Final regulations for filing Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification to become effective August 23, 2010
Source: 75 Federal Register 42575
Section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (INA), see 8 U.S.C. 1324a, requires all U.S. employers, agricultural associations, agricultural employers, farm labor contractors, or persons or other entities that recruit or refer persons for employment for a fee, to verify the employment authorization and identity of all employees hired to work in the United States after November 6, 1986.
To comply with the law, an employer is responsible for the completion of a Form I-9, the Employment Eligibility Verification (Form I-9), for each new employee, including United States citizens.
The Department of Homeland Security has issued final regulations to provide that employers who are required to complete and retain the Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification may sign the form electronically and retain the form in an electronic format.
The final rule is effective August 23, 2010 and essentially requires that employers complete the required Form I-9 within three business days. The employer may use paper, electronic systems, or a combination of paper and electronic systems for this purpose.
The Form I-9, available to the public in numerous paper and electronic forms, since 1986, is now available online at the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) Web site as a Portable Document Format (.pdf) fillable and printable form. The form is posted on the Internet at http://uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf.
In addition, the Handbook for Employers published by the Department of Homeland Security setting out instructions for completing the Form I-9 (a.k.a. the Employment Eligibility Verification Form) is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.bipc.com/images/newsletters/M-274_I-9_Handbook.pdf
The text of the Department of Homeland Security's Final Regulation is posted on the Internet at: http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/07/22/2010-17806/electronic-signature-and-storage-of-form-i9-employment-eligibility-verification
.
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL
August 10, 2010
U.S. Department of Labor expands definition of “son” or “daughter” for FMLA purposes
U.S. Department of Labor expands definition of “son” or “daughter” for FMLA purposes
Source: Roetzel & Andress , Douglas M. Kennedy, Esq.
[http://www.ralaw.com/about.cfm?sp=overview ]
An Administrator's Interpretation Letter on June 22, 2010 from the Department of Labor has clarified the definition of son or daughter as it applies to an employee taking FMLA leave to care for a newborn, newly placed or sick child. Using the portion of FMLA referring to the term "in loco parentis," the DOL's letter states that one does not have to have a biological or legal relationship with the child to be able to take FMLA leave. One must look at factors like the age of the child, the degree to which the child is dependent on the person providing care, the amount of support provided and the extent to which duties commonly associated with parenthood are exercised.
The letter specifically refers to an employee caring for his or her unmarried partner's child, as well as a grandparent, aunt or uncle, as examples of those who could stand "in loco parentis," and also says that an employee must only provide "a simple statement asserting that the requisite family relationship exists" in order to support a request for leave.
Source: Roetzel & Andress , Douglas M. Kennedy, Esq.
[http://www.ralaw.com/about.cfm?sp=overview ]
An Administrator's Interpretation Letter on June 22, 2010 from the Department of Labor has clarified the definition of son or daughter as it applies to an employee taking FMLA leave to care for a newborn, newly placed or sick child. Using the portion of FMLA referring to the term "in loco parentis," the DOL's letter states that one does not have to have a biological or legal relationship with the child to be able to take FMLA leave. One must look at factors like the age of the child, the degree to which the child is dependent on the person providing care, the amount of support provided and the extent to which duties commonly associated with parenthood are exercised.
The letter specifically refers to an employee caring for his or her unmarried partner's child, as well as a grandparent, aunt or uncle, as examples of those who could stand "in loco parentis," and also says that an employee must only provide "a simple statement asserting that the requisite family relationship exists" in order to support a request for leave.
Security records were properly admitted into evidence by disciplinary hearing officer
Security records were properly admitted into evidence by disciplinary hearing officer
Peil v Beirne, 72 AD3d 1095*
In this appeal the Appellate Division held:
1. Security records were properly admitted into evidence by disciplinary hearing officer.
2. The existence of another, alternative rational conclusion does not warrant annulment of the appointing authority’s conclusion that Peil was guilty of the charges preferred against him, citing Incorporated Vill. of Lake Success v New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 41 AD3d 599.
* Text of decision e-mailed to registered readers.
