Union’s demand for all documents, including without limitation, any memoranda between any of the employer’s agents overbroad

Union’s demand for all documents, including without limitation, any memoranda between any of the employer’s agents overbroad
District Council 37, AFSCME, Local 1070 and State Of New York - Unified Court System, U-27031 [Source: PERB’s Recent Decisions posting on the Internet]

PERB affirmed the ALJ's decision that the Unified Court System [UCS] violated §§209a.1(a) and (d) of the Act when it refused DC 37's request for documents and information for its representation of a bargaining unit member subject to a notice of charges issued pursuant to the disciplinary procedures contained in the UCSDC 37 collectively negotiated agreement.

The Board found that the charge was timely because each denial of a request for information gives rise to a separate violation of the Act. Reiterating the obligation under the Act of an employer to provide an employee organization with reasonable, relevant information necessary for the negotiation and administration of collectively negotiated agreements and the processing of grievances, the Board found that this general right to receive requested information extends to an employee organization's representation of an employee who is the subject of discipline under the negotiated terms of an agreement.

The Board held that "there is no meaningful distinction under the Act between a negotiated disciplinary grievance procedure and one calling for the filing of an answer in response to a notice of charges. Whether disciplinary action can be grieved, answered and/or appealed under a negotiated procedure, an employee organization has a duty to administer that provision under the Act. It follows that in order to fulfill that duty, an employee organization is entitled to receive, upon request, relevant and necessary information in order to effectively represent a member charged."

The Board modified the ALJ's order, however, by finding that DC 37's request for "all documents, including without limitation, any memoranda between any UCS agents" regarding the aggrieved employee was overly broad, unduly burdensome and unnecessary.

Notice of a final administrative determination

Notice of a final administrative determination
City of New York v Appl, 289 A.D.2d 144

The New York City Board of Collective Bargaining [OCB] issued its "final determina­tion." It later sent a "courtesy copy of the decision to the City's Office of Labor Relations [OLR].

The City attempted to appeal the determination. OCB asked a State Supreme Court jus­tice to dismiss the appeal, contending that its appeal was untimely based on the date it initially delivered its ruling to the City. The City, on the other hand, argued that it had filed a timely appeal based on the date OLR had received its "courtesy copy."

The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court's determination that the City's appeal was, in fact, timely. Why? Because, said the court, OCB had created an ambiguity as to the date on which its determination became final and binding. The court's rationale: if a party creates an ambiguity, the ambiguity should be resolved against the party creating it -- here OCB.

According to the decision, OCB had sent OLR a courtesy copy of the decision after the initial copy of the decision had been delivered to the City in response to OLR's asking it if the initial decision "contained the final version of a dissent submitted by two members of the Board."

Holding that granting OCB's motion to dismiss the City's appeal under the facts in this case would deny the City "its day in court," the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling that the statutory period for filing the appeal did not begin to run until the second decision had been delivered to OLR.

The general rule in such cases is that the statute of limitations to appeal an administrative determination begins to run when notice of the final administrative action or decision is received by the party or, if the party is represented by an attorney, the party's attorney.

Delivery of a final administrative decision to an employee's union does not count with respect to the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations. In Weeks v State of New York, 198 AD2d 615, the court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the decision is served on the employee, not from the date on which the union received its copy.
The basic rule:

1. If an employee is represented by an attorney, the administrative body maysend a copy of the determination to the employee but it must serve the attorneyto begin the running of the statute of limitations.

2. If the employee is represented by a person who is not an attorney, the administrative body may send a copy to the representative but it must serve the employee to start the statute of limitations running.

In contrast, a request for reconsideration does not serve to extend the period during which a party can file a timely appeal challenging the administrative action or decision.

This point is illustrated in the Cardo case [Cardo v Sielaff, 588 NYS2d 282]. In Cardo one of the issues concerned the question of the timely filing of an appeal. The court said that although Cardo asked his employer to "reconsider" its administrative decision, such a request "did not extend the period \within which the [Article 78] proceeding must be commenced."

