The statute of limitations for litigating an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement is six years
Lagreca v City of Niagara Falls, 244 AD2d 862, leave to appeal denied, 91 NY2d 813.
The Lagreca decision points out that a law suit for an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement must be brought within six years of the act or omission claimed to constitute the breach.
When does the statute of limitations for the alleged breach of contract begin to run? On the date when the alleged breach occurred.
Bernadette J. Lagreca, the widow of a deceased city of Niagara Falls employee, sued the city because it had terminated her late husband’s life insurance policy in June 1988.
Lagreca contended that the cancellation of the policy violated the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. Lagreca, however, did not file her lawsuit until seven years after the insurance had been terminated. The court said that statute of limitation for breach of contract was six-years and had expired by the time the suit was filed.
The appellate division affirmed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Lagreca’s petition, commenting that “the cause of action for breach of contract occurred at the time of the breach when the [city] terminated life insurance coverage of [Lagreca deceased husband] ... allegedly in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.”
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN THE SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS PREPARED BY NYPPL
August 19, 2010
Union security
Union security
Local 1095, AFSCME and Erie Community College, 30 PERB 4707
How much does it take to show that negotiating unit employees did not have “work exclusivity” with respect to a particular work site? If there is a history of work assignments being frequently switched between unit members and non-unit workers, the work is non-exclusive according to a PERB Administrative Law Judge.
Administrative Law Judge Jean Doerr ruled that Local 1095 failed to demonstrate that the union had “exclusivity” with respect to “second shift” security work being performed at an off-campus site of the college because employees of a private security company, Pro Service, had alternated with union members in providing security services at that location for a number of years.
In such cases, said Doerr, the “essential questions to be resolved are (1) has the work been performed exclusively by unit employees? and (2) are the reassigned tasks substantially similar to those previously performed by unit members? One of the points made in the decision was that “the work at issue shifted back and forth between [Local 1095] and Pro Guard from September 1995 through January 1997,” when Pro Guard again took over the entire operation.
Doerr said that given the “ever changing nature of the assignment,” it is difficult to see that [Local 1095] had any expectation that, after again resuming the work in April of 1996, the last “switch,” it would have the second shift assignment for any extended period of time.
Local 1095, AFSCME and Erie Community College, 30 PERB 4707
How much does it take to show that negotiating unit employees did not have “work exclusivity” with respect to a particular work site? If there is a history of work assignments being frequently switched between unit members and non-unit workers, the work is non-exclusive according to a PERB Administrative Law Judge.
Administrative Law Judge Jean Doerr ruled that Local 1095 failed to demonstrate that the union had “exclusivity” with respect to “second shift” security work being performed at an off-campus site of the college because employees of a private security company, Pro Service, had alternated with union members in providing security services at that location for a number of years.
In such cases, said Doerr, the “essential questions to be resolved are (1) has the work been performed exclusively by unit employees? and (2) are the reassigned tasks substantially similar to those previously performed by unit members? One of the points made in the decision was that “the work at issue shifted back and forth between [Local 1095] and Pro Guard from September 1995 through January 1997,” when Pro Guard again took over the entire operation.
Doerr said that given the “ever changing nature of the assignment,” it is difficult to see that [Local 1095] had any expectation that, after again resuming the work in April of 1996, the last “switch,” it would have the second shift assignment for any extended period of time.
August 18, 2010
Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies fatal to seeking court review
Failure to exhaust available administrative remedies fatal to seeking court review
White v Pozzi, 72 AD3d 1106*
Employee’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies coupled with his failure to demonstrate an exception to the exhaustion requirement applied in his case requires the denial of his petition seeking judicial review of the disciplinary determination.
* Text of decision e-mailed to registered readers.
White v Pozzi, 72 AD3d 1106*
Employee’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies coupled with his failure to demonstrate an exception to the exhaustion requirement applied in his case requires the denial of his petition seeking judicial review of the disciplinary determination.
* Text of decision e-mailed to registered readers.
Disciplinary suspension without pay
Disciplinary suspension without pay
Empire Hook & Ladder Co. #1 v Nyack FD, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
It is not at all unusual for an employee to challenge his or her disciplinary suspension by filing an Article 78 petition with a court.
In contrast, an Article 78 petition challenging the disciplinary suspension of a volunteer organization is not at all common. Yet a disciplinary suspension was the basis for a lawsuit filed by the Empire Hook and Ladder Company #1, a volunteer fire department, against the Nyack Fire Department.
