County department’s refusal to implement County's grievance committee’s determination held contrary to the CBA's grievance

County department’s refusal to implement County's grievance committee’s determination held contrary to the CBA's grievance procedure
Vaillancourt v Putnam County, 250 A.D.2d 617

Grievance procedures typically provide for a series of steps ultimately leading to arbitration. Pre-arbitration determinations are made by the employer’s designated representative, which may be a hearing officer or a panel.

Typically the appointing authority accepts and implements the findings of its designated representative. But what happens if the employee’s grievance is sustained by the employer’s designated representative, but employer refuses to implement it? This somewhat unusual circumstance is examined in the Vaillancourt case.

Patricia Vaillancourt filed a grievance after her employer, Putnam County, refused to grant her a lateral transfer from the County Department of Mental Hygiene to the County Department of Social Services.

The County Grievance Committee ruled in her favor at Step III of a five-step grievance procedure. But the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services refused to implement the Committee’s decision. When the County Executive refused to take action implementing the decision, Vaillancourt’s union sued.

Initially, the union lost. A State Supreme Court justice dismissed the union’s petition, observing that the union never took advantage of the fifth step of the grievance procedure -- proceeding to arbitration. The Supreme Court found that this constituted a failure to exhaust the available “administrative remedy.”

On appeal the Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling. It said that the collective bargaining agreement provided for a “Step 4” appeal to the County Executive in the event the Grievance Committee dismissed the grievance. In contrast, the Court noted, “the agreement did not afford the County the same right in the event that the Committee sustained [Vaillancourt’s] grievance.”

Since the Grievance Committee sustained Vaillancourt’s grievance, the court concluded that this had been the final resolution of the grievance. The Appellate Division therefore held that Vaillancourt was entitled to have the decision in her favor enforced and that there was no need to go to arbitration.

There was a different outcome in a grievance case with similar procedural facts [Weed v Orange County, 209 A.D.2d 627; 209 A.D.2d 628].

Weed had been injured on the job and applied for leave with full pay, claiming he was eligible for such leave under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. The Orange County Commissioner of Personnel disapproved Weed’s request. Weed filed a contract grievance and won at Step I, when his supervisor ruled in his favor. The Commissioner refused to implement the Step I decision and Weed sued.

The Appellate Division dismissed Weed’s petition, citing the language of the contract. Under the terms of the agreement “the Commissioner of Personnel is given sole discretion in granting paid leave.” Therefore, the issue was not grievable in the first place.

Presumably the Court would have enforced the decision by Weed’s immediate supervisor had the contract not reserved the authority to make paid leave decisions exclusively in the Commissioner.

Appointing an individual to serve as an election commissioner

Appointing an individual to serve as an election commissioner
Wood v County of Cortland, 72 AD3d 1447

County Legislature has the authority to appoint an Election Commissioner where the mechanism for making such an appointment set out in Election Law § 3-204 did not result in an appointment.

Freedom of information requests related to disciplinary actions

Freedom of information requests related to disciplinary actions
Western Suffolk BOCES v Bay Shore UFSD, 250 A.D.2d 772

After the Bay Shore Union Free School District refused to honor Western Suffolk BOCES’ Freedom of Information [Section 87, Public Officers Law] request for the employment history of a teacher, BOCES won an order in State Supreme Court directing the District to provide it with certain documents, including some, but not all, material demanded by BOCES. Apparently some of the material demanded concerned disciplinary matters while other papers dealt with a “stipulation of settlement.”

The district, the teacher and BOCES all appealed. Although the district subsequently withdrew its appeal, the teacher continued his objection to the release of the material in the “sealed record” while BOCES pressed for those documents in the “sealed record on appeal” that the Supreme Court declined to have the district provide.

The Appellate Division modified the lower court’s order. It said that BOCES could not have certain pages in the “sealed record” that the lower court had ordered released and with respect to some other pages, the names of parents and students had to be redacted [obliterated] from the documents before BOCES could have them.

Specifically, the Appellate Division said that the lower court should not have directed the release of pages in the “sealed record” which recite or refer to unproven disciplinary charges. In contrast, the Appellate Division said that while BOCES was entitled to a copy of the “stipulation of settlement,” the names of the students and their parents mentioned in the stipulation should not be disclosed to BOCES.