In contrast to the legal effect of an individual merely submitting a "request for reconsid­eration," suppose the administrative body actually agrees to reconsider the matter and issue a new determination. In such a situation the statute of limitations will begin running from the date of the new "final determination." This is the case even if the new "final determination" confirms the original administrative decision.

Presumably the court did not view OLR's action as a "request for reconsideration." The court, however, may have considered the contents of the "courtesy copy" sent to OLR in response to its inquiry to be OCB's final determination.

In any event, at least one court has ruled that the final administrative action must be reduced to writing in order to start the statute of limitations running. In McCoy v San Francisco, CA9, 92-16319, a federal circuit court of appeals ruled that a public em­ployee's civil rights suit against his employer accrued when the appointing authority issued a written statement suspending him from work rather than from the date of a hearing held earlier at which time McCoy was orally advised that he was suspended from his position.

In contrast, in another case, Mavica v New York City Transit Authority, 289 A.D.2d 86, the court rejected an argument based on an alleged ambiguity created by a collective bargaining agreement and the employer's regu­lations.

Here the court rejected John Mavica's claim that a provision in his union's collective bargaining agreement with Transit Authority explicitly implementing a disciplinary grievance arbitration procedure in lieu of any other disciplinary procedure that may have previously applied to an employee covered by this Agreement including but not limited to the procedure specified in Sections 75 and 76 of the Civil Service Law was rendered ambiguous by other provisions of the same collective bargaining agreement and by the Authority's regulations.

Mavica filed an Article 78 petition seeking to have the Authority's action terminating his employment declared null and void.Here, said the court, the proper way to challenge the Authority's dismissing Mavica from his position following a disciplinary arbitration upholding the Authority's determination was for Mavica to file a motion to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, suggesting that the court did not find any ambiguity created by the terms set out in the collective bargaining agreement or in the Authority's rules.

Exception to seeking competitive bids for good and services

Exception to seeking competitive bids for good and services
Omni Recycling of Westbury, Inc. v Town of Oyster Bay, 11 NY3d 868

Typically a political subdivision of the State will solicit competitive bids for goods and services. However, this is not always the case, as the Omni Recycling decision by the Court of Appeals demonstrates.

The Town of Oyster Bay adopted a resolution authorizing the use of the procedures set out in General Municipal Law Section 104-b to obtain certain recycling services. Section 104-b provides for the procurement of goods and services without going through a competitive bidding process. The Town's Department of Public then distributed a RFP [Request for Proposals] for these recycling services to nine companies.

When another company, Giove Company was awarded the contract, Omni Recycling sued the Town and Giove, arguing that the Town should have used the competitive bidding process under General Municipal Law Section 103.

§103(1) provides, in part, that "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by an act of the legislature or by a local law adopted prior to September first, nineteen hundred fifty-three, all contracts for public work involving an expenditure of more than twenty thousand dollars and all purchase contracts involving an expenditure of more than ten thousand dollars, shall be awarded . . . to the lowest responsible bidder furnishing the required security after advertisement for sealed bids in the manner provided by this section."

The Court of Appeals noted that “It has long been recognized that public work contracts that require the exercise of specialized or technical skills, expertise or knowledge are not subject to the sealed, competitive bidding requirements under §103 and may instead be awarded using the Request for Proposals (RFP) process set forth in General Municipal Law §104-b.”

Of the nine companies to which the RFP was sent, ultimately the proposals submitted by Omni and Giove were evaluated by an independent consultant. A public hearing was conducted and the contract was awarded to Grove.

Reversing a lower court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals held that based on the description of the particular services to be rendered set out in the RFP, “this recycling contract fell within the special skills exception to the 'lowest responsible bidder' requirement of Section 103(1) and therefore was properly awarded using an RFP process consistent with the Section 104-b procedures adopted by the Town.”

The full text of the decisions is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09850.htm