The genesis of the action was the Village of Upper Nyack’s approval of a request submitted by a member of Empire to purchase a vehicle to be used to transport Empire members to fires as well as certain non-fire details.
The Nyack Fire Department, however, said that the member who submitted the request to the village had violated Nyack’s rules because the member had appeared before the village board without first obtaining permission to do so from Nyack’s chief. The chief declared that unless Empire apologized within 10 days “the matter would be reopened and appropriate action would be taken.”
No apology was received and Nyack told Empire it was suspended from service for 30 days for violating the department’s rules. The suspension, however, “did not include fires, emergencies or funeral detail.”
Empire sued, contending that its suspension was arbitrary and capricious. It argued that (1) it was never presented with written charges specifying the Nyack rule or regulation which it allegedly violated and (2) the penalty imposed -- suspension for 30 days -- violated General Municipal Law Section 209-i because it had not been given a hearing on the charges.*
According to the ruling, Empire was a member of the Nyack Fire Department. One of Nyack’s rules prohibited “an individual or company ... from communicating or asking to go before any village body for any type of equipment or any other reason without obtaining permission from the Chief of the Nyack Fire Department.”
Based on this prohibition, Acting Justice Weiner dismissed Empire’s petition, ruling that:
1. GML Section 209-i did not apply in this situation and therefore no “pre-suspension” hearing was required; and
2. The discipline imposed on Empire was not so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock one’s sense of fairness.
* GML 209-i authorizes fire departments to make regulations governing removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of such departments and member companies for incompetence or misconduct. The Section also requires “notice and hearing” before a member may be removed from his or her position. In Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Company, 83 NY2d 937, however, the Court of Appeals decided that in adopting Section 209-i the legislature did not intend to interfere with discipline in connection with the conduct of the internal affairs of a fire department.
Empire Hook & Ladder Co. #1 v Nyack FD, [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
It is not at all unusual for an employee to challenge his or her disciplinary suspension by filing an Article 78 petition with a court.
In contrast, an Article 78 petition challenging the disciplinary suspension of a volunteer organization is not at all common. Yet a disciplinary suspension was the basis for a lawsuit filed by the Empire Hook and Ladder Company #1, a volunteer fire department, against the Nyack Fire Department.
The genesis of the action was the Village of Upper Nyack’s approval of a request submitted by a member of Empire to purchase a vehicle to be used to transport Empire members to fires as well as certain non-fire details.
The Nyack Fire Department, however, said that the member who submitted the request to the village had violated Nyack’s rules because the member had appeared before the village board without first obtaining permission to do so from Nyack’s chief. The chief declared that unless Empire apologized within 10 days “the matter would be reopened and appropriate action would be taken.”
No apology was received and Nyack told Empire it was suspended from service for 30 days for violating the department’s rules. The suspension, however, “did not include fires, emergencies or funeral detail.”
Empire sued, contending that its suspension was arbitrary and capricious. It argued that (1) it was never presented with written charges specifying the Nyack rule or regulation which it allegedly violated and (2) the penalty imposed -- suspension for 30 days -- violated General Municipal Law Section 209-i because it had not been given a hearing on the charges.*
According to the ruling, Empire was a member of the Nyack Fire Department. One of Nyack’s rules prohibited “an individual or company ... from communicating or asking to go before any village body for any type of equipment or any other reason without obtaining permission from the Chief of the Nyack Fire Department.”
Based on this prohibition, Acting Justice Weiner dismissed Empire’s petition, ruling that:
1. GML Section 209-i did not apply in this situation and therefore no “pre-suspension” hearing was required; and
2. The discipline imposed on Empire was not so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock one’s sense of fairness.
* GML 209-i authorizes fire departments to make regulations governing removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of such departments and member companies for incompetence or misconduct. The Section also requires “notice and hearing” before a member may be removed from his or her position. In Armstrong v. Centerville Fire Company, 83 NY2d 937, however, the Court of Appeals decided that in adopting Section 209-i the legislature did not intend to interfere with discipline in connection with the conduct of the internal affairs of a fire department.
August 17, 2010
Employer’s good faith suspicion of employee’s stealing defeats FMLA claim
Employer’s good faith suspicion of employee’s stealing defeats FMLA claim
Source: The FMLA Blog - http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/ Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation.