Peil v Beirne, 72 AD3d 1095*
In this appeal the Appellate Division held:
1. Security records were properly admitted into evidence by disciplinary hearing officer.
2. The existence of another, alternative rational conclusion does not warrant annulment of the appointing authority’s conclusion that Peil was guilty of the charges preferred against him, citing Incorporated Vill. of Lake Success v New York State Public Employment Relations Board, 41 AD3d 599.
* Text of decision e-mailed to registered readers.
The status of the individual performing services for a public employer may be critical in determining liability
The status of the individual performing services for a public employer may be critical in determining liability
Czark v Hauppauge UFSD, NYS Supreme Court, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
The Czark case illustrates that the status of the individual performing services for a public employer may be critical in determining whether or not the public employer will be held liable for an injury to an individual.
A Hauppauge Union Free School District student complained that in the course of a school sports physical examination the examining physician “touched and fondled her breast.” The student and her mother sued the district and the physician allegedly involved. Hauppauge asked State Supreme Court Justice Floyd to dismiss it from the law suit, contending that (a) the physician alleged to have touched the student was “an independent contractor and not an employee of the school district” and that (b) the district “had no knowledge of any prior sexual propensities” of the physician.
Justice Floyd said that a school district, like any other employer, may be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for a tort committed by an employee in the course of the performance of the employee’s duties. Here, however, Justice Floyd ruled that the record clearly establishes an independent contractor status between the school district and the physician.
The defendant physician was the associate of the physician that was under contract with the district to provide medical services to the school district and was paid a scheduled fee for services performed. Also noted was the fact that the contracting physician was not named as a party to the action.
Accordingly, Justice Floyd dismissed the claims against the District for negligent supervision, negligent hiring and vicarious liability because, he said, “[t]here are no terms and conditions contained within this contract that would permit this Court to conclude that an employer/employee relationship had been established.”
The Court, however, refused to dismiss the suit filed against the physician by the student for the alleged battery and by her parent for the alleged “loss of services.”
Czark v Hauppauge UFSD, NYS Supreme Court, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
The Czark case illustrates that the status of the individual performing services for a public employer may be critical in determining whether or not the public employer will be held liable for an injury to an individual.
A Hauppauge Union Free School District student complained that in the course of a school sports physical examination the examining physician “touched and fondled her breast.” The student and her mother sued the district and the physician allegedly involved. Hauppauge asked State Supreme Court Justice Floyd to dismiss it from the law suit, contending that (a) the physician alleged to have touched the student was “an independent contractor and not an employee of the school district” and that (b) the district “had no knowledge of any prior sexual propensities” of the physician.
Justice Floyd said that a school district, like any other employer, may be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for a tort committed by an employee in the course of the performance of the employee’s duties. Here, however, Justice Floyd ruled that the record clearly establishes an independent contractor status between the school district and the physician.
The defendant physician was the associate of the physician that was under contract with the district to provide medical services to the school district and was paid a scheduled fee for services performed. Also noted was the fact that the contracting physician was not named as a party to the action.
Accordingly, Justice Floyd dismissed the claims against the District for negligent supervision, negligent hiring and vicarious liability because, he said, “[t]here are no terms and conditions contained within this contract that would permit this Court to conclude that an employer/employee relationship had been established.”
The Court, however, refused to dismiss the suit filed against the physician by the student for the alleged battery and by her parent for the alleged “loss of services.”
August 09, 2010
In a law enforcement environment, safety interests trump sincere religious beliefs
In a law enforcement environment, safety interests trump sincere religious beliefs
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v The GEO Group, Inc., USCA 3rd Circuit, No. 09-3093
GEO, a private company, contracted to run the George W. Hill Correctional Facility, the prison for Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
In April 2005, the Hill Facility instituted a dress policy that provided that “[n]o hats or caps will be permitted to be worn in the facility unless issued with the uniform.” The new policy also stated that “[s]carves and hooded jackets or sweatshirts will not be permitted past the Front Security Desk.”
These directives were interpreted to prohibit the wearing of a khimar, an “Islamic religious head scarf, designed to cover the hair, forehead, sides of the neck, shoulders, and chest,” which was until then worn by some female Muslim employees inside of the Hill Facility.
EEOC filed a lawsuit on behalf of a class of Muslim women employees against GEO, contending that GEO violated Title VII's prohibitions on religious discrimination when it failed to accommodate the Muslim female employees by providing them an exception to the prison's dress policy that prevented them from wearing khimars at work.
