in that Plaintiff's description of the Respondent's conduct creates no more than “a sheer possibility that [the Respondent] has acted unlawfully.” In the words of the court, Plaintiff's claim "is based on a single incident in which [Respondent] allegedly invited her to see a corporate apartment on their way to lunch, asked her repeatedly to join him in the apartment’s bedroom, and then inquired over lunch whether she was married or had a boyfriend." The Circuit Court also noted that Plaintiff's amended complaint "contains no allegations of any sexual comments or physical contact, never alleges that [Respondent] engaged in any other sexual conduct towards Reed or anyone else, and makes no other allegations sufficient to support an inference that [Respondent's] conduct was sexual.
Addressing Plaintiff's "Retaliation and Constructive Discharge" allegations, the Circuit Court opined that "[F]or a retaliation claim to survive ... a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that: ... defendants discriminated — or took an adverse employment action — against [her], (2) because [she] has opposed any unlawful employment practice.” As the Second Circuit held in Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, “[T]he plaintiff need only have had a good faith, reasonable belief that [she] was opposing an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII”.* Further, the Circuit Court noted “The reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief is to be assessed in light of the totality of the circumstances.” "... mere subjective good faith belief is insufficient; the belief must be reasonable and characterized by objective good faith.”
Finding the Plaintiff "failed to allege adequately that she had a reasonable, good-faith belief that [Respondent's] conduct violated the law or that her conduct constituted opposition to unlawful conduct" and that in her formal complaint "[Plaintiff] failed to allege that [Respondent] took an adverse employment action against her for filing it.
Finally, the Circuit Court opined that Plaintiff's allegations that "new monitoring programs appeared on her computer" do not suffice for a claim of retaliation because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the monitoring was so severe that “it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”. Accordingly, the Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff's constructive discharge claims as well.
* See, also, Kessler v. Westchester County. Dep’t of Social Services, 461 F.3d 199.
Click HERE to access the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals posted on the Internet.