Gwendolyn Donald worked for Arby's as an assistant manger. Shortly after being hired she suffered a series of medical problems causing intermittent periods of extreme pain. She was granted FMLA leave for related surgeries. While working the drive-through window, Donald’s cash register was over $4.00. Concerned that this might be evidence of employee theft, the company conducted an investigation, including video surveillance.
The surveillance suggested that Donald was ringing folks up at the full amount while recording the transaction in the register as discounted, and pocketing the difference. The suspicion could not be confirmed because the customers could have been handing coupons to Donald, which would explain the discrepancy. The company confronted Donald with its suspicions. When she refused to acknowledge in writing that she was stealing, she was fired.
Donald sued alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave in the past. She also claimed that her termination interferences with her right to return to work from intermittent FMLA leave in the future.
The Court initially noted that there were substantial questions regarding her FMLA retaliation/interference claims. Such questions would normally defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment. Because, however, the court found that the company established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to end Donald's employment, and that Donald had failed to establish that the reason was pretextual.
The court agreed that being $4.00 over may be evidence of theft. The court also credited the company's investigation, which confirmed the possibility of theft. The company's handbook cited theft as a reason for immediate termination. A demonstrable risk of theft, the court found, is a legitimate reason for an employer to end that person's employment.
The court rejected the non-theft explanations offered by Donald. The fact that the discrepancy could be explained because the customers could have presented discount coupons failed to diminish the legitimacy of the company's concerns. The court explained:
There may be other explanations for the discrepancies beyond the, but Plaintiff has offered no reason to believe Plum, Barocko, and Ballance fabricated their concern to cover up their unlawful discrimination. Indeed, whether Plaintiff was actually stealing or not is largely irrelevant, the relevant question is whether the evidence of theft was a sufficient reason and the actual reason for Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff's evidence does not demonstrate that Defendant made up its reason for the termination, the stated reason was not the real reason, or that the stated reason is insufficient to justify the decision. Nor is there any evidence that the inconvenience associated with her requests for FMLA lave played any role in the decision to end Donald's employment.
Mr. Bosland Comments: So long as an employer can establish that it had a good faith belief that it took an adverse action against an employee for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the employer will likely be successful in defeating an FMLA at the summary judgment phase. The employer does not have to prove that its suspicions were, in fact, correct. It need only prove that it held those suspicions in good faith, and acted on those suspicions when it decided to terminate the employee.
To show pretext, an employee will have to demonstrate that the employer did not have a good faith belief that the employee engaged in conduct that could get them terminated. This is not an easy burden. Simply offering innocent, alternative explanations won't do it. Stated differently, the fact that the employer may not be able to prove theft "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not the standard. To defeat an FMLA claim, all the employer need prove is that it had a reasonable, good faith suspicion of theft.
Evidence of innocent, alternative explanations might, however, be used as evidence of a particularly substandard employer investigation. Coupled with some adverse comments incident to the use of FMLA leave in the past, and a short period of time between protected activity and the adverse action, and the employee can start to build a credible argument to survive the employer's inevitable summary judgment motion.
The case Donald v. Sybra Inc., No. 09-12252-BC (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2010).
The decisions is posted on the Internet on the “Leagle” law blog at:
http://www.leagle.com/unsecure/page.htm?shortname=infdco20100811b16
Source: The FMLA Blog - http://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/ Copyright © 2010. All rights reserved by Carl C. Bosland, Esq. Reproduced with permission. Mr. Bosland is the author of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation.
Gwendolyn Donald worked for Arby's as an assistant manger. Shortly after being hired she suffered a series of medical problems causing intermittent periods of extreme pain. She was granted FMLA leave for related surgeries. While working the drive-through window, Donald’s cash register was over $4.00. Concerned that this might be evidence of employee theft, the company conducted an investigation, including video surveillance.
The surveillance suggested that Donald was ringing folks up at the full amount while recording the transaction in the register as discounted, and pocketing the difference. The suspicion could not be confirmed because the customers could have been handing coupons to Donald, which would explain the discrepancy. The company confronted Donald with its suspicions. When she refused to acknowledge in writing that she was stealing, she was fired.
Donald sued alleging that she was terminated in retaliation for taking FMLA leave in the past. She also claimed that her termination interferences with her right to return to work from intermittent FMLA leave in the future.
The Court initially noted that there were substantial questions regarding her FMLA retaliation/interference claims. Such questions would normally defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment. Because, however, the court found that the company established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to end Donald's employment, and that Donald had failed to establish that the reason was pretextual.