The Circuit Court affirmed the federal district court’s decision granting GEO's motion for summary judgment dismissing EEOC’s complaint.
The district court had cited Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256,* in support of its ruling.
In Webb the US Circuit Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, held that regardless of the sincere religious beliefs of certain police officer of the need to wear a khimar, their belief had to yield to the Philadelphia's police department's policy prohibiting the wearing of a khimar while on duty because "safety is undoubtedly an interest of the greatest importance."
* The Webb decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/073081p.pdf
The GEO decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/093093p.pdf
.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v The GEO Group, Inc., USCA 3rd Circuit, No. 09-3093
GEO, a private company, contracted to run the George W. Hill Correctional Facility, the prison for Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
In April 2005, the Hill Facility instituted a dress policy that provided that “[n]o hats or caps will be permitted to be worn in the facility unless issued with the uniform.” The new policy also stated that “[s]carves and hooded jackets or sweatshirts will not be permitted past the Front Security Desk.”
These directives were interpreted to prohibit the wearing of a khimar, an “Islamic religious head scarf, designed to cover the hair, forehead, sides of the neck, shoulders, and chest,” which was until then worn by some female Muslim employees inside of the Hill Facility.
EEOC filed a lawsuit on behalf of a class of Muslim women employees against GEO, contending that GEO violated Title VII's prohibitions on religious discrimination when it failed to accommodate the Muslim female employees by providing them an exception to the prison's dress policy that prevented them from wearing khimars at work.
The Circuit Court affirmed the federal district court’s decision granting GEO's motion for summary judgment dismissing EEOC’s complaint.
The district court had cited Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256,* in support of its ruling.
In Webb the US Circuit Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit, held that regardless of the sincere religious beliefs of certain police officer of the need to wear a khimar, their belief had to yield to the Philadelphia's police department's policy prohibiting the wearing of a khimar while on duty because "safety is undoubtedly an interest of the greatest importance."
* The Webb decision is posted on the Internet at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/073081p.pdf
The GEO decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/093093p.pdf
.
Determining the disciplinary penalty to be imposed following conviction of a crime underlying the disciplinary action taken against the employee
Determining the disciplinary penalty to be imposed following conviction of a crime underlying the disciplinary action taken against the employee
Garippa v New York City Bd. of Ed., NYS Supreme Court, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
A Section 3020-a arbitrator found Michael Garippa, a New York City school teacher, guilty of conduct unbecoming the profession and authorized his termination.
Garippa, a tenured English teacher at Franklin D. Roosevelt High School in Brooklyn, was arrested by federal authorities and charged with conspiracy to distribute steroids.
Garippa subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance and was sentenced to serve three years of probation and six months of home confinement; to perform 200 hours of community service by coaching children’s sports teams; and to continue drug counseling.
Section 3020-a Hearing Officer Jacquelin F. Drucker concluded that “... the question before this hearing officer relates not to guilt or innocence but to the proper level of discipline for the conduct at issue.”*
Drucker decided that Board was authorized to remove Garippa as a teacher because of two factors:
1. Newspaper reports identifying Garippa, his occupation and his employer, allegedly caused the board to suffer “unfortunate, unpleasant publicity”; and
2. The fact that “Respondent’s initial contact with the purchaser was made at a school function.”
Garippa appealed to the state Supreme Court and Justice H. Freedman granted Garippa’s petition and vacated the hearing officer’s decision. He then remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration.
Justice Freedman observed that the hearing officer did not suggest that Garippa could be trusted to work with children. The offense occurred off-duty and off-premises. The Court concluded that the hearing officer’s decision “was based on an assumption that Garippa’s guilty plea automatically constituted guilt of conduct unbecoming the profession,” rather than on an express finding to that effect.
This was improper, Justice Freedman said. Section 3020-a guarantees that the employee shall have full and fair disclosure of the nature of the case and evidence against him.
According to Justice Freedman, Garippa was neither told beforehand that the articles or the “bad publicity” would be the basis for either a finding of guilt or a determination of penalty nor was he ever shown copies of the articles, which were the subject of his cross-examination.