The court agreed that being $4.00 over may be evidence of theft. The court also credited the company's investigation, which confirmed the possibility of theft. The company's handbook cited theft as a reason for immediate termination. A demonstrable risk of theft, the court found, is a legitimate reason for an employer to end that person's employment.
The court rejected the non-theft explanations offered by Donald. The fact that the discrepancy could be explained because the customers could have presented discount coupons failed to diminish the legitimacy of the company's concerns. The court explained:
There may be other explanations for the discrepancies beyond the, but Plaintiff has offered no reason to believe Plum, Barocko, and Ballance fabricated their concern to cover up their unlawful discrimination. Indeed, whether Plaintiff was actually stealing or not is largely irrelevant, the relevant question is whether the evidence of theft was a sufficient reason and the actual reason for Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff's evidence does not demonstrate that Defendant made up its reason for the termination, the stated reason was not the real reason, or that the stated reason is insufficient to justify the decision. Nor is there any evidence that the inconvenience associated with her requests for FMLA lave played any role in the decision to end Donald's employment.
Mr. Bosland Comments: So long as an employer can establish that it had a good faith belief that it took an adverse action against an employee for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, the employer will likely be successful in defeating an FMLA at the summary judgment phase. The employer does not have to prove that its suspicions were, in fact, correct. It need only prove that it held those suspicions in good faith, and acted on those suspicions when it decided to terminate the employee.
To show pretext, an employee will have to demonstrate that the employer did not have a good faith belief that the employee engaged in conduct that could get them terminated. This is not an easy burden. Simply offering innocent, alternative explanations won't do it. Stated differently, the fact that the employer may not be able to prove theft "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not the standard. To defeat an FMLA claim, all the employer need prove is that it had a reasonable, good faith suspicion of theft.
Evidence of innocent, alternative explanations might, however, be used as evidence of a particularly substandard employer investigation. Coupled with some adverse comments incident to the use of FMLA leave in the past, and a short period of time between protected activity and the adverse action, and the employee can start to build a credible argument to survive the employer's inevitable summary judgment motion.
The case Donald v. Sybra Inc., No. 09-12252-BC (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2010).
The decisions is posted on the Internet on the “Leagle” law blog at:
http://www.leagle.com/unsecure/page.htm?shortname=infdco20100811b16
Alleged violations of a "Memorandum of Understanding" to a Taylor Law agreement may not be subject to contract grievance procedures
Alleged violations of a "Memorandum of Understanding" to a Taylor Law agreement may not be subject to contract grievance procedures
Pine Plains CSD v Federation of Teachers, 248 A.D.2d 612
It is not unusual for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to agree to provisions set out in a “supplemental agreement” or to sign a “memorandum of understanding” in the course of collective bargaining pursuant to the Taylor Law.
Typically this device is used to set out provisions that although they have been agreed upon, for some reason, one or both of the parties do not wish to have the item set out in the collective bargaining agreement. In other instances, the supplemental agreement or memorandum of understanding is used to explain or modify a term or contract provision contained in the agreement or provide something after negotiations have been completed.
The Pine Plains Central School District case considers a significant issue: how does a party resolve a dispute concerning a provision contained in a supplemental agreement or in a memorandum of understanding?
The case arose when the Pine Plains Federation of Teachers demanded that its grievance concerning an alleged violation of a provision contained in a “supplemental memorandum of agreement” between the parties be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement in chief between the District and the Federation.
The District won a stay of arbitration of the alleged violation on the grounds that the supplement did not contain an arbitration clause nor was the contract grievance/arbitration procedure incorporated by reference into the supplement agreement.
According to the ruling by the Appellate Division, unless there is an arbitration process specifically set out in a supplement to a collective bargaining agreement or a memorandum of understanding, or the supplement or memorandum specifically states that the collective bargaining agreement in chief's arbitration procedure will be used to resolve disputes arising under it, a party cannot demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration as a matter of right.
Pine Plains CSD v Federation of Teachers, 248 A.D.2d 612
It is not unusual for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to agree to provisions set out in a “supplemental agreement” or to sign a “memorandum of understanding” in the course of collective bargaining pursuant to the Taylor Law.
Typically this device is used to set out provisions that although they have been agreed upon, for some reason, one or both of the parties do not wish to have the item set out in the collective bargaining agreement. In other instances, the supplemental agreement or memorandum of understanding is used to explain or modify a term or contract provision contained in the agreement or provide something after negotiations have been completed.
The Pine Plains Central School District case considers a significant issue: how does a party resolve a dispute concerning a provision contained in a supplemental agreement or in a memorandum of understanding?
The case arose when the Pine Plains Federation of Teachers demanded that its grievance concerning an alleged violation of a provision contained in a “supplemental memorandum of agreement” between the parties be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration procedure set out in the collective bargaining agreement in chief between the District and the Federation.
The District won a stay of arbitration of the alleged violation on the grounds that the supplement did not contain an arbitration clause nor was the contract grievance/arbitration procedure incorporated by reference into the supplement agreement.
According to the ruling by the Appellate Division, unless there is an arbitration process specifically set out in a supplement to a collective bargaining agreement or a memorandum of understanding, or the supplement or memorandum specifically states that the collective bargaining agreement in chief's arbitration procedure will be used to resolve disputes arising under it, a party cannot demand that the issue be submitted to arbitration as a matter of right.
Delay in issuing arbitration decision did not constitute misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the CPLR
Delay in issuing arbitration decision did not constitute misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the CPLR
Squillini v State of New York, App. Div., 248 A.D.2d 391
Michael A. Squillini, a maintenance supervisor, was served with disciplinary charges alleging “theft and deceit.” The arbitrator issued a decision on December 20, in which he found Squillini guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of dismissal.
Squillini contended that he had agreed to an extension of time for issuing the arbitration award through November 17, but the award was issued more than a month after that. This delay, Squillini said, constituted misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Squillini attempted to vacate the arbitration award alleging misconduct based on the arbitrator’s delay in his issuing the award.
The Appellate Division rejected Squillini’s petition to vacate the award, finding that “the arbitrator’s actions did not constitute misconduct.”
Further, said the court, “the arbitration award ... sustaining the penalty of dismissal from employment for theft and deceit, does not violate a strong public policy and is not irrational.”
Squillini v State of New York, App. Div., 248 A.D.2d 391
Michael A. Squillini, a maintenance supervisor, was served with disciplinary charges alleging “theft and deceit.” The arbitrator issued a decision on December 20, in which he found Squillini guilty of the charges and imposed the penalty of dismissal.
Squillini contended that he had agreed to an extension of time for issuing the arbitration award through November 17, but the award was issued more than a month after that. This delay, Squillini said, constituted misconduct by the arbitrator within the meaning of Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Squillini attempted to vacate the arbitration award alleging misconduct based on the arbitrator’s delay in his issuing the award.
The Appellate Division rejected Squillini’s petition to vacate the award, finding that “the arbitrator’s actions did not constitute misconduct.”
Further, said the court, “the arbitration award ... sustaining the penalty of dismissal from employment for theft and deceit, does not violate a strong public policy and is not irrational.”
August 16, 2010
New York Department of Correctional Services announces examination for Correction Officer
New York Department of Correctional Services announces examination for Correction Officer
Source: New York Department of Correctional Services - [Published by NYPPL as a public service].
A statewide competitive Civil Service exam for the position of correction officer trainee will be held on October 16, 2010. [Examination 25-431]
There are no minimum requirements for taking this written examination. However, at the time of appointment, applicants must have passed the written exam, must be 21 or older, a U.S. citizen and a resident of New York, and possess a high school diploma or GED. Appointees must also have passed medical and psychological screenings, as well as a background investigation.
Please note that although conviction for a felony automatically disqualifies anyone from becoming a correction officer, applicants having misdemeanor convictions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility.
Applications must be postmarked by September 13, 2010.
The starting annual salary for a trainee is $36,420 and $43,867 after the one-year traineeship, subject to potential increase through contract negotiations, with additional geographic pay Downstate. In addition to the base salary, appointees will receive 16 college credits, a comprehensive health insurance program, retirement benefits, and pre-shift briefing and expanded duty pay which amount to $3,344 annually.
Officers working at correctional facilities in the New York City area and select Mid-Hudson areas will receive an addition to their salary - $3,210 annually for working in New York City or Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland or Westchester counties, or $1,195 annually for working in Dutchess, Orange or Putnam counties. There are also evening and night shift inconvenience pay programs.
The exam is administered by the New York State Department of Civil Service. Additional information is available at:
http://www.cs.state.ny.us/examannouncements/announcements/oc/25-431.cfm,
or by telephone toll-free at (877) 697-5627, option 2.