Since the newspaper articles were not submitted into evidence, Justice Freedman said that they were not part of the reviewable record before the court. In addition, Justice Freedman pointed out that “it is improper for an administrative agency [or an arbitrator] to base a decision of an adjudicatory nature upon evidence outside of the record.”
The court said the school board raised a legitimate issue regarding publicity because it has a right to protect the reputation of the institution. But since Garippa was denied an opportunity to address and rebut this allegation, the arbitrator’s determination was made without prior notice and lacked evidentiary basis.
The lesson here appears to be that an appointing authority cannot assume that a conviction of a crime will be sufficient to find an individual guilty of embarrassing it and justify its imposition of a penalty. Rather, the appointing authority must prove each and every element of it allegations, including those factors underlying the reason for bringing the disciplinary action in the first instance.
* N.B. In Kelly v. Levin, 440 NY2d 424, the Court of Appeals ruled that is a reversable error for an administrative disciplinary body to acquit an employee in a disciplinary action if the individual had earlier been found guilty of a criminal act involving the same allegations.
The full opinion is available at:
http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/
[Registration required]
============================================
If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary actions please click here: http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
============================================
Garippa v New York City Bd. of Ed., NYS Supreme Court, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
A Section 3020-a arbitrator found Michael Garippa, a New York City school teacher, guilty of conduct unbecoming the profession and authorized his termination.
Garippa, a tenured English teacher at Franklin D. Roosevelt High School in Brooklyn, was arrested by federal authorities and charged with conspiracy to distribute steroids.
Garippa subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance and was sentenced to serve three years of probation and six months of home confinement; to perform 200 hours of community service by coaching children’s sports teams; and to continue drug counseling.
Section 3020-a Hearing Officer Jacquelin F. Drucker concluded that “... the question before this hearing officer relates not to guilt or innocence but to the proper level of discipline for the conduct at issue.”*
Drucker decided that Board was authorized to remove Garippa as a teacher because of two factors:
1. Newspaper reports identifying Garippa, his occupation and his employer, allegedly caused the board to suffer “unfortunate, unpleasant publicity”; and
2. The fact that “Respondent’s initial contact with the purchaser was made at a school function.”
Garippa appealed to the state Supreme Court and Justice H. Freedman granted Garippa’s petition and vacated the hearing officer’s decision. He then remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration.
Justice Freedman observed that the hearing officer did not suggest that Garippa could be trusted to work with children. The offense occurred off-duty and off-premises. The Court concluded that the hearing officer’s decision “was based on an assumption that Garippa’s guilty plea automatically constituted guilt of conduct unbecoming the profession,” rather than on an express finding to that effect.
This was improper, Justice Freedman said. Section 3020-a guarantees that the employee shall have full and fair disclosure of the nature of the case and evidence against him.
According to Justice Freedman, Garippa was neither told beforehand that the articles or the “bad publicity” would be the basis for either a finding of guilt or a determination of penalty nor was he ever shown copies of the articles, which were the subject of his cross-examination.
Since the newspaper articles were not submitted into evidence, Justice Freedman said that they were not part of the reviewable record before the court. In addition, Justice Freedman pointed out that “it is improper for an administrative agency [or an arbitrator] to base a decision of an adjudicatory nature upon evidence outside of the record.”
The court said the school board raised a legitimate issue regarding publicity because it has a right to protect the reputation of the institution. But since Garippa was denied an opportunity to address and rebut this allegation, the arbitrator’s determination was made without prior notice and lacked evidentiary basis.
The lesson here appears to be that an appointing authority cannot assume that a conviction of a crime will be sufficient to find an individual guilty of embarrassing it and justify its imposition of a penalty. Rather, the appointing authority must prove each and every element of it allegations, including those factors underlying the reason for bringing the disciplinary action in the first instance.
* N.B. In Kelly v. Levin, 440 NY2d 424, the Court of Appeals ruled that is a reversable error for an administrative disciplinary body to acquit an employee in a disciplinary action if the individual had earlier been found guilty of a criminal act involving the same allegations.
The full opinion is available at:
http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/
[Registration required]
============================================
If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary actions please click here: http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
============================================
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
CAUTION
Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the decisions summarized here. Accordingly, these summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
Copyright 2009-2024 - Public Employment Law Press.
Email: n467fl@gmail.com