Corrections Commissioner Brian Fischer said that “Corrections is a great career for the men and women of New York, and I encourage anyone looking for a challenging and rewarding job, especially women and minorities, to take this exam ... The important job of Correction Officer not only provides opportunities for career advancement but carries with it the honor of playing a critical role in keeping this State and its citizens safe and secure.”
To ensure a successful recruitment for October’s competitive exam, test announcements and applications will be distributed at multiple locations as well as the Department of Civil Service’s website (http://www.cs.state.ny.us/), its Albany location, its regional Civil Service offices, local New York State Employment Offices, and all State correctional facilities.
Examination announcements and applications can be obtained by contacting the Department of Correctional Services at NYSDOCS, Correction Officer Recruitment Unit, Building 2, The Harriman State Campus, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY, 12226 or by calling DOCS at (518) 457-8131, or via the internet at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/.
NOTE: Candidates for the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination held on April 10, 2010, may apply for the State examination but such individuals will not be admitted to the written test on October 16, 2010. However, the Correction Department advises that if you apply for the State Correction Officer Examination, your results from the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be used to calculate your final score for the State examination.
The names of candidates scoring 70 or higher on the April 10, 2010 County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be included on the eligible list for appointment as a New York State Correction Officer ONLY if the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination candidate files an application for the State Correction Officer Examination and pays the required non-refundable processing fee for the State Examination .
Source: New York Department of Correctional Services - [Published by NYPPL as a public service].
A statewide competitive Civil Service exam for the position of correction officer trainee will be held on October 16, 2010. [Examination 25-431]
There are no minimum requirements for taking this written examination. However, at the time of appointment, applicants must have passed the written exam, must be 21 or older, a U.S. citizen and a resident of New York, and possess a high school diploma or GED. Appointees must also have passed medical and psychological screenings, as well as a background investigation.
Please note that although conviction for a felony automatically disqualifies anyone from becoming a correction officer, applicants having misdemeanor convictions are reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine eligibility.
Applications must be postmarked by September 13, 2010.
The starting annual salary for a trainee is $36,420 and $43,867 after the one-year traineeship, subject to potential increase through contract negotiations, with additional geographic pay Downstate. In addition to the base salary, appointees will receive 16 college credits, a comprehensive health insurance program, retirement benefits, and pre-shift briefing and expanded duty pay which amount to $3,344 annually.
Officers working at correctional facilities in the New York City area and select Mid-Hudson areas will receive an addition to their salary - $3,210 annually for working in New York City or Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland or Westchester counties, or $1,195 annually for working in Dutchess, Orange or Putnam counties. There are also evening and night shift inconvenience pay programs.
The exam is administered by the New York State Department of Civil Service. Additional information is available at:
http://www.cs.state.ny.us/examannouncements/announcements/oc/25-431.cfm,
or by telephone toll-free at (877) 697-5627, option 2.
Corrections Commissioner Brian Fischer said that “Corrections is a great career for the men and women of New York, and I encourage anyone looking for a challenging and rewarding job, especially women and minorities, to take this exam ... The important job of Correction Officer not only provides opportunities for career advancement but carries with it the honor of playing a critical role in keeping this State and its citizens safe and secure.”
To ensure a successful recruitment for October’s competitive exam, test announcements and applications will be distributed at multiple locations as well as the Department of Civil Service’s website (http://www.cs.state.ny.us/), its Albany location, its regional Civil Service offices, local New York State Employment Offices, and all State correctional facilities.
Examination announcements and applications can be obtained by contacting the Department of Correctional Services at NYSDOCS, Correction Officer Recruitment Unit, Building 2, The Harriman State Campus, 1220 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY, 12226 or by calling DOCS at (518) 457-8131, or via the internet at http://www.docs.state.ny.us/.
NOTE: Candidates for the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination held on April 10, 2010, may apply for the State examination but such individuals will not be admitted to the written test on October 16, 2010. However, the Correction Department advises that if you apply for the State Correction Officer Examination, your results from the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be used to calculate your final score for the State examination.
The names of candidates scoring 70 or higher on the April 10, 2010 County Correction Officer/Trainee examination will be included on the eligible list for appointment as a New York State Correction Officer ONLY if the County Correction Officer/Trainee examination candidate files an application for the State Correction Officer Examination and pays the required non-refundable processing fee for the State Examination .
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New York Public Personnel Law Blog Editor